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The goals of the second volume of the AHDR – Arctic Human 
Development Report: Regional Processes and Global Linkages – 
are to provide an update to the first AHDR (2004) in terms of an 
assessment of the state of Arctic human development; to highlight 
the major trends and changes unfolding related to the various 
issues and thematic areas of human development in the Arctic 
over the past decade; and, based on this assessment, to identify 
policy relevant conclusions and key gaps in knowledge, new and 
emerging Arctic success stories.
The production of AHDR-II on the tenth anniversary of the first 
AHDR makes it possible to move beyond the baseline assessment 
to make valuable comparisons and contrasts across a decade of 
persistent and rapid change in the North. It addresses critical 
issues and emerging challenges in Arctic living conditions, quality 
of life in the North, global change impacts and adaptation, and 
Indigenous livelihoods.  
The assessment contributes to our understanding of the interplay 
and consequences of physical and social change processes 
affecting Arctic residents’ quality of life, at both the regional and 
global scales.  It shows that the Arctic is not a homogenous region. 
Impacts of globalization and environmental change differ within 
and between regions, between Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
northerners, between genders and along other axes. 
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Foreword 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is with great pleasure that I present this second volume of the Arctic 
Human Development Report (AHDR): Regional Processes and Global 
Linkages, initiated by the Stefansson Arctic Institute, Iceland, and pre-
sented to the Sustainable Development Working Group of the Arctic 
Council for project endorsement in the fall of 2011. 
On the tenth anniversary of the first Arctic Human Development Re-
port this second volume offers an overview of the contrasts in an era 
marked by changes, at both far more rapid pace and to a greater extent 
than anticipated. People living in the Arctic are aware of the region’s 
dynamics that have shaped our livelihood and history through time. 
Therefore the authors of this report make a welcome effort to cover 
many of the critical and emerging challenges we are facing in the region 
and thus deepening our knowledge about the impacts of global changes 
that are interlinked and have profound implications for sustainable de-
velopment in the Arctic. 
Preparation and writing of the Arctic Human Development Report II 
was carried out by an international group of leading scientific experts on 
Arctic issues. The management and scientific coordination of the project 
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was led by the Stefansson Arctic Institute, which hosted the Secretariat 
supported by an Executive and Advisory Committee. In particular I 
would like to thank project leader Dr. Joan Nymand Larsen from Iceland 
and project co-leaders Dr. Gail Fondahl from Canada and Ms. Henriette 
Rasmussen from Greenland for their great dedication, efforts and skills 
in leading and coordinating this ambitious and challenging work. I 
would also like to thank the numerous lead authors and contributing 
authors who gave so generously of their time and expertise and without 
whom this volume would not have been possible.  
In presenting the Arctic Human Development Report II, I acknowledge 
that the present report, like the first one, is an academic report and the 
fruit of a close and long-term collaboration of an extensive network of 
experts in Arctic sciences. Although the report reflects neither the poli-
cies of the Arctic States nor the position of the Arctic Council, this report, 
like other scientific research reports can serve as an important source of 
valuable information to help deepen our understanding of human devel-
opment in the Arctic. Furthermore, our role is to ensure that the work of 
the scientific community feeds into public debate, whereas public policy 
is supported by a strong knowledge base. Improved understanding of 
our circumstances helps governments identify problems and strength-
ens our ability to implement solutions aimed at supporting strong and 
sustainable communities in the Arctic.  
 
 
 
 
Gunnar Bragi Sveinsson 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iceland 
 
 
 
Preface  
We are pleased to present this second volume of the Arctic Human De-
velopment Report: Regional Processes and Global Linkages (AHDR-II). The 
report was initiated by the Stefansson Arctic Institute in 2010, and to-
gether with the Icelandic representation on the Sustainable Develop-
ment Working Group (SDWG) of the Arctic Council it was presented to 
the Council in 2011 for project endorsement. The startup work on this 
second volume was met with great enthusiasm, including by members of 
the Arctic Council, Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, the scientific 
community and educators throughout the North. 
The first AHDR – the priority project of the Icelandic Chairmanship 
of the Arctic Council 2002–2004 – was launched in November, 2004. 
The production of AHDR-II on the tenth anniversary of the first AHDR 
makes it possible to move beyond the baseline assessment to make 
valuable comparisons and contrasts across a decade of persistent and 
rapid change in the North. This new volume addresses critical issues 
and emerging challenges in Arctic living conditions, quality of life in 
the North, global change impacts and adaptation, and Indigenous 
livelihoods. The report is designed to integrate new knowledge from a 
diverse set of disciplines, to highlight key messages and major current 
and emerging trends, and to identify gaps in our knowledge. 
AHDR-II was prepared by a working group consisting of 25 lead au-
thors and 57 contributing experts. The volume is organized into ten sub-
stantive chapters. Eight are devoted to a thematic area of key relevance 
to Arctic human development and two chapters present issues that cut 
across these themes – Globalization and Community Viability & Adapta-
bility. The volume focuses on changes in each of these areas since the 
first AHDR was published in 2004. 
The AHDR process began in 2002, with a mandate to present the 
most up-to-date information about the state of Arctic human develop-
ment and the major trends unfolding in the region. The AHDR and its 
follow-up projects on Arctic social indicators (ASI) have since then 
played an important role in facilitating discussions about impacts of 
change in Arctic societies. AHDR (2004) provided important baseline 
information for the Arctic Council, policymakers, and others who deal 
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with issues of human development and societal transformation in a time 
of rapid environmental, cultural, political, economic and social change. 
Discussion about producing a sequel to the first AHDR commenced in 
mid-2010. Once funding had been assured from the Nordic Council of 
Ministers, and dialogue initiated with the Arctic Council’s SDWG, the 
Northern Forum, and other key organizations, a call for nomination of 
Arctic experts to serve as lead authors was disseminated widely via sev-
eral Arctic electronic mailing lists. The call resulted in over 120 nomina-
tions. From these names, the project lead and co-leads together with the 
Report’s Executive Committee selected lead authors, using criteria of 
representation of all of the Arctic states, various academic disciplines, 
both genders, and balancing the desire to have a number of authors who 
had participated in the first AHDR with a number of new contributors. 
Lead authors, in turn, were responsible for recruiting contributing au-
thors to offer further expertise.  
We aspired to have strong representation of Indigenous scholars 
among the lead authors. However, among the several invitations for-
warded to Indigenous scholars, only one responded positively: others 
declined due to the many demands they face on other fronts. We then 
entreated lead authors to consider including Indigenous scholars among 
their contributing authors. Among the report’s contributing authors are 
nine Indigenous scholars. To further address the desire for representa-
tion of Indigenous perspectives, on advice of the SDWG’s Permanent 
Participants, we sought to incorporate more Indigenous persons in the 
review of the report’s chapters. 
Lead authors reviewed each other’s chapter outlines; these outlines 
were also provided to the SDWG for review. Second stage drafts of the 
chapters were externally peer-reviewed, in a process handled by the 
International Arctic Science Committee (IASC), whose help we gratefully 
acknowledge. Two or more scholars reviewed each chapter. The second 
draft chapters were also provided to SDWG for review. During the writ-
ing of the report, several authors presented their work at conferences, in 
order to receive further input and review from colleagues.  
The growing challenges to human well-being in the Arctic provide the 
context that underlies this second volume, as seen in the explicit cover-
age of a larger number of topics, including one new chapter and the in-
clusion of new and emerging issues in several others. Increasing 
knowledge, expressed in a growing volume of published literature in 
particular since the International Polar Year (IPY) 2007–2008, enables 
our deeper assessment of a range of topics. We have also benefited from 
developments in Arctic social sciences since the first AHDR, including the 
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greater participation of indigenous peoples, the increased volume of 
social science research on Arctic issues, the better integration of tradi-
tional and local knowledge in research, and the broader discussion of the 
complexity of Arctic change. Thus this second volume aims to contribute 
to a richer, more nuanced understanding of Arctic human development, 
and to help expand our knowledge of the thematic areas presented in 
the first AHDR.  
In terms of its scope, AHDR-II spans a wide range of topics: Arctic 
populations and migration, culture and identities, economy, politics, 
legal issues, resource governance, health and well-being, and education 
and human capital. Interwoven through all of these topics are issues of 
gender and the influences of a changing climate, and changing global and 
regional political, economic, cultural and social processes. With the 
deepening of knowledge about Arctic human development, we see more 
connectivity among these areas. Early research focused more on the 
immediate changes within Arctic regions and local communities, where-
as new evidence points increasingly to the regional processes, the global 
linkages, and the complex interactions between different sources and 
scales of changes. Thus, the individual chapters address observed and 
projected climate change impacts and their interaction with other 
sources of change, global processes other than climate/environmental 
change, and gendered dimensions of each chapter’s thematic area. 
AHDR II is an academic report written for several audiences – gov-
ernments, communities, and other stakeholders at all levels, but also 
very much with the Arctic Council in mind: the report aims to help in-
form its work and that of the SDWG in particular, in furthering sustaina-
ble development in the Arctic. As a second circumpolar assessment of 
human development and quality of life in the Arctic that identifies im-
portant and emerging issues relating to sustainable human development 
in the Arctic, the report provides a basis for the development of policies 
and actions to address these issues. In addition, the report will hopefully 
be an important contribution to the instructional material for northern 
colleges and universities, and an accessible handbook for non-Arctic 
stakeholders seeking to know more about change and emerging trends 
in the North. 
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The work of organizing and preparing the AHDR-II report was sup-
ported by an Executive Committee, and the Secretariat for this project was 
located at the Stefansson Arctic Institute. This volume was made possible 
thanks to the commitment and voluntarism of a large number of leading 
Arctic social scientists. We express our gratitude to all the authors and 
contributing experts, and others who contributed to this process. 
 
 
Joan Nymand Larsen Gail Fondahl 
Project Leader (Iceland) Co-lead (Canada) 
Stefansson Arctic Institute University of Northern British Columbia 
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Summary of Major Findings  
Joan Nymand Larsen and Gail Fondahl 
 
The goals of the second volume of the (AHDR-II) Arctic Human Develop-
ment Report: Regional Processes and Global Linkages – are to provide an 
update to the first AHDR (2004) in terms of an assessment of the state of 
Arctic human development; to highlight the major trends and changes 
unfolding related to the various issues and thematic areas of human 
development in the Arctic over the past decade; and, based on this as-
sessment, to identify policy relevant conclusions and key gaps in 
knowledge, new and emerging Arctic success stories, and important 
AHDR-II follow-up activities. 
Policy-relevant conclusions 
The report contains a broad range of policy-relevant conclusions, many 
of which are specific to individual thematic areas covered in the chap-
ters. Based on these findings we offer a set of cross-cutting trends with 
relevance for policy makers at various levels, including priority setting 
by the Arctic Council and its Sustainable Development Working Group: 
 
 The combination of rapid and stressful changes highlighted in the 
first AHDR (2004) continues today, amplified in rate and magnitude. 
These societal and environmental changes confront Arctic residents, 
local communities, and socioeconomic sectors and challenge their 
wellbeing. Gaps in development and human well-being persist 
between different groups, genders, levels, and geographical locations. 
At the same time, we note trends of increased indigenous 
empowerment and improved local political and economic autonomy. 
 Urbanization in the Arctic is accelerating, propelled both by local and 
global forces. Outmigration from rural communities toward larger 
settlements and urban centers, increased concentration of the 
population and the emergence of “climigration” are notable trends. 
Rural depopulation, “brain drain” and “brain waves” related to 
changes in the economy and resource development and to growing 
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aspirations for formal education, population aging and associated 
changing dependency ratios, new flows of immigrants to the Arctic 
and related cultural negotiations and contestations – in short the 
magnitude and complexity of migration and urbanization – pose 
multifaceted challenges to human development in the Arctic. 
 Interest in the Arctic has mushroomed, due in large part to climate 
change and expected resource development opportunities, and the 
media hype regarding these developments. The Arctic is becoming 
more “marketable” and Arctic identities are seen increasingly as an 
asset. Concomitantly Arctic residents are themselves redefining what 
it means to be “a Northerner”. 
 An increasing trend of legitimate participation in Arctic decision-
making and continued innovation in governance can be observed at 
all scales. At the same time, as we witness greater self-determination 
and autonomy, and improved indigenous representation in regional, 
national and international bodies, the demands on local and 
indigenous representatives are stretching resources, human and 
fiscal, to the limit. These are challenges that need to be resolved if the 
positive trajectories are to be maintained.  
 Expectations are high for the expansion of resource extractive 
industries; we note also the growth in importance of non-resource 
extractive industries. Interest in economic diversification, within and 
beyond extractive industries, is rising. While optimism surrounding 
resource extractive activities remains, so does the high cost of doing 
business in the North. Climate change is not likely to change this 
reality, as benefits related to increased accessibility will be balanced 
or even outweighed by infrastructure damage. 
Arctic success stories 
The current assessment of human development in the Arctic has shown 
that the region continues to face significant challenges, yet at the same 
time, there are many examples of Arctic success stories that must be 
told, and they include:  
 
 The increasing use of Indigenous knowledge: There is an increasing 
use of Indigenous languages in formal schooling in the Arctic, and a 
growing recognition of the importance of local and Indigenous 
knowledge in many aspects of Arctic life. Indigenous knowledge is 
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increasingly employed in education, governance, and other spheres 
of Arctic life. 
 The increase in local participation, control and ownership: Recent 
institutional changes in the North have increased the local control 
and ownership of northern resources in some parts of the Arctic, and 
have had an important effect on the relationship between 
international and local economies.  
 The continued growth of innovative governance arrangements: The 
efforts of indigenous peoples to achieve self-determination and forms 
of self-government have been fundamental to the success of the 
emergence of new and innovative forms of governance, and the 
growth of regional autonomy.  
 The emergence of Arctic identities and a sense of Indigenous and, more 
broadly, Northern identity becoming an asset: Culture, especially 
indigenous culture in the North, has increasingly become a resource, 
both in the sense of a commodity and in the sense of a tool that 
makes external recognition easier. Also, there is a growing sense of 
the marketability of the North, which may present certain advantages 
to being in the North.  
Gaps in knowledge 
This second assessment of the state of human development in the Arctic, 
and its focus on the major trends unfolding in these times of rapid 
change, has brought attention to a number of critical gaps in knowledge 
about human development and living conditions in the North. These 
include: 
 
 Understanding the needs of Arctic youth and elderly – The population 
is aging in many parts of the Arctic, triggering the need to better 
understand the social, cultural, economic and political role this 
segment of the population does and could play. Qualitative research 
is needed to investigate both the needs of older people, including 
their gendered dimensions, and available capacities of regional 
policy-makers to respond to those needs. At the same time, the future 
of the Arctic is dependent on its youth. The aspirations and ambitions 
of Arctic youth (and their gendered dimensions) need to be 
understood.  
 Arctic social indicators and monitoring – As a direct follow-up to 
recommendations made in the first AHDR (2004), the Arctic Social 
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Indicators project developed a set of social indicators to track and 
monitor human development in the Arctic. Further work is needed on 
these indicators and their technical definitions to increase their 
strength and applicability; to reevaluate and to readjust them as 
needed to better reflect the impact of global changes, as well as the 
complex interactions between bio-physical changes and changes in 
human system. Such improvement will ensure ASI’s ability to 
effectively contribute to informing successive volumes of the AHDR. 
In addition, efforts are needed at the national and international as 
well as regional scales to address the persistent gaps in data 
availability, the lack of common data protocols and the lack of 
primary data collection, in order to enable the application of Arctic 
social indicators for tracking human development in the Arctic. 
 Gendered dimensions of Arctic change – While the past decade has 
seen a substantial expansion of research on gender in the Arctic, we 
still note significant gaps in knowledge. Men and women are not 
affected equally by climate change and globalization, and their 
impacts on traditional and non-traditional economic activities in the 
Arctic, on political systems, on education and health care provision, 
etc.. We lack knowledge about the gendered dimensions of 
contemporary cultural practices and expressions, domestic violence’s 
gendered dimensions, the gendered characteristics of decision-
making regarding resources at different scales, the gendered nature 
of aging in the Arctic (see above), the gendered experience of food 
and other (in)securities (see below) and the gendered nature of 
Arctic geopolitics. 
 “Soft securities”: Food, water, and energy – Food security is declining 
in the Arctic. Both environmental change and globalization play a 
role, as local foods become less available or attractive, and imported 
foodstuffs of lesser nutritional value and high cost gain popularity. 
We need to better understand the evolving role of traditional 
activities that produce “country foods” in northern societies, and 
their evolving interdependencies with the industrial sector. Climate 
and other environmental changes affect water security as well, while 
global shifts in energy prices and related transportation costs 
compromise energy security in many Arctic settlements dependent 
imported fuel. Research is needed here on innovative, economically 
effective ways of providing these key physical components to human 
well-being.  
 Arctic settlements, cities, and communities. – Questions remain on the 
economic role of large settlements in the economic growth of 
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Northern regions. Further knowledge about the relation of Arctic 
“diasporas” – and their impact on the culture, economics and politics 
of the communities from which they originate, is needed, as is greater 
knowledge about how “new newcomers” are also affecting these 
same spheres. We also need more knowledge on the impacts of global 
change on Arctic cities and urban areas. 
 Institutional arrangements – While the introduction of a variety of 
new institutions represents one of the most significant changes in the 
Northern economy, we lack knowledge on what types of institutions 
work best to improve the economic well-being of northern residents; 
and what roles institutions, formal and informal, will play in meeting 
future needs of human development in the North.  
 Global linkages and new Arctic actors – We need to continue to work 
toward a more comprehensive understanding of the social, cultural, 
political, economic and environmental linkages between the Arctic 
and the rest of the world. How can we better evaluate the changing 
importance of the Arctic to the globe – economically, 
environmentally, and politically? We need to better understand the 
ambitions of non-Arctic states in the Arctic, and the impacts these 
may have on Arctic futures.  
 Promulgating and adopting best practices – The Arctic has generated 
many innovations: in adaptive governance practices, in the inclusion 
of local and indigenous voices in decision-making and also in 
research, in the development of power- and economic benefit sharing 
structures, and in initiatives related to distance education and 
telemedicine. We need greater insight into the conditions under 
which these innovations can be transferred to other northern places 
and what adaptations are required. We need to develop best 
practices for evaluating the impact of economic development 
initiatives in the Arctic, which fully calculate environmental, social 
and cultural costs and benefits.  
Regional perspectives on human development – Arctic 
specific social indicators 
AHDR (2004) identified the need for follow-up activities on devising 
specific social indicators for the Arctic region. In two follow-up projects 
to the first AHDR indicators were devised in the work of the Arctic Social 
Indicators projects (ASI I and II). The chosen ASI domains and the corre-
sponding selected indicators have provided the framework for measur-
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ing and tracking change in Arctic human development while emphasiz-
ing those aspects of well-being that are particularly important to Arctic 
residents. The construction of an ASI suite of indicators that reflect well-
being in the Arctic, and which goes beyond the standard and universal 
Human Development Index of the United Nations, has enabled the analy-
sis and discussion of Arctic human development from an Arctic regional 
perspective. The domains and suite of ASI indicators are: 
 
 Fate control – guiding one’s own destiny (% of surface lands legally 
controlled by the inhabitants through public governments and Native 
corporations). 
 Cultural integrity – belonging to a viable local culture (language 
retention). 
 Contact with nature – interacting closely with the natural world 
(consumption or harvest of local foods). 
 Material wellbeing (per capita household income). 
 Health and Population (infant mortality and net-migration). 
 Education (ratio of students successfully completing post-secondary 
education). 
 
These indicators have been cited and applied recurrently in AHDR-II and 
have been employed in other recent studies of the Arctic. They require 
further refinement as important region-specific measures of human 
development in the Arctic.  
Follow-up activities 
We offer a number of suggestions for follow-up activities to AHDR-II, 
based on discussions with lead and contributing authors. 
 
 Dissemination: A series of well-targeted town hall meetings, 
addressing a range of issues and challenges discussed and brought to 
the forefront in this volume, would be a highly effective AHDR-II 
dissemination and outreach activity.  
 Monitoring: We propose the further implementation of the ASI 
monitoring system. There remains a critical need to refine the region-
specific indicators and then to implement a system for collecting, 
storing, and tracking data on such Arctic social indicators, to provide 
a tool for measuring changes in human development in the Arctic. 
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 Science Plan: Efforts should be made to support and undertake the 
drafting of an AHDR science plan. The AHDR team is in a unique 
position to present a science plan for addressing critical gaps in 
knowledge on Arctic human development and living conditions in the 
circumpolar region. 
 AHDR and the youth: The future of the Arctic will be determined by 
the choices of the youth and their aspirations and priorities as 
concerns culture and identities, where to study and where to live and 
work. Thus, we suggest the production of a follow-up version of the 
AHDR-II that targets specifically the youth and puts the focus on 
issues and topics of interest and importance to Arctic youth. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction  
Lead authors  
Gail Fondahl, University of Northern British Columbia, Canada and  
Joan Nymand Larsen, Stefansson Arctic Institute, Iceland 
Contributing authors  
Igor Krupnik (Smithsonian Institution, USA), Jingchao Peng (Graduate 
School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Japan), Vijay Sakhuja (National Maritime 
Foundation, India) 
1.1 Why a second Arctic Human Development 
Report? Why now? 
A decade has passed since the publication of the Arctic Human Develop-
ment Report (AHDR, 2004). That report, the first assessment of human 
development in the Arctic, described the unprecedented combination of 
rapid changes confronting Arctic societies, including environmental and 
economic changes, cultural transformations, industrial expansion and 
political developments. It provided a snapshot of the Arctic region at the 
beginning of the 21st century, and a baseline to “serve as a point of de-
parture for assessing progress in the future” (AHDR, 2004: 15).  
During the intervening decade, we have witnessed a dramatic in-
crease in interest in the Arctic, in part due to the continued rapid and 
even accelerating socio-economic and climatic changes in this region. A 
record low sea ice extent in the Arctic ocean in 2007, followed by a new 
record minimum in 2012, have both alarmed and excited the global 
community, as concern over climate change and its negative impacts is 
counterpoised by the seeming promise of greater access to the vast nat-
ural resources of the region and the anticipation of seasonal commercial 
shipping through Arctic waters. Evolving technologies and shifting geo-
politics also suggest that the Arctic may provide more economical re-
sources and safer shipping routes to the world’s population. Yet North-
erners continue to face the “double exposure” (O’Brien and Leichenko, 
2000) of environmental change and globalization, which in cases is test-
ing their capacity to cope and adapt. Indeed, given these challenges, sev-
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en years after the publication of first Arctic Human Development Report 
the Arctic Council’s Nuuk Declaration identified “the need for a compre-
hensive overview of human development in the Arctic and call[ed] for an 
assessment of the current state of human development in the Arctic and 
its relationship with climate change and other factors affecting Arctic 
communities” (Arctic Council, 2011: 2). The Parliamentarians of the 
Arctic Region also advocated for a second AHDR in the concluding con-
ference statement of their 9th Conference: “Support the Icelandic initia-
tive toward a second Arctic Human Development Report in 2014, bring-
ing together state-of-the-art knowledge from the IPY that covers Arctic 
societies and their welfare in a global context” (CPAR, 2010). 
To develop policies and practices that will reduce the vulnerabilities 
of Northerners and increase the benefits they experience from the vari-
ous changes, we need to understand trends in Arctic human develop-
ment. A decadal checkup allows us to begin to map such trends. We hope 
that by documenting developments over the past decade and identifying 
such trends this second Arctic Human Development Report (AHDR-II) 
will further encourage scientists to invest efforts in addressing their 
sources and potential trajectories, and policy makers to identify ways of 
encouraging positive paths and reversing negative ones. We imagine 
that AHDR-II will be followed, on a regular basis, by further assessments 
of human development in this rapidly transforming region.  
Torshavn, capital of Faroe Islands, 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit: Harald Finkler. 
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1.2 Objectives of this report 
AHDR-II has six key objectives: 
 
 To deliver a broad and inclusive update to the baseline of human 
development in the Arctic provided by the first AHDR, in a time of 
rapid regional and global change. 
 To offer an instrument that can be used in assessing progress toward 
sustainable human development in the Arctic. 
 To allow for the comparison and contrasting of cultural, social, 
economic and political conditions in the Arctic with similar 
conditions in the non-Arctic parts of the Arctic states, as well as in 
other parts of the world. 
 To inform the public and provide valuable material for educational 
instruction, especially for, but not limited to, the University of the 
Arctic and northern universities and colleges. 
 To serve as a handbook for policy makers concerned with the Arctic. 
 To provide a circumpolar assessment that the Arctic Council’s 
Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG) can use to better 
understand major issues related to sustainable human development 
in the Arctic, in order to identify priorities and to develop policies 
and plans to address these issues. 
 
This new assessment contributes to our understanding of the interplay 
and consequences of physical and social change processes affecting Arc-
tic residents’ quality of life, at both the regional and global scales. As a 
second assessment it begins to reveal trends in human development. It 
identifies important gaps that remain in our knowledge and the data 
needed to better understand the preconditions for sustainable human 
development in the Arctic region. Also, it offers examples of a number of 
Arctic success stories and in doing so emphasizes that while there are 
many challenges unfolding in the Arctic today, there is also a growing 
number of achievements related to the increasing political and economic 
autonomy, changing governance structures, and improved livelihoods 
for Indigenous peoples in the Arctic.  
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University of Svalbard in Longyearbyen, Svalbard, Norway, 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit: Joan Nymand Larsen. 
1.3 The rationale for a second Arctic Human 
Development Report 
Within the past decade, we have observed increasing environmental and 
social change in the Arctic. We have also witnessed increasing interest 
in, and attention to the Arctic. Interest on behalf of politicians, govern-
mental officials, resource corporations, and others has been comple-
mented by increased study of both the human and the physical dimen-
sions of the Arctic: we are of course especially interested in the former 
in this report. Together these trends provide incentive for a new as-
sessment of the state of human development in the Arctic. 
1.3.1 A decade of accelerating change in the Arctic 
“The Arctic is changing rapidly in ways that interact and fundamentally affect 
the region’s ecosystems and societies. Climate change is important, but it is 
not the only driver of rapid changes in the Arctic. In many contexts, social, 
political and economic drivers may be of greater importance than global 
warming.”  
(Arctic Council 2013a, p. x) 
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The first AHDR reported rapid change: the past decade has witnessed yet 
further intensification of such change. Melting ice, thawing permafrost, 
increased forest fires, more variability in weather, and other changes 
pose challenges to Arctic residents. The Arctic is warming at twice the 
rate of the rest of the planet. But, as noted above in the quote from the 
Arctic Resilience Interim Report, a range of social, economic and political 
forces also challenge human development. The chapters of this second 
Arctic Human Development Report document: 
 
 intensified migrations, both within the Arctic, and between the Arctic 
and other global regions 
 the increasing penetration of new ideas, norms and values into and 
across Arctic space due to new communications technologies and 
educational opportunities 
 growing interest in Arctic resource development from a variety of 
players, Arctic and non-Arctic 
 (d)evolving governance structures that both enable and challenge 
northern communities 
 accelerating geopolitical maneuverings and policy developments 
incited by both an increasingly accessible Arctic and by changes in 
political rapport between the (non-Arctic) centers of the Arctic states, 
as well as by relations between Arctic and non-Arctic states 
 trends and needs in the development of human capital. 
 
In short, we observe an Arctic affected by accelerating movements of 
people, ideas and capital as well as by a “destabilized ecosystem” (Se-
jersen 2009; see also Megatrends, 2011). The cumulative and imbricated 
effects of these myriad contributors to change pose heightened chal-
lenges: a new assessment of human development in the Arctic will con-
tribute to understanding their nature and impacts. 
1.3.2 A decade of increased attention to the Arctic  
“The Arctic is hot,” declared Gustav Lind, then Chair of the Arctic Coun-
cil’s Senior Arctic Officials, in 2012. Interest in the region has surged, 
giving rise to many new and potential “stakeholders” and players in the 
region’s future. New resource extraction projects are underway or being 
drafted, although not without difficulties. While much is made of the 
changes in accessibility due to climatic warming, global commodity 
markets and price fluctuations play a definitive role in these develop-
ments. Illustrative of such resource projects is the initiation of the Mary 
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River Iron Ore Project on Baffin Island – a rich deposit long known is 
now being mined, though at a scaled-back version of original plans due 
to multiple challenges (Conley, 2013).  
Interest in the Arctic Ocean as both a shipping route and a tourism 
destination is also growing. Observations suggest increased maritime 
accessibility: in the periods between 1979–1988 and 1988–2007 the 
number of ice free days along the Northern Sea Route in the Russian 
Arctic increased by 22 days (Mokhow and Khon, 2008). Increased cruise 
tourism is already observed in Greenland, Norway, Alaska, and Canada 
(Stewart et al., 2010). Tourism, research and government support ves-
sels contribute to the growth of Arctic shipping more than do ships for 
resource development and for the shipping of goods through the Arctic 
Ocean (Dawson and Pizzolato, 2014). Still, northern newsfeeds report 
the growing interest in using the Northern Sea Route and Northwest 
Passage for commercial purposes by both Arctic States and non-Arctic, 
and preliminary voyages have been undertaken by several such states. 
Expectations for increased use in turn have given impetus to increased 
international cooperation on Arctic response to shipping (and other) 
disasters in the region, as observed in the Arctic Search and Rescue 
Treaty, concluded in 2012 by the eight Arctic states. Projections indicate 
that the five Arctic littoral states will gain increased maritime access to 
their exclusive economic zones: Greenland’s access will grow by an es-
timated 28%, Canada’s by19%, and Russia’s by 16% by mid-century 
(Stephenson et al., 2011; Larsen et al., 2014).  
The increasing geopolitical importance of the Arctic also has stimulat-
ed interest on the part of the governments of the Arctic states to attend 
more to their northern regions. In the past decade all eight Arctic states 
have crafted new policy strategies regarding these regions (see Chapter 5, 
Political Systems and Geopolitics). Non-Arctic states also have pursued 
much more active roles in the Arctic: witness, for instance, the successful 
petition of five new non-Arctic states for observer status to the Arctic 
Council (Arctic Council, 2013b; see also Chaturvedi, 2013; Lackenbauer, 
2013; Xing and Bertelsen, 2013; and Textboxes 1.1 and 1.2). 
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Rising interest in the Arctic: a Chinese perspective 
Jingchao Peng 
 
In recent years, the Arctic region has attracted a great deal of attention from 
China. The ice level of the Arctic is decreasing due to rising temperature caused 
by climate change, opening up energy resources and shipping routes. China’s 
policymakers consider these changes in the Arctic will impact all countries in its 
periphery, thus legitimizing China’s demand for a greater voice in Arctic gov-
ernance. Beijing has publicly announced itself as a ‘near-Arctic state’. It is now a 
permanent observer in the Arctic Council. 
Beijing’s primary interests in the Arctic focus at the environment, energy 
resources and the new shipping route. To understand the consequences the 
warming Arctic has on China’s domestic environment and climate, the gov-
ernment has sponsored six Arctic expeditions. It has also set up a scientific 
station in the Svalbard Islands and is building a second expedition ice-
breaker. China is also gearing up to tap the Arctic’s economic potential. The 
Northern Sea Route decreases the navigation time between China and north 
Europe by one-third. In the summer of 2013, China’s state shipping company 
COSCO sent cargo to Rotterdam via the Northern Sea Route for the first time. 
In October 2014, China’s Ministry of Transport released its first-ever guide-
book on Arctic shipping to the public. Noteworthy moves were also made in 
the energy sector. China’s state oil firm, China National Petroleum Corp, is 
reported to be negotiating with Rosneft a joint exploration of the oil resources 
in Barents and Pechora Seas’ continental shelves.  
China’s rising presence in the Arctic has been met with misgivings and even 
outright objection from the local population. Perhaps with the hope to diffuse 
local negative perceptions, Chinese policymakers insist that monitoring climate 
change in the Arctic remain China’s Arctic priority and it fully recognizes the 
sovereignty and sovereign rights of Arctic states in the Arctic. On the ground, 
however, it is clear that economic interests are driving China’s Arctic invest-
ment as well. Looking ahead, China’s investment in the Arctic is slated to grow. 
Against this backdrop, how to promote and manage China’s Arctic stakes while 
avoiding conflicts with local interests remains one of Beijing’s biggest Arctic 
policy challenges. 
Textbox 1.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The past decade also witnessed a considerable expansion of confer-
ences, academic and otherwise, focusing wholly or partially on issues 
of human development in the Arctic (e.g., the Second International 
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Indian perspective on Asia-Arctic relations and transnational connections 
Vijay Sakhuja 
 
The growing importance of the Arctic in Indian discourse is recognizable; the nar-
rative focuses on the scientific-politico-economic-strategic developments in the 
region. India has established a research station, ‘Himadri,’ on Svalbard and 14 
science related institutions in India are engaged in research on the Arctic .The 
studies of these relate to the polar ice, climate, and weather but India can be ex-
pected to expand its interest in the field of resource development. This can be 
attributed to the evolving geo-economic shift to the North pivoting on living and 
non-living resources, which would be of immense economic value. India also has 
interest in the navigability of the Northern Sea Route, which would help transport 
resources from the Arctic. India advocates making the Arctic a region of peace and 
stability, demilitarized sea space, and would like to play a vital role in promoting 
the idea of a nuclear free Arctic. India’s entry into the Arctic Council as an Observer 
is noteworthy, and it hopes to engage other members and play a constructive role. 
In essence, the Arctic is not at the margins of India’s mental map. India is a respon-
sible stakeholder willing to contribute to the evolving Arctic order. 
Conference on Arctic Research Planning [ICARP-II] in 2005; ArcticNet 
Annual Scientific Meetings, since 2004; Arctic Frontiers, since 2007; 
the Polar Law Symposium, since 2008: the Arctic Futures Symposium, 
since 2010, Arctic Circle, since 2013). We have seen several new jour-
nals and yearbooks launched (e.g., Yearbook of Polar Law [launched in 
2009], Polar Journal [2011], Arctic Yearbook [2012], Arkticheskie Ve-
domosti/Arctic Herald [2012]). We also observe the expansion of aca-
demic programming, especially notable at the Masters level, through 
University of the Arctic, as well as the development of new academic 
programs (e.g., the Polar Law program at University of Akureyri). New 
centers focused on the Arctic proliferated (e.g., the International Cen-
tre for Northern Governance and Development, Canada, opened 2008; 
the Centre for Innovation and Research in Culture and Learning in the 
Arctic (CIRCLA) at Aalborg University in Denmark, 2012; the Arctic 
Research Center at Umeå University (ARCUM) in Sweden, 2012). The 
increased focus on socio-economic, cultural and political issues can 
also be discerned in the International Arctic Science Committee’s 
(IASC) establishment, in 2011, of a Social and Human Sciences Working 
Group as one of its five working groups.  
Textbox 1.2 
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IPY 2007–2008 
Igor Krupnik  
 
The (fourth) International Polar Year (IPY) 2007–2008, co-sponsored by ICSU 
and WMO, became the largest coordinated research program in the Earth’s polar 
regions and followed in the footsteps of its predecessors, the International Geo-
physical Year 1957–1958, the Second International Polar Year 1932–1933, and 
the First International Polar Year 1882–1883. An estimated 50,000 researchers, 
local observers, educators, students, and support personnel from more than 60 
nations were involved in 228 international IPY 2007–2008 projects (170 in 
science, one in data management, and 57 in education and outreach) and related 
national efforts. IPY generated an intensive spike of research and observation 
activities in the Arctic and Antarctica from 1 March 2007 till 1 March 2009, with 
many efforts continuing beyond that date. 
1.3.3 A decade of substantial research on the Arctic 
Concomitant with this general upsurge of interest in the Arctic, we have 
also witnessed a substantial increase in the study of all facets of the Arc-
tic over the past decade, including those focusing on various aspects of 
human development. A wide range of circumpolar assessments have 
been completed since the first AHDR; while many focus on natu-
ral/physical sciences, increasingly these include consideration of the so-
called “human dimensions” (e.g., ACIA, 2005; AMAP, 2011; AMAP, 2014; 
CAFF, 2013; PAME, 2011; Forbes 2011). Also contributing greatly to our 
knowledge of the Arctic regions in the past decade were the efforts of 
thousands of researchers, from 60 countries, involved in the Interna-
tional Polar Year 2007–2008 (Krupnik et al. 2011; see Textbox 1.3). IPY 
2007–2008 was the first International Polar Year in which social scien-
tists took an active role in research projects, and in which the social life 
of humans in the Arctic received significant scholarly attention. Arctic 
research in the past decade has increasingly involved collaboration be-
tween visiting scientists and local community members, enhancing its 
relevance and accessibility to Northerners.  
Textbox 1.3 
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Textbox 3.1 continued 
 
IPY 2007–2008 involved a large range of disciplines, from geophysics to ecology, 
human health, social sciences, and the humanities. Introduction of the social sciences 
and humanities, as well as the inclusion of polar residents, particularly Indigenous 
people, marked a radical shift from the earlier IPY/IGY efforts, which had excluded 
research in the socio-economic and humanities field, except for medical and psycho-
logical studies focused on the personnel of polar stations. All IPY 2007–2008 projects 
included partners from several nations and/or from Indigenous communities and 
polar residents’ organizations. IPY demonstrated a new trans-disciplinary approach 
that included biology, human health, social sciences, and the humanities, in addition 
to meteorology, glaciology, oceanography, geophysics, geology, and other traditional 
polar research fields. It sent a powerful message about the societal value of advanced 
research on rapid environmental change across the polar regions, and it reached out 
to many new constituencies, including polar residents, Arctic Indigenous nations, and 
millions of people on the planet.  
IPY activities in social science disciplines (anthropology, archaeology, eco-
nomics, human geography, linguistics, political science) and the humanities 
(history, literature, arts) included 35 endorsed international research projects, 
plus several initiatives in education and outreach directly related to the social 
science and humanities themes. For the first time, projects were proposed and 
implemented by polar Indigenous organizations. All Arctic Council’s ‘permanent 
participants’—the Inuit Circumpolar Council, Aleut International Association, 
Arctic Athabaskan Council, Gwich’in Council International, Russian Association 
of Indigenous Peoples of the North, and Sámi Council—and their national and 
local chapters were involved in IPY as partners, logistical and public supporters, 
but also as initiators and lead institutions. Altogether, IPY social science and 
humanities projects engaged more than 1500 researchers, students, Indigenous 
experts and monitors, and representatives of polar Indigenous organizations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.4 Progress on monitoring human development in 
the Arctic 
The first Arctic Human Development Report called for the development of 
small, tractable and robust set of indicators to track human development 
in the Arctic. In response, the follow-on Arctic Social Indicators project 
proposed such a set of indicators (ASI, 2010), and performed prelimi-
nary testing on them (ASI, 2014) (See Textbox 1.4). These indicators 
provide a basis for tracking change between subsequent volumes of the 
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Arctic Social Indicators (ASI): Monitoring Human Development in the Arctic 
 
The Arctic Social Indicators (ASI) project was formulated to fill a critical gap 
identified by the AHDR to devise a set of Arctic specific social indicators to help 
facilitate monitoring of change in human development. A key objective was to 
devise a small suite of affordable indicators that would enable policy makers and 
others to take the quick pulse on the state of human development, while other 
objectives included the development and implementation of the first ASI moni-
toring system. 
The work on devising Arctic specific indicators dates back to the time of the 
first AHDR (2004). One of the original objectives of the first AHDR had been to 
devise a set of Arctic social indicators. However, during the process of completing 
the first AHDR this task soon proved too ambitious in terms of time and other 
resources. Still, the AHDR identified a number of key domains of particular rele-
vance to Arctic residents and well-being for devising such indicators, and in its 
conclusion the AHDR recommended that “a small number of tractable indicators to 
be used in tracking changes in key elements of human development in the Arctic 
over time“ be developed (AHDR, 2004:242). In 2006, and as follow-up to the first 
AHDR, the work on devising Arctic social indicators commenced. An ASI working 
group was put in place with representation from a broad range of disciplines, and 
from different geographical locations. The ASI working group met in a series of 
workshops with the objectives to discuss, identify, select and measure ASI indica-
tors, and to formulate the framework for an ASI monitoring system. By 2014 the 
working group had produced two reports on the development, measurement and 
application of Arctic specific social indicators. 
The work on the ASI constitutes a significant step forward in moving us to-
ward an ability to track trends in key elements of human development in the 
Arctic and, as a result, guiding discussions regarding questions of policy. The 
bulk of ASI activities have coincided with the research initiatives of the Interna-
tional Polar Year (IPY) 2007-2008, which officially lasted to March of 2009. ASI 
was endorsed as an IPY project in the Arctic social sciences. While in some re-
spects still relatively rudimentary, the ASI monitoring system has been hailed as 
pioneering and as a forerunner in discussions and applications of Arctic indica-
tors and the monitoring of human societies and the impacts of Arctic change. In 
this regard ASI has made an important contribution to the study of Arctic social 
indicators and human based monitoring in the Arctic. 
 
AHDR. Other initiatives to measure human development, such as the 
Arctic Observation Network Social Indicator Project (2007–2011) con-
tribute to this goal as well.  
Textbox 1.4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40 Arctic Human Development Report 
Textbox 1.4 continued 
 
In its work the ASI working group arrived at six domains for Arctic social indicator 
selection, of which three domains had been identified during the process of the 
first AHDR as being particularly important for capturing those aspects of well-
being in the Arctic that Arctic residents view as particularly prominent (fate con-
trol, cultural integrity, contact with nature) and three domains that may be con-
sidered more universal in terms of measuring well-being, and that are prominent 
in the measurement of the Human Development Index of the United Nations 
(material well-being, education, and health/demography) (AHDR, 2004). 
A common list of key criteria for the selection of indicators was developed by the 
ASI working group, and they included: data availability, data affordability, ease of 
measurement, robustness, scalability and inclusiveness. A wide range of indica-
tors was identified for each domain, and the best indicators in terms of the set of 
selection criteria were identified. In particular, the ASI team agreed that the 
chosen indicators should be affordable in terms of time and other resources (ASI, 
2010; ASI, 2014). 
While a large number of indicators were identified during the process, and 
subsequently included in the two ASI volumes, special attention was placed on 
identifying a small suite of ASI indicators which would be particularly strong in 
terms of meeting the selection criteria, and which as a collective would provide a 
holistic picture of the state of Arctic human well-being. This suite of ASI indica-
tors is composed of the following indicators: infant mortality, net-migration, 
consumption/harvest of local foods, per capita household income, ratio of stu-
dents successfully completing post-secondary education, language retention, fate 
control index. Challenges do persist however in terms of those indicators that 
reply on primary data collection (e.g. country food) and those that are formulat-
ed in terms of an index value (e.g. fate control) (ASI, 2014). 
Following the success of ASI-I to develop a set of Arctic specific social indica-
tors, ASI-II was implemented in 2011. The objectives of the ASI-II follow-up 
project were to systematically identify and describe data challenges of the final 
set of recommended ASI indicators; to conduct a series of regional case studies 
to illustrate and further test their strength and applicability; and to formulate 
recommendations for a long-term monitoring system. ASI-II constitutes the 
implementation phase of the set of Arctic social indicators developed during the 
ASI-I project; and together with ASI-I, the results serve as input into the process 
of the AHDR-II. 
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Textbox 1.4 continued 
 
The suite of ASI indicators has been applied to five case studies representing 
different regions in the Arctic: Sakha Republic (Yakutia), Russian Federation; 
West-Nordic region; North West Territories, Canada; Inuit regions of Alaska, 
USA; and the Inuit world – an application of SLiCA data (Survey of Living Condi-
tions in the Arctic). A general conclusion of the ASI case studies is that significant 
data challenges persist in the Arctic, although some regions are more data rich 
than others; and significant trade-offs are encountered when we rely on a single 
indicator (ASI, 2014).  
The original ambition of the ASI project had been to produce extensive sets 
of comparable data featuring ASI indicators for each of the six ASI domains. 
However, this task has proved to be impossible given the current state of data 
quality and lack of data availability both at the pan-arctic level and at different 
geographical scales. Indicators cannot be compared between regions in any 
meaningful way given existing differences in data protocols in addition to other 
data issues. It is necessary to make adjustments to tailor the analysis to meet the 
regional availability of data, and hence, to settle for best possible proxies, or in 
some cases substitute with second-best alternative indicators – though without 
compromising the validity of the analysis. 
The implementation of a more complete system of ASI monitoring might be 
costly indeed, but as far as addressing existing data limitations, the direct and 
indirect cost savings in terms of the potential value created by such a system 
should not be ignored. The core pillars of an ASI monitoring system are: the use of 
high quality data that meets standards for robustness, validity, reliability, compa-
rability, scalability and ease of measurement and interpretation. The data needs to 
be clearly relevant to one or more of the six domains of Arctic human development 
(health and demography, material well-being, education, cultural integrity, contact 
with nature, and fate control), be sensitive to change over time, be available at least 
down to a regional level, and be applicable to, and reported separately for, Indige-
nous and non-Indigenous populations; and preference is for available and afforda-
ble data. Any monitoring system will need to rely on existing and continuously 
collected data available from national, regional and local agencies, and other 
sources that provide such data at no or small cost (ASI, 2014).  
Notwithstanding existing data challenges, the ASI team has been able to not on-
ly draw important conclusions about human well-being for each of the five case 
study regions, but also demonstrate the strength, applicability, and value of the 
suite of ASI indicators and the proposed ASI monitoring system. The ASI analysis 
has demonstrated that if more complete data sets were available, including 
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Katuaq, the cultural centre in Nuuk, Greenland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit: Harald Finkler. 
1.5 AHDR-II’s sub-title: regional processes and global 
linkages  
The subtitle of this second assessment of human development in the 
Arctic, Regional processes and global linkages, underscores how Arctic 
transformations must be understood as intimately linked to global 
change – both the environmental changes brought on by global warming 
and the cultural, social, economic, political and environmental transfor-
mations driven by other global change processes, often lumped together 
under the term “globalization”. Connections between communities of the 
north and the national and global souths are expanding, both due to 
Textbox 1.4 continued 
 
primary data collection on harvest, the ASI system could provide an even stronger 
tool to inform the policy level, and for engaging in regional and local priority setting.  
There is no doubt that the long-term monitoring of human development in 
the Arctic would be greatly facilitated by the regular and frequent collection and 
reporting of relevant data, including those required for the proposed small set of 
ASI indicators. 
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communications infrastructure and to increases in physical mobility. 
These can lead to cultural enrichment – and to social fragmentation 
(Megatrends, 2011). The connectivity, and its impacts, are uneven across 
the regions of the North. 
The Arctic contains a number of globally important and increasingly 
desired resources, which nevertheless remain expensive to develop. 
Hydrocarbons on- and off-shore across the Arctic, rare earths in Green-
land, diamonds in Sakha Republic and Northwest Territories, and 
many other reserves beckon outside investors and developers. “The 
scope and size of [resource development] projects makes them inher-
ently global in nature as only the largest of corporations can pull them 
off” (Heinenen et al., 2013: 29). Such corporations have the financial 
capital, technology, and human resources required in highly capital 
intensive projects, and tend to be able to operate under the kind of 
conditions of greater risk and uncertainty that typify resource devel-
opment in the Arctic. Protest to such projects has also assumed a glob-
al nature, organized most notably by transnational environmental 
NGOs (Heinenen et al., 2013). At the regional level, job opportunities, 
in-migration, infrastructural developments, and environmental dam-
age reshape Arctic places. 
Global and regional developments in Indigenous rights are greatly in-
formed by Arctic persons and peoples. Self-determination movements 
have transformed the Arctic’s geopolitical landscape, most notably in 
Greenland, but with examples from all corners of the Arctic. Arctic Indig-
enous groups increasingly influence regions beyond the Arctic and their 
rights agendas, by actions such as assuming leadership roles in interna-
tional Indigenous forums, and mounting political campaigns when ac-
tions beyond the Arctic affect their well-being (e.g., opposing the Euro-
pean Union’s application for observer status at the Arctic Council). 
Changes in the Arctic – political, economic, and cultural have global 
effects, potentially impacting human development in other parts of the 
world (Arctic Council, 2013a), while we also see increasing evidence of 
changes outside the Arctic spurring transformations within the region. 
This report’s chapters attend to these regional processes and global 
linkages in acknowledgement of the increasingly intertwined social and 
ecological systems of the Arctic with the rest of the world. 
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1.6 Producing AHDR-II: scope, choices and challenges 
AHDR-II builds on the first Arctic Human Development Report, and most-
ly avoids repetition of the former. For those unfamiliar with the first 
report, the two might best be read together (http://www.thearctic.is/ 
AHDR%20chapters.htm). This report focuses predominantly on the first 
decade of the 21st century.  
As an overview of human development, AHDR-II cannot be all-
encompassing. Rather, its goal is to identify the major trends for each 
topic under consideration. Concrete examples from various regions of 
the Arctic illuminate such trends. It is not the report’s intention to deal 
with all regions of the Arctic within each sub-topic, but rather to offer a 
limited number of illustrations to ground the observations. 
Figure 1.1: AHDR map 
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1.6.1 The Arctic(s) 
AHDR-II employs the same delimitation of the Arctic as did the first AHDR 
(Figure 1.1). As the first report discussed the various ways of defining the 
Arctic (AHDR, 2004: 17-18), we will not repeat those here. As in the first 
report, in some cases authors have needed to diverge from these common 
geographical boundaries, due to data availability and other reasons.  
Yet while we consider the Arctic a distinctive region (a notion that the 
first AHDR noted is contested from some quarters) we also underscore the 
great sub-regional differentiation across this territory. Students of the 
Arctic often note that there is not one Arctic, but several. We acknowledge 
this heterogeneity, and note that the trends identified in each chapter in 
certain cases apply to only some areas of the Arctic. Still, Arctic residents 
do face many of the same challenges across the entire region. 
1.6.2 The Content 
This assessment of human development in the Arctic is organized simi-
larly to the first AHDR, to allow for easy comparison. Developments in 
the Arctic over the past decade, however, suggested some need for modi-
fications, which we outline below. We asked authors to attend to a spe-
cific set of questions in addressing their topic and crafting their chapter 
for this report. These included the effect of indigeneity, ethnicity, geog-
raphy, age and gender on perceptions and experiences of change in the 
Arctic; the impacts of climate and global change on the system (i.e., chap-
ter topic) under consideration; variance across the Arctic; and main re-
gional processes and global connections relevant to their topic. Authors 
were also tasked with identifying the major changes in the past decade 
and the major trends unfolding related to their topics.  
The “common threads” of gender, globalization and climate change 
Central to our analysis of changes and trends were three overarching 
themes of great importance to today’s Arctic: climate change, globaliza-
tion, and gender. All chapters were expected to deal with these “com-
mon threads”. In addition, AHDR-II includes a specific chapter on glob-
alization, as a major force in Arctic human development, and as force 
less scrutinized than climate change. Given the focus on climate change 
in numerous recent studies of the Arctic (e.g., AMAP, 2011; Larsen et 
al., 2014), we judged it desirable to include consideration of climate 
change within the chapters but not necessary to allocate a separate 
chapter to this topic. 
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The decision to not include a specific chapter on gender in this sec-
ond AHDR was made purposefully and after considerable deliberation. 
Gender affects all domains of human development in the Arctic. Women 
and men often experience and accommodate change in distinct ways. 
They are differently affected by climate change (e.g., Preet et al., 2010); 
perceive health risks from contaminated food differently; enumerate 
different reasons for migration from rural to urban areas (e.g., Christen-
sen, 2013); and participate differentially in governance and decision-
making bodies in the North, to name just a few divergences along gender 
lines. Lead authors were tasked with considering the gender dimensions 
of developments and trends for their specific topic, be it politics, eco-
nomics, education, etc., over the past decade. The chapters in this vol-
ume document the difference that gender makes .We continue to assert 
that gender equality is a pre-requisite for human development, well-
being and dignity in the Arctic.  
Drying fish in Svolvær, Norway 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit: Harald Finkler. 
1.7 An overview of the chapters  
As with the first AHDR, we start with a chapter on demographics that 
lays out who lives in the Arctic at the end of the first decade of the 21st 
century, and charts the changes in demographic indicators (birth rates, 
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death rates, fertility, etc.) over the past decade for the Arctic region and 
its sub-regions. In addition, the chapter focuses more attention on mi-
gration. The Arctic population is increasingly mobile. The chapter docu-
ments the continued rural-urban migration (a trend common for the 
whole Arctic region), describes the loss of population from urban cen-
ters in the Russian North, and notes the relocation of whole communi-
ties necessitated by climate change.  
In place of a chapter on Societies and Cultures, AHDR-II offers a chap-
ter on Cultures and Identities. The cultural politics of identities are out-
lined, with attention to the complex and multiple identities negotiated 
and claimed by many Arctic residents. These identities are in part lega-
cies of the colonial history of the Arctic: thus, the chapter adds a brief 
historical overview of the Arctic’s various sub-regions to help contextu-
alize current developments. Increased communication, travel and trade 
connect Arctic residents to each other and other populations, influencing 
their cultures. The chapter adds a section on arts and sports. It high-
lights the heightened interest in, and marketability of the North, identi-
fying this as an advantage and resource for northern residents. 
Chapter 4, on Economic Systems, recaps the Arctic’s wealth of natural 
resources, which to date have remained largely unexploited due to the 
remoteness and harsh climate. While it appears that both accessibility 
and demand are growing, the authors remind us that the physical con-
straints remain and will continue to influence the rate of resource devel-
opment. A “resource rush” is not inevitable, but rather very much a func-
tion of world demand and related commodity prices. Transfer payments 
and traditional subsistence activities continue to be important to the 
Arctic economy, and we also see some diversification of the economy 
toward non-resource based industries and services. 
A decision to merge the topics of political systems and geopolitics 
shapes Chapter 5. The chapter documents the multi-level governance of 
Arctic political life, notes the innovative approaches to governance de-
veloped in the Arctic, and discusses the benefits and challenges of devo-
lutionary processes common to several Arctic sub-regions. It under-
scores the important role the Arctic plays in world politics. AHDR-II de-
liberately eschews a strong focus on military security in the Arctic, 
embracing a broader concept of “security.” Food and water security are 
appraised in discussions of well-being (Chapter 8). The Arctic has cer-
tainly served as an area for state performances of sovereignty and na-
tional security assertions. As this report was being completed, we ob-
served the beginning of a re-militarization of the Arctic, in the face of 
both a more accessible Arctic and geopolitical tensions among Arctic 
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states. The topics of sovereignty and security, as important dimension of 
human development, may warrant more attention in future AHDRs.  
Chapter 6, on Legal Systems, reviews the multiple legal orders of the 
Arctic (regional, national, global), then focuses on developments in 
Indigenous rights in the Arctic and on the current priority of delineat-
ing continental shelf boundaries in the Arctic Sea. It asserts that, de-
spite occasional media coverage intimating acrimonious territorial 
conflicts, such geopolitical contests are being settled through diplomat-
ic channels and cordially.  
Through a set of cases that span different sub-regions, various 
scales, and numerous resources, Chapter 7, on Resource Governance, 
describes innovative ways developed by communities, government, 
industries and others, working together, to improve resource steward-
ship and benefits to all involved. Through several of the examples the 
chapter underscores how the scientific community has partnered with 
local resource users to incorporate traditional and local knowledge 
into governance structures, in an effort to make these more culturally 
appropriate and resilient. 
Climate change as well as the increasing movement of people into the 
Arctic, are giving rise to new diseases in the Arctic. Chapter 8, on Health 
and Well-Being, describes this trend. It also draws attention to key chal-
lenges to well-being, such as chronic housing shortages throughout 
much of the North. The chapter also seeks to provide a more holistic 
picture of health and well-being by incorporating the indicators and 
findings from the Arctic Social Indicators project (ASI). It discusses how 
a set of Arctic-specific indicators as a collective helps us better under-
stand the status of well-being of Arctic residents. Special attention is 
paid to different forms of violence, one of many contributors to signifi-
cant health disparities between the Arctic and non-Arctic regions in the 
eight Arctic states. 
This report’s chapter on Education and Human Capital differs from 
the first AHDR in that it pays more attention to non-formal types of edu-
cation, and also to the broader concept of developing human capital in 
Arctic regions. The authors discuss the growth of creative capital in the 
North as a necessary precondition for economic and more general hu-
man development in the 21st century. The notable gender dimensions of 
educational attainment are highlighted. 
While Chapters 2–9 address key domains of human development, 
two further chapters provide an integrative review of key processes at 
two scales. Chapter 10, Globalization, reviews global economic, politi-
cal, cultural and social processes, referred to collectively as “globaliz-
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ing forces”, that are affecting human development in the Arctic. In con-
sidering the impact of these forces, it attends to both regional differ-
ences and common trajectories. Chapter 11, on Community Viability 
and Adaptation provides a complementary synthesis of human devel-
opment processes in the Arctic, focused at the local, community scale. 
Together, these two chapters serve as capstones to the discussion of 
changes in the Arctic over the past decade and their impacts on human 
well-being, and offer commentary on societal adaptation in this region.  
In the concluding chapter we summarize the continuing and new 
trends in Arctic human development. Based on the findings of individual 
chapters we first highlight a number of cross cutting trends with rele-
vance for policy makers and priority setting in governments and the 
Arctic Council. Next, we look at some of the key policy relevant conclu-
sions specific to individual chapters. We then identify the most critical 
cross-cutting gaps in our knowledge that extend across various systems 
and thematic issues. While the current assessment of human develop-
ment in the Arctic has shown that the region continues to face significant 
and even heightened challenges, there are many examples of Arctic suc-
cess stories that can be told: we highlight a few of these. We conclude 
the report by offering a number of suggestions for follow-up activities. 
Reindeer Herding in Sakha Republic (Yakutia), Russian Federation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit: Hiroki Takakura. 
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1.8 Intended audiences 
AHDR-II was prepared with multiple audiences in mind. As with the first 
Arctic Human Development Report, we address the report to policy mak-
ers at all levels who focus on the Arctic. Many of these policy makers will 
work outside the Arctic region yet determine at least in part the course 
of human development within the region.  
We also direct the report to students of the University of the Arctic and 
other students both at Northern post-secondary institutions and beyond. 
To begin to understand the many dimensions of human development in 
the Arctic is a critical step in developing future “human capital” dedicated 
to improving life in the Arctic, whether working in the Arctic or beyond its 
borders. Exposed to Arctic issues, even those individuals who do not pur-
sue careers that intersect with Arctic affairs will nevertheless be more 
informed, and hopefully concerned, about global and regional action that 
affect the Arctic. An up-to-date assessment of human development in Sthe 
Arctic will also facilitate curricular development and educational initia-
tives focusing on this critical aspect of the Arctic. 
In identifying gaps in knowledge we aim to inform priorities for fu-
ture research. The report will contribute to the third International Con-
ference on Arctic Research Planning’s (ICARP-III) roadmap for research 
priorities and partnerships. We anticipate that the Arctic Council’s Sus-
tainable Development Working Group (SDWG) will utilize the report in 
its priority-setting exercises over the next decade. Other targeted audi-
ences include the media, and non-governmental organizations that 
work, or aspire to work, in the Arctic. Tracking and understanding hu-
man development in the Arctic are important steps to informed, and 
hopefully compassionate, policy choices that will contribute to increas-
ing the well-being of the Arctic’s residents. 
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2.1 Introduction 
In 2013, there were 4,053,055 people living in the Arctic. This is a de-
cline of 55,982 since 2000, or 1.4%. That the overall Arctic population 
has remained roughly the same over this period masks considerable 
regional variation in population change among Arctic countries, re-
gions, and settlements. This chapter examines a number of key ques-
tions about the population of the Arctic including: factors influencing 
the number of children Arctic women are having, mortality levels and 
patterns, causes and implications of changes in the gender, age, and 
racial or ethnic composition of Arctic populations, the spatial distribu-
tion of the Arctic population and factors influencing population mobili-
ty across the Arctic, and the expected future size and composition of 
the Arctic population. It is appropriate that the first substantive chap-
ter of a report on human development in the Arctic focuses on the peo-
ple living in the Arctic. 
In addition to describing population changes since the first AHDR, 
this chapter analyzes migration and its impact on Arctic populations. 
Because of the small population size of settlements in the Arctic, m i-
gration has the potential to have a significant impact on both origins 
and destinations. This chapter analyzes mobility and immobility, the 
role of climate change, urbanization, and international migration into 
and out of the Arctic. A final section examines projections of the Arc-
tic population. To put population change in the Arctic in context, 
comparisons are made to the Arctic states and to global demographic 
trends, including separately to developed and developing countries 
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Figure 2.1: Population change in the Arctic, 2000-2010 (percent)
Percent change, 2000 to 2010
Source: National statiscal offices and UN Population Division.
as defined by the United Nations (UN Population Division, 2011). All 
Arctic states are classified as developed countries. 
2.2 Population change  
During the first decade of the 21st century, the global population con-
tinued to grow rapidly, increasing by 13% between 2000 and 2010 and 
reaching seven billion in October 2011 (Figure 2.1). Rapid population 
growth, along with technological advances and growing affluence of 
the global population, has contributed to anthropogenic climate change 
and warming, more so in the Arctic than other regions of the world. 
The world’s population is expected to continue to grow, reaching 9.3 
billion by mid-century and over 10 billion by the end of the century.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In contrast to rapid global population growth, the population of the Arc-
tic has declined slightly since 2000 (historical data on the population of 
the Arctic extending before 2000 are contained in the chapter “Arctic 
Demography” in the first AHDR). This is largely due to the continued 
decline of the population of the Russia Arctic, which now contains less 
than half the Arctic population. Alaska, Iceland, and the Canadian Arctic 
all grew faster than the global rate. There was moderate population 
growth in the Faroe Islands. The populations of Greenland and the Nor-
wegian Arctic remained roughly the same, while Lappi (Finland) and 
Norrbotten (Sweden) had moderate declines. 
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The populations of the Arctic regions in the United States and Canada 
both grew faster than those countries as a whole. The fastest growing 
region in the Arctic was Nunavut, which increased by nearly 20% since 
2000. By contrast, the Arctic regions of Norway, Sweden, Finland, and 
Russia had slower population growth or faster decline than their respec-
tive countries. The Arctic regions with the largest declines were in Rus-
sia, which continued its post-Soviet contraction of economic activity. The 
cities of Vorkuta and Igarka, northern Yakutia, and Chukotka all had 
population declines of more than 20% in the 2000s. By contrast, Yamal-
Nenets okrug had a population increase of 10% because its young age 
structure contributed to significant natural increase of the population. 
2.2.1 Population change from natural increase and net 
migration 
Population growth, or decline, for any settlement, region, or country can 
be disaggregated into natural increase or decrease and net migration. 
Natural increase is the difference between the number of births and the 
number of deaths while net migration is the difference between the 
number of in-migrants and out-migrants. The population of a region 
changes because of the combination of these two processes due to de-
mographic and other factors. Demographic factors influencing natural 
increase or decrease include levels of fertility and mortality and the age 
and gender structure of a population. If the population of a region has 
relatively more young people, including many women in the child-
bearing ages, and fewer in older ages which have higher rates of mortali-
ty, then natural increase tends to be high. This is the case in many Arctic 
regions, including in many regions with high shares of Indigenous peo-
ples. If the age structure of a population has relatively more older and 
fewer younger people, natural increase will be low or even show a de-
crease as has been the case in Russia over the past several decades. 
Whether net migration is positive into a region (more people coming 
into a region than leaving) or negative (more people leaving the region 
than coming into it) has primarily to do with economic opportunities in 
the region versus opportunities elsewhere. Because migration tends to 
be age selective among people in the young-adult ages when mobility is 
highest, regions gaining people from migration tend to gain large num-
bers of people in the young-adult ages and their children, since the 
young-adult ages are also the prime child-bearing ages. Demographical-
ly, this tends to keep the population of a region quite young (young peo-
ple tend to be more productive) and, in addition offers other economic 
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Sources: National and regional statistical offices.  Data are in order by total population change.
influences, such as being a boost to economic growth because these 
young people tend to be more productive. On the other hand, regions 
experiencing population declines from migration are losing large num-
bers of people in the young adult ages exacerbating population decline 
and serving to dampen economic dynamism. As will be illustrated, many 
Arctic regions and settlements are on the extremes of population change 
from high rates of in-migration or out-migration. 
At a global level, the 13% increase in the population of the world is 
due to significantly more births than deaths (Figure 2.2). In spite of a 
slowdown in fertility across much of the developed and developing 
countries of the world, woman are still giving birth to more than two 
children on average, causing populations to grow. This is coupled with 
young populations across much of the developing world, where even if 
fertility were to decline, there are still large numbers of people in the 
child-bearing ages having children. All of the Arctic countries and re-
gions are at more advanced stages demographically and have much old-
er age structures and lower fertility rates than the developing countries 
of the world. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alaska’s population growth is primarily due to more births than deaths, 
though there has been moderate net in-migration to the state over the 
period. In Yukon, migration is the largest driver of population change. 
With its young population, the major component of Nunavut’s popula-
tion change is natural increase combined with moderate out-migration. 
Population growth in the Faroe Islands was driven largely by natural 
increase with only moderate out-migration. Greenland’s population 
stayed about the same over the period because the natural increase of 
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the country’s young population was offset by the same amount of net 
out-migration. Iceland’s population grew from having both natural in-
crease and positive net migration into the country. Migration was quite 
significant into Iceland until the financial crisis of 2008. 
In recent years, the regions of Arctic Norway have had both natural 
increase and net in-migration while those in Arctic Sweden and Finland 
have had either natural increase or decrease combined with net out-
migration, resulting in population losses. 
With one exception, all regions of the Russian Arctic had continued 
out-migration combined with natural increase. This was due to all hav-
ing significant Indigenous populations who have higher birth rates than 
the national average or younger age structures due to recent waves of 
in-migrants, as in the case of Yamal-Nenets okrug. 
2.2.2 The demographic transition 
The demographic transition is the transition that most societies and 
countries go through from having high birth rates and death rates to 
having low birth rates and death rates (Weeks, 2008). Because death 
rates typically decline faster than birth rates, there is a period of rapid 
population growth when births exceed deaths by a considerable amount. 
Simultaneous with the demographic transition are a series of other tran-
sitions. These include a health and mortality transition where the major 
causes of death shift from being from infectious and communicable dis-
eases to more being from degenerative and non-communicable causes. 
In the later stages of the health and mortality transition more people die 
from neoplasms and external causes – murder, suicides, and accidents. 
The underlying causes are often lifestyle factors such as smoking, obesi-
ty, and risk-taking behavior. The age and gender pattern of deaths also 
change from women and children dying first in the larger numbers to 
men having higher mortality rates. 
There is also a fertility transition from high fertility rates, early mar-
riage and first birth, and little birth control to lower fertility rates, later 
marriage and first birth, and increased birth control, especially modern, 
more effective methods. There are migration and urban transitions 
characterized by increased mobility and movement up the urban hierar-
chy away from small settlements towards larger settlements and cities. 
There is also an age transition marked by a rise in the median age and a 
family and household transition away from large, multi-generation 
households towards smaller, two-generation households and an in-
creased number of single-person households. 
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The unique demographic transition in the Arctic: the case of Greenland 
Societies composed primarily of Indigenous peoples who encounter Western 
peoples or other groups of outsiders may have unusual demographic transitions. 
The Inuit of Greenland are one such example. Demographic transitions in this 
population differ from the expected pattern in either their timing or pattern. The 
typical demographic transition is one from high birth and death rates to lower 
birth and death rates, a transition which demographers have divided into four 
stages. The decline in death rates precedes the decline in birth rates resulting in 
a period of rapid population growth. 
 
Most of the Arctic consists of economically advanced countries that 
are demographically at late stages of the transition. However, many of 
these states are home to Indigenous populations who are at earlier stag-
es of the transition. These differentials can be seen when comparing data 
for Indigenous and non-Indigenous populations, or when examining 
data for Arctic regions that have predominantly Indigenous populations. 
Also, many Arctic Native populations have had somewhat interrupted 
transitions because of their encounters with outsiders, often marked by 
periods of high mortality from exposure to diseases from which they had 
little immunity (Textbox 2.1). 
Textbox 2.1 
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Textbox 2.1 continued 
 
The figure shows the natural increase (difference between births and deaths) 
and population size among Greenlanders over the period from 1781– 2007. Birth 
and death rates are for “Greenlanders.” The deaths include only people born in 
Greenland and still living in Greenland two years later. For births, the definition 
is more complicated. It is possible to distinguish between persons as born 
“Greenlanders” with both parents born in Greenland and others having only one 
parent in Greenland.  
The figure shows the natural increase (difference between births and deaths) 
and population size among Greenlanders over the period from 1781 to 2007, 
from the time of the start of the Royal Greenland Trade Company’s monopoly to 
the present. Until 1781, the population size was small and population growth 
was slow. The economy was still largely based on the hunting of seals and 
whales, some land mammals, and fish and birds. Difficult climatic conditions and 
various epidemics resulted in a population decline from 8,000 to 6,000 during 
the 18th century. 
Under colonial rule, the population doubled to 12,000 by 1900. In the early 
20th century, more than half of deaths were from tuberculosis and infectious 
diseases that caused the fluctuations in the death rate. A warmer climate re-
duced the seal population but increased cod supplies, giving rise to a commercial 
fishing industry. Population growth resulted in another doubling of the popula-
tion in 30 years. After WWII, efforts were made to improve health conditions. In 
the 1960s, family planning efforts were introduced, resulting in a steep decline in 
fertility rates. The death rate fell and then leveled off in the 1970s. Births contin-
ue to exceed deaths by about 500 per year, placing Greenland at the third of four 
stages of the demographic transition. The total size of the population has stabi-
lized at about 56,000 and is projected to remain at about this level because con-
tinued net outmigration, mainly to Denmark, is roughly equal to the amount of 
births exceeding amount of deaths. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Hamilton and Rasmussen, 2010; figure reproduced by permission. 
2.2.3 Fertility  
The growth or decline of any country or region’s population is especially 
sensitive to deviations from replacement-level fertility of 2.1 children 
per woman (the total fertility rate, often referred to simply as the fertili-
ty rate, is a synthetic measure which shows the number of children a 
woman would have if she passed through her childbearing years at the 
current age specific fertility levels). Over the long run, with a fertility 
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Figure 2.3: Total Fertility Rate in the Arctic, 2009 -2012
(number of children per woman)
Sources and notes: Data are from national and regional statistical offices.
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rate of 2.1 children per woman, allowing for some mortality, a popula-
tion will just replace itself; each generation will be the same size as the 
previous. Fertility rates above this level will lead to population growth 
as the current cohort will be replaced by larger cohorts. Rates below this 
lead to population decline as subsequent generations will be smaller. 
Global fertility rates continue to decline, going from 3.04 children per 
woman in 1990 to 2.45 in 2010. However, this level remains above re-
placement, thus contributing to continued significant population growth. 
Figure 2.3 shows the most recent fertility levels for the Arctic regions 
and includes comparisons to the global levels and those for developed 
and less developed countries (UN Population Division, 2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The United States has long had among the highest fertility rates among 
developed countries. This, and continued high levels of immigration, 
explain the higher levels of population growth in the United States. The 
total fertility rate in the United States has been about or just below re-
placement level for the past several decades. The fertility rate in Alaska 
has declined over the past two decades from 2.6 to 2.3 children per 
woman, though this level is still above replacement and above the na-
tional average. For the past several decades, Alaska has had among the 
highest fertility rates among U.S. states. There are significant differences 
in fertility rates between Natives and non-Natives with Alaska Natives 
having fertility rates of over 3 children per woman while non-Natives 
have less than 2.5 (Hunsinger and Sandberg, 2013). 
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Yukon and Northwest Territories (NWT) have fertility rates above 
the national average but below replacement level. Nunavut, with its ma-
jority Indigenous population, has a fertility rate of nearly 3 children per 
woman, which is above the level for less developed countries. This level, 
combined with a young age structure, will ensure continued high popu-
lation growth in the region into the future. 
The fertility rate in Iceland is among the highest in Europe at 2.04 chil-
dren per woman in 2012. This high fertility rate persists in spite of a small 
decline from a peak of 2.2 just prior to the 2008 financial crisis. The fertili-
ty rate in Greenland, while declining, remains about the replacement level. 
The fertility rate in the Faroe Islands is also above replacement level. 
The regions of the Norwegian Arctic have fertility rates of about 1.9 
children per woman which is just below replacement level but slightly 
above the national average. Similar to the Arctic regions of Norway, the 
fertility rate in Lapland is just below replacement and slightly above the 
national level. Norrbotten in Sweden has recently had below-
replacement fertility and a rate below the national average. 
During Russia’s post-Soviet demographic crisis, fertility fell to unseen 
levels that demographers termed “lowest-low” fertility, which at its na-
dir fell to 1.157 births per woman (Figure 2.4) (Kohler, Billari, and Orte-
ga, 2002). These low rates were also seen in the country’s Arctic regions. 
The fertility rate in Murmansk has been lower than the national rate 
reaching a low of 1.015 in 2000 before increasing to 1.35 in 2009, 
though this is still far below replacement. The fertility rate in Yamal-
Nenets has been above the national average though below replacement 
while the rates in Chukotka and Yakutia have recently been about 2.0 
children per women. These regions with large Indigenous populations 
have among the highest fertility rates in the country. 
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Differences in levels and the age pattern of fertility are shown in Figure 
2.5 for Canada and the three northern territories. In 2011, Canada had a 
fertility rate of 1.6 while Yukon and NWT have slightly higher fertility 
rates, though still below replacement. Canada and Yukon had similar age 
pattern of fertility characteristic of societies at an advanced stage of the 
demographic transition with a later peak fertility among women ages 30 
to 34. NWT had a pattern characteristic of a population at an earlier 
stage, with peak fertility among women ages 25 to 29 but moderately 
high levels from ages 20 to 39. Women in Nunavut displayed a pattern of 
a population even earlier in the transition, with a peak among women 
ages 20 to 24 and continued high fertility in the late 20s.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As noted above, deviations from replacement-level fertility have a large 
impact on future population growth. With fertility rates above replace-
ment level, and younger age structures, the populations of Nunavut, the 
Faroe Islands, and Alaska can expect to have significant population 
growth in the future. With a fertility rate of just 1.35, and an older age 
structure, the Murmansk oblast can expect to experience continued 
population decline. Most of the rest of the Arctic have fertility rates at or 
just below replacement level, indicating that the populations will decline 
but rather slowly. 
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Figure 2.6: Life expectancy in selected Arctic regions (circa 2010)
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2.2.4 Mortality  
Two indicators depict mortality trends among Arctic populations – life 
expectancy at birth and the infant mortality rate (more detail on the 
health status and trends in health among Arctic populations are in the 
health chapter). Gender differences and differences between Indigenous 
and non-Indigenous peoples are emphasized within these indicators. Dur-
ing the twentieth century and beyond, there have been significant im-
provements in health because of increased knowledge of infectious dis-
eases and other causes of mortality, improved sanitation, food safety, and 
public health. Between 1950 and 2010, global life expectancy at birth has 
increased from 47.7 to 67.9 years (Figure 2.6), a remarkable increase of 
22.2 years. Life expectancy gains have been greater in less developed 
countries than in developed countries as the populations in the latter ap-
proach what is believed to be the biological limits of human life span. 
Globally, the female life expectancy advantage has increased from 2.0 to 
4.4 years between 1950 and 2010, as life-style causes of mortality, which 
affect males more than females, have become predominant.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2.5 Life expectancy 
Based on data for 2000, life expectancy in Alaska does not differ from 
that for the United States. Life expectancy in the northern territories of 
Canada has consistently been below the national average with Nunavut 
having the lowest. In 2004, the last year for which data were available, 
life expectancy for both genders combined was 70.4, nearly 10 years less 
than the national average of 80.2. 
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Since 1990, life expectancy in Iceland and the Faroe Islands has risen 
by similar amounts to similar levels. For men in the Faroe Islands, life 
expectancy rose by 6 years in 1990 to 79.1 in 2011. For women in the 
Faroe Islands, life expectancy rose by 4.6 years to 84.9. In Iceland, the 
life expectancy increase for women of 3.5 years was also smaller (to 
83.6), while male life expectancy increased by 4.9 years from 75.0 to 
79.9 years. Life expectancy levels in Greenland are significantly lower 
than in the other two North Atlantic northern countries but rose faster, 
especially for males. Male life expectancy in Greenland rose by 7.6 years 
to 68.3 in 2011, and for females by 4.6 years over the same period.  
Of the Arctic regions of Norway, Nordland and Troms have levels of 
life expectancy close to the national average while Finnmark has gener-
ally had the lowest life expectancy of any of the twenty Norwegian re-
gions at the NUTS3 level, though it is only 2.1 years below the national 
average for males and 1.3 for females. (NUTS, or Nomenclature of Terri-
torial Units for Statistics, from the French nomenclature d'unités territo-
riales statistiques, is a system for referencing the administrative divi-
sions of countries for statistical purposes). Life expectancy has increased 
for the entire country and for all regions, more so for males than females 
as the gender gap has narrowed. Life expectancy in Lapland is within a 
half year of the national average for both genders. 
One of the consequences of Russia’s post-Soviet transition away 
from a centrally-planned towards a market economy has been the 
steep increases in mortality and precipitous declines in life expectancy 
(Eberstadt, 2005; World Bank, 2005). The health status of the Russian 
population has never been good, and prior to the economic transition, 
levels of life expectancy were far below those expected based on the 
country’s GDP and level of development. Life expectancy for men de-
clined by 7.4 years from 64.9 in 1987, to 57.5 in 1994 before recover-
ing somewhat to 64.0 in 2011. The male-female gap in life expectancy 
in Russia is the highest in the world with women currently outliving 
men by 12 years. The consensus is that the increase in mortality was 
due to extreme psychosocial stress brought about by the social up-
heaval of the transition period. 
There are significant regional disparities in life expectancy in Russia, 
with many of the Arctic and Siberian regions having levels far below the 
already-low national average. In the early 1990s, life expectancy in 
Murmansk was about a year above the national average. By 1995, near 
the nadir of Russia’s post-Soviet plunge in life expectancy, levels in 
Murmansk were less than the national average and in Chukotka they 
were two years less than the national average. In the 2002, the first year 
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for which data for all of the okrugs were published, life expectancy in 
Yamal-Nenets okrug exceeded the national average, while that in Mur-
mansk was less than the national level by 1.5 years. Life expectancy in 
Nenets okrug was 3.5 years below the national average and in Chukotka 
it was 7 years below the national average, at 58.0 years for both genders, 
or 63.9 for females and an absurdly low level of 53.3 years for males. 
Social and economic dislocation explains Russia’s steep decline in life 
expectancy. The largest increases in the causes of death were cardiovas-
cular diseases and external causes including accidents, suicides, and 
murder. In these periphery Arctic regions, with the rapid shrinkage of 
local economies and high levels of out-migration, plunges in life expec-
tancy were even steeper. In 2009, the last year for which data are avail-
able, the same rankings relative to the national average remained, with 
life expectancy in Chukotka falling even more relative to the Russian 
average. In that year, people in Chukotka could expect to live 10.5 years 
less than the Russian average, 68.7 years in Russia versus 58.2 years in 
Chukotka, the lowest level of any Russian region. The explanation for 
this low level can only partially be attributed to the Indigenous popula-
tion as they only make up one-third of Chukotka’s population. 
Figure 2.6 summarizes data available on life expectancy for the Arctic 
regions showing the incredible diversity of life chances for Arctic resi-
dents of different regions. There is an enormous 24-year difference be-
tween the Faroe Islands and Chukotka. The Arctic regions of Russia have 
the lowest levels of life expectancy with Chukotka and the Nenets okrug 
having levels below those of less developed countries. Greenland and 
Nunavut also have relatively low levels, combining mortality patterns of 
both more and less developed countries, due in part to colonialism.  
2.2.6 Gender differences in life expectancy  
Globally, women outlive men by 4.4 years (Figure 2.7). The gap in devel-
oped countries, 7 years, is greater than in less developed countries 
where the female advantage is 3.5 years. The reason is that in developed 
countries, life-style factors, which disproportionally impact males, are 
the major causes of death. In less developed countries, factors contrib-
uting to major causes of death impact both genders more or less equally. 
In Arctic countries and regions there is correlation between large female 
advantages in life expectancy and low overall levels, as low levels of life 
expectancy by half the population would necessarily bring down the 
overall levels. 
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Sources: Data are from national and regional statisical offices.
Female life expectancy minus
male life expectancy (years)
Three of the four Arctic regions of Russia stand out with women out-
living men by more than ten years. The exception is the Yamal-Nenets 
region where women only outlive men by 4.2 years. 
Nunavut and Lapland also have wide gaps though these are close to 
the level for more developed countries. At the other extreme are a num-
ber of Arctic regions that have female-males gaps in life expectancy close 
to or less than the global average. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2.7 Infant mortality  
The infant mortality rate has been found to be a robust indicator of the 
level of development of a country or society. Large increases in life ex-
pectancy in the twentieth century are due in part to the steep declines in 
infant mortality. Globally, the infant mortality rate declined from 133 
infant deaths per thousand births in 1950 to 46 in 2005. Among devel-
oped countries, there has been a decline from 60 to 6. In some developed 
countries, the infant mortality rate is approaching the lowest practical 
limits. In less developed countries, the rate has fallen from 151 in 1950 
to 50 in 2005. As with other indicators, the Arctic populations are com-
binations of more and less developed societies and the infant mortality 
rates reflect this. 
Like the rest of the United States, the infant mortality rate in Alaska 
has steadily declined from 7.7 infant deaths per thousand births in 1994 
to 6.7 in 2009 (though there are wide annual fluctuations for this indica-
tor in Alaska and other Arctic regions because of small number of occur-
rences). The infant mortality rate for Alaska is close to the national aver-
age (Figure 2.8). However, the racial gaps in infant mortality in Alaska 
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Figure 2.8: Infant mortality in the Arctic 
Sources and notes: Data are from national and regional statisical offices and UN Population Division. Data are for 2010 unless otherwise noted. 
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are wide and becoming wider. In 1997–1999, whites in Alaska had an 
infant mortality rate of 5.3 infant deaths per thousand births while Alas-
ka Natives had a rate of 9.4 (Alaska Bureau of Vital Statistics, 2008). In 
2007–2009, the rate for whites had declined to 4.0 while the rate for 
Natives had increased to 11.4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Canada, the three northern territories have the highest infant mortali-
ty rates in the country with Nunavut consistently being the highest. 
It is difficult to determine trends in infant mortality in the Faroe Is-
lands, Greenland, and Iceland because of their rare occurrences in these 
small populations. Iceland has among the lowest rates in the world at 
1.8. The rate in the Faroe Islands is also quite low at 5.4, while that in 
Greenland is higher at 16.4. 
The infant mortality rate in Norway has declined from 7.9 infant 
deaths per thousand births in 1990 to 3.1 in 2009, placing it among the 
lowest rates in the world. As recently as 1990, the three Arctic regions of 
Norway had infant mortality rates among the highest in the country. 
While they still have rates above the national average, with rates be-
tween 3.5 and 3.8, they are quite low by international standards. The 
infant mortality rate in Finland and Lapland has declined to quite low 
levels and the rate in Lapland does not differ from the national average. 
Russia’s recent demographic crisis affected working-age males the 
most and was not due to a collapse of the health care system, which 
would have had an effect on children and infants. The national infant 
mortality rate fell from 17.4 in 1990 to 8.1 in 2009. In 1990, most Arctic 
regions had infant mortality rates slightly above the national average. By 
2000, the regional gaps had widened and some Arctic regions had rates 
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significantly above the national average. For instance, the rate in Chu-
kotka was 23.4 against the national average of 15.3. In 2009, most Arctic 
regions had rates below the national average except for Chukotka, which 
remained above with a rate of 12.6 while the national average was 8.1. 
The Arctic countries and regions all have infant mortality rates well 
below the global average, with some such as Iceland and Norway having 
among the lowest rates in the world. Greenland, Nunavut, and Chukotka, 
all predominantly Indigenous regions, have the highest rates and are the 
only regions with rates above 10 infant deaths per thousand births – but 
these are also not particularly high by global standards. Most of the Arc-
tic regions have rates around or less than the average for more devel-
oped countries. This includes the Arctic regions of Russia, where the 
mortality crisis has affected persons in the working ages more so than 
infants, children, or the elderly. 
AnnCatrin Blind, a young herder, and her son, Assar. Northern Sweden 
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2.3 Changing composition of the Arctic population 
The previous section examined overall changes in the population. This 
section turns to examination of changes in the gender, age, and ethnic 
composition of the population. 
2.3.1 Changing gender composition  
Because the Arctic economy is heavily based on resource extraction and 
fishing, the region has a relatively high male gender ratio. In the early days 
of outsider migration to the Arctic, the flows were predominantly male. 
For example, according to the 1900 census for Alaska, at the time of Alas-
ka Gold Rush, there were 258 males per 100 females (Sandberg, 2013). 
The male gender ratio steadily declined as more families moved to the 
area but then increased again to 162 males per 100 females in 1950 with 
the migration of predominantly-male military personnel at the onset of 
the Cold War. Again, a pattern of more permanent settlement followed, 
including wives and children, which lowered the male gender ratio. Still, 
Alaska remains the state with the highest male gender ratio in the United 
States. A similar pattern of high male gender ratios in the period of initial 
contact and exploration took place across the Arctic. However, as the 
economies of Alaska and other Arctic regions have diversified the per-
centage males has declined, though in most the ratio of men-to-women 
remains above the national and global ratios. More recently, female out-
migration has exceeded male outmigration from a number of Arctic re-
gions, leading again to high male gender ratios, especially in some smaller 
settlements. For Greenland, this has been the case since the 1980s. 
Globally, there are 102 males per 100 females. In developed coun-
tries, the male gender ratio is much lower, 95 males per 100 females, 
because of higher male mortality, whereas in less developed countries it 
is 103 males per 100 females. Analysis of gender ratios needs to also be 
compared to national gender ratios because of the wide diversity for the 
eight Arctic countries. Both Greenland, with 113 males per 100 females 
and the Faroe Islands with 108, have ratios which place them among the 
highest in the world. The reason for these high male gender ratios is due 
to recent high female out-migration (Hamilton and Rasmussen, 2010). 
Iceland has a male gender ratio of 101 males per 100 females, close to 
the global average. With one exception, most other Arctic regions have 
slightly lower male gender ratios of between 100 and 97 males per 100 
females. Russia and other former Soviet states, with just 86 men per 100 
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women, have the lowest male gender ratios in the world due to high 
male mortality and longer female life expectancy. 
At the sub-national, and even more so at the settlement level, there 
are rather skewed male gender ratios, as shown in Figure 2.9. Arctic 
regions in darkest blue are those with the highest gender ratios relative 
to the national averages, which is the situation across most of the Arctic. 
Though some of the gender-based division of labor is disappearing, 
there is a new pattern emerging of higher female education in the Arctic 
resulting in higher rates of female out-migration, first from smaller to 
larger settlements and then out of the Arctic either to the metropoles of 
the Arctic states or abroad, in seek of work commensurate with their 
skill levels. While men also migrate away, they tend to do so on a tempo-
rary basis, while women tend to leave permanently. Only in some of the 
larger Arctic settlements with more diversified economies is there a 
surplus of women. At the other extreme are smaller settlements with a 
narrow economic base such as fishing, forestry, mining, construction, or 
military that are sectors dominated by males (Nordregio, 2011). 
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Figure 2.9: Sex ratio of Arctic cities and regions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to the 2010 U.S. census, in Alaska there were 109 males per 100 
females, a slight increase since 2000 when there were 107 males per 100 
females. However, even this slightly higher level is part of a long-term 
downward trend since World War II and the beginning of the Cold War 
when the male gender ratio peaked with the inflow of servicemen to the 
state. The inflow of military personnel at that time not only temporarily 
increased the gender ratio in Alaska but in other ways had a profound 
influence on the size and spatial pattern of settlement. All three northern 
territories of Canada have male gender ratios higher than the national 
average with Nunavut being the highest with 106 males per 100 females. 
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All the Arctic regions of Fennoscandia have higher male gender ratios than 
the national averages by a few percentage points. 
Similar to the situation in other Arctic countries, the male gender ratio 
in the Russian Arctic is higher than the country as a whole, 96 males per 
100 females versus 86 for the entire country. However, the gender ratio in 
the Russian Arctic differs from other Arctic regions in two important re-
spects (Heleniak, 2011). The first is that while male gender ratios in other 
Arctic regions have been stable or slightly increasing over the past dec-
ades, in the Russian Arctic, there has been a precipitous decline in the 
male gender ratio since the economic transition in Russia began in the 
early 1990s. In Murmansk, the ratio of males to females fell from 102 in 
1990 to 94 in 2010, in Nenets okrug, from 96 to 94, in Yamal-Nenets from 
109 to 98, in Taymyr okrug, from 100 to 93, and in Chukotka from 110 to 
105. The second difference is that whereas levels and changes in the gen-
der ratio elsewhere in the Arctic are driven largely by differential rates of 
migration between the genders, in the Russian Arctic, the steeps declines 
are the result of unusually large differences in rates of natural increase. 
Figure 2.10 shows the percentage point change in the number of males 
per 100 females by region in Russia during the inter-census periods from 
1989 to 2002 and from 2002 to 2010. It is the periphery regions in the 
Arctic and Siberia where the male gender ratios declined the most. The 
explanation is not primarily one of differential rates of migration. For a 
broader set of regions included in the Russian North, between 1990 and 
2010, there was a net out-migration of 926 thousand for males and 827 
thousand for females, a difference of 99 thousand. Over the same period, 
males had a natural decrease of 69 thousand while females had a natural 
increase of 209 thousand, a difference of 278 thousand. Thus, about three-
quarters of the explanation for the change in the gender ratios in these 
regions can be explained by the increased differentials in natural increase 
between men and women. The explanation for these differences lies in 
examination of causes of death in the Arctic. Death rates from external 
causes (murder, suicide, accidents) and cardiovascular diseases are much 
higher in the North than in the rest of Russia. These are factors that dis-
proportionally affect men. Thus, the mortality crisis, which affected Russia 
during the past two decades as a result of the country’s economic transi-
tion, had an even greater impact in the northern and Arctic regions where 
the social upheaval was even more pronounced. 
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Fig 2.10a: Male-Female Change 1989–2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 2.10b: Male-Female Change 2002–2010 
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The wide diversity in the male-female gender ratios can be seen in Fig-
ure 2.11. With one exception, the region with the lowest male gender 
ratios are in the Russian Arctic but these need to be seen in the context 
of Russia which has among the lowest gender ratios in the world. The 
exception is Chukotka, which with a gender ratio of 105 males per 100, 
has nearly 20 more males per 100 females than the country as a whole. 
Aside from Russia, most Arctic regions have more males than females as 
expected by the occupational differences, which attract more men. At the 
high end are Greenland, Alaska, and the Faroe Islands. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3.2 Changes in the age composition  
The age structure of a population reflects past levels of fertility, mortality, 
and age-differential migration into and out of a region. The current age 
structure of a population also determines the parameters of future popu-
lation growth or decline. All else being equal, a population that has a rela-
tively young population will grow in the future because of factors built 
into its age structure, whereas an older population is likely to have no 
growth or a declining population. Several measures are used to evaluate 
the age structures of the Arctic regions – the median age of the population, 
the shares below, in, and above the working ages, and the age structure of 
the populations. Like elsewhere in the world, the population of the Arctic 
is aging which will have consequences for these societies. 
The median age is the age at which half the population is older and 
half the population is younger. In 2010, the median age of the global 
population was 29 years, in less developed countries 27 years, and in 
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more developed countries 40 years, the latter reflecting unpredicted 
population aging. Among Arctic countries, Finland has the highest medi-
an age at 42, only 3 years younger than Japan, the country with the old-
est population in the world. Sweden is the next oldest Arctic country 
with a median age of 41, followed by Canada at 40 years, Norway at 39, 
the Faroe Islands and Russia at 38, the United States at 37, Iceland at 35, 
and Greenland at 32. In spite of Greenland having the youngest median 
age of all Arctic countries, it is still has an older population than the me-
dian age of the global population. 
Among Arctic regions, Alaska has a median age three years younger 
than that for the United States. In Canada, Yukon has a median age just 
one year below that for Canada, while the median age for NWT is nearly 
8 years younger. The median age for the predominantly Inuit population 
in Nunavut, at 24 years, is younger than the median age for less devel-
oped regions in the world. In Norway, Nordland has a median age rough-
ly the same as the entire country while Troms and Finnmark are slightly 
younger. Both Norrbotten in Sweden and Lappi in Finland have median 
ages older than the national levels. In the Russian Arctic, the median age 
in Murmansk is 37 years, less than a year younger than the Russian av-
erage of 38 years. The other Arctic regions for which data are available, 
Nenets, Yamal-Nenets, and Chukotka okrugs have median ages about 33 
years, or 5 years below the Russian level. 
Population aging is nearly universal across the world due to declin-
ing birth rates and increasing longevity. Population aging can be de-
picted in several ways, using the median age, the shares of the popula-
tion below, in, and above the working ages, or the dependency ratio – 
the ratio of the number of persons outside the working ages to those in 
the working ages (to facilitate comparison across Arctic countries, a 
standard definition of working ages is used of persons between the 
ages of 15 and 64, even though countries differ in their official defini-
tions of working ages). The dependency ratio can be sub-divided into a 
youth dependency ratio and an elderly dependency ratio. Differences 
in the sizes of dependency ratios call for differences in the mix of social 
spending (e.g. spending on health care and education). The size of the 
overall dependency ratio and the relative size of the workforce have 
implications for economic growth. 
As with most demographic indicators, there are significant differ-
ences among Arctic regions in terms of the age structure as measured by 
the median age. The Arctic regions of Fennoscandia have the highest 
median ages between 38 and 45 years. These are regions in demograph-
ically advanced countries where the issue of how to deal with population 
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aging has been part of the political discourse for a number of years 
(Megatrends, 2011). Yukon and the Faroe Islands are also in this group. 
A middle group consists of Alaska and Iceland with median ages of 34 to 
35 years. Relatively high birth rates and continued in-migration into 
both contribute to the lower median age. A younger group is made up of 
the Siberian regions of the Russian Arctic, Greenland, NWT, and Nunavut 
with median ages of 34 years or younger. More so than other regions of 
the Arctic, the regions of the Russian Arctic were seen as places of tem-
porary labor, from which people would return to the “mainland” or cen-
tral Russia upon retirement. 
The series of maps in Figure 2.12 show the relative portions of the 
populations in the youth category (age 15 and below), in the working 
ages (ages 15 to 64), and in the pension ages (64 and older), (though the 
actual pension ages differ among countries). The Arctic regions with the 
largest shares of persons in the youth ages are in Nunavut and the Rus-
sian Arctic (Figure 2.12a). The Arctic regions with the smallest youth 
shares are in Fennoscandia and Murmansk. This common trend among 
the Arctic regions of northern Fennoscandia (including the Murmansk 
oblast) shows up in a number of demographic indicators, even though 
they are from four different countries and two quite different economic 
systems. The difference between the relative youth shares also illus-
trates how different Murmansk is demographically from the rest of the 
Russian Arctic. The share of persons below age 15 now and in the future 
is crucial for determining the demand for education and training. 
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Figure 2.12a: Population under 15 years in the Arctic regions 
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Figure 2.12b: Population 15–64 years (working-age) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Arctic Human Development Report 79 
Figure 2.12c: Population over 64 years in the Arctic regions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is a diverse set of regions with low proportions in the working 
ages including Nunavut, the Arctic regions of Fennoscandia, the Nenets 
and Taymyr okrugs (Figure 2.12b). For Fennoscandia the explanation is 
the relatively high portions of pension-age persons and small youth 
populations while in the others, the explanation is the large youth 
shares. Declines in the working-age populations brought about by in-
creases in life expectancy and out-migration is leading to a shortage of 
workers in some of these regions. 
The Arctic regions of the Nordic countries as well as Murmansk, Nu-
navik and Labrador have the highest shares of pension-age persons 
(Figure 2.12c). Yamal-Nenets okrug and NWT have relatively small el-
derly shares because of recent in-migration of young persons due to 
growing resource economies and in Nunavut because of high fertility. 
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Indigenous and non-Indigenous populations have quite different age 
structures as most Indigenous populations are at an earlier stage of the 
demographic transition. As a result, most have much younger popula-
tions and are poised to have continued population growth into the fu-
ture. Comparing the Alaska Native population and that of non-
Indigenous peoples in Alaska shows some of these differences in the age 
structures (Figure 2.13) (the Indigenous population in Alaska includes 
American Indians and Alaska Natives). The Alaska Native population has 
a much younger population, as indicated by the much larger cohorts of 
persons under age 20; 39% of Alaska Natives are young as compared to 
27% of non-Natives. The relative size of the non-Indigenous population 
becomes larger starting at age 20, in part because these are the most 
mobile age groups (at age 20 and higher), when young people begin to 
migrate to Alaska in large numbers. The non-Indigenous population in 
Alaska is much larger among ages 50 to 64. The predominantly Inuit and 
Indigenous regions of Arctic Canada have similar age structures relative 
to the total population. In Nunavut, 42% of the population is below age 
20, whereas 23% of Canadians are below age 20.  
Figure 2.13: Age-Sex Composition of Indigenous and Non-Indigenous Populations 
in Selected Arctic Regions, circa 2010 
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In Greenland, there are the same differences between the Indigenous 
population (those born in Greenland) and the non-Indigenous popula-
tion (those born outside Greenland), where 31% of those from Green-
land are below 20 as distinct from the 12% of those born outside. For 
persons not from Greenland, it is obviously a place of work, as 80% of 
those born outside Greenland are in the working ages versus 61% of 
those born in Greenland. Further demonstrating that Greenland is a 
place of work for those from outside the country is that the male-female 
gender ratio is 200 males per 100 females for those born outside the 
country while it is a more expected 104 males per 100 females for those 
born inside Greenland. These differences are especially pronounced 
from age 38 and older as the gender ratio for those born outside the 
country is 3 or 4 males per female. 
In the Russia Arctic, the mean age of the population (35.1 years) is 
slightly younger than the national average for all of Russia (39.0 years) 
For the numerically small peoples of the North, it is much younger (27.5 
years). The Russian Arctic has a larger share of children (ages 0–15) 
than elsewhere in the country, 18.1% as opposed to 15.0%. The propor-
tions of adolescents and young adults (15–24 years) are almost equal: 
14.1% in the Arctic and 14.4% outside. There are noticeably more adults 
(25–55 years of age) in the Arctic (51.7%) than outside (45.0%) and far 
fewer over 55 years of age, 16.0% in the Arctic versus 25.6% outside. 
These differences, in shares of adults and older, are a direct result of 
migration. Adults come to the Arctic regions and the elderly leave the 
Arctic. The reason for the high proportion of children is an indirect con-
sequence of the same migration of adults arriving to the Arctic who mar-
ry and have children. 
The Arctic Indigenous peoples are ethnically distinct from the rest of 
the inhabitants and have distinct demographic parameters. The Indige-
nous population has a much younger age structure. Of the total popula-
tion of Arctic Indigenous peoples, the proportion of children under 15 
years of age is more than 30%, of adolescents and young people more 
than 20%. The other age groups are much smaller than that of non-
Indigenous people in the Arctic. In general, the age structure of the In-
digenous population is entirely determined by the parameters of its 
natural movement: a relatively high birth rate, and ultra-high mortality 
rates, particularly in adulthood. 
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Russia aged during the inter-census period between 2002 and 2010. 
The entire population of Russia went from an average age of 37.8 years 
in 2002 to 39.0 in 2010, while the population of the entire Arctic went 
from 33.0 to 35.1 years over the same period. The Indigenous peoples in 
the Arctic had a slightly smaller increase, from 26.5 to 27.5 years. 
2.3.3 Changes in the ethnic composition  
The population of the Arctic is ethnically complex. It consists of various 
groups whose ancestors have resided in the region for millennia and 
who are considered Indigenous to the region, non-Indigenous groups 
who migrated to the region or whose ancestors migrated to the region 
from the non-Arctic regions of Arctic states to work in resource extrac-
tion, military, fishing, or government administration, people of mixed 
ethnicity, and more recently significant numbers of people who have 
migrated to the Arctic from non-Arctic states. Indigenous peoples have 
demographic structures and rates of change that are quite different from 
the non-Indigenous populations. The percent that the Indigenous popu-
lations make up of each Arctic region is shown in Figure 2.14. The high-
est shares, where the Arctic Indigenous groups are a majority are in 
Greenland, Nunavut, and Nunavik in northern Quebec. The lowest per-
cent Indigenous are in Murmansk, Nenets okrug, and Yamal-Nenets 
okrug in Russia, all three the destinations of large numbers of Slavic 
migrants who moved to these regions to work in resource extraction and 
large-scale industry. However, the ethnic composition of the Arctic is 
much more nuanced and complex that what can be shown in a simple 
thematic map (see Textbox 2.2). 
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Figure 2.14: Indigenous population in the Arctic regions 
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Categorizing Arctic peoples 
The Arctic states have adopted quite different approaches to the categorization 
of all peoples, including those in the Arctic. Among the provisions in the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (United Nations, 2007) are the 
rights to self-determination and that every Indigenous individual has the right to 
a nationality. How these rights are operationalized in statistical and legal terms 
varies across Arctic countries. 
The United States classifies people based on race, a trait based mostly on 
phenotypes or observable characteristics, and since 1970, whether the person is 
Hispanic or not, which is considered their ethnicity. People of Hispanic ethnicity 
can be of any race. A category for American Indian was added in 1870 and Alaska 
Natives were included in this category. In 2000, the category was expanded to 
read ‘American Indian or Alaska Native’, though they are tabulated together as a 
combined group. People who check this category are asked to indicate their 
enrolled or principle tribe. 
Canada classifies people based on ethnic origin. This includes three groups of 
aboriginal peoples – Inuit, Métis and First Nations. The first Canadian census to 
include the entire territory and all northern aboriginal peoples was in 1891 
(Hamilton and Inwood, 2011).  
Greenland categorizes people based on place of birth, the main distinction being 
in Greenland or outside Greenland. This distinction can be roughly thought to be 
Native Greenlanders or non-Greenlanders, or Inuit or non-Inuit. The Faroe Islands 
classifies people based on place of birth or citizenship (which they also refer to as 
nationality). Iceland also classifies people by place of birth and citizenship. 
Norway, Sweden, and Finland are considered together because the Indige-
nous peoples in the northern regions are the same, the Sámi, and the treatment 
of them in censuses and statistical registers is similar. All these states ceased 
recording ethnicity in the censuses after World War II, in part because of the role 
that ethnicity played in some of the atrocities. The Sami people are spread across 
those three countries plus Russia, in the Sámi homeland called Sapmi. 
When the Bolsheviks came to power after the 1917 revolution, they needed 
to make sense of the multi-national empire they were presiding over. They set-
tled on the concept of natsionalnost’ (nationality) as the term used to divide 
people into different groups, a concept still used in post-Soviet Russia (Hirsh, 
1997: Hirsh, 2005). They used the results of the first all-union census after crea-
tion of Soviet Union in 1926 to demarcate ethnic homelands, including those of 
the Arctic and Siberian peoples. In the post-Soviet period, many of the various 
Arctic and Siberian groups are classified belonging to a legal category titled 
korennye malochislennye narody (numerically small Native peoples). Of these, 26 
groups with populations less than 50,000 were designated as malochislenny  
Textbox 2.2 
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Textbox 2.2 continued 
 
narod Severa (numerically small peoples of the North), a number which has since 
grown to 37. In the 2010 census, 46 groups were classified as small numbered 
Indigenous peoples, of which 37 lived predominantly in Siberian or the Arctic. 
Thus, in the Arctic and Siberia, there are both numerically small peoples of the 
North and larger groups such as Yakuts, Komi, and Karelians. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Because of the different ways in which Arctic states categorize people 
based on their identity, no attempt is made to compare the percent In-
digenous or Arctic Native across all countries. Rather, the ethnic or racial 
breakdown for each Arctic country and region is shown based on na-
tional definitions. 
In the 2010 U.S. census, Whites make up 72% of the U.S. population. 
The combined category American Indians and Alaska Natives totaled 2.9 
million people, or 0.9% of the total U.S. population. 44% of American 
Indians and Alaska Natives reported in combination with another race, 
the most common being “some other race”. For Alaska, using the adjust-
ed data, which apportions those identifying more than one race, the 
American Indian and Alaska Native population totaled 120,452, or 
17.0% of the population of Alaska. This percentage has remained at 
about this level since 1960, though in absolute terms, this is the largest 
the Alaska Native population has ever been. 
In the 2006 Canadian census, the Aboriginal population, consisting of 
First Nations people, Métis, and Inuit, exceeded one million for the first 
time when they totaled 1,172,785. Only small shares of First Nations 
people and Métis reside in the Canadian Arctic. In Yukon, Aboriginal 
peoples made up one-quarter of the population, the majority of these 
First Nations peoples. In NWT, Aboriginal peoples were half the popula-
tion, with First Nations peoples being 31% of the total, Inuit 10%, and 
Métis 9%. In the Inuit homeland of Nunavut, Aboriginal peoples made up 
85% of the population. The 24,635 Inuit in Nunavut comprise nearly half 
of the Inuit in Canada.  
“Inuit Nunaat” is the Inuktitut expression for “Inuit homeland”, an 
expanse comprising more than one-third of Canada's land-mass, extend-
ing from northern Labrador to Northwest Territories (Statistics Canada, 
2006). Inuit Nunaat is comprised of four regions: Nunavut; Nunavik in 
northern Quebec (home to 9,565 Inuit, or 19% of the total Inuit popula-
tion); the Inuvialuit region in Northwest Territories (3,115 Inuit, or 6% 
of all Inuit nationally); and Nunatsiavut, in northern Labrador (popula-
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tion of 2,160 Inuit, or 4% of the total Inuit population). Four-fifths of all 
Inuit in Canada reside in Inuit Nunaat. 
Greenland identifies people based on place of birth. In 2013, 11.1% of 
the population was born outside Greenland, the majority born in Den-
mark. There has been a long-term decline in the percent born outside 
Greenland since it peaked at 19.2% in 1975. The percent born outside 
Greenland fell below 12% in 2000 and has remained at about the same 
level since then. Though not perfect, the percent born in Greenland can 
be thought to be roughly equal to the percent Arctic Native or the per-
cent Inuit. Because Greenland is a subject of Denmark, nearly all people, 
98.6%, were Danish citizens in 2011. Thai residents were the second 
largest group, though they only made up 0.3% of the population. 
Biking in Sisimiut, Greenland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit: Rasmus Ole Rasmussen. 
 
The Faroe Islands also classifies people based on place of birth, though 
unlike Greenland, there was no Indigenous population when Vikings 
from Norway first arrived more than a thousand years ago. In 2013, 
85% of the population had been born in the Faroe Islands, 6% in Den-
mark, and 9% elsewhere outside the Faroe Islands. Now a subject of 
Denmark, the vast majority of the population – 97.4% in 2013 – are 
Danish citizens. 
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Iceland also had no Indigenous population when Norwegian Vikings 
first occupied the country in the 900s. Historically, Iceland is ethnically 
homogenous, but there has recently been increased immigration into the 
country as a result of economic prosperity. In 2013, 11% of the popula-
tion was foreign-born, up from 4.6% in 1995. In 2013, the countries of 
origin of the largest number of foreign-born were Poland (2.6% of the 
population), Denmark (1.0%), the United States (0.6%), and Sweden 
(0.6%). Non-citizens make up an increasing share of the population. In 
2013, 6.7% of the population did not have Icelandic citizenship, up from 
just 2.6% in 2000. This is down slightly from 2008, just prior to the fi-
nancial crisis, when 7.4% of the population was foreign born. The non-
citizens came primarily from Poland (2.9% of the population) and Lithu-
ania (0.5%), both relatively recent EU accession countries that send 
large numbers of foreign workers abroad. 
Because ethnicity has not been recorded in censuses in Norway, 
Sweden, or Finland in decades, estimates of the number of Sámi in this 
part of their traditional territory are quite wide, varying between 50,000 
and 100,000 with 40,000 to 50,000 in Norway, 17,000 to 20,000 in Swe-
den, 7,000 to 8,000 in Finland, and 2,000 in Russia (Pettersen, 2011). 
The figures would be significantly higher if those of mixed ethnicity 
were included. 
Ethnic Russians are obviously the dominant group in Russia, constitut-
ing 78% of the population. Tatars are the second largest ethnic group with 
3.7% of the population followed by Ukrainians with 1.3%. These groups 
are among the most highly educated and mobile and have a large presence 
in many Arctic regions. The large-numbered Arctic groups, Yakuts, Komi, 
and Karelians combined are only 0.5% of the population. The numerically 
small peoples of the North totaled 253,932 in the 2010 census that is just 
0.2% of the national total. In the Russian Arctic, the total number of Indig-
enous peoples was 98,651 in 2010, which is 5.5% of the total Arctic popu-
lation, an increase over 2002 when they were 4.5%. 
The Murmansk oblast was very sparsely populated prior to Russian 
migration into the region and development. As a result, the Slavic popu-
lation makes up 87% of the population. Nearly all of the Sámi in Russia 
(1,599 of 1,771) reside in the Murmansk oblast. 
In Nenets okrug, Russians make up 63% of the population, the titular 
Nenets, 18%, and Komi, one of the larger Arctic groups, 9% (the term 
titular refers to the group upon which the ethnic homeland is based). 
Yamal-Nenets okrug is one of the few northern regions of Russia that 
actually had a population increase in the post-Soviet period as result of its 
growing economy from gas extraction. Ethnic Russians constitute 60% of 
  Arctic Human Development Report 89 
the population followed by Ukrainians with 9%. The Russian share is low-
er than in other northern regions because there are significant numbers of 
people from other parts of Russia and elsewhere in the former Soviet Un-
ion who have migrated to the region to work. Arctic Indigenous groups 
totaled 41,728 or 8% of the population. This includes 29,772 titular Ne-
nets who make up 6% of the population of one of their ethnic homelands, 
9,489 Khanty, and 1,968 Selkups. 
According to estimates made for Taymyr (Dolgan-Nenets) okrug, 
the ethnic Russian was 59% of the population, the Arctic Indigenous 
population primarily Dolgans and Nenets totaled 10,471 which is 29% 
of the population. 
Following the mass outmigration of the past several decades, the 
ethnic Russian population in Chukotka now makes up less than half the 
population, down from 1989 when their percent was 66%. Arctic Indig-
enous groups totaled 16,879, one-third of the population. Because of the 
out-migration of others, the Chukchi percent of the total population has 
increased from 7.3% in 1989, to 24% in 2002, and 25% in 2010. 
From the discussion above, it is apparent that the Arctic regions have 
quite diverse ethnic profiles, with some being composed predominantly 
of Indigenous peoples while others are made up mostly of migrants from 
outside the Arctic. As described elsewhere in this chapter, there are sig-
nificant demographic differences among the various ethnic groups resid-
ing in the Arctic in terms of size, urban-rural residence, household size 
and composition, fertility levels, mortality levels and migration patterns. 
As described elsewhere in this report, there are also significant differ-
ences among the groups in terms of lifestyle, economic status, and politi-
cal clout. Chapter 3, Cultures and Identities, provides a more nuanced and 
in-depth description of identity. 
2.3.4 Migration  
Since the time when the first humans crossed the Bering Land Bridge 
following the retreat of the last ice age, migration has played a large role 
in shaping the size, distribution, and composition of the Arctic popula-
tion. The overall population of the Arctic is quite small and even the 
largest settlements are not very large compared to elsewhere in the 
world. Thus, the movement of people into or out of the settlements or 
regions in the Arctic has an enormous impact on the size and composi-
tion of the populations. This section provides an overview of trends and 
patterns of migration in the Arctic. 
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Climate change and migration in the Arctic 
According to recent IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) and 
other reports, there is no doubt that the climate is changing, that much of the 
change is the result of human activity, and the Arctic is warming more rapidly 
than other parts of the planet. The warming of much of the Arctic will have 
impacts on the population at various geographic scales, which could impact 
settlement and migration patterns. These include reduced thickness of sea ice, 
which could lead to increased marine access and also to increased coastal 
erosion. Thawing permafrost could impact buildings in urban settlements. 
Terrestrial and marine ecosystems could shift causing changes in resource 
availability. These changes have both positive and negative effects on settle-
ment patterns in the Arctic. 
Migration is referred to as investment in human capital across space 
– people migrate in order to improve their quality of life. People migrate 
to, from, and within the Arctic for the same reasons they migrate else-
where in the world. There are a set of theories which explain how migra-
tion gets started and a separate set that explain how migration keeps 
going once it has started. 
The neoclassical economic approach is the oldest theory of migration 
and holds that income differentials between regions are why people 
migration from low-income to high-income regions. An extension of this 
theory is the new household economics of migration, which uses the 
household as the unit of analysis, and holds that the goal is maximization 
of household income, where one member migrates, others remain be-
hind to stabilize income. In dual labor market theory, there is one sector 
with well-educated persons and well paid and another sector with less 
well-educated and lower wages, often referred to as “immigrant jobs.” 
Network theory is one explanation of how migration is perpetuated 
once started. It states that ties created among migrants lower costs and 
risks and increase net returns. Related to this is the theory of cumulative 
causation, which explains that each act of migration makes the next act 
easier as information is gathered and a system has been created. Institu-
tional theory explains that once migration has started, institutions de-
velop to perpetuate migration flows. Incorporating climate change and 
the impact that it could play in migration in the Arctic is rather new 
(Textbox 2.3). 
Textbox 2.3 
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Textbox 2.3 continued 
 
While the climate in the Arctic is changing, in a number of studies of communi-
ties in the region, the impact of climate change on adaptation of communities to 
change is rather minimal compared to many other factors.  
Migration is multi-causal: people move for many different reasons and it is of-
ten difficult to isolate just one cause. "Climigration" is a term that has recently been 
coined to refer to people who are forced or who choose to move because of chang-
ing climatic reasons. While there are certainly settlements that will be impacted 
from climate change, such as coastal villages in Alaska and larger urban settle-
ments impacted by thawing permafrost in Russia, the overall impacts of climate 
change on migration and settlement patterns in the Arctic require more study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Fay. et al., 2010; Ford and Smit, 2004;. Johansen and Skryzhevska, 2013; Bronen and 
Chapin, 2013. 
2.3.5 Mobility and immobility 
This section starts with analysis of mobility and immobility of Arctic 
populations. It then looks at and international migration and migration 
of Indigenous peoples away from the Arctic. The next set of sub-sections 
look at the changing urban-rural composition of the Arctic and popula-
tion change in the largest Arctic cities.  
Two measures of mobility are used to compare populations between 
Arctic and non-Arctic regions and across the Arctic. The first is annual 
mobility or another measure of short-term mobility, depending on data 
availability. The second is lifetime mobility measured by the percent of 
the population born outside each Arctic region. Globally, 3% of the popu-
lation resides outside their country of birth.  
In the United States in 2010, 41% of the population was born outside 
the state where they are currently residing, including 13% who are for-
eign born (Ren, 2011). In Alaska, 61% of the population was born out-
side of Alaska, including 7% who were born abroad (Figure 2.15). 
Among U.S. states, only Arizona, Florida, and Nevada have higher shares 
born outside of these states. Whereas those states all have higher than 
average foreign-born populations, many Alaskans who were born out-
side the state come from elsewhere in the United States. In 2009, 22% of 
the population of Alaska moved, which is well above the 15% of all 
Americans who moved in that year, reflecting higher mobility of the 
Alaskan population. 
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Figure 2.15: Percent of population born outside region in selected Arctic regions, circa 2010
Source: National statistical offices.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to data from the 2006 Canadian census, all three Arctic re-
gions have had higher portions of their populations migrate over the 
previous five-year period than the national average. 
The data for Greenland, Iceland, and the Faroe Islands show that per-
cent of the population born outside of these countries is respectively 11, 
11, and 15%. In 2010, 16% of the population of Greenland migrated 
either internationally or between towns or settlements. According to 
data for 2008, 13% of the Icelandic population migrated that year. In 
2011, 10.5% of the population of the Faroe Islands moved between the 
six districts or to or from abroad. 
Like the other Arctic countries, Russia has a large foreign-born 
population. The 11.2 million foreign-born persons in Russia are the 
second-largest stock in the world after the United States. This consists 
of many who had migrated to the country from another republic when 
it was part of the Soviet Union and others who migrated since the 
breakup. The regions of the Russian Arctic have large numbers of peo-
ple who were born either elsewhere in Russia or outside of Russia. 
Though the regions of the Russian Arctic continue to be made up large-
ly of migrant populations, the shares have declined in the post-Soviet 
period, as it was those born elsewhere who had ties outside these re-
gions who left these regions in the largest numbers during the steep 
economic decline of the post-Soviet period (Heleniak, 2009). Ukraine 
and Belarus were the sources of large numbers of people who migrated 
to live and work in the Arctic. 
In 2010, for all of Russia, 10.5% of the population was born outside 
the region they were living in, of which 8% were foreign-born. In Ne-
nets okrug, 29% of the population was born outside the okrug and 6% 
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were foreign-born. In Murmansk, half the population was born outside 
the region and 13% were born abroad. In Chukotka, 65% were born 
outside the region, of which 15% were foreign-born. In Yamal-Nenets, 
70% were born outside the region, of which a quarter were born out-
side of Russia.  
Along with Moscow and St. Petersburg, many of the periphery re-
gions in the Arctic and Siberia have the highest rates of migration turno-
ver. In these regions there are high levels of both in-migration and out-
migration and there is a high correlation between the two indicating 
considerable migration turnover in the Arctic regions.  
All of the Arctic regions have highly mobile populations and many 
people who have originated from outside the region, including many 
from abroad. This has implications for migration, should there be an 
economic downturn, as many retain ties to places outside the Arctic to 
where they could move.  
2.3.6 Changing urban-rural composition 
The percent of a country’s population residing in urban areas is reflective 
of the structure of its economy. When larger shares are employed in min-
ing, manufacturing, and the service sector than in agriculture, there are 
higher urban shares. Arctic regions tend to have rather small manufactur-
ing sectors but many have large mining, forestry, or resource extraction 
sectors which tend to be concentrated in urban areas or which develop 
urban areas by their presence. Urban areas in the Arctic grow because of 
the in-migration of both outsiders and also Arctic Natives. 
There are significant differences in lifestyle and amenities between 
urban and rural areas, which tend to perpetuate the pull of urban areas 
in the Arctic and elsewhere. 
It is difficult enough to compare the percent urban across all of the 
world’s countries let alone among Arctic countries. In preparing esti-
mates and projections of the urban population, the United Nations relies 
on the data produced by national sources that reflect the definitions and 
criteria established by national authorities. It has long been recognized 
that, given the variety of situations in the countries of the world, it is not 
possible or desirable to adopt uniform criteria to distinguish urban are-
as from rural areas. Thus, including for Arctic countries, national defini-
tions are used to define the percent urban. 
Globally, the world’s population crossed a threshold in 2008, when 
more than half of the world’s population was defined as urban. This is 
a rather rapid rise in global urbanization, up from a 43% in 1990. With 
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their increasingly developed economies, more developed countries 
have long had more than half of their populations residing in urban 
areas, now 79%, while less developed countries as a whole are nearing 
this mark with 49% currently living in urban areas. Of Arctic countries, 
all but the Faroe Islands have three-quarters or more of their popula-
tions residing in urban areas (Figure 2.16). The Faroe Islands, with a 
more dispersed economy based on fishing, is only 42% urban. Iceland, 
with much of the population residing in the capital of Reykjavik and a 
few other urban centers, has the highest percent urban of Arctic coun-
tries at 94%, followed by Greenland and Sweden at 86%. The percent 
urban in the Arctic countries continues to increase, albeit at a rather 
slow pace, as the shares are reaching their maximum possible without 
further and significant structural economic changes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The population of Alaska is becoming increasingly urbanized with in-
migration to urban areas from outside the state as well as within. In 
1920, only 6% of the population resided in urban areas. With much of 
the economic growth concentrated in urban areas and the growth of 
new urban areas, by the 1970 census, more than half, 57% of Alaska’s 
population was residing in urban areas. However, the percent urban in 
Alaska has plateaued at about two-thirds of the population over the past 
three censuses, including the most recent 2010 census. This is far below 
the level of urbanization for the entire country but there are a number of 
U.S. states with smaller urban shares.  
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In northern Canada, only Yukon has a share of its population residing 
in urban areas (76%) that is anywhere near that of Canada (81%), while 
NWT (46%) and Nunavut (32%) remain predominantly rural territories. 
The percent of the population residing in urban areas of the Norwegian 
Arctic, 69%, is less than the overall share in Norway, 79%. 
In all regions of the Russian Arctic, more than half the population 
resides in urban areas, with Murmansk (93%) and Yamal-Nenets 
(85%) having the highest shares. Much of the population of Murmansk 
oblast is concentrated in Murmansk city, the home of the North Sea 
Fleet, and in a number of other mining settlements, while much of the 
rest of the region is sparsely inhabited. In Yamal-Nenets, much of the 
population resides in a number of gas-producing and related transport 
settlements. Nenets, Taymyr, and Chukotka okrugs all have two-thirds 
of their populations in urban areas, which is less than the Russian av-
erage. Of Russian Arctic regions, Chukotka actually had a decline in the 
percent urban from 73 to 65% between the 1989 and 2010 censuses, 
as much of the contraction of economic activity took place in the large 
urban settlements. Overall, the sixteen regions defined as the Russian 
North have 80% of their populations residing in urban areas, reflecting 
the structure of their economies based on resource extraction and 
transport and small agricultural sectors. 
There is obviously considerable diversity in each Arctic region’s 
share of urban populations, reflecting differences in economic structures 
and spatial distributions. The percent urban also reflects the lifestyles 
and access to urban amenities that each region’s population enjoys. 
2.3.7 Population change in largest cities 
Along with the general trend of increased urbanization taking place 
across the Arctic is increased concentration of the population in most 
Arctic regions into one or a few of the larger urban settlements. There 
are many ways to depict this trend but one simple way is to examine the 
share of the region’s population in the largest settlement over time. For 
nearly all Arctic regions, this settlement serves as the economic, admin-
istrative, and transport hub. In many cases, there are far more amenities 
in these larger settlements, such as education, consumer goods, enter-
tainment and leisure opportunities, as well as employment opportuni-
ties. The draw of the “bright lights and big city” will continue this trend 
well into the future. 
In 1960, 36% of the population of Alaska lived in Anchorage. This 
share has steadily increased to about 42% currently (Figure 2.17). An-
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Figure 2.17: Largest city share of  total population in selected Arctic regions, 1990 -2013
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chorage’s share has leveled off, though there has been increased popula-
tion growth in the nearby Matanuska-Susitna Valley. Combined with 
Fairbanks, 55% of Alaska’s population resides in these two urban set-
tlements. This reflects a confluence of factors, including migration of 
Alaska Natives to larger urban settlements. The share of Alaska Natives 
who reside in the five most-populous boroughs increased sharply from 
42 to 49% between 2000 and 2010 (Sandberg 2013). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The population of Yukon is extremely concentrated into the capital of 
Whitehorse and is becoming more so. In 1990, 71% of the territory’s 
population resided in Whitehorse, a figure that has risen to 76% in 
2013. Between the 2001 and 2006 censuses, Yellowknife’s share of 
NWT’s population increased from 44.3 to 45.1%. Because of a deliber-
ate effort to decentralize jobs in Nunavut and higher natural increase 
in other settlements, Iqaluit’s share of the territory’s population has 
declined from 21.1% in 2006 to 20.3% in 2013. 
Nuuk’s share of Greenland’s population has been steadily rising over 
time, from 17.2% in 1977 to 22.0% in 1990 to 29.2% currently. If not for 
housing shortages in Nuuk, the share might even be higher. Iceland is an 
extreme example of population concentration, with Reykjavik’s popula-
tion increasing from 8.5% of Iceland’s total in 1901 to 38.2% in 1990 
(the larger capital region also increased from 10.5 to 57.1% over the 
same period). Reykjavik’s share peaked in the early 2000s at 39.4% and 
has declined slightly to 37.2% in 2013, in part because of continued 
growth in the larger capital region. Tórshavn’s share of the total popula-
tion of the Faroe Islands has declined slightly from 27.5% in 1990 to 
25.4% in 2013. However, with population numbers in Hoyvik and Argir 
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included, Tórshavn’s share of the total population of Faroe Islands has 
increased from 33% in 1990 to 37% in 2013. 
Apartment buildings, Nuuk, Greenland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit: Harald Finkler. 
 
The predominant trend across the Russia Arctic is absolute population 
decline in the oblast centers or largest settlements combined with in-
creases in their shares of the regions’ overall population. This obviously 
indicates significant depopulation of the areas outside of the largest 
settlements, including in many cases, complete closure of many smaller 
settlements. This trend is also taking place across a larger set of sixteen 
regions that comprise the Russian North. This trend is due to a conflu-
ence of factors, including greatly increased transport costs under market 
conditions in the Russian North and Arctic which have made both per-
sonal and freight transport extremely costly. This caused a significant 
contraction of the settlement structure in the Russian Arctic and the 
concentration of the population into a few of the largest settlements in 
each region. An example is the Anadyr in Chukotka okrug. Between 1989 
and 2011, the population of the region shrank from 164,000 to just 
50,000, a decline of 70%, as the true cost of living in this distant region 
became apparent with the withdrawal of many subsidies. However, 
while the population of Anadyr fell from 18,000 to 13,500 between the 
1989 and 2002 censuses, its share of the region’s population increased 
from 11 to 27%. 
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Thus, with a few exceptions, the dominant trend has been high and 
increased population concentration into the urban areas and capital 
cities. This trend is expected to continue as economies of scale make jobs 
and life more attractive in the capitals than outside. 
2.4 Arctic populations in the future 
2.4.1 Cohort-component methods of population 
projections 
The common method for projecting the population of a country or re-
gion into the future is the cohort-component method. The components of 
population change – fertility, mortality, and migration – are applied to 
the cohorts or the age-sex structure of a population to project how a 
population will change into the future. Assumptions are made about the 
future levels and age-sex structure of fertility, mortality, and migration 
based on the country’s or region’s recent past and demographic theory. 
Population projections are used by a variety of government agencies, 
businesses, and others in planning for the future. The statistical offices of 
the Arctic regions or national statistical offices make population projects 
for the Arctic regions. For any region or country, migration is the most 
difficult component of population change because of the exogenous fac-
tors affecting it, whereas future levels of fertility and mortality are 
bounded by the current age structure of a population. This is especially 
true in the Arctic because of small populations and the extreme volatility 
of migration.  
This section examines projections between 2010 and 2030, or rough-
ly one generation ahead. If there is more than one scenario, the median 
or baseline scenario is used. The world’s population is projected to con-
tinue to grow and to increase by 29% between 2010 and 2040, all obvi-
ously from there being more births than deaths. Global population 
growth is projected to continue through the end of the century, by which 
time, the world’s population will exceed 10 billion. This enormous num-
ber of people has and will continue to impact the Arctic as this growing 
population will increasingly look to the region for natural resources. The 
impact of this growing, and increasingly affluent population will also 
contribute to anthropogenic climate change, which will affect the Arctic 
sooner and more severely than other regions. 
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2.4.2 Projections of the population  
The population of Alaska is projected to increase by 28% to 915,211 by 
2035, most of this from natural increase. A low scenario with net out-
migration from the state projects a moderate increase to 761,879, while 
a high scenario with continued in-migration projects a population of 
over a million at 1,143,334. This projected rate of growth of the Alaskan 
population is higher than the rate for the United States, which is project-
ed to increase by 15% to 370 million in 2035. About 60% of the popula-
tion increase for the United States will be from natural increase and 40% 
from migration. 
Yukon is projected to grow by 19% to 41,698 over the next decade. 
Presumably this will be through a combination of natural increase and 
net in-migration, as the methodology states that the projections were 
based on demographic patterns during the reference period and that 
users of the data should determine how economic conditions will affect 
migration. Thus, the impact of resource development is not explicitly 
incorporated into these projections. The population of Yukon’s capital of 
Whitehorse will increase faster than the rest of the territory, growing 
from 26,711 to 32,194 in 2021 when it will have over three-quarters of 
Yukon’s population. The NWT is projected to have population growth of 
19% over the quarter-century from 2010 to 2035. Projections for the 
population of Nunavut are made by projecting the population of each of 
the region’s twenty-seven communities and then aggregating them to 
the regional and territorial levels. The population of Nunavut is project-
ed to increase by 39% by 2036, when it will be 44,581. This will occur 
through a rather significant natural increase of the population offset by 
projected net outmigration. The natural increase will occur because of 
the region’s young age structure and continued above-replacement fer-
tility level. The projected net out-migration could be detrimental to de-
velopment in the region because it will likely be young persons in their 
twenties leaving in the largest numbers. 
The population of Greenland reached 55,000 in 1990 and has stabi-
lized within a few thousand of that amount over the past two decades. 
According to projections from Statistics Greenland, in 2040 the popula-
tion will remain at about that same number. The population of Iceland is 
projected to increase by 36% by 2060 to 435,106 with two-thirds of this 
increase coming from natural increase and one-third from net immigra-
tion. The population size of Faroe Islands is projected to be 53,000 in 
2040 under the most optimistic scenario.  
Under almost any scenario, there is projected to be continued im-
migration into Norway based on the assumption that income differen-
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tials between Norway and the rest of the world will remain wide (Sta-
tistics Norway, 2013). Under the medium scenario, the population of 
Norway is projected to increase by 31% by 2040, while the three re-
gions of the Norwegian Arctic will have much slower growth of just 
9%. Norrbotten, in northern Sweden is projected to continue to slowly 
lose population. About two-thirds of the projected growth will come 
from natural increase and one-third from in-migration. The population 
of Lapland is projected to remain roughly the same over the next three 
decades, while the population of Finland is projected to grow by 11%. 
The population of Russia is projected to continue to decline, albeit at 
a slower rate than over the past few decades. The total fertility rate for 
Russia is projected to stay below replacement level and life expectancy 
is projected to rise by nearly ten years, though there is little basis for 
such an optimistic projection as life expectancy for the country is cur-
rently lower than it was in 1964 and many of the Arctic regions have 
levels of life expectancy lower than the national average (Heleniak, 
2010). Data for only four of the nine Arctic regions of Russia are availa-
ble but some assumptions were made about the others based on recent 
population change. According to these projections, the population of the 
Russian Arctic will decline by 7% between 2010 and 2030 and would be 
about 1.8 million, down from 2.1 million in 2000 and much lower than in 
1990, at the beginning of the transition period, when it was 2.6 million. 
All regions are projected to show declines except for Nenets okrug, 
which will show a modest increase ,and Yamal-Nenets okrug, which is 
projected to increase by a quarter. Regions with projected population 
increase will do so because of a combination of natural increase due to 
having younger age structures. Though data are not available for all re-
gions, those with projected declines will do so because of large amounts 
of continued out-migration. For instance, the population of Chukotka is 
projected to decline by 26% to 35,400 in 2030 in spite of births project-
ed to exceed deaths. If the projections hold, the population will be just 
one-fifth the size it was in 1989 when it had a population of 164,000. 
Based on these different projections, the population of the Arctic will 
grow quite slowly from its current size of 4.050 million in 2010 to 4.127 
million in 2020 and 4.197 million in 2030 (Figure 2.18). This is an in-
crease of just under 150,000 or 4% over the next two decades, at a time 
when the global population is projected to increase by 29%. The North 
American Arctic is projected to increase by nearly 200,000 persons. 
Greenland will have roughly the same population size. Iceland is pro-
jected to increase by 56,000. The Arctic regions of Fennoscandia will 
only add 13,000 persons. It is the Russian Arctic where the largest loses 
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will take place: that region is projected to lose another 124,000 persons. 
Already, less than half the Arctic population resides in Russia and by 
2030, Russia’s share of the Arctic population will be only 42%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.5 Summary of major trends  
 After decades of growth, the population of the Arctic has stabilized 
at just over 4 million. This is due to continued population decline in 
the Russian Arctic, which is offset by population growth in other 
Arctic regions. 
 Most of the Arctic countries and regions are at a later stage in the 
demographic transition from high birth and death rates to low birth 
and death rates, meaning that population change from natural 
increase, the difference between birth and deaths, will be quite low 
or even negative. Exceptions to this are Arctic indigenous populations 
or regions with large indigenous populations, which are at earlier 
stages in the demographic transition and continue to have significant 
population growth because of younger age structures and higher 
fertility rates. The fertility rate in the Arctic ranges from 3.0 children 
per woman in Nunavut to 1.3 in Murmansk. 
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 Across the Arctic, infant mortality is low by international standards, 
with some Arctic countries and regions having the lowest rates in the 
world. However, there is considerable diversity in overall life 
expectancy because of large differences in adult mortality. Life 
expectancy in several regions in the Russian Arctic is below the levels 
for less developed countries, while the levels in Iceland, the Faroe 
Islands, and several Arctic regions in Fennoscandia are among the 
highest in the world. 
 There is a continued trend of increased urbanization and 
concentration of the populations in nearly all Arctic regions in the 
capital cities. 
 In the future, the overall population of the Arctic is not projected to 
increase very much. Projected population increases in Alaska, the 
Canadian Arctic, Iceland and the Norwegian Arctic will be offset by 
declines in other Arctic regions, especially the Russian Arctic. 
2.6 Key conclusions and gaps in knowledge 
After decades of rather substantial population growth, the size of the 
population of the Arctic appears to have stabilized at just over four mil-
lion. Projections of the future size do not foresee growth much above 
this level. The leveling off the overall size of the Arctic population is due 
to continued population declines in most of the Russian Arctic, combined 
with robust growth in some other Arctic regions. The booms and busts 
in the Arctic economy associated with the discovery and depletion of 
resources have always had and will continue to have a large influence on 
the size of the population. 
This chapter has depicted the considerable demographic diversity 
among the different Arctic countries and regions. Some Arctic regions are 
made up largely of Arctic Indigenous peoples who continue to be engaged 
in traditional economic activities and have rural lifestyles. At the other 
extreme are urban settlements consisting almost entirely of people from 
outside the Arctic engaged in resource extraction or construction. This has 
led Arctic regions to differ in terms of their spatial settlement patterns. 
Some consist of a number of small, scattered villages while others have 
most of their populations concentrated into just a few larger urban set-
tlements. The Arctic regions differ considerably in terms of fertility levels 
and patterns, mortality and morbidity patterns, age, gender, and ethnic 
composition. The role of migration also has a differential impact on Arctic 
regions and settlements. The difference in demographic levels and pat-
  Arctic Human Development Report 103 
terns between Arctic Indigenous peoples and outsiders is clearly evident. 
The role and influence of natural conditions also obviously differs across 
the Arctic, as does the influence of climate change on settlement and mi-
gration patterns. Thus, it is difficult to generalize about the Arctic popula-
tion as this diversity needs to be considered. 
The Arctic consists of countries and regions with very good statistical 
systems and much is known about the people living in the North. There 
are an increasing number of studies on various aspects of Arctic demo-
graphic patterns though, obviously, much more analysis and research 
could be done on specific demographic issues in the Arctic, including 
specific regions and explorations of the linkages between demographic 
and social, economic, and natural influences. This chapter has presented 
a broad overview of current and recent trends and patterns in the Arctic 
population as background for the chapters to follow on the human de-
velopment in the region. 
2.7 References 
Alaska Bureau of Vital Statistics, 2008, Fetal, infant, and child deaths. 
http://dhss.alaska.gov/dph/VitalStats/Documents/PDFs/2008/2008_Fetal_Infant_
Child_web.pdf (24 February 2014). 
Bronen, R. and F.S. Chapin III, 2013. Adaptive governance and institutional strategies 
for climate induced community relocations in Alaska, Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences. http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2013/05/16/ 
1210508110.full.pdf (23 February 2014). 
Eberstadt, N., 2010. Russia’s Peacetime Demographic Crisis: Dimensions, Causes, Impli-
cations. The National Bureau of Asian Research, NBR Project Report, Seattle. 
http://nbr.org/downloads/pdfs/psa/Russia_PR_May10.pdf (1 September 2014).  
Fay, M., R.I. Block and J. Ebinger (eds.), 2010. Adapting to Climate change in Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia. The World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
Ford, J.D., and B. Smit, 2004. A framework for assessing the vulnerability of commu-
nities in the Canadian Arctic to risks associated with climate change. Arctic, 57(4): 
389–400. 
Hamilton, L.C. and R.O. Rasmussen, 2010. Population, sex ratios and development in 
Greenland. Arctic, 63(1): 43–52. 
Hamilton, M.A. and K Inwood, 2011. The Aboriginal population and the 1891 census 
of Canada. In: Axelsson, P. and P. Sköld (eds.). Indigenous Peoples and Demography: 
The Complex Relation between Identity and Statistics, pp. 95–115. Berghahn Books, 
New York and Oxford. 
Heleniak, T., 2011. The changing gender composition of the Russian North, Presenta-
tion made at the Annual Meeting of the Association of American Geographers, Seat-
tle, Washington, April 12–16.  
Heleniak, T., 2010. Mortality trends in the former USSR. Geographische Rundschau, 
Special Issue on World Population, 62(3): 56–63. 
104 Arctic Human Development Report 
Heleniak, T., 2009. The role of attachment to place in migration decisions of the 
population of the Russian North. Polar Geography, 32(1-2): 31–60. 
Hirsch, F., 2005. Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the 
Soviet Union, Cornell University Press, Ithaca. 
Hirsch, F., 1997. The Soviet Union as a work in progress: ethnographers and the 
category Nationality in the 1926, 1937, and 1939 censuses. Slavic Review, 56(2): 
251–78.  
Hunsinger, E. and E. Sandberg, 2013. The Alaska Native population: steady growth 
for original Alaskans through years of change. Alaska Economic Trends, 33(4): 4–9. 
http://labor.state.ak.us/trends/apr13.pdf (1 September 2014). 
Johansen, H.E. and Y.V. Skryzhevska, 2013. Adaptation priorities in Russia's High 
North: climate change vs. post-Soviet transition. Polar Geography, 36(4): 271-90;  
Kohler, H., F.C. Billari, and J.A. Ortega, 2002. The emergence of lowest-low fertility in 
Europe during the 1990s. Population and Development Review, 28(4): 641–80. 
Megatrends, 2011. Rasmussen, R.O. (ed). Nordic Council of Ministers, Copenhagen. 
http://www.norden.org/en/publications/publications/2011-527 (24 February 
2014). 
Pettersen, T. 2011. Out of the backwater? Prospects for contemporary Sámi demog-
raphy in Norway. In: Axelsson, P. and P. Sköld (eds.) Indigenous Peoples and Demog-
raphy: The Complex Relation between Identity and Statistics, pp. 185–96. Berghahn 
Books, New York and Oxford. 
Ren, P., 2011. Lifetime mobility in the United States: 2010. American Community 
Survey Briefs, U.S. Census Bureau, Washington, D.C. 
Sandberg, E. 2013. A history of Alaska population settlement, Alaska Department of 
Labor and Workforce Development. http://labor.alaska.gov/research/pop/ 
estimates/pub/pophistory.pdf (24 February 2014). 
Statistics Canada, 2006 Census: Aboriginal Peoples in Canada in 2006: Inuit, Métis 
and First Nations. http://www12.statcan.ca/census-recensement/2006/as-sa/97-
558/p6-eng.cfm#02 (24 February 2014). 
Statistics Norway, Population projections, 2012-2100, release dated June 20, 2012. 
http://www.ssb.no/en/befolkning/statistikker/folkfram (19 April 2013). 
UN Population Division, 2011. World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision, 
Special Aggregates: list of groupings.  
UNDRIP, 2007. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: 
resolution / adopted by the UN General Assembly, 2 October 2007, A/RES/61/295. 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/471355a82.html (24 February 2014). 
Weeks, J.R., 2008. Population: An Introduction to Concepts and Issues, Tenth Edition, 
Thompson Wadsworth, Belmont, California. 
World Bank, 2005. Dying Too Young: Addressing Premature Mortality and Ill Health 
Due to Non-Communicable Diseases and Injuries in the Russian Federation. World 
Bank, Washington, D.C. 
 
 
3. Cultures and Identities 
Lead Authors 
Peter Schweitzer, University of Vienna, Austria, Peter Sköld, Umeå Uni-
versity, Sweden and Olga Ulturgasheva, University of Manchester, UK 
Contributing Authors 
Shari Gearheard (University of Colorado at Boulder, USA); Aytalina 
Ivanova (North-Eastern Federal University, Russian Federation); Florian 
Stammler (University of Lapland, Finland); Aimar Ventsel (University of 
Tartu, Estonia) 
3.1 Introduction 
“Culture” and “identity” are two highly contested and debated notions, 
which permeate current public and political discourses throughout the 
Arctic. They also refer to features by which individuals, groups and peo-
ples claim, negotiate or assert their differences in the context of national 
or ethnic frameworks. To share a culture or share an identity (national, 
ethnic, class or otherwise) implies that one shares certain features with 
members of that group. Since these features can be easily essentialized 
and rigidified in political and nationalist discourses, notions of “culture” 
and “identity” can lead to political exclusion, alienation, tension or conflict. 
In order to avoid deterministic views of culture, we define it as a non-
static, creative process that imbues people’s actions with particular 
meanings, saturates their words with distinct sounds and frames their 
relations within certain logic. All the configurations of meanings, sounds, 
relations and logic change over time but what remains is their embed-
dedness in socio-economic environments and systems of adaptations to 
the Arctic landscape. We also accept the view that often people’s identi-
ties are not fixed but are fluid and open to change. 
This chapter sees itself as a successor to the first AHDR’s on Societies 
and Cultures. The title change – to Cultures and Identities – indicates a 
shift of emphasis toward cultural dimensions of circumpolar life and 
away from its social aspects. Given the significance of culture in the 
realm of identity politics, we decided to focus on these two elements of 
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Arctic human development. The topical field of societies is addressed in 
Chapter 11, Community Viability and Adaptation. 
Discussions of identity, cultural identification and ethnic affiliation 
are often embedded in colonial discourses. In wider contexts where In-
digenous and non-Indigenous communities overlap, Arctic Indigenous 
groups are often marginalized and labeled as suicidal, dysfunctional or 
dependent on the welfare state (Fienup-Riordan, 2000; Morrow, 1996; 
Vitebsky, 2005). Although these discussions demonstrate that culture 
and identity are highly contested and heavily influenced by the politi-
cized world, they still play a crucial role and remain as critical compo-
nents in the ways Arctic communities construe their relations with the 
outside world and position themselves in the global arena of human 
rights. Both “culture” and “identity” are often invoked when Indigenous 
peoples’ groups try to establish and uphold legal frameworks for their 
rights. Therefore, in this chapter we find it necessary to present an up-
dated view on what constitutes “culture” and “identity” for the people 
and peoples of the Arctic. 
We proceed with a brief overview of the historical interactions of dif-
ferent groups of population in the Arctic, important to an understanding 
of the genesis of contemporary group identities and cultural practices. 
Such a historical overview was not provided in the first Arctic Human 
Development Report. Culture and identity are interdependent, but we 
will treat them in separate sections, distinguishing them for analytical 
purposes. The section on cultures addresses languages and language 
vitality, spirituality and worldview, and arts and sports as aspects of 
circumpolar cultural practices. Under the section on “Identities” we pro-
vide a theoretical discussion of facets of identity, followed by reflections 
on “Indigenous identities”, “mixed identities” and “Arctic identity” as 
categories of identification in the North. We next offer a brief delibera-
tion on “quantifying ethnicity”, and then discuss subsistence, landscape 
and globalization in relation to identities. The final section of this chap-
ter summarizes its findings and identifies the major trends regarding 
Arctic cultures and identities over the last decade. 
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3.2 Brief historical background to circumpolar 
cultures and identities 
The diversity of the Arctic is well illustrated by its spectrum of cultures 
and historical experiences. Recognizing the processes of historical 
change occurring across the Arctic regions is important for a proper 
understanding of the current situation. Contemporary cultures and iden-
tities are products of the past.  
Human habitation of the Circumpolar North extends over several thou-
sand years. In the north of Eurasia, the earliest traces of settlements of 
modern humans during the Paleolithic are in continental Siberia; modern 
humans expanded above the Arctic Circle between 12,000 and 7,000 years 
ago (Hoffecker, 2004). Starting with the earliest phases of human habita-
tion of the Arctic, processes of interaction, exchange, and displacement 
among northern groups are recognizable. The direct presence of Europe-
an colonial powers in the Arctic is a relatively recent phenomenon, but 
findings of iron and of other items that were not produced locally attest to 
long-standing connections with trade centers to the South. The territory of 
the Sámi has a history of more than 2,000 years of interaction with south-
ern agriculturalists (Hansen and Olsen, 2014: 39–44), as the Norse pushed 
north along the western coast of contemporary Norway and Finnish-
speakers moved into the southern and western parts of contemporary 
Finland. While the expansion of farming as well as economic exchange 
seemed to drive the process in northernmost Europe, the quest for mar-
ketable resources alone seemed to fuel European expansion into other 
parts of the North. From the 17th century onwards, the rich boreal forests 
of Siberia and Canada became staging areas for the fur trade. The areas 
north of the tree line were little affected by fur trapping prior to the 20th 
century, but the coastal areas of the Arctic close to the Atlantic and Pacific 
Oceans became important destinations for the Euro-American whaling 
industry in the 18th and 19th centuries. 
3.2.1 Alaska 
The Indigenous peoples of Alaska are generally divided into six major 
groupings: Unangan (Aleut), Sugpiaq (Alutiiq), Yupik (Central Yup’ik and 
Siberian Yupik), Iñupiaq (northwest Alaskan Inuit), Athabaskans (Inte-
rior Indians) and Tlingit and Haida (Southeast Coastal Indians). These 
peoples share linguistic and cultural similarities as a result of a long 
presence in different parts of the region. When Russian explorers en-
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tered Alaska in the mid-18th century, they found it occupied by approx-
imately 80,000 Indigenous people (Langdon, 2002). 
After several decades of uncoordinated exploitation of southern 
Alaskan human and natural resources by Russian fur traders, the incor-
poration in 1799 of the Russian American Company (RAC) – a state-
sponsored company that held a trade monopoly similar to the Hudson’s 
Bay Company and the Royal Greenland Company – marked the begin-
ning of a regulated colonial administration of the region. In 1867, the 
United States purchased Alaska from Russia, leading to the establish-
ment of a new colonial order, which differed in its attitude toward reli-
gion and native languages (among other things) from the previous one. 
While Russian rule was in no way idyllic, U.S. American rule was charac-
terized by even less tolerance toward Indigenous languages and belief 
systems. It took many decades for the territory of Alaska and its (Indige-
nous) inhabitants to receive full recognition of their citizens’ rights and 
achieve political representation. For the non-Indigenous inhabitants of 
the region, Alaskan statehood in 1959 marked the major achievement 
along that way; for the Indigenous peoples, the passage of the Alaska 
Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) in 1971 was the main event. 
ANCSA was triggered by the discovery of oil on Alaska’s North Slope and 
addressed Indigenous land rights in an unusual way, by giving cash and 
land titles to newly formed “Native corporations” (on the regional and 
local level). ANCSA has been controversial since its passage, but Alaska’s 
history of the last 40+ years was impacted significantly by it (Berger, 
1985; Mitchell, 2001). 
3.2.2 Canada 
Across present-day Canada, settlements and trade routes had been es-
tablished by Indigenous peoples by 500 BCE – 1000 CE. Communities 
developed, each with its own culture, customs, and character. Cultures 
varied markedly across this expanse, from Tlingit and Athapaskan in the 
northwest to Innu and Abenaki on the Atlantic Coast. Various Inuit 
groups inhabited the Arctic coast (Damas, 1984). 
After the short-lived settlement attempts by Vikings to establish a 
presence on the eastern shores of what is now Canada c.1000 CE, the 
next European exploration dated to the late 15th century, followed by 
settlements on the Atlantic coast and the St. Lawrence River in the 16th 
century. Northern and Arctic aboriginal groups, however, experienced 
European contact much later. This led to a very different dynamic be-
tween aboriginal groups and settlers in the North than in the South of 
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Canada, a difference that continues to shape the North-South politics of 
Canada to this day (Freeman, 2000). 
With few exceptions, the Inuit are coastal people. They are descend-
ants of what anthropologists call the Thule culture, which emerged in 
western Alaska around 1000 CE and spread eastward across the Arctic. 
Inuit who migrated east from Alaska possessed a sophisticated technol-
ogy enabling them to hunt whales. They were highly adapted to the en-
vironment, and a rich material and spiritual culture. During the Little Ice 
Age (1600–1850) scarcity of game challenged the nomadic Inuit, who 
also experienced increased external pressure as the Canadian govern-
ment began to put more focus on the Arctic (Creery, 1994). 
From the late 18th century, European settlers in Canada pressured 
Aboriginals to assimilate into European, and later so-called “Canadian” 
culture. These attempts reached a climax in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries with forced integration (Creery, 1994). 
3.2.3 Greenland 
Paleo-Eskimo groups of nomadic migrants arrived in Greenland about 
4,500 years ago, from the Canadian High Arctic. They mainly hunted 
musk-ox, caribou, seals, whales and walrus. In 985 CE, the first European 
settlements were established in the southern parts of the island. These 
settlements lasted for 500 years, subsisting on farming and livestock 
husbandry (cattle, sheep and goats). At about the same time that the 
Norse arrived in Southern Greenland, a new influx of Arctic people from 
the west, the Late Dorset culture, entered the extreme northwest of 
Greenland. 
Around 1200 members of the Thule Culture arrived from the west, 
having emerged 200 years earlier in Alaska. They settled south of the 
Late Dorset culture and ranged over vast areas of Greenland’s west and 
east coasts. These ancestors of the modern Inuit engaged in the hunting 
of almost all animals on land and in the ocean, including big whales. 
They had dogs, which the Dorset did not, and used them as work animals 
to pull sleds. They also used bows and arrows, contrary to the Dorset. 
Increasingly settled, they stored large amounts of food to avoid winter 
famine. The early Thule avoided the highest latitudes, which only be-
came populated again after renewed immigration from Canada in the 
19th century.  
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In 1721, two centuries after the Norse colonies disappeared from 
Greenland, the Norwegian-Danish priest Hans Egede arrived in Green-
land and began missionary activities. Within a few decades, a colonial 
structure was established, and the presence of inspectors, traders and 
others had an overwhelming impact on the Inuit culture (Gad, 1973). 
3.2.4 Russia 
The Russian North has been occupied by different ethnic groups for sev-
eral thousand years. Traditionally, they were either hunters and gather-
ers or reindeer herders. Before the 16th century they had no contact 
with Europeans. At this time the interest of the Russian state awoke. By 
the time of colonization, the Indigenous peoples of the North had already 
developed subsistence patterns in accordance with their natural envi-
ronment, as well as regulations concerning social relations, mutual aid, 
public support of the disabled, orphans and widows, regulations of col-
lective use of certain territories (hunting grounds, fishing sites, reindeer 
pastures), property relations and inheritance. Most of the Indigenous 
nations led a nomadic life and were organized in autonomous clans or 
territorial communities based on common law. Under these circum-
stances, the Tsarist policy towards the Indigenous population rested on 
indirect control through the traditional institutions of the community 
(Vakhtin, 1994). 
Although military governors collected tribute, they interfered little 
with native Siberian customs and religions; while the smaller nomadic 
groups of hunters and reindeer herders (e.g., Chukchi, Koryak, Eveny, 
Evenki, Nenets, Khanty) formed ambiguous relations with Russians, 
larger stationary, cattle-breeding groups (Sakha, Buryat) submitted to 
Russians swiftly and were henceforth subjected to colonial relations 
with the Russian imperial center (Fisher, 1943; Slezkine, 1994). Siberian 
furs constituted an important source of wealth for Russia and figured 
prominently in Russian trade with Europe and China. These furs, along 
with customs duties levied on all Siberian raw materials acquired by 
Russian entrepreneurs, more than reimbursed the state for the costs of 
its Siberian acquisitions and administration (Forsyth, 1994). 
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Russian settlement of Siberia on a large scale began only with the con-
struction of the Trans-Siberian railroad between 1892–1905, after which 
the eastward migratory movement reached major proportions. Russia 
made efforts to reduce rural overpopulation in European Russia by en-
couraging Siberian colonization. The railroad's needs spurred the devel-
opment of coal mining and the opening of repair shops. Before the Russian 
Revolution, however, Siberia contributed only a minute fraction of Rus-
sia's industrial output, mainly in the form of gold (Thompson, 2008). 
3.2.5 Fennoscandia  
The Sámi were traditionally hunters and gatherers in Fennoscandia and 
the Kola Peninsula. Historically they inhabited great parts of northern 
Russia and Finland. In Sweden and Norway, their traditional area was 
more extensive than the area used for reindeer pasture today. It is be-
lieved that since the Viking Age, the Sámi culture has been driven farther 
and farther north. 
Along the Northern Norwegian coast, the Sámi culture came under 
pressure during the Iron Age by expanding Norse settlements and taxa-
tion from powerful Norse chieftains. In the early Middle Ages, the cen-
tralized Norwegian state broke the power of the chieftains. The fish 
trade in the 14th century triggered another wave of Norse settlement 
along the coast of Finnmark province (Hansen and Olsen, 2004).  
In the mid-16th century, Swedish governmental interest in the 
northern region arose and it was not unusual that the Sámi paid taxes 
to three different kings, most commonly in furs and dried fish. There 
was an increasing demand for furs in Europe, so the Crown also traded 
these products. Dried fish was used as payment for the soldiers who 
were constantly involved in different wars. The Sámi also sold fish, and 
purchased food products such as butter and flour, which until then had 
been relatively rare in the Sámi culture. As a result of the improved 
nutritional supply, the population grew considerably. However, the fur 
market shifted and the lakes were soon almost depleted of fish, leading 
to a population crisis. Sámi society could not supply its increased 
population with sufficient foodstuffs when the import of butter and 
flour was stopped, and fish became scarce. It was around this time, in 
the early seventeenth century, that the Sámi became reindeer herders, 
which to a great extent can be seen as a response to the population 
crisis (Sköld, 1992).  
At the end of the 17th century, the states of Fennoscandia encour-
aged settlers to move to the area, offering free land and generous condi-
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tions. This had, however, a limited impact on in-migration, a trend that 
did not shift until the mid-18th century. From this time, however, the 
process of colonization began, and during the next hundred years, the 
ethnic balance in Sápmi (the Sámi homeland) changed, turning the Sámi 
into a minority, except for some parts of northern Norway and smaller 
areas in Finland and Russia (Axelsson and Sköld, 2011). 
3.2.6 Iceland and the Faroe Islands 
Settlements by Viking explorers from the east, particularly Norway and 
the British Isles, in the late 9th century mark the beginning of Iceland as 
a nation. By 930, the chieftains had established a form of representative 
governance (Althing) that was one of the world’s oldest parliaments. 
Towards the end of the 10th century, Christianity came to Iceland but 
the country remained independent. Internal conflict in the early 13th 
century weakened Iceland, and resulted in subjugation to Norway. Nor-
way in turn was united with Sweden (1319) and then Denmark (1376). 
A strict trade monopoly imposed by Denmark in the 17th and 18th cen-
turies caused Iceland to fall into poverty. Additionally, natural disasters 
forced a population decline. Iceland remained part of Denmark, but in 
the 19th century an independence movement emerged as a part of the 
rising nationalism around Europe. In 1844, the Althing, which had been 
suspended in 1799, was restored. Iceland gained sovereignty after 
World War I, on 1 December 1918 (Karlsson, 2001).  
Irish monks and Vikings had visited the Faroe Islands before stable 
settlements, Christianity and Norwegian rule and laws were established 
in the 11th century. In 1380, the Faroe Islands followed Norway into the 
union with Denmark, and after the reformation, the Danish language and 
influence increased over time. Copenhagen monopolized and controlled 
foreign trade. Fishing and farming were the dominating industries. As a 
result of an increased movement of nationalism, Faroese developed into 
a written language in the mid-19th century. At this time, free trade 
opened and fishing was commercialized. The population numbered 
around 9,000 people. Danish was the official language until 1948, when 
extensive home rule was introduced, together with the position of a Far-
oese Prime Minister as head of a the government. The Faroe Islands is 
still part of the Danish Kingdom but together with Greenland, they often 
enjoy a special status within the Kingdom, and neither has joined the 
European Union (Wylie, 1987). 
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3.3 Aspects of circumpolar cultures 
Cultures in the Circumpolar North are complex and dynamic systems of 
meaning and identity. Given the encompassing definition of culture pre-
sented above, many facets of everyday life – from subsistence practices 
to religious beliefs, arts and music – could be presented under that ru-
bric. In order to increase comparability with the first AHDR, we look at 
some of the same issue as in 2004 while adding some new components. 
We review language and language vitality, spirituality and worldview, 
and the arts and sports. As in the first AHDR, we begin with an overview 
of language. 
3.3.1 Language and language vitality 
Language is arguably one of the most important aspects of human cul-
ture(s) and a vital factor for the survival of culture. It is not just a means 
of communicating information, but also contributes to the preservation 
of memory, involves specific terminologies and the traditional 
knowledge encoded within, and articulates a world-view. Each language 
develops its own expressions that reflect areas that are important to the 
speakers (see Chapter 9, Education and Human Capital). In the Arctic, an 
area with great linguistic diversity (see below), colonial and assimilatory 
pressures against Indigenous language use and the small demographic 
numbers of many Indigenous groups have created difficult situations for 
many languages. 
Attention to the dire prospects of Arctic languages has significantly 
increased in recent years. Ever since the Alaskan linguist Michael Krauss 
(1992: 10) urged his fellow language specialists toward a “serious re-
thinking of our priorities, lest linguistics go down in history as the only 
science that presided obliviously over the disappearance of 90% of the 
very field to which it is dedicated,” the magnitude of the problem has 
been recognized by academics and practitioners alike. Thus, the Arctic 
Social Indicators report (ASI, 2010), which follows from the first AHDR, 
elevated “language retention” to the single best indicator of cultural vi-
tality. Arctic Social Indicators II (ASI, 2014) addresses language retention 
in each of its case study applications. 
Apart from the AHDR (2004) and ASI (2010, 2014), it is notable that 
Arctic Council Working Groups are paying increased attention to the 
situation of Arctic languages. An example is the chapter on linguistic 
diversity in the Arctic Biodiversity Assessment, which provides a good 
treatment of the subject matter (Barry, 2013). 
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Most importantly, Permanent Participants of the Arctic Council 
spearheaded two important initiatives on Arctic languages in recent 
years. The “Arctic Indigenous Languages Symposium” was organized by 
ICC Canada and held in Tromsø, Norway, in October 2008 (ICC – Canada, 
2008). ICC-Canada's Assessing, Monitoring and Promoting Arctic Indige-
nous Languages project was approved by the Arctic council's Sustainable 
Development Working Group in 2011 as a direct follow-up to the rec-
ommendations of the 2008 symposium. The Research Development 
Workshop “Assessing the Vitality of Arctic Indigenous Languages” was 
organized by the same organization and held in Ottawa in June 2012 
(ICC – Canada, 2012), and a second Arctic Indigenous Languages Sympo-
sium is scheduled to take place in 2015. 
Despite all this attention, the general tendency continues to be a re-
duction of the proportion of speakers of most languages of the North. 
One example of this trend is Alaska. As Figure 3.1 shows, all but one 
Alaska Native language had a lower proportion of speakers in 2007 than 
in 1997. At the same time, we see that most Alaskan languages – with the 
exception of Siberian Yupik and Central Yup’ik – had already a rather 
low retention during the 1990s. 
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Source: Krauss, Michael E. 2007. Native languages of Alaska. In: The Vanishing Voices of the Pacific Rim, ed. by Osahito
Miyaoko, Osamu Sakiyama, and Michael E. Krauss. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Table 21.1, page 408). Michael E. Krauss
(1997). The indigenous languages of the north: A report on their present state. Northern Minority Languages: Problems of
Survival, ed. by Hiroshi Shoji & Juha Janhunen, 1-34. (Senri Ethological Studies 44.) Osaka, Japan: National Museum of
Ethnology.
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Figure 3.1: Language Retention Dynamic in Alaska, 1997–2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Icelandic language has changed very little from when the country 
was settled, and therefore a text from the 12th century is still under-
standable to Icelandic schoolchildren. The Icelandic language is consid-
ered a cornerstone of Icelandic culture, in large part due to a strong lit-
erary heritage. Icelandic does not usually adopt foreign words for new 
concepts, opting instead to coin new words, or give old words new 
meaning (Jóhannesson, 2007).  
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The language of the Faroe Islands, Faroese, derives from the language 
of the Norsemen, who settled the islands some 1,200 years ago. Today, 
Faroese is spoken by approximately 75,000 to 80,000 people. It was es-
tablished as a written language in 1854, and accepted as a national lan-
guage by the Danish authorities in 1948. The Faroese language is consid-
ered an important aspect of cultural identity and the Faroese are con-
scious of the need to preserve and develop their language in the face of 
global influences. Research and development of the Faroese language is 
thus a high political priority of the Faroese government (Nauerby, 1996). 
There are other positive language-related developments elsewhere in 
the Arctic. For example, 50,000 of the 57,000 residents of Greenland 
speak Greenlandic (Lykke Thomsen, 2013); that is, almost 88% of all 
people living in Greenland – whether of Inuit descent or not – speak this 
Inuit language. Such success is the result of decades of attention to lan-
guage issues, crowned by declaring Greenlandic (Inuit) as the official 
language in the Greenland Self-Government Act of 2009. Inuit in the 
neighboring eastern Canadian Arctic also continue to keep native lan-
guage retention at relatively high levels, while the western Canadian 
Arctic and the Subarctic are characterized by more substantial losses. 
For many parts of the Arctic, data on language use and retention is 
absent or hard to access. However, the Russian Census provides figures 
regarding language retention in the northern parts of the Russian Feder-
ation. During the recent censuses of 2002 and 2010, people were asked 
about the languages they speak; at the same time, respondents self-
identified with a particular ethnic group. For example, 482 individuals 
declared themselves as Aleuts (Unangan) in 2010, while 45 respondents 
claimed to know the Aleut language. We can thus assume that we are 
dealing with a proportion of Aleut speakers of slightly fewer than 10%. 
It should be pointed out, however, that we do not know with certainty 
whether the 45 speakers come from the group who identified them-
selves as Aleuts. Notwithstanding these and other issues of enumeration, 
a comparison of results for 2002 and 2010 shows a clear downward 
trend in the proportion of speakers: of 21 languages, only one (Siberian 
Yupik) claims a higher proportion of speakers in 2010 than in 2002. 
The absence of enumeration of the population by ethnicity in Fen-
noscandian statistics makes the assessment of Sámi language retention 
difficult (see Chapter 2, Arctic Populations and Migration). In addition, the 
multitude of Sámi languages and dialects make generalizing statements on 
the vitality of language retention impossible. As depicted in Figure 3.2, 
Northern Sámi – spoken primarily in northern Norway, as well as in parts 
of northern Sweden and Finland – is the least vulnerable of all Sámi lan-
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guages, with most speakers and regular increases in the total number of 
speakers. Other Sámi languages, however, are in a much more difficult 
position, even where municipalities recognize them as official languages. 
Figure 3.2: Sámi Languages and dialects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These ambiguous developments are best expressed by Figure 3.3, which 
we borrow from the Arctic Biodiversity Assessment (CAFF, 2013). It 
shows that most of the 46 languages captured in the graph experienced 
declines in the proportion of speakers between 1989 and 2006. Nine 
languages, however, saw an increase in the proportion of speakers dur-
ing that same period. Thus, we can conclude that while the vitality of 
many Arctic languages is threatened some languages enjoy a stable posi-
tion, and a few are even gaining in strength. Given that most parts of the 
Arctic saw the establishment of language revitalization programs in re-
cent years, it is thus doubly important that such positive developments 
can be reported. It is to be hoped that these successes will stimulate the 
reversal of language loss in other parts of the Arctic as well. 
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Figure 3.3: Estimated change in proportion of speakers for 46 Arctic languages 
between 1989 and 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Barry et al., 2013:549. 
 
In recent years, new laws (e.g., in Fennoscandia) have given speakers of 
certain minority languages the right to use their language in public offic-
es, in preschools and in geriatric care (Elenius, 2008). On one hand, this 
provides important recognition of the minority languages and cultures. 
On the other hand, not all minority languages are nationally protected 
and questions of which variant or dialect of a language is chosen as the 
standard adds further complications to language retention and vitality. 
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3.4 Spirituality and worldview 
“Traditional” forms of spirituality and worldview among Arctic Indige-
nous peoples need to be seen as part of their productive and reproduc-
tive relations with the land, its animals, and the spiritual and ancestral 
beings that affect the well-being of human communities in the Arctic 
region. Shaped in response to Arctic social and material ecologies, these 
systems involve complex and sophisticated religious forms, ideologies 
and practices that revolve around the activity of hunting. The concern 
over the necessity “to kill in order to live” expressed in the animist be-
liefs about return of animal souls and ancestor spirits in charge of souls 
of animals has remained a significant feature of the worldview of many 
Indigenous groups within the region (Willerslev, 2007). The practice of 
hunting which required intense human contact with the animal spirit 
world entails specific perceptions of “animals as persons” (Bird David, 
2006; Scott, 2006; Descola, 2006). Personhood is attributed not only to 
humans but also to certain non-human beings, such as animals, plants 
and “things”. Such concepts and practices form the basis of animist be-
liefs among Indigenous hunting groups in the Arctic. 
Recent research on human-animal relations points to the common el-
ements present in animist societies such as continuity between humans 
and non-humans, shamanist cosmology, egalitarian or semi-egalitarian 
ethos and unbounded potential for identification (Descola, 2006; Peder-
sen, 2001; Willerslev, 2007; Brightman, et al., 2012; Ulturgasheva, 
2012). For example, bears are closely associated with shamans: they 
may be said to “be” shamans themselves, or to be able to transform 
themselves into humans. Shamans are likewise said to be able to trans-
form themselves, or parts of themselves, into bears (Hallowell, 1926: 86; 
Kwon, 1999: 373-87). Perhaps most importantly, bears play key roles in 
the symbolic organization of society. As both powerful ancestors and 
significant actors, they participate in the reproduction of kinship pat-
terns and in this mode of human-animal relations. 
Among Iñupiat and Yup’ik of Alaska, and the Inuit of northern Canada 
the question about the identity of a child and a child’s personhood cannot 
be considered without naming practices and Indigenous ideas about the 
circulation of souls between the living and the dead (Bodenhorn, 2000; 
Bodenhorn, 2004). The beliefs in reincarnation and rebirth among Inuit 
groups and some Siberian groups, e.g. Chukchi, Koryak and Itel’men, are 
most eloquently expressed in the system of naming children. 
Shamanic and animistic practices, consistent with the everyday en-
gagement with the animals and spirits of the land, persist, especially in 
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rural areas, through small rituals, such as the feeding of the fire and the 
interpretation of dreams and omens practiced by the hunters and rein-
deer-herders in the Siberian forest (Vitebsky, 2005; Lavrillier, 2012). 
For those inhabiting the Siberian taiga and moving around vast areas of 
land, animistic worldview and the principles of sociality are rooted in 
legacies of accumulated ecological experience and interaction with the 
environment. For the urban nationalists, the current fad of a “shamanic 
renaissance” functions as a convenient and flexible metaphor for nation-
building aspirations (Balzer, 2011; Vitebsky, 2005). 
The first AHDR contained a box about sacred sites authored by 
RAIPON. If at the time, attention to the conservation of such sites was 
especially notable among Russian Indigenous peoples, over the past 
decade we have seen expansion of this interest. For example, the confer-
ence “Protecting the Sacred: Recognition of Sacred Sites of Indigenous 
Peoples for Sustaining Nature and Culture in Northern and Arctic Re-
gions,” held in Rovaniemi in September 2013, confirmed this increased 
interest. The conference approved a draft declaration that called for 
promotion of awareness of sacred sites, stronger mechanisms for con-
sultation of Indigenous groups, and enforcement of effective measures to 
protect them from damage and destruction (Arctic Centre, 2013). A par-
allel movement deals with cultural heritage sites in the Arctic (Barr and 
Chaplin, 2004), which are overwhelmingly non-Indigenous in origin. 
Another interesting development is the revitalization of certain as-
pects of shamanism in the Circumpolar North. This can happen at the 
grassroots level, in the form of northern residents actively trying to re-
engage with shamanism as a set of beliefs and practices. Even more 
powerful, however, is a situation in which there is encouragement and 
recognition from above, from state or regional authorities. In the Arctic, 
we are aware of two regions in which shamanism is an officially recog-
nized religion: in the Sakha Republic (Russian Federation) it is a form of 
Tengreism (the Turkic version of shamanic beliefs with the god Tengri), 
which is mainly spread among urban Sakha, and the New Age form of 
shamanism emphasizing its healing aspect in the north Norwegian coun-
ty of Tromsø (see Textbox 3.1). 
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Shamanism as an officially recognized religion  
Aytalina Ivanova and Florian Stammler 
 
Shamanism as a worldview of people living in close connection to the environ-
ment with all its animate features including spirits is gaining popularity among 
indigenous and settler populations in the Arctic. In the European and Russian 
Arctic, particularly in Siberia from where the word "shaman" originates, the 
revival of shamanism has had also an identity-forming influence for several 
societies in the Arctic. For that purpose of identity building there have been 
cases where shamanism has been recognized as a religion alongside other main 
religions such as Christianity, while some scholars refer to shamanism more as a 
worldview in animist societies (Vitebsky, 1995, 2012) than a religion. In the East 
Siberian Sakha Republic, for example, an officially recognized association of 
shamans (then called “people’s healers” (народные целители)) has been active 
since 1990. In May 2014, shamanism was recognized by the Ministry of Justice of 
Russia in the Sakha Republic as a religion, after three local religious groups had 
united into a regional religious denomination (Ministry of Culture, 2014). The 
decision was made after an expert review in September 2011 (Ministry of Justice 
of the Russian Federation, 2011) had concluded that the specifics of Sakha Aar 
Ajyy (Аар Айыы, the official name of the religion) including 16 directions of the 
most influential rituals and prayers (Algysy-Dommy Алгысы-Доммы) qualify for 
official recognition as a religion according to point 1, Article 6 of the Russian 
Federal Law on the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Unions (Russian Fed-
eration, 1997). The expert statement specifically highlights the importance of the 
shaman as mediator between the spiritual and the material world. Such officially 
recognized religious practice qualifies for support by the state. Although there is 
no state salary for religious practitioners, through an especially established 
regional ministry for culture and spiritual development (министерство 
культуры и духовного развития), this support plays an important role in pro-
moting not only the identity of the Sakha people, but also their well-being 
through connection to their land and its spirits, which is seen as a guarantor for a 
healthy lifestyle in an Arctic environment.  
In the European Arctic, shamanism has also been recognized as a religion, 
where, like in Siberia, people can get ritual services such as marriage ceremonies, 
funerals, and baptisms. The first official decision in this respect was taken in the 
North Norwegian county of Troms in 2012, where the governor recognized the 
regional Shamanic Association as religious denomination (Shamanism, 2012). 
Textbox 3.1 
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3.5 The arts and sports 
Harpa – Reykjavík Concert Hall, Iceland, 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit: Joan Nymand Larsen 
 
The arts are booming in the North. Be it a new concert hall in Reykjavík, 
the Greenland Eyes International Film festival, new choreography by the 
Yellowknife Dance Collective, or the opening of an art show in Anchor-
age or Arkhangelsk, the production, marketing, and consumption of 
northern art seems to be a growth market. Interestingly, both Indige-
nous and non-Indigenous art productions are sought after, as are crea-
tions consciously marking mixed identities. All art genres seem to be 
involved. While music, literature and fine arts have been prominent in 
the North for a while, Arctic film productions and film festivals are fairly 
new and successful phenomena. 
The global language of hip-hop music, and related breakdancing 
found in almost any corner of the Arctic, provides an excellent example 
of adoption and adaptation of exogenous cultural forms for local pur-
poses. We provide two examples of local applications of this music style 
(Textbox 3.2). As the cases illustrate, hip-hop is used to increase aware-
ness of and pride in local cultures. Far from being a destructive aspect of 
globalization, locally produced hip-hop music appears to be a vehicle of 
cultural revitalization. 
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Hip Hop in the Siberian and Canadian Norths: contributing to cultural 
vitality and physical well-being 
The Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), the largest republic of the Russian Federation, 
and famous for its diamond production, contains 140 different ethnic groups, in-
cluding the dominant two: Sakha and Russian. Since the Russian Federation’s dec-
laration of sovereignty in 1991, the region has undergone several changes. The 
increase of the rural migration into cities, especially into the capital city Yakutsk, 
changed the ethnic and linguistic situation in urban centers. Post-Soviet transfor-
mations also initiated the emergence of new youth styles, such as hip hop. 
There is an interesting correlation between growing rural-urban migration and 
evolution of local hip hop, including its language. The first hip hop artists or ‘crews’ 
appeared in Yakutsk at the end of the 1990s. They were mainly Russian speaking, 
urban Sakha. This was the period when the first substantial urban-born Sakha 
generation came into their teenage years and looked for cultural expressions that 
reflected their urban experience. Sakha pop and rock music was rooted in the 
village – the most popular songs romanticized rural life as the cradle of Sakha 
culture, and most of the musicians were of village origin. Hip hop thus embodied a 
counterpoint to the rural and manifested a new urban Sakha identity.  
In contrast to this Russian speaking Sakha generation, by around 2005 a sig-
nificant Sakha speaking urban youth community had developed; these were the 
children of village Sakha who moved to Yakutsk and sent their children to Sakha-
language schools. This “youth market” was the target for Sakha-language youth 
radios, TV-shows and glossy magazines. As a result, Sakha-language media 
helped to promote Sakha hip hop, which developed as a distinct genre from local 
Russian-language hip hop. Currently Sakha-language hip hop enjoys support 
from media and state institutions, reflecting a general power shift in local politics 
that becomes increasingly dominated by ethnic Sakha. 
In the last decade, hip hop has also found a prominent place in the Canadian Arc-
tic. Hundreds of youth in dozens of communities across the Canadian North have 
connected to the music, history, art, and culture of hip hop, which is being used in a 
range of programs to promote health, prevent suicide, support youth leadership, and 
reduce crime. An active group in the movement has been Blueprint for Life 
(http://www.blueprintforlife.ca/), a southern-based organization offering social 
work and healing to youth through hip hop. In many cases, after introducing hip hop 
in northern communities, local schools and organizations have established clubs or 
programs to support the youth to continue. Through hip hop dance, art, and music 
youth have found a powerful outlet for expressing themselves. In many communities 
Elders have joined the activities, lending their support, and youth have used hip hop 
as a means to strengthen connections to their own culture, for example mixing tradi-
tional throat singing with “beat boxing”, rapping in Inuktitut, or creating dance moves 
based on imitations of seal hunting, dog teaming, or Arctic animals.  
Textbox 3.2 
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Spontaneous hiphop break dance event in the Ordzonikidze Square, Yakutsk, 
Russian Federation, during a summer youth festival (June 2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit: Aimar Ventsel (permission received) 
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While singing, dancing and poetry are always recognized as part of cul-
ture, a sometimes less recognized component of culture is sport. Yet 
sports are cultural practices, and team sports are ideal vehicles for the 
expression of group identities. 
When looking at Arctic sports, rather than be tempted to focus only 
on winter sports that seem to fit the Arctic’s climatic conditions (such as 
skiing, ice hockey, etc.), we note that a number of other sports have re-
cently become prevalent in the North. As one example, we cite the popu-
larity of basketball in rural Alaska. Michael D'Orso (2007) followed a 
winning high school basketball team from Fort Yukon, Alaska for a sea-
son and provided evidence for the link between community resilience 
and team sports. Another example is the importance of football for the 
Faroe Islands. Admitted to the international football association FIFA in 
1988, the Faroe Islands have since surprised a number of bigger football 
nations – such as Austria, which they beat in 1990. Likewise, handball 
has developed as a national sport in Iceland since the 1950s, and the 
team won silver medals in the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing. Green-
land handball has been represented in the World Championships. 
Hockey Game in Makkovik, Canada 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit: Rudy Riedlsperger. 
 
Canada and Russia are great winter sport nations with extensive records 
of internationally successful athletes from northern regions, with ice 
hockey and cross-country skiing as notable activities. The Arctic Winter 
Games (AWG) were established as collaboration between Yukon, 
Northwest Territories and Alaska, with the first games held in Yellow-
knife in 1970. Every two years, a Canadian or Alaskan city hosts the 
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event, with the games traveling to Nuuk, Greenland in 2002. The AWG 
subscribe to the core values of “cultural awareness and understanding” 
(Arctic Winter Games, n.d.).  
Sports not only encompass the more “western” activities noted 
above. The town of Fairbanks, Alaska, has been hosting the World Eski-
mo-Indian Olympics (WEIO) annually since the early 1960s. The event 
showcases a variety of competitions based on demonstrations of tradi-
tional skills and endurance, such as the “greased pole walk,” the “kneel 
jump” and the “ear pull”. In addition, WEIO includes dance performanc-
es, a Miss WEIO pageant, and a best-dressed baby contest. Held in the 
summer months, the event has become a major attraction for locals and 
tourists alike. 
High school basketball: the State playoffs in Anchorage, Alaska, USA 
(Girls’ teams, 2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit: Hugh Beach. 
 
The Sámi have several sports organizations and competitions that serve 
as important meeting places – not least for Sámi youth – and are im-
portant contributors to identity formation. The Sámi Championships 
include cross country skiing, lasso, and shooting. Reindeer sledge races 
are frequently held. Several Sámi have been internationally successful in 
alpine skiing, cross-country skiing, ice hockey and other less obviously 
northern sports, such as football. 
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3.6 Identities  
One is not born with an identity: rather it is socially constructed, and is 
formed and reformed over the course of one’s lifetime. One’s identity 
depends on one’s experiences and one’s relations with other members of 
society – people need to know and understand their position in society. 
As well, one’s identity depends on one’s calculated, strategic decisions. 
Identity is the conception and expression of both individuality and group 
affiliations. Social, cultural and ethnic identities emerge in any given 
situation where social interaction, political formation or cultural meet-
ings take place. Thus, identities are not easily classified. 
Identity can be self-ascribed, defined by others, or both (Patrick, 
2005; Kishigami, 2002). Olofsson (2004) states that it is possible to both 
identify with the ethnic group of biological heritage without being social-
ized into it, or, conversely, to perceive identity with an ethnic group 
where socialization has taken place but where biological relations are 
missing. She introduces a model that illustrates the complexity of identi-
ty formation (Table 3.1). 
Table 3.1: Models of Different Aspects of Identity 
 Ascribed Experienced Aspired Recognized 
Self A person’s ethnic 
self-label 
How a person 
experiences change 
in ethnic self-identity 
according to cultural 
content and personal 
circumstances 
 
A person’s aspira-
tion for recognition 
of ethnic self-label 
A person feels a 
recognition of 
ethnic self-label 
from others 
Other Others’ ethnic 
label of that 
person 
How others experi-
ence change in that 
person’s ethnic 
identity according to 
his cultural context 
and personal circum-
stances 
Others’ aspirations 
for recognition of 
ethnic self-label 
Others recognize 
that person’s 
ethnic self-label 
Source: Olofsson 2004: 364-265. 
 
Individuals can belong to several collectives or have several identities. 
Identity choices can be strategic. A person can change identity over time, 
but it is also possible to experience and be associated with different 
identities at the same time. Moreover, identities often have varying de-
grees of status. Consequently, the identity of a person from an older gen-
eration can differ from that of a person from a younger generation of the 
same family. These complex circumstances highlight the striking differ-
ences that can occur within groups that at first glance seem homogenous 
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(for a striking Evenki example of hybrid and complex identities see 
Chapter 5, Governance in the Arctic). Adequate data on ethnic identity 
(ethnicity) are often missing, and indeed hard to collect, in part due to 
the contextual and changing nature of a person’s ethnic identity.  
The social sciences and humanities have been using a relational notion 
of identity for some time; that is, identity as being created by the tension 
between Us and Them (“Other”). Still, it seems that modernization and 
globalization threaten the continuation of these distinctions (see Chapter 
11, Community Viability and Adaptation). The Internet’s rapid spread and 
the development of other communication systems present additional chal-
lenges to the adherence to cultural traditions. Nevertheless, these techno-
logical innovations have also contributed to the rapid spread of ethno-
political mobilization (Southcott, 2005). Thus, globalization enables the 
development of new technologies and practices, which in turn offer op-
portunities to revitalize and strengthen cultures and identities in Arctic 
communities (see Chapter10, Globalization). 
3.6.1 Indigenous Arctic identities 
Colonial and post-colonial experiences continue to be central to the dis-
cussions of the postmodern identity creation in the Arctic. For example, 
official descriptions and enumerations of Indigenous peoples, including 
their numbers, the geographical extent of homelands, social structure, 
etc., sometimes inform Indigenous peoples’ identity constructions – and 
sometimes clash with these identities, when they do not represent In-
digenous realities. External definitions of who is Indigenous can result in 
exclusion of persons who otherwise would identify with a group, and 
their alienation from Indigenous culture. Acknowledging the negative 
effects that can be associated with exclusionary, ethnocentric perspec-
tives, argues for an overwhelming need to integrate Indigenous perspec-
tives when discussing “ethnic” categories based on demographic 
measures. Such perspectives provide a more culturally correct under-
standing and description of who is Indigenous.  
Recent official definitions of “Indigenous peoples”, such as those com-
ing from the United Nations, stress historical continuity with a territory, 
the experience of colonization and self-identifications as being universal 
to all Indigenous peoples worldwide. The most used and cited definition 
has long been that of the Ecuadorian diplomat and at that time UN spe-
cial rapporteur José Martinez Cobo, who in 1986 introduced a “working 
definition” of Indigenous peoples: 
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Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a 
historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that de-
veloped on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sec-
tors of the societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. 
They form at present non-dominant sectors of society and are determined 
to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral ter-
ritories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence 
as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institu-
tions and legal systems  
(Martinez Cobo, 1987: paragraph 380). 
Indigenous identities are more complex than Martinez Cobo’s working 
definition and there are additional problems that occur when trying to 
implement it in the Arctic context. The United Nations, national govern-
ments, and academic institutions have different perspectives on defining 
or characterizing Indigenous peoples. Certainly, Indigenous peoples them-
selves best define how they wish to be viewed and identified. Neverthe-
less, self-identification has practical, and sometimes ideological challenges 
(Beach, 2007). More extensive definitions focus on historical processes 
and relationships, the aim being to remain sensitive to the circumstances 
of local Indigenous societies where central characteristics are small size, 
attachment to the land, value system and culture rooted in the environ-
ment, commitment to a sustainable lifestyle, positioning, mobility and 
cultural conservatism. The definition also includes shared experiences of 
economic and political domination by outsiders, selected integra-
tion/participation with non-Indigenous societies, limited or non-existent 
power within the nation state, and emerging involvement in a local or 
international process of decolonization (Coates, 2004; Loukacheva, 2009). 
More recently, Indigenous activists from across the globe have insisted on 
self-identification and oppose exogenous criteria that determine who 
qualifies as “Indigenous” and who does not (Hodgson, 2011). 
Indigenous identity, status and rights have been under debate in 
most parts of the world during the last decades. Hundreds of thousands 
of individuals in the Arctic identify as Indigenous. The lack of a general 
or even regional definition of who is Indigenous is a challenge for both 
demographers and other researchers (Axelsson and Sköld, 2011; see 
also Chapter 2, Arctic Populations and Migration). In modern society, 
where identity becomes an increasingly personal project and belonging 
is important, considering oneself as a member of a recognized Indige-
nous group (e.g., I am Sámi, I am Nenets) can be tempting for individuals 
searching for such belonging. Indigenous societies can, however, some-
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times be exclusionary, valuing individuals differently, depending on her-
itage and levels of cultural competence (Åhrén, 2008). 
3.6.2 Mixed identities 
Most historical population records are based on rigid ideas of unchange-
able cultural units. Prior to the 19th century many local peoples relied 
on very inclusive identity systems based on kinship, while governments 
increasingly relied on a race-based definition that focused on the indi-
vidual’s blood quantum. “Full-bloods”, “half-castes” and “quadroons” and 
octoroons have all been official categories in the USA, Canada, Sweden 
and Norway, if different terminology is used in the different countries. 
This of course led to problems with “boundaries” (Olofsson, 2004). State 
definitions of whom to include as a member of a particular ethnic cate-
gory, or national minority, were often based on certain stereotypes of 
cultural belonging or behavior that might have been well removed from 
the realities of life. “Pure” categories used for counting by necessity also 
created “mixed” categories, when enumerators discovered cases of 
“mixed marriage” or the accommodation of settler ways through the 
mastery of the languages of the incomers or their economic practices. In 
some cases the “mixed” cases cause indigenousness itself to disappear 
(as a case of assimilation). In other cases, entirely new peoples are cre-
ated such as the Canadian Métis (ASI, 2010). 
Studies on Indigenous societies in northern Sweden and Canada sug-
gest that the ethnic formation of a person with mixed parentage can 
greatly differ from situations in which mixed parentage is not present or 
not problematized. Already in childhood there are different ways of 
managing the situation. Some children feel that they only belong to one 
ethnic group while others experience a more complex situation where 
they feel caught between two identities. Socialization including more 
persons than the parents is important for the self-experienced ethnic 
identity and the ethnic self-label, which nevertheless fluctuates and 
changes according to cultural context. A person can manage different 
self-representations attached to different cultural behaviors without 
getting confused in his or her personal identity (Olofsson, 2004). 
Names and ethnic labels can have benefits and disadvantages de-
pending on context. The descendants of the Old Settlers of Russian origin 
who married native women in northeast Siberia from the seventeenth 
century onward were never classified as a unique ethnic group and nev-
er received state recognition as a mixed group. Today, some of these 
groups have achieved Indigenous status with limited privileges, while 
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most of them are left with ambiguous social status and ethnic identity 
(Schweitzer et al., 2013). Since the Arctic is being influenced by exten-
sive processes of change, including internet access, migration, and glob-
alization, the complexity of identities increase correspondingly. Overall, 
a slightly improved understanding of mixed or multiple identities is a 
trend since the first AHDR.  
3.7 An Arctic identity? 
There are reasons to wonder if an Arctic identity exists at the individu-
al level, and whether such an identity is similarly understood in all 
eight Arctic (Council) countries (Keskitalo, 2009). Still, sometimes a 
broader and more general definition of an Arctic identity – stretching 
over nations and regions – is used. It denotes a sense of shared inter-
ests within a geographic region and is understood in terms of how 
members connect to their linguistic, cultural, and social similarities, 
and their perception of common interests and threats regardless of 
state boundaries. Regionalized Arctic identity is being claimed by insti-
tutions and sub-national groups to strengthen their political legitimacy 
and mobilize people for collective action. The identity is geographically 
bounded in the sense of referring to the “natural” or self-evident Arctic 
that makes up this circumpolar region, defined in part by latitude, cli-
mate, ecology, and even oceans (Berkman, 2012; Gerhardt et al., 2010). 
Arctic regional identity is, however, also an outcome of institutional 
and intergovernmental co-operation. It is partly created through lan-
guage, policy, and political action. National identity draws on and 
stresses valued characteristics that include resourcefulness and hard 
work in using nature to secure material wealth and prosperity, resili-
ence and adaptability in thriving in a cold climate, closeness with na-
ture and the desire to explore it, and commitment to protecting the 
Arctic and its natural beauty. This Arctic identity points to transna-
tional problems and interdependencies, the importance of non-state 
actors, and the multiple and often competing layers of identities that 
exist in the Arctic (Williams, 2011; Thisted, 2012). Nevertheless, our 
impression is that a general Arctic identity is still weak, while regional, 
local and Indigenous identities have developed. 
Within each Arctic country, northern identity varies. While Greenland 
and Iceland have an indisputable northern geographic location, only 
parts of the remaining six countries fall within the Arctic. The label “Arc-
tic” when used for northern Canada, Alaska, Greenland and northern 
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Russia, is often understood in terms of “the frontier”, including specific 
notions of the environment, Indigenous peoples, and forms of subsist-
ence. In Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Iceland, nation states that have 
historically not been discussed as Arctic areas, such an “identity” seems 
less common. Keskitalo et al. (2013: 353) argue that “these countries 
have thus not necessarily been subject to processes associated with the 
term “Arctic”, and in Sweden, domestic research and discourse regularly 
use other terms. Discussions of regional “norths” exist in the area, but 
the language used exhibits none of the very strong and specific charac-
teristics related to the term Arctic.” (See Textbox 3.3.). 
The North has served as an important and enduring imaginative re-
source in the construction of Canadian national identity. Arnold (2012) 
argues that the North is more an idea, a discursive formation, as a social 
and political place that has been “nordicised”. Canadian northerners feel 
largely ignored. They want to be recognized for their contribution to 
Canadian culture and identity, while remaining first and fundamentally 
northern (Robinson, 2012; England, 2000; Stephenson, 2012).  
There is a complex interplay between Arctic identities and Arctic poli-
cy (see Textbox 3.4). The different countries’ Arctic resources and exercis-
es of sovereignty are part of the historic importance of the Arctic in pro-
ducing distinct national identities. At the same time, the development of 
shared values, ideas and ambitions have been emphasized in the estab-
lishment of the Arctic Council, circumpolar organizations, and in the In-
ternational Polar Year. One intention these initiatives share is to grow a 
circumpolar identity based on values, ideas, and interests that these coun-
tries have in common. These two identities (national and regional), and 
the policy options and directions that emerge from them, are in tension. 
They might converge into unique national circumpolar identities by pur-
suing a multi-level identity framework, in which post-colonial values and 
institutions compensate for the limitations of the national, and vice-versa 
(Williams, 2011). The eight member states of the Arctic Council all claim 
to have Arctic identities in one form or another. The five Arctic Ocean 
coastal states, however, have made even stronger Arctic identity claims. 
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The Barents region  
Originating from an idea of the former Norwegian Foreign Minister Thorvald 
Stoltenberg the Kirkenes Declaration formally established the Barents Euro-
Arctic Region in 1993, to further security objectives in the European North. In 
order to reach the superior goal of maintaining stability in the area, ’its declared 
aim to create a shared identity in the area. The common history of the popula-
tions in the area as well as their similar geographical frame of reference is em-
phasized as forces capable of enhancing such a process.  
An urgent challenge for decision-makers lies in making the populations if the dif-
ferent states in the region feel that they have something in common with their neigh-
bors across the border. To be more specific, the goal becomes one of urging a maxi-
mum number of people in the area to include Northerners from all the states in the 
region in their notion of a political self, that is to say, their identification of belonging 
to a group with specific common interests, prospects and threats, as opposed to other 
sub-groups in society. Region-building thus becomes a question of identity politics. 
This involves a view of identity as something flexible, a relation rather than a posses-
sion, a quality conditional to persons in different situations rather than categorical 
pertaining to persons as such. A person's identity may thus change over time, and he 
or she may at one point in time have, or be related to, several identities. Overlapping 
identities are not only considered possible, from a security point of view, they may 
even be regarded as desirable. 
Official statements stress that people in the area all live in a region character-
ized by a harsh climate, a vulnerable nature, long distances to national centers, 
and a sparse population, which allegedly gives them some kind of common 
worldview and a mutual understanding of each other’s situation, notwithstand-
ing the state borders in the area.  
However, in the cross-border region Karelia of Finland and Russia separation 
has been a more common historical state than community and interaction. An-
other factor that somewhat weakens the argument that a transnational Northern 
identity will easily develop - or is already in existence - is the fact that North-
western Russia to a large degree is populated by “Southerners”. Hönneland 
(1998) claims that the historical transnational identity outlined in the “Barents 
rhetoric” has never existed, and that the new northern identity is so far a castle 
in the air; the Barents citizen an illusion. 
Many who live in the area have only a vague conception of the Barents re-
gion, others have never heard of it. It seems all the more appropriate to ask 
whether the new transnational northern identity relates only to a very limited 
group of entrepreneurial people with particular interests in developing contacts 
at the other side of the border. 
 
 
Textbox 3.3 
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3.8 Quantifying ethnicity  
The Arctic countries differ substantially in their efforts to collect and share 
data on ethnicity. It is often very difficult to trace ethnicity in both the 
historical records and in the present-day population statistics, even where 
statistics are collected. Official and self-determined definitions have varied 
extensively over time, and between countries (ASI, 2010). Looking into 
the future, the descendants of today’s ethnic groups may or may not iden-
tify with the ethnic heritage of their ancestors. Cultural transition can 
threaten ethnic continuity, and thus Indigenous cultural persistence.  
The incomplete inclusion and categorization of ethnicity in registers 
creates difficulties to estimate not only the population size and composi-
tion of different ethnic groups, but also specific features such as lan-
guage spoken, educational attainment, occupations, and health status 
(Axelsson and Sköld, 2011) (see Chapter 2, Arctic Populations and Migra-
tion). The UN Special Rapporteur Paul Hunt has pointed out that it is 
practically impossible to improve the situation of Indigenous peoples if 
they are not visible through enumeration (Hunt, 2007). This was espe-
cially stressed for the Sámi in Sweden. All official estimations present a 
number of 20,000 Sámi living in Sweden. A genealogically based exami-
nation shows, however, that the number is probably almost three times 
as high (Hassler, 2005). This means that there are more or less 30,000 
persons in Sweden with a Sámi background who are not aware of their 
ethnicity or for some reason have chosen not to identify with the Sámi 
culture. These persons can be said to represent transitions that threaten 
to undermine Indigenous identity: the threat is cultural rather than de-
mographic (Axelsson and Sköld, 2006). 
Language is one of those features of ethnicity closely tied to issues of 
identity and political rights. For example, in order to vote in the Sámi 
parliaments of Norway, Sweden and Finland, one must prove that either 
he or she speaks Sámi, or that it is spoken by a parent or grandparent 
(Keskitalo et al., 2013).  
Overall, there is a great need for improving and integrating quantita-
tive ethnic information at the individual level in official registers and 
statistics. This includes better coordination on the regional, national and 
international levels. Better information is a prerequisite for understand-
ing the past and present situation, and thus for the long-term sustaina-
bility of Arctic cultures and identities. 
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3.9 Cultural identities and “traditional” activities 
“Connection with nature” is a defining feature of Arctic identity (ASI, 
2010). Traditional activities – such as hunting, fishing and herding – rep-
resents both sources of monetary income and cultural values, and are 
strongly linked to northern identities (see Chapter 4, Economic Systems). 
In a time when Inuit were solely living on the land and constantly trav-
elled between locations, the sharing of food was important. The move to 
settlements has brought about changes in Inuit notions of sharing food, 
and – indirectly – in ideas about identity (Gombay, 2005). While tradition-
al subsistence economies and the right to possess and occupy the land of 
their ancestors are intrinsic to the cultural identity of Arctic Indigenous 
peoples (ASI, 2010: 136; MacLennan, 2008), non-Indigenous hunting and 
fishing practices often follow a different (sport or hobby) logic. Still, in 
some parts of the Arctic (e.g., in the Nordic countries) hunting and fishing 
are seen as a part of one’s livelihood among non-Indigenous persons and 
are strongly related to one’s identity (Keskitalo et al., 2013). 
In the Faroe Islands, local forms of agriculture and hunting have ena-
bled the Islanders to maintain a relatively high degree of self-sufficiency in 
local food production. Mountain grazing sheep provide up to 60% of all 
locally produced meat as well as wool, while some limited catching of sea 
birds such as puffins and fulmars, and the coastal hunting of the abundant 
and regularly available pilot whales provide meat and blubber. Enough 
dairy cattle are kept to satisfy all domestic milk needs, and small potato 
crops are carefully cultivated by private households for their own use. 
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Young Eveny couple at annual celebration of Reindeer Herders’ Day, Russian 
Federation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit: Olga Ulturgasheva. 
 
Nomadic reindeer pastoralism for some Sámi and many Indigenous Si-
berian peoples is a key feature of their culture. Extensive reindeer pasto-
ralism depends on large areas for pasturing the deer. Reindeer herding 
is under pressure from extractive industries and other infrastructural 
initiatives. In Fennoscandia, many rivers have been dammed and large 
areas of pasturage flooded as a result of extensive water regulation. Val-
uable riverside pasturage, natural pasture boundaries, and migration 
routes have disappeared. The pasture areas have been replaced with 
paddocks, the natural migration routes supplanted by road networks. 
Through clear-felling, soil scarification and road construction, forestry 
has broken up winter pasturage areas and reduced the supply of winter 
grazing for reindeer in northern Europe. Peat-harvesting activities also 
have an adverse impact on pastures. Today, less than 10 per cent of the 
Sámi population are connected to reindeer herding, which requires 
membership in a Sámi village. This keeps a major part of the Sámi popu-
lation outside one of the traditional economic activities and today also 
outside hunting and fishing privileges, and in the end from the possibil-
ity of using the traditional areas at all. This has severe consequences for 
the ethnic and cultural identity among the Sámi (Sköld, 2011). 
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A different, almost post-productionist, approach to reindeer herd-
ing can be observed in the Sakha Republic in Siberia (Aytalina Ivanova 
and Florian Stammler, personal communication, October 2014). There, 
a reindeer herding law passed in 1997 specifies the value of this liveli-
hood as a “national property” that is worth of state support as such 
(Sakha Republic, 1997). Implementing this law, the region has intro-
duced a guaranteed salary to herders of reindeer regardless of whether 
they are privately or publicly owned, paying them for just raising and 
keeping herds rather than producing meat or other agricultural output 
from these animals. The main condition for this is that they lead a no-
madic way of life (Sakha Republic, 2002). Similar thoughts underlie 
support policies in other Arctic regions, such as in the West Siberian 
Yamal District, although there politics follow a double strategy of stim-
ulating reindeer meat production alongside nomadic lifestyle 
(Stammler & Ventsel, 2003).  
Throughout the Arctic, subsistence activities such as fishing and 
hunting have suffered greatly under the impact of mining industries and 
the construction of hydro-electric power stations. For example, the Inuit 
in Nunavik and the Cree First Nations of James Bay Region have experi-
enced a dramatic loss of hunting grounds through flooding for hydro-
electric purposes. While mining in the Arctic has impacted traditional 
economies, resource exploitation can also form the basis for the 
(re)construction of identities, where the links to traditional economies 
have transformed into new occupation and settlement forms (see Chap-
ter 11, Community Viability and Adaptation). Still, as a general tendency, 
conditions for traditionally important industries such as herding, hunt-
ing and fishing have been deteriorating due to mining and large-scale 
development, which have negative impacts on culture and identities. 
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Arctic cultural representations in the interest of the nation 
Inuksuit are Inuit stone constructions stacked to resemble the human figure. 
They are strong cultural symbols embedded in songs, shamanism, myths, leg-
ends and stories. In April 2005 the Vancouver 2010 Olympic committee present-
ed their logo, an Inuksuk named Ilanaaq, meaning friendship in Inuktitut. The 
decision was controversial to some, and logical to others (Arnold, 2010). A no-
tion was expressed that the Inuksuk was a symbol for the entire Canada, and it 
has been claimed that it has also emerged as the unofficial symbol of the Arctic 
(Heyes, 2002).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When the city of Umeå announced its candidacy for the European Capital of 
Culture 2014, the Indigenous culture of the Sámi was a prominent part of the 
application. The bid was said to be “an invitation to this magic and exciting bor-
derless country, with the unique Sámi culture as one of its highlights.” It was 
stated that historically, the outside world has often varied in its descriptions of 
this borderless northern place, seeing it either as a country of the future, or as 
completely marginalized. Umeå claimed a strong northern identity that under-
stands the north through every fiber of its being; an essential attribute, as the 
northern region rises to the top of the European agenda. 2014 would offer fabu-
lous opportunities for Sámi to show their art, music, handicraft and other ex-
pressions of culture to a wide and global audience, and to put to the attention of 
an extensive audience the too often problematic situation of Sámi and other 
Indigenous peoples in the world. There are also reasons to critically scrutinize 
how they were integrated, engaged and empowered during the process, and to 
see how others represented their culture (Rönnmark and Björinge, 2014).  
Textbox 3.4 
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3.10 Landscape and place 
Identity is certainly place-bound and time-bound, as well as relational-
ly determined (Oosten and Remie, 1999). Relating to the landscape 
plays an important part in Arctic identities. The landscape is a source 
of collective (clan, family, national) history, which is captured through 
place names, monuments and oral tradition. It is on the land that the 
dynamics between humans, animals and the environment are experi-
enced, and traditional skills learned and perfected (Anderson, 2014). 
Cultural traditions are most often communicated through physical 
activities on the land (and the sea). Through participation in these ac-
tivities one learns how to behave properly. The capacity for decipher-
ing and understanding landscapes can be developed over time (Patrick, 
2005). Thus, respect for and knowledge of different places is an inte-
gral part of Arctic cultures and identities.  
Place names (toponyms) for landscape features contribute to how a 
place is perceived. Place names may describe topographic features, draw 
attention to sites used by animals, provide directional/navigational ref-
erences, or have religious/ritual significance (Collignon, 2006).  
It is not economic motives that encourage many to continue with a 
traditional relation to nature, but the quality of life, the quasi-existential 
persuasion that the landscape contains the meaning of life. Or, as one 
Sámi put it to the historian Åsa Nordin: 
Today it’s a lifestyle. So long as we carry on reindeer herding the way we do, 
with extensive herding, migrations and guarding, it’s a lifestyle. […] Especial-
ly when reindeer herding doesn’t bring in most money, you factor other Sami 
values into it, values which cannot be stated in money terms, and when you 
assimilate and experience those values as well, it’s a lifestyle  
(Nordin, 2007: 82). 
Landscape is of pivotal importance to most Arctic communities and cul-
tures. But Indigenous peoples are not alone in feeling strong ties to their 
home areas. One challenge facing tomorrow’s land use systems in the 
Arctic will be that of devising forms of co-management of resources, 
both within communities and between groups living in the Arctic. Place 
identity is not a given but rather an outcome of a continuous process of 
place-making. Still, place identity is perhaps even more important for 
Indigenous peoples than for other populations. Where non-Indigenous 
populations have occupied their territories, Indigenous peoples must 
confront the impacts of disruptive incursions upon their land-based way 
of life and upon their sense of identity. 
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3.11 Identities in a changing Arctic  
The Arctic is constantly changing and so are the identities embedded in 
the region. Since identity is a way of relating with one’s human, social 
and political surroundings, it is continually constructed, and should be 
seen as a process rather than as a category. Identity is enacted and re-
enacted every time one has to relate to someone else (Dorais, 2005). At 
the same time, the Arctic experiences a variety of change processes. 
Long-term socio-economic developments have major effects on cultural 
identities, not least among Indigenous peoples in the Circumpolar North 
(see Chapter 10, Globalization).  
Climate change acts contributes to other factors of change that have 
far-reaching impacts. Changes to climate have a mostly negative effect 
on subsistence, travel on sea ice, reindeer pasture conditions, and there-
by indirectly on cultural identities (ASI, 2010; Hovelsrud et al., 2011; 
Magraw et al., 2008). Community viability and a sense of common iden-
tity are challenged by changing environmental conditions and increasing 
competition over resources (see Chapter 11, Community Viability and 
Adaptation; Andrachuk and Smit, 2012; Keskitalo et al., 2013; Stepian et 
al., 2014). These challenges are especially keen among adolescents 
(Kvernmo and Heyerdahl, 2003; Caulfield, 2000). The loss of social iden-
tity resulting from these changes increases the risk for social alienation 
and destructive behaviours (ASI, 2010).  
Urbanization has been a distinctive trend all over the Arctic during 
the past decades, involving Indigenous and non-Indigenous groups 
(Megatrends, 2011). For example, in the Canadian Arctic, recent demo-
graphic changes have made settlement patterns increasingly urban, with 
more and more people moving to larger communities. Despite these 
trends, Inuit cultural identity for many continues to be strongly connect-
ed to spending time out on the land, hunting, fishing, trapping and camp-
ing. Some Inuit indeed maintain a rather negative view of urban spaces 
in the Arctic, identifying them as places where non-Indigenous people 
have eclipsed Inuit values and practices (Searles, 2010). Many Inuit be-
lieve that living off the land creates intelligent and moral persons, and 
that individuals develop a capacity to think and reason through facing 
the elements of sea, snow, ice, and wind. On the other hand, an urban 
living has the potential to offer a new platform for identity building, 
where freedom, reflection and innovation are key elements (Kishigami, 
2002; see Chapter 11, Community Viability and Adaptation). 
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Graffiti protesting the appropriation of Sami culture during Umeå’s celebration 
as European Capital of Culture (2014) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit: Gail Fondahl. 
3.12 Chapter summary and trends 
As was stated in the first AHDR, resilient cultures and modernity do not 
have to contradict each other. That is, contemporary Arctic Indigenous 
peoples understand that the challenge is not to choose between “moder-
nity” and “unchanging tradition,” but to find a livable combination of the 
two. Given the political sophistication of local communities, to work in 
the North has become a tremendously rewarding learning experience 
for scientists and other scholars. At the same time, there is an evolving 
self-consciousness in some areas of the North that goes beyond the 
(necessary) anti-colonial rhetoric of earlier years. There is also an in-
creased awareness of “mixed” identities, and of the fact that many 
northerners have a mixed heritage. Still, these social realities are not 
always reflected in official policies and legislation, which tend to favor 
simplistic “black or white” identity categories. 
There is an ongoing trend toward cultural and linguistic revitaliza-
tion. Indigenous people are increasingly participating in academic and 
civil society discourses. This needs to be seen in the context of emerging 
northern identities and the positive valuation of regional perspectives. 
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We must not forget, however, that there are enormous differences with-
in the North regarding cultures and identities. While these differences 
must not be left out of the picture, a few general developments are nev-
ertheless traceable. 
We observe an increased focus on “culture.” Culture, especially Indig-
enous culture in the North, has become more and more a resource, both 
in the sense of a commodity and in the sense of a tool that makes exter-
nal recognition easier. Alongside this, there is a growing sense of the 
marketability of the North, which includes tourism but is not limited to 
it. So, it is not just “northern culture,” but the North as a whole that be-
comes more and more reified, be it as commodity, experience, state of 
mind, wilderness, resource base, and homeland. This leads to a kind of 
strategic advantage of being in the North. What used to cause isolation 
and marginalization – that is, Arctic identities – can be an advantage in 
contemporary identity politics. 
Gwich’in Moccasins, Canada, 2014 
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Much has been written about climate change in the Arctic. It is obvious 
that the cultural impact of climate change across the Circumpolar North 
varies from place to place and region to region. Still, there has been an 
enormous increase in the overall amount of attention Arctic communi-
ties are receiving because of climate change. Thus, while climate change 
might or might not be a priority issue for a specific group of northerners, 
  Arctic Human Development Report 143 
the (southern) discourse about climate change and its impact on north-
ern cultures has changed dramatically since the first AHDR. This empha-
sizes a clash between inside and outside perspectives, and indicates that 
parts of the Arctic have acquired a new stereotypical position, namely 
that of victims of climate change.  
In focusing on specific characteristics of Arctic cultures and identi-
ties, one is tempted to overemphasize the differences with the outside 
world. There are, however, multiple vectors of similarities that tie cul-
tures and identities of the North to other parts of the globe. On the one 
hand, many metropoles of Arctic states, to varying degrees, are geo-
graphically and culturally located far south of the Arctic Circle. Given the 
historical and contemporary connections between southern political 
centers and Arctic peripheries, it is not surprising that cultures of the 
North share many features with their respective dominant (southern) 
societies. On the other hand, northern identities also share similarities 
with those of other peripheral parts of the world (Brightman et al., 2006; 
Ulturgasheva et al., 2010). The transnational Indigenous movement, in 
which Arctic organizations are very active participants, is an example of 
this development. 
Even today, however, Arctic cultures and identities remain different 
from southern counterparts in many respects. For example, Arctic cul-
tures and identities have been characterized by tight relations with the 
natural and social environment. Kinship ties and networks continue to 
be valuable, not least in the urban context.  
Some argue that there is a more general circumpolar “Arctic” cul-
ture, as the different identities share common characteristics. The de-
velopment of communication technologies linking different parts of 
North has increased this trend, while at the time encouraging globaliz-
ing tendencies. 
Gender, age and ethnicity – and their interactions – are important as-
pects and parameters of Arctic livelihoods. Of these, indigeneity has re-
ceived the most attention in the literature. Arctic cultures and identities 
have not been sufficiently investigated through the lens of gender. While 
we know that traditional circumpolar cultures were characterized by 
gender-specific realms of activities, we know too little about the gender 
dimensions of contemporary cultural practices. Since we know that ur-
banization and other aspects of modernity affect men and women in the 
Arctic differently, we can assume pronounced gender differentiation, 
especially in urban contexts. While “traditional” notions of culture and 
identity are often tied to rural areas, 21st century Arctic realities include 
significant rural to urban migration movements, which are often more 
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difficult to align with male cultural practices and concepts than with 
those of women. The gender balance in the production of modern Indig-
enous cultural expressions is differentiated. Whether women or men are 
predominant in culturally important activities depends on a variety of 
local and regional factors. More gender-sensitive research on cultures 
and identities in the Arctic is much needed.  
Likewise, the rapid changes of a globalized world are having and 
will have profound impacts on the younger generation (and future 
generations); thus, it is critical to understand the hopes and aspira-
tions of Arctic youth. The future of Arctic cultures and identities will 
rest on the choices made by young people in the North today. These 
choices include – but are not limited to – decisions about where to live, 
which languages to learn and use, etc. Most important will be whether 
and to what extent Arctic Indigenous cultures and identities will be 
attractive for the younger generations. There are localized positive 
examples, as well as negative ones (Megatrends, 2011; Åhrén, 2008; 
Ulturgasheva et al., 2010). 
There is great cultural variation and complexity in the Arctic, proba-
bly more so than recognized in the first AHDR. Even where forms of ex-
pression (e.g., drumming, story-telling, rituals) are similar, the underly-
ing cultural ideologies can be different. Identities change over time and 
there are multiple identities, which further complicate a homogeneous 
understanding. There are, however, basic similarities in the worldviews 
and spiritualities of many Indigenous societies and cultures of the North. 
So what other major trends concerning cultures and identities in the 
North can be found? To some extent, they seem contradictory. On the 
one hand, there is a trend toward revitalization of Indigenous languages 
and cultures and the strengthening of northern identities. On the other 
hand, there is growing threat to circumpolar cultures and identities 
through modernization, globalization and (urban) migration. Only 
northerners themselves can decide where they want to live and work. As 
indicated above, this is hardly an either/or question but a situation of 
where both revitalization and modernization are necessary. In these 
decisions, however, “fate control” as defined by AHDR (2004) and ASI 
(2010), seems to be a critical indicator of positive change. 
Finally, we want to conclude with what we see as the major changes 
since 2004, the publication of the first AHDR. Given that certain layers of 
cultures and identities are “slow-changing” entities, it could be argued 
that not much has changed in terms of cultures and identities during the 
past ten years. Trends that started long before 2004 are visible in 2014 
as well: increased connectedness with the non-Arctic, especially with 
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national and international hubs and centers; decrease of local language 
use; and increase of cultural revitalization efforts. 
However, there has been a marked growth in the global awareness of 
the Arctic between 2004 and 2014. This is primarily connected to the 
global climate change discourse and to anticipation of future economic 
development opportunities in the North. While these conversations typ-
ically originate in the South, northerners are active participants in them. 
The net costs and benefits for Arctic residents remain to be seen, not 
only in terms of economic development, but also whether the increased 
interest in Arctic cultures might cement old stereotypes rather than 
overcome them. 
Still, it is clear that Arctic (Indigenous) “culture” has become an as-
set and a resource in many parts of the North. At the same time as in-
digeneity is being celebrated, cultural and social realities in the Arctic 
are increasingly characterized by “mixed” identities, whether or not 
they are socially and politically recognized. Parts of the Arctic show 
indications of increased strategic advantage of northern-ness and a 
growing marketability of symbols and things northern. Whether the 
interest in Arctic cultures and identities is a short-lived fad or not is a 
question for AHDR-III. 
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4. Economic Systems 
Lead Authors  
Lee Huskey, University of Alaska Anchorage, USA, Ilmo Mӓenpӓӓ, Univer-
sity of Oulu, Finland and Alexander Pelyasov, Council of Productive Forc-
es, Russian Federation 
4.1 Introduction 
The Arctic economy encompasses a range of activities from the small-
scale traditional production for community use to large-scale production 
and distribution of the region’s natural resources to the international 
market. This economy includes the flow of rents and transfers into and 
out of the North. Because these economic activities define the material 
well-being of the region’s residents, economic activity is a fundamental 
component of northern human development.  
Arctic Gross Product. Circumpolar Arctic, regions and countries, 2010 (Millions 
of $US-PPP and %) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Arctic map by W.K. Dallmann, Norwegian Polar Institute. Ilmo Mäenpää, Regional Economic 
Accounts of the Arctic, 2000–2010. 
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The Arctic economic region is not an integrated region, but rather a re-
gion of different economies with similar characteristics. The Arctic eco-
nomic region shares economic and environmental conditions that shape 
the economy of any part of the region. But because the area crosses the 
boundaries of countries, the overall regional economy and its effect on 
human development is influenced by the variety of different histories, 
institutions and resources that affect economic performance.  
4.2 Arctic regions 
In this chapter we define the Arctic as the northern regions of the eight 
Arctic nations, including: 
 
 United States: Alaska 
 Canada: Yukon, Northwest Territory, Nunavut 
 Denmark: Greenland, Faroe Islands 
 Iceland 
 Norway: Finnmark, Troms, Nordland 
 Sweden: Norrbotten, Vӓsterbotten 
 Finland: Lapland, Oulu, Kainuu 
 Russia: Murmansk, Karelia, Arkhangelsk, Komi, Yamal-Nenets, Khanty-
Mansi, Taimyr and Evenk, Sakha, Magadan, Koryak, Chukotka. 
 
The Arctic economy as a whole responds to similar signals from world 
markets, but throughout the North the local response may differ from 
the response in other parts of the North. The different responses reflect 
differences in such things as the concentration of resources, the varia-
tion in the quality of deposits, and the level of transport infrastructure in 
northern regions (Glomsrød and Aslaksen, 2009).  
The first Arctic Human Development Report described the northern 
economy by its structure of production and distribution of output 
(Duhaime, 2004). That Report presented two themes describing the 
Arctic economy. The Arctic economy was set apart from other econo-
mies by its structure combining large-scale natural resource produc-
tion, small family-based production, and consumption supported by 
transfers from higher levels of government; and second by the varia-
tion in the level of economic activity across the region. The first AHDR 
also identified three important trends influencing the Arctic economy. 
First, the Circumpolar North continued its role as a natural resource 
reservoir for the world with successive waves of resources produced 
  Arctic Human Development Report 153 
reflecting world markets. Second, the Report noted northern economic 
activity was increasingly privatized, as demonstrated by reduced fed-
eral subsidies and the increased importance of private companies and 
market decisions. Privatization affected economies throughout the 
Arctic but was especially important in the Russian North. Finally, the 
2004 AHDR identified a general diversification or structural change in 
the North, as evidenced by a multi-level diversification with new activi-
ties (like tourism) and new actors (like local or regional associations) 
becoming part of the economy. 
This chapter describes the economy of the Circumpolar North and 
highlights significant changes since the last Arctic Human Development 
Report. It reviews the level of economic activity in the Arctic between 
2000 and 2010. Over this decade, the Arctic has experienced dramatic 
expansion of its economy and increased expectations for its future 
(Graff, 2007). While there has been a change in the scale of economic 
activity in the Circumpolar North, the current economy of the Arctic 
region remains recognizable in structure and distribution to anyone 
familiar with the economy described in the earlier report. After examin-
ing the economy in terms of the themes and trends identified in the first 
AHDR, the report discusses the general causes of economic change in the 
Circumpolar North. A discussion of the variety of economic outcomes 
and the effects of the economy on Northerners is followed by a review of 
the performance of the components of the economy. The chapter con-
cludes by discussing the region’s likely future by identifying the trends 
that are likely to carry the economy into the future.  
4.3 General overview of the Arctic economy 
This section describes the aggregate Arctic economy. The Arctic econo-
my is relatively large. In terms of output the economy ranks with coun-
tries of much greater population. Between 2000 and 2010 the Arctic 
region also experienced rapid economic growth, growing faster than the 
national economies of the eight Arctic nations. As an important part of 
the world resource economy, the pattern of change in the Arctic econo-
my reflected changes in the world economy.  
The Arctic economy, like all regional economies, serves two different 
markets. A wide range of resource products including diamonds, iron, 
gold, zinc, oil and natural gas, fish, and timber is produced for an inter-
national market (Glomsrød et al., 2009). A local market likewise exists to 
provide goods and services to the residents of local regions throughout 
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the North. This local economy includes a significant public sector that 
provides income, jobs, and services to local residents. In some parts of 
the North, the local economy includes a traditional sector that provides 
for local consumption through fishing, hunting, herding, and gathering. 
The strength of the connections between these two parts of the local 
economy varies across the North.  
The local and international economies often behave like two separate 
economies, occupying the same space, but with little in common. This 
difference exists, for example, in the structure of production. While the 
international economy supports modern large scale, capital-intensive 
production, local production often takes place in small groups, which 
mix modern and traditional methods of production. The two economies 
also have contrasting economic geographies. The international economy 
is concentrated while historic settlements in the local economy are small 
and scattered. These contrasts are less likely for those industries that 
have historical local roots in a region or those which may serve both 
local and international markets, like fishing and herding (Helander-
Renvall, 2010; Crate, et al., 2010). 
Lukoil Offices, Salekhard, Russian Federation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit: Harald Finkler. 
 
This section uses Gross Regional Product (GRP) to describe the Arctic’s 
economic production between 2000–2010. GRP is a monetary measure 
of the goods and services produced in a region in one year. GRP is the 
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The calculation of Arctic GRP  
The gross regional product, or GRP, of Arctic regions is defined throughout this 
section as the gross domestic product at market prices. The data were retrieved 
from the regional and national economic accounts web sites of the statistical 
offices of the Arctic nations. The original data were produced in local national 
currencies. Two nations, Norway and Russia, have published their GRP figures 
only at basic prices. The difference between market price and basic price valua-
tion of GRP is the sum of accrued product taxes minus product subsidies. The 
basic price valued GRP figures of Norway and Russia has been converted into 
market values by the share of the product taxes minus subsidies in the GDP of 
the national accounts of mainland Norway (i.e., without off-shore activities) and 
Russian Federation. The difference of market valued GDP over basic price GDP 
was 17% in Norway and 16% in Russia in the year 2010. 
In most countries, the GRP figures are provided by the statistical offices at 
both current and constant prices of a chosen reference year. The reference 
years differ by the country, however. The constant price time series has there-
fore been converted uniformly to the national price levels for the year 2010. 
The GRP time series have, however, been published only at current prices in 
Norway and Faroe Islands. For Arctic regions of Norway the implicit price 
deflator of the GDP of the mainland Norway and for the Faroe Islands the im-
plicit price deflator of the GDP of Greenland were used to convert the current 
price time series into constant price series. 
Before adding up the GRP’s of the Arctic regions of the different nations, the 
figures expressed at local currencies have to be converted into a uniform inter-
national monetary unit, United States dollar. For this conversion, the purchasing 
power parities (PPP) of each national currency were used. The purchasing pow-
er factors are based on a comprehensive work of the International Comparison 
Program of the main international economic organizations and retrieved here 
from the online databank of the OECD (OECD, 2012). One problem with using the 
PPP’s is that they are national averages and using them to convert the local cur-
rencies of Arctic regions into uniform monetary unit implies that the price levels 
of Arctic regions correspond to their national averages.  
regional equivalent of national Gross Domestic Product, which is a wide-
ly accepted measure of production. Because GRP is a monetary measure 
of output, it describes real change in the amount produced as well as 
changes in the prices for the resources, goods, and services produced.  
Textbox 4.1 
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Two price adjustments to the GRP data are made for each country. First, 
price changes over time are adjusted to reflect changes in real produc-
tion. GRP is presented in 2010 prices by removing the effects of each 
country’s general inflation from our estimate of output. Second, price 
differences across space are adjusted, because the Arctic region crosses 
the borders of eight countries and GRP in each part of the Arctic is calcu-
lated in home country currencies. US dollar purchasing power parity 
(PPP) is used to estimate GRP in each country in comparable units. Even 
with these adjustments, if the prices of resources, such as oil and gas, 
increase faster than the general price level, real GRP in those regions 
producing these resources will increase.  
Arctic GRP provides a good estimate of the output in the money com-
ponent of both the international and local sectors of the Arctic econo-
mies. However, it underestimates total production in some parts of the 
Arctic. When the national calculation of GRP ignores the non-market 
traditional or subsistence component of the economy, production is 
underestimated. The more important traditional activities are in a re-
gion of the Arctic, the greater the underestimation of total output. Goods 
that are not traded in a market are not counted as part of the GDP in 
some national accounts. This limit is more important in the North Amer-
ican Arctic than in northern Europe.  
GRP has other limits as a measure of the material well-being for the 
region (Larsen and Huskey, 2010). For the North, GRP overestimates the 
material well-being because much of the income produced in the North 
leaves the region through rents, taxes, and wages paid to owners of re-
sources in other regions. GRP underestimates well-being because it does 
not include transfers that do not create jobs; transfers that provide ser-
vices or income directly are not part of the GRP. In parts of the North, 
services ranging from housing to health care to utilities are provided at 
subsidized rates underestimating their contribution to well-being.  
The economy of the Arctic is larger than might be expected for a 
remote region of the world. Arctic GRP in 2010 was USD 442.8 billion 
(see Table 4.1). According to the World Bank (2013) the Arctic GRP 
was equivalent to the GDP of Malaysia and Columbia. The Arctic’s con-
tribution to world output was four times its share of population; the 
Arctic produced 0.6% of world GDP and had 0.15% of world popula-
tion. On a per capita basis, Arctic GRP in 2010 was USD 45,360 per 
person. This was comparable to the United States and greater than 
most European countries.  
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Table 4.1: Arctic GRP 2000–2010 (millions of 2010 USD and US PPP) 
 GRP Arctic Region GRP Arctic Nation Arctic Region 
Growth Rate 
Arctic Nation 
Growth Rate 
2000  USD 311,036   USD 16,345,663    
2001  USD 329,729   USD 16,626,132  6.0% 1.7% 
2002  USD 340,444   USD 16,979,638  3.2% 2.1% 
2003  USD 357,991   USD 17,435,960  5.2% 2.7% 
2004  USD 378,967   USD 18,095,244  5.9% 3.8% 
2005  USD 399,748   USD 18,683,039  5.5% 3.2% 
2006  USD 421,678   USD 19,326,038  5.5% 3.4% 
2007  USD 435,637   USD 19,862,329  3.3% 2.8% 
2008  USD 446,983   USD 19,923,946  2.6% 0.3% 
2009  USD 428,364   USD 19,055,081  -4.2% -4.4% 
2010  USD 442,810   USD 19,685,256  3.4% 3.3% 
Source: Ilmo Mӓenpӓӓ, 2012, Regional Economic Accounts of the Arctic 2000–2010, unpublished 
typescript in possession of the author. 
 
The Arctic economy experienced relatively rapid growth during this 
decade. In real terms, Arctic GRP increased by 42.2% between 2000 and 
2010. This was an annual average growth rate of 3.5%. The growth rate 
of the Arctic economy was more than twice as fast as the growth of the 
eight Arctic nations. The Arctic nations’ GRP grew 20.4% over this peri-
od, a yearly rate of 1.9%. The performance of the Arctic economy re-
flected the world economic downturn in the later part of this period. As 
Table 4.1 shows, the Arctic Regional economy grew faster in the first 
part of the period than after 2006. Real Arctic GRP declined between 
2008 and 2009.  
4.3.1 General causes of change in the Arctic economy  
Production for the international market in the Circumpolar North is 
determined by the world’s demand for its resources and the cost of pro-
ducing and moving the resources to market. In the past, governments 
may have promoted some northern resource development for strategic 
purposes, but as recognized in the first AHDR, the trend towards privati-
zation means this is less likely (Hill and Gaddy, 2003). Modern resource 
developments must meet the market test: expected revenues must ex-
ceed expected costs. The long exploration and development time associ-
ated with mineral and petroleum development means that current eco-
nomic activity in these industries is influenced by expectations of future 
costs and prices. Development and production for the international 
market in the Arctic economy will be driven by changes in expected 
prices and costs.  
The cost side of this equation distinguishes the Arctic from other re-
gions. The high costs affect the amount and type of resource production 
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The Jack London hypothesis 
In his 1900 essay, “The economics of the Klondike”, Jack London addressed the 
path dependent nature of northern development. When examining the balance 
sheet of the Klondike gold rush, London suggested that long run benefits needed 
to be considered. The often overlooked benefit of resource development is the 
change in the economics of the place that it brings. He described how this change 
in the economic structure of the place would change future development: 
“The new Klondike, the Klondike of the future, will present remarkable 
contrasts with the Klondike of the past. Natural obstacles will be cleared 
away or surmounted, primitive methods abandoned, and hardship and 
toil and travel reduced to the smallest possible minimum. Explorations 
and transportation will be systematized. There will be no wasted energy, 
no harum-scarum carrying on of industry. The frontiersman will yield to 
the laborer, the prospector to the mining engineer, the dog-driver to the 
engine driver, the trader and speculator to the steady-going modern man 
of business; for these are the men in whose hands the destiny of the 
Klondike will be entrusted” 
(London, J., 1900).  
This dynamic is still at work lowering the cost of resource development in re-
gions of existing and historic resource production. 
that takes place in the North (Budzik, 2009). These costs are partly a con-
sequence of the region’s harsh climate, along with sparse populations and 
remoteness of resource deposits from centers of consumption, produc-
tion, and decision-making (Leven, 1986). The distance from markets and 
population centers increases the costs of shipping products to market and 
of bringing material, labor and other resources to production sites.  
The level of development in the region also influences costs in the 
Arctic. The Arctic includes both frontier regions with limited develop-
ment and mature development areas (Duhaime, 2004; Sugden, 1982). 
Greenland represents a frontier region for oil and gas development 
while Alaska’s Prudhoe Bay is a mature region. In the frontier or unde-
veloped regions of the North, large scale or rich deposits are required to 
overcome the high costs of production (Huskey, 2010). Production in 
mature regions is less costly because the infrastructure, labor, and tech-
nology exist in place, while these must all be brought into frontier re-
gions. Costs in the Arctic are path dependent and will be affected by the 
history of development in the area.  
Textbox 4.2 
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One of the themes of the first AHDR was that the Arctic has long been 
considered a global storehouse for natural resource wealth that the en-
vironment makes difficult to access. For example, the USGS recently es-
timated that the Arctic holds almost a quarter of the world’s undiscov-
ered conventional oil and gas (Budzik, 2009). One reason people are 
optimistic about the future of Arctic resource production is climate 
change. Warming would allow longer ice-free travel in Arctic seas and 
lower the cost of access and development for northern resources. Im-
proved access would lower the cost of delivering supplies and shipping 
the resources to markets. While the effects of warming on northern pro-
duction are complex, lowering transport costs would increase the possi-
bility of resource development in the Arctic. 
Agriculture in South Greenland. Qaqortoq Upernaviarsuk, October 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit: Jón Haukur Ingimundarson. 
 
The potential for opening this vast northern storehouse of resources 
improved with the recent increases in commodity prices and the expec-
tations that price increases will continue in the long run. The recent rise 
of commodity prices was driven primarily by the increasing demand for 
commodities resulting from the rapid expansion of the world’s emerging 
economies, especially China (Kaufmann et al., 2008). These changes re-
sulted in the expansion of resource activity in the resource producing 
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Commodity prices over the decade 
The growth in demand from the emerging nations is one reason for the increase 
in prices of all commodities. China’s appetite for natural resources has especially 
fired the imagination in Arctic nations. Prices of most commodities rose sharply 
between 2000 and 2011 and some argue that the likelihood of sharp reversals, 
especially in oil prices, is low (Kaufmann, et al., 2008).  
The recent dramatic increase in commodity prices may not be a long run 
trend. The arguments supporting long-term price increases are based on the 
increasing resource demand resulting from the industrialization of the world’s 
emerging economies. Recent analysis suggests that the current period is differ-
ent from the past and that resource prices will diverge from past trends 
(O’Connor and Orsmond, 2009). However, the world has experienced dramatic 
expansion of economic output in the past. High and rapidly increasing resource 
prices have existed for periods in the past, but over the very long run most re-
source prices have fallen in real terms (Blackman and Baumol, 2008).  
Historically, high prices for any resource provide the incentive for explora-
tion to find more of the high price resource and innovation to find technology 
substitutes for the resource. The North has seen new technology replace existing 
northern production starting with petroleum replacing whales and continuing 
through the development of fish farming as a competing source of northern fish. 
For Arctic oil and gas, the development of techniques to produce oil and gas from 
unconventional sources provides a new substitute. These new techniques used 
in North America have resulted in what The Economist magazine called “An Un-
conventional Glut” describing the market for natural gas (2010). Technological 
innovations have also helped mineral producers produce more from existing 
deposits (Barta and Miller, 2013).  
Together these effects suggest that high and rising prices of Arctic re-
sources may not be a long-term phenomena. After almost tripling between 
2000 and 2011, the International Monetary Fund’s index of all commodity 
prices has recently declined about 12% from recent peaks (Barta and Miller, 
2013). Arctic resources may face the long run pattern of resource prices de-
clining in real terms.  
regions of the world, including the Arctic (Sorenson, 2008; Doss, 2011). 
The expectation that the rise in commodity price is a long-term phe-
nomenon is important because of the long time it takes to develop new 
resource projects.  
Textbox 4.3 
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Throughout the Arctic, access to resources is also a public sector deci-
sion. The public sector may limit profitable resource production with 
taxes and regulation. Government may also prevent development by 
limiting access to the resources as in Alaska’s Arctic National Wildlife 
Refuge. Environmental concerns and conflicts with other land uses 
may provide good reason for limiting access or removing some eco-
nomic resources from potential production, but uncertainty in public 
decisions about access to resources will delay projects and increase the 
cost of development.  
The trend of privatization, identified in the first AHDR, will change 
the discussions of access. For example, institutional changes have in-
creased local self-government and ownership by local residents, thus 
offering the opportunity to control the development of local resources 
for an international market. This is especially the case in North America 
but also in Greenland and Norway (see Textbox 4.4) (Huskey, 2010).  
The effect of production for the international market on the well-being 
of Northerners depends on the connections between Northern residents 
and resource production activities. These connections are often limited. 
The location of many northern settlements reflects historic or traditional 
economic activities and only by the accident of discovery will existing 
communities be located near modern resource discoveries. Scale and dis-
tance often result in enclave production with limited connections to local 
communities. The capital, technological, and labor needs of large scale 
resource production are often brought from outside the region, which 
means that much of the income generated by resource projects flows out 
of the region of production as payment to these resources.  
Resource ownership and public resource revenue regimes also affect 
the flow of resource rents; control by non-local owners and govern-
ments reduces the economic contributions of resource production to the 
northern economy. Recent institutional changes in the North have in-
creased the control and ownership of northern resources in some parts 
of the Arctic and have had an important effect on the relation between 
the international and local Arctic economies. Control by local govern-
ments or local organizations have increased the role of residents in mak-
ing decisions about resource production and increased the share of re-
source rents and income that stays in the region.  
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Institutional change in the Arctic  
In the last part of the 20th century there were significant changes in the institu-
tional relationships between Arctic residents and resource producers. Changes 
were made in local control and ownership of natural resources, which will in-
crease the economic effects of resource production in the North. Northern insti-
tutional changes have increased self-government and ownership by local resi-
dents (McBeath, 2010). Local, indigenous majority governments were estab-
lished in Arctic Alaska, northern Canada, and Greenland and Finnmark in 
Norway, providing both opportunities and control for local residents. Ownership 
institutions have also been established through land claims settlements in Alaska 
and Canada. Ownership allows local residents both the ability to control and 
share the rewards of resource development. Finally, other types of ownership-
like arrangements have given residents more control. These include individual 
fishing quotas in Alaska, Iceland and the Faroe Islands. They also include more 
community ownership through mechanisms like Community Development Quo-
ta in the Alaska fisheries and the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission. These 
institutional changes give local residents more say in resource development, 
provide them with a certainty of rewards from development, and offer mecha-
nisms for residents to be compensated for losses suffered from development. 
This may reduce conflict over future development of the Arctic’s resources.  
 
Textbox 4.4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The importance of public sector to the local economies of the North 
means that the transfer policies of regional and national governments 
are important drivers for local economic change. The amount and type 
of transfers matter and changes in policies will have significant impact in 
local economies. Public transfers add to the economy by creating jobs 
and providing income and services for local residents. The size of this 
economic impact will both depend on and influence the size of the popu-
lation of local areas. 
In some parts of the remote Arctic, the economic well-being of resi-
dents continues to depend on traditional activities. This sector is also 
affected by production of resources for the international market. Pro-
duction for the Arctic international market has two opposing effects on 
the traditional economy (Nutall, 2005). The negative impacts of devel-
opment in the international economy of the North may damage ecosys-
tems that support traditional economies as in the reindeer herding re-
gions of the Russian North. However, income brought into the local 
economy because of activity in the international economy may also have 
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Maturing resource industries and sustainable economies 
When Arctic development depends on production of a non-renewable resource such 
as petroleum or mineral production, sustainable development will be challenged as 
existing resource reserves are depleted. The decline of their economy’s primary 
natural resource presents a challenge for both Northwest Territories (NWT) and 
Alaska. The diamond industry in Northwest Territories began with the opening of the 
first mine in 1998, and by the early 2000s, Canada had become the world’s third 
largest diamond producer. The diamond mines are an important source of jobs for 
the NWT economy. A decline in diamond prices and the maturing of the region’s 
original large mines led the Conference Board of Canada to forecast a near term 
decline in production as the early mines close up (Conference Board, 2013). In the 
short run, newer mines will fill the gap, but the Conference Board predicts the matur-
ing resource will cause production to decline after 2020. The economy is likely to be 
rescued by the growth of other types of mining in the region.  
The Alaska economy faces a similar challenge as petroleum production is in de-
cline. From the beginning of production at Prudhoe Bay in 1977, Alaska’s petroleum 
industry has significantly contributed to the Alaska economy. Oil has been the prima-
ry source of revenue for Alaska’s general fund, accounting for about 90% of the 
state's revenue. Goldsmith (2011) has estimated that direct activity in the oil industry 
and the effect of the state’s spending of oil revenue account for one-third of the jobs 
in the economy. But petroleum production peaked more than two decades ago and 
while new fields and new production technology have slowed the rate of decline, 
production continues to fall. Unlike NWT, Alaska’s other natural resource industries 
are too small to fill the gap in the economy. Fortunately, though, Alaska has set up a 
number of savings funds of which Alaska’s Permanent Fund is the largest. As Gold-
smith (2011) has suggested these funds provide a source of revenue to mitigate the 
effect of the decline in petroleum production on the economy. 
 
positive impacts on the traditional economy. Cash may make the sub-
sistence activities like hunting and fishing more productive.  
4.4 The three pillars of the Arctic economy 
The first AHDR identified the well-known three part economic struc-
ture of northern economies (see also Knapp and Huskey, 1988). The 
Arctic economy was described as based on three separate sectors. The 
formal economy was primarily based on large-scale resource produc-
tion. Traditional activities and small scale/family resource production 
provided a second support for the economy. Finally, transfers from 
higher levels of government supported much of the consumption 
through public sector jobs, direct payments to residents, and provision 
services. This economic organization continues to describe the Arctic 
and provides for its unique character.  
Textbox 4.5 
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Table 4.2 examines the distribution of Arctic production through the 
share of gross regional product found in the Arctic regions for industry 
groups in each of the eight Arctic nations for the year 2005. This distri-
bution will not necessarily reflect the importance of each industry in the 
income of local residents. Some industries, such as the mining sector, use 
a significant amount of labor and capital from outside the region. For 
these industries, local income will be less than output.  
The story told in Table 4.2 supports the theme of the first AHDR. The 
resource industries and public services accounted for more than half of 
Arctic’s regional output in six of the Arctic nations. The share of GRP in 
the resources and public services is highest in Russia (72.3%) and Alas-
ka (62.8%). The share of the resource industries and public services was 
lowest in Iceland, which still had more than one-third of its production 
in these industries. The resource sector includes both capturing and 
processing the resource. The public sector includes public administra-
tion, defense, utilities, and education, health, and social work.  
Table 4.2 also suggests the differences may be as interesting as the 
similarities. The Russian Arctic presents one extreme, with over 60% of its 
output in resource production and only 9% in the public sector. Iceland 
may provide the other extreme, with over 55% of its output in 2005 com-
ing from outside the natural resource and public services sectors (output 
in other service and the remainder). This distribution of output describes 
two general types of Arctic economies. Iceland, Finland, Norway, and 
Sweden may represent a more mature North with less than 20% of their 
output in natural resource production and more than 40% of their econ-
omy outside of resources and public sector. The Russian, North American, 
and Danish Arctic represent the frontier North, where resource produc-
tion and the public sector remain more important to the economy.  
Table 4.2: Distribution of GRP for Arctic regions, 2005 (percent) 
 United States Canada Finland Iceland Norway Russia Sweden Denmark 
Fishing  0.6 0 0.1 4.7 5 0.6 0 10.5 
Mining and petroleum 33.2 27.7 0.8 0.1 1 56.9 7.5 3.2 
Other resource  0.1 0.4 4.7 1.4 0.9 1.3 3 2.4 
Resource Processing 2 0 13.3 4.8 5.2 4.4 7.2 5.8 
Construction 5.4 8 6.8 9.6 6.9 5 5.4 7.2 
Public sector 26.9 28.7 24.8 23.8 40.5 9.1 32.6 29.9 
Other services 31.3 34.8 37.7 50.1 37.4 22.1 36.6 38.9 
Remainder 0.5 0.4 11.8 5.5 3.1 0.6 7.7 2.1 
Source: Based on tables in Glomsrød, et al, 2009. 
 
Production outside of the resource and public sectors is significant 
throughout most of the Arctic. With the exception of the Russian Arctic, 
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production outside of these industries accounted for more than 37% of 
output across all regions. These industries produce approximately half 
or more of the output in the Finnish, Norwegian, Swedish, and Danish 
Arctic and Iceland. Production in these industries includes production of 
goods and services for the region’s resident population as well as export 
industries not connected to resource production. 
Small-scale Entrepreneurship: Pilu Arctic products from Greenland – tea and 
cosmetics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit: Ivonn Hegelund Stenskov. 
 
The Arctic economy has been maturing while it grows. The Circumpolar 
North is comprised not just of small villages and resource enclaves, but 
also of towns and cities of significant size (Weber and Rasmussen, 
2014). These urban economies provide the trade, personal, government, 
and business services and the manufacturing of products that have his-
torically been supplied from outside the North. The growth of these ag-
glomerations results in the growth of businesses that replace imports. 
The rise of northern industries with no direct connection to extrac-
tive resources may be partly a result of the existence of these urban are-
as. Some of these new industries are connected to the region’s resource 
base. The Arctic’s natural beauty supports a growing tourism industry, 
and the aluminum smelting industry in Iceland is drawn by the low cost 
energy that country offers. Alaska’s cargo operations grew because of 
the state’s location and developed infrastructure. The electronics manu-
facturing industry in northern Finland is another important non-
traditional industry. The growth of Iceland’s financial industry in the 
first part of the decade provides another example of a non-traditional 
industry developed in the North. 
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Svalbard dogsledding tourism, Norway 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit: Joan Nymand Larsen. 
 
Data on the third pillar of the northern economy, traditional harvesting 
or subsistence, is not universally collected but this sector remains im-
portant throughout the North. Hunting, herding, fishing, and gathering, 
like money income, support the material well-being or real income of the 
region’s Indigenous population. These activities are also important for 
maintaining social relationships and cultural identity. Residents of re-
mote regions often balance traditional and wage work to create real 
income. Surveys of traditional activity throughout the North find signifi-
cant consumption of traditionally harvest foods, over 600 pounds per 
person in rural Alaska and the Canadian North. Subsistence provides at 
least half of the meat consumed by more than 40% of the Inuit popula-
tion throughout the Arctic. Reindeer herding and meat production re-
main important components of the economy in the Nenets Autonomous 
okrug (Aslaksen, et al., 2009). 
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Cultural economy of the Arctic 
Andrey Petrov 
 
Elements of traditional knowledge, such as arts and crafts, are not only im-
portant components of Native culture, but are also commodities that can bring 
economic profit (this economic sector is known as ‘cultural economy’). Artisans 
and handcrafters can provide incomes important to community well-being. The 
commercial production of arts and crafts from bone, ivory, soapstone, and hides 
has been important since the 1950s. According to the Survey of Living Condi-
tions in the Arctic, 18% of Aboriginal residents of the Canadian Arctic manufac-
tured crafts for sale (SLiCA, 2008, Table 1, p. 48). Almost one-third of all Aborigi-
nal people reported receiving some income from selling pieces of traditional art. 
Involvement in commercial handcrafting and artisanship was the highest in 
Nunavut, especially in some communities, like Cape Dorset. In another survey, 
30% of Inuit living in Nunavut reported deriving a part-time income from their 
sculpture, carving and print making. Interestingly, the region encompassing 
Baffin Island (including Iqaluit and Cape Dorset) has been the most creative rural 
area in Canada (Hill Strategies, 2010).  
Commercial arts and crafts are a substantial and growing sector of northern 
economy. It is estimated that these activities contribute USD 30 million in earn-
ings (Nordicity, 2010). Most of the purchases are made by tourists and collectors 
of Inuit art. Whereas they bring some sales earnings to Aboriginal communities, 
the challenge for local artists in the North is low incomes. Crafters and artists 
receive much smaller wages than their counterparts in other regions and than 
other workers in their own areas. The average earnings of an artist in Nunavut is 
just above USD 20,000, compared with an average wage of USD 38,000 for all 
workers in the Territory (Hill Strategies, 2009). In fact, this is below the official 
poverty line. As a result, arts and crafts are predominantly part-time activities 
for women: 40-80% of artisan products in Nunavut are done by Inuit women, 
many of whom are over 60 years old. Engaging younger people and men is an 
important strategy for furthering cultural economy in the North. Improving 
access to markets, business infrastructure and stimulating the demand for native 
arts are necessary to expand Nunavut’s cultural economy (Nordicity, 2014) and 
increase the attractiveness of artisan occupations. 
 
Textbox 4.6 
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Harbour area in Nuuk, Greenland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit: Joan Nymand Larsen. 
4.5 Variation in production around the North 
The significant variation in the size of the economy from one northern 
region to another identified in the first AHDR continues to exist. Tables 4.3 
and 4.4 describe the distribution of GRP by nation and by the Arctic sub-
regions in each nation. Arctic output is not evenly distributed throughout 
the North, and varies significantly between and within nations. 
Table 4.3: Arctic GRP by Arctic Nation, millions 2010 US dollar PPP 
Year GRP Arctic 
Region 
GDP Arctic Nation Share Arctic 
Region GRP 
 Arctic 
Share of 
Nation GDP 
Arctic Share 
of Nation 
Population 
United States  USD 47,713.00   USD 14,416,601.00  10.8% 0.3% 0.2% 
Canada  USD 7,268.95   USD 1,362,733.26  1.6% 0.5% 0.3% 
Denmark  USD 3,226.51   USD 221,243.88  0.7% 1.5% 1.8% 
Iceland  USD 11,071.28   USD 11,071.28  2.5% 100.0% 100% 
Norway  USD 18,450.81   USD 282,289.27  4.2% 6.5% 9.6% 
Sweden  USD 20,345.05   USD 369,320.86  4.6% 5.5% 5.4% 
Finland  USD 19,961.05   USD 194,994.45  4.5% 10.2% 12.3% 
Russia  USD 314,773.41   USD 2,827,002.00  71.1% 11.1% 4.8% 
Arctic regions, 
total 
 USD 442,810.05   USD 19,685,256.00  100.0% 2.2% 1.9% 
Source: Ilmo Mӓenpӓӓ, 2012, Regional Economic Accounts of the Arctic 2000–2010, unpublished 
typescript in possession of the author. 
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Table 4.4: Share of Arctic Output by Locality, millions 2010 US dollar PPP 
  GRP by Locality Share of 
National 
Arctic GRP 
Share of 
World Arctic 
GRP 
United States Alaska  USD 47,713  100.0% 10.8% 
Canada Yukon  USD 1,951  26.8% 0.4% 
 Northwest Territories  USD 3,792  52.2% 0.9% 
  Nunavut  USD 1,525  21.0% 0.3% 
Denmark Greenland  USD 1,601  49.6% 0.4% 
 Faroe Islands  USD 1,626  50.4% 0.4% 
Iceland Iceland  USD 11,071  100.0% 2.5% 
Norway Finnmark  USD 2,876  15.6% 0.6% 
 Troms  USD 6,154  33.4% 1.4% 
 Nordland  USD 9,421  51.1% 2.1% 
Sweden Norrbotten  USD 11,226  55.2% 2.5% 
  Västerbotten  USD 9,119  44.8% 2.1% 
Finland Lapland  USD 5,613  28.1% 1.3% 
 Oulu  USD 12,239  61.3% 2.8% 
  Kainuu  USD 2,109  10.6% 0.5% 
Russia Murmansk   USD 17,065  5.4% 3.9% 
 Karelia  USD 9,290  3.0% 2.1% 
 Arkhangelsk   USD 25,883  8.2% 5.8% 
 Komi  USD 25,624  8.1% 5.8% 
 Yamal-Nenets   USD 56,129  17.8% 12.7% 
 Khanty-Mansi   USD 143,726  45.7% 32.5% 
 Taimyr & Evenk  USD 1,055  0.3% 0.2% 
 Sakha  USD 27,980  8.9% 6.3% 
 Маgadan   USD 4,231  1.3% 1.0% 
 Koryak   USD 737  0.2% 0.2% 
  Chukotka  USD 3,053  1.0% 0.7% 
Arctic regions, total  USD 442,810   100.0% 
Source: Ilmo Mӓenpӓӓ, 2012, Regional Economic Accounts of the Arctic 2000–2010, unpublished 
typescript in possession of the author. 
 
As shown in Table 4.3, the Russian Arctic dominates Arctic production; it 
produces over 70% of the Arctic’s GRP. Russia’s share of Arctic produc-
tion is almost seven times the share of Alaska, the second largest eco-
nomic region in the Arctic. Both regions are oil and gas areas and the 
high value of this resource during this period helps explain this domi-
nance. The Arctic region contributes significantly (more than 5%) to the 
national GDP in five of the Arctic nations. As a region, the Arctic accounts 
for a slightly greater share of national GDP than population. However, 
only the Russian Arctic contributes significantly more to the national 
economy than its population share.  
Economic production is also concentrated within the Arctic regions 
of each Arctic nation. Table 4.4 shows the GRP in each of the sub-regions 
of each nation’s Arctic. In all Arctic nations output is unevenly distribut-
ed between sub-regions (this cannot be observed for the US, Greenland, 
or Iceland). In Norway and Sweden, the difference in distribution likely 
reflects the location of major towns within particular sub-regions. In 
Finland, 60% of its Arctic GDP is in the Oulu region that includes the city 
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of Oulu and its electronics industry. For Canada and Russia, the differ-
ence reflects the concentration of natural resources; diamonds in Cana-
da and oil and gas in Russia. In Russia, over 45% of its Arctic output is 
concentrated in the Khanty-Mansi region of the country. Over 60% of 
Russia’s Arctic GDP is produced in two regions – Khanty-Mansi and 
Yamal-Nenets.  
There are two reasons to expect output to be concentrated in the 
North. First, the significance of natural resource production to the Arctic 
economy implies the spatial economy will reflect the geography of the 
region’s natural resources. The Arctic is large and serves as a storehouse 
of natural resources but these resources are concentrated not spread 
evenly throughout the North. For example, a few sedimentary provinces 
in the Arctic account for most of the region’s petroleum resources; 65% 
of the estimated reserves in the Arctic are in three provinces (Budzik, 
2009). This results in the concentration of production in those places of 
rich or historic resource deposits. Second, the existence of an urban 
north also creates concentrations of economic production. Northern 
cities often serve as public administration, trade, transport, and health 
centers for large regions.  
4.6 The economy and the well-being of northern 
residents 
This section examines the well-being of northern residents in relation to 
the North’s economic output. The benefits of economic production for 
residents of the Arctic depend on the residents’ participation in the econ-
omy as owners of capital, resources, or labor, and the net flow of govern-
ment revenues flowing to the region. In the North, natural resource pro-
duction often separates local income from production. The scale and tech-
nology of Arctic resource production often makes resource industries 
importers of capital and labor. Income produced in the region will flow 
out of the region to pay for these imported factors of production.  
The growth of employment faster than population would be con-
sistent with Arctic residents increasing their share of available north-
ern jobs. Table 4.5 compares employment and population growth in 
the Arctic regions of the eight Arctic nations between 2000 and 2010. 
Population declined during this period for the entire Arctic while em-
ployment increased. However, change in Russia drives this pattern 
since it dominates both Arctic population (70% in 2010) and employ-
ment (72% in 2010).  
  Arctic Human Development Report 171 
Table 4.5: Employment Growth in the Arctic, 2000–2010 
 Employment (000s) Population (000s) 
 2000 2010 % increase 2000 2010 % increase 
United States 392.37 446.77 13.9% 627.96 714.15 13.7% 
Canada 47.24 57.29 21.3% 98.41 111.50 13.3% 
Denmark 54.54 51.54 -5.5% 101.95 105.08 3.1% 
Iceland 156.50 167.20 6.8% 281.21 318.04 13.1% 
Norway 216.00 232.90 7.8% 464.24 466.94 0.6% 
Sweden 224.50 233.10 3.8% 513.00 508.00 -1.0% 
Finland 255.27 276.25 8.2% 650.63 659.51 1.4% 
Russia 3577.20 3768.51 5.3% 7263.10 6878.44 -5.3% 
Arctic regions, total 4923.63 5233.55 6.3% 10000.50 9761.65 -2.4% 
Source: Ilmo Mӓenpӓӓ, 2012, Regional Economic Accounts of the Arctic 2000–2010, unpublished 
typescript in possession of the author. 
 
For the non-Russian Arctic, both employment and population grew, 
with employment growing faster. Population and employment grew 
fastest in Alaska and the Canadian Arctic. Population grew slowest in 
the mature Arctic of Fennoscandia even though these regions had rela-
tively healthy employment growth. Throughout the Arctic, population 
increased faster than employment in only Greenland/Faroe Islands 
and Iceland. The increased employment does not guarantee that resi-
dents increased their employment participation in the economy but it 
is consistent with that result.  
The dependency rates shown in Table 4.6 provide another way of look-
ing at the relative growth of employment and population. The dependency 
rate shows the population supported by each job in a region. The rate will 
be influenced by the age distribution of the population; a decline in the 
young and the old population will decrease the dependency rate. The de-
pendency rate will also be lower if more of the resident population of 
working age is employed. Table 4.6 shows the dependency rate fell over 
our study period in five of the eight Arctic nations. It increased in only 
Iceland and the Danish Arctic. A declining dependency rate is consistent 
with increased employment for local residents.  
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Long distance commuters in the Russian Arctic 
The long distance commuting worker is a significant component of the work-
force used to develop the Northern oil and gas resources in Russia. This repre-
sents a change in northern development policy from Soviet times that encour-
aged settlement and the development of towns and cities in the North. The 
“Vakhtovy method” includes both commuters from within and outside of the 
northern region. Commuters live in work camps while at the work place. These 
workers experience shifts of intense work time away from home and time away 
from the workplace. Shift length depends on such things as workers’ profession, 
travel time, and requirements of the operations. Common shifts are thirty days at 
work and 30 days off. This approach reduces the cost of resource production, 
since new towns and their infrastructure and services don’t need to be created. It 
also impacts the sending regions through the incomes earned in the North by 
residents of these regions (Eilmsteiner-Saxinger, 2011). 
Table 4.6: Dependency Rate in Arctic Regions 
(Population /Employment) 
 2000 2005 2010 
United States 1.60 1.57 1.60 
Canada 2.08 2.07 1.95 
Denmark 1.87 1.82 2.04 
Iceland 1.80 1.84 1.90 
Norway 2.15 2.10 2.00 
Sweden 2.29 2.27 2.18 
Finland 2.55 2.46 2.30 
Russia 2.03 1.88 1.83 
The Arctic 2.03 1.91 1.87 
Source: Ilmo Mӓenpӓӓ, 2012, Regional Economic Accounts of the Arctic 2000–2010, unpublished 
typescript in possession of the author. 
Textbox 4.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.7 compares the most direct measure of resident well-being, per 
capita household disposable income, with per capita GRP for 2010. 
Household disposable income includes all income earned by house-
holds including net transfers from governments. Per capita household 
disposable income is a good measure of the household’s material well-
being (Larsen and Huskey, 2010). Table 4.7 shows the variation in per 
capita incomes across the Arctic and within each Arctic nation. The 
highest is Alaska’s USD 40,600 which is more than three times the in-
come in the poorest regions, Karelia in Arctic Russia. Three of the five 
regions with the highest per capita incomes are in North America while 
two are in Russia. Russia also illustrates the variation in per capita 
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income. Two of the five highest per capita income regions are in Russia 
as well as two of the poorest.  
Table 4.7: Arctic Per Capita Household Disposable Income and GRP, 2010 
 Per Capita Disposable 
Income (000s) 
Per Capita GRP 
(000s) 
PC Income as a 
share of PC GRP 
United States    
Alaska 40.6 66.8 60.8% 
Canada    
Yukon 32.3 56.5 57.1% 
Northwest Territories 34.1 86.7 39.3% 
Nunavut 24.6 45.9 53.7% 
Denmark    
Greenland 16.3 28.3 57.6% 
Faroe Islands 16.2 33.5 48.4% 
    
Iceland 15.0 34.8 43.1% 
Norway    
Finnmark 22.0 39.3 55.9% 
Troms 21.9 39.2 55.8% 
Nordland 21.5 39.8 54.0% 
Sweden    
Norrbotten 18.3 45.1 40.7% 
Västerbotten 17.4 35.2 49.5% 
Finland    
Lapland 17.1 30.6 56.0% 
Oulu 16.7 31.1 53.8% 
Kainuu 17.0 25.6 66.4% 
Russia    
Murmansk  19.0 21.4 88.5% 
Karelia 12.4 14.4 86.0% 
Arkhangelsk  15.1 21.0 71.7% 
Komi 18.1 28.3 64.1% 
Yamal-Nenets  32.7 36.6 89.2% 
Khanty-Mansi  24.4 274.9 8.9% 
Taimyr & Evenk 20.6 19.1 108.0% 
Sakha 18.0 29.2 61.6% 
Маgadan  21.5 26.8 80.0% 
Koryak  23.8 33.3 71.4% 
Chukotka 29.2 60.1 48.6% 
Arctic 21.9 45.4 48.3% 
Source: Ilmo Mӓenpӓӓ, 2012, Regional Economic Accounts of the Arctic 2000–2010, unpublished 
typescript in possession of the author. 
 
Table 4.7 also compares each region’s disposable income to it GRP. This 
ratio would be one (1) for a region that was entirely self-supporting, 
keeping all the resource rents and production costs and not relying on 
transfers from other governments. Ratios lower than one represent the 
flow of rents and spending to outside resource owners and govern-
ments. Of the five highest income regions, only Yamal-Nenets has a ratio 
of more than 60%. Regions with higher ratios of income to output are 
the poorer regions, which may represent the importance of transfers to 
these economies. These ratios represent the connections between the 
regions of the arctic and other parts of the world.  
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Table 4.8 compares the per capita disposable household income of 
each Arctic region with per capita income for its nation in 2010. The 
Arctic regions in FennoScandia have per capita incomes that are similar 
to national incomes. Per capita incomes in the Arctic regions are general-
ly higher than the national per capita income in the US, Canada, and Rus-
sia. Although these results would seemingly lead to the conclusion that 
residents of the North experience similar levels of well-being to their 
counterparts in the rest of their respective countries, these results fail to 
account for the differences in costs of living in Northern communities. 
Since the North is a high cost region, these results likely overestimate 
the relative well-being of residents of the region. 
AIR NUNAVUT, Canada  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit: Harald Finkler. 
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Table 4.8: Per Capita Disposable Household Income (PPP) in 2010 (100 US dollars)  
Per Capita Disposable Household Income (PPP) in 2010 (100 US dollars)  
United States USD 36.1 Alaska USD 40.6 
Canada USD 22.8 Yukon Territories USD 32.3 
  Northwest Territories USD 34.1 
  Nunavut USD 24.6 
Denmark USD 16.3 Greenland USD 16.3 
  Faroe Islands USD 16.2 
Iceland USD 15.0 Iceland  USD 15.0 
Norway USD 22.8 Finnmark USD 22.0 
  Troms USD 21.9 
  Nordland USD 21.5 
Sweden USD 18.8 Norrbotten USD 18.3 
  Västerbotten USD 17.4 
Finland USD 18.7 Lapland USD 17.1 
  Oulu USD 16.7 
  Kainuu USD 17.0 
Russia USD 14.5 Murmansk  USD 19.0 
  Karelia USD 12.4 
  Arkhangelsk  USD 15.1 
  Komi USD 18.1 
  Yamal-Nenets  USD 32.7 
  Khanty-Mansi  USD 24.4 
  Taimyr & Evenk USD 20.6 
  Sakha USD 18.0 
  Маgadan  USD 21.5 
  Koryak  USD 23.8 
  Chukotka USD 29.2 
Source: Ilmo Mӓenpӓӓ, 2012, Regional Economic Accounts of the Arctic 2000–2010, unpublished 
typescript in possession of the author. 
4.7 The future of the Arctic  
What will the future hold for the Arctic economy? The recent perfor-
mance of the North’s economy provides some clues to the future. This 
section describes a likely future for the economy in terms of five trends. 
These trends are extensions of important observations about recent 
economic change and its causes in the North.  
Trend 1  
Northern resources will be developed for the international resource 
markets only when market participants expect the development to be 
profitable. This relationship will determine the future pattern of Arctic 
resource development. The predicted changes in resource prices and 
development costs are encouraging signs for future development. In-
creased commodity prices and reduced costs from climate change will 
increase the profitability of northern resource development. 
Unfortunately for the future of the Arctic economy, recent dramatic 
increases in commodity prices are not likely to be a long run trend. Re-
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The Shtokman experience  
The glut of gas from American unconventional sources resulted in a slowdown in 
gas production in the High North. Development of the large Russian Shtokman 
gas field was originally scheduled to begin production in 2013. Many observers 
estimate the start date will be closer to 2020. Because of its northern location it 
is a difficult and costly project. The Shtokman project was affected by a decrease 
in demand from the recession but also by the availability of less expensive and 
more accessible gas affecting the profitability of this project (Nordregio, 2010; 
The Economist, 2010). 
cent high prices are based on the increasing resource demand resulting 
from the industrialization of the world’s emerging economies. High and 
rapidly increasing resource prices have existed for periods in the past, 
but over the very long run most resource prices have fallen in real terms 
(Blackman and Baumol, 2008). Historically, high prices for any resource 
have provided the incentive for exploration to find more of the high 
price resource and innovation to find technology substitutes for the re-
source (Barta and Miller, 2013). 
Textbox 4.8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Trend 2  
The Arctic will remain a high cost region. Costs are high because resources 
are far from markets and lie in a sparsely settled land and an inhospitable 
environment. Budzik (2009) identifies the reasons behind the high costs 
of development, including harsh winters requiring special designs; poor 
soil condition requiring additional site preparations; potentially damaging 
ice pack in Arctic seas; long supply lines which require large inventories of 
parts; limited transport access; and higher wages and salaries required to 
induce personnel to work in the region. Of these only the transport cost 
may be positively affected by climate change.  
The effects of environmental changes in the Arctic will not always 
benefit economic development and there is evidence that climate 
change may make it more costly to develop resources. While warming 
may open the Arctic seas for transportation and the continental shelf 
for development, the sea ice will be unpredictable. The increase in 
flooding and the reduction in permafrost and snow cover will increase 
production costs even in areas with significant current resource activi-
ty; warming may shorten the period during which ice roads allow ex-
ploration and development activity on the tundra and thawing ground 
may destabilize existing systems of roads and pipelines and other in-
dustrial infrastructure in the North. These changes will impose costs 
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Prices and production from existing mines in northern Europe  
Including Northwest Russia there were 42 functioning mines in this region in 
2009. High demand and resource prices have generated interest in the region’s 
resource, which could result in the opening of as many as 68 mines, as well as 
increased production at existing mines. The geologic wealth of the Fennoscandi-
an Shield provides both the history of mining and the reason for interest in the 
region. Significant exploration took place in Sweden, Norway and Finland from 
2006-2007, costing the equivalent of EUR 55 million per year (Pietila, 2009). 
Greenland as a resource frontier  
Historically, Greenland’s economy was based on fishing and transfers from 
Denmark. In 2009 self-governance came to Greenland. Its sub-surface mineral 
rights may become a source of further economic growth. In 2010 Cairn Energy, a 
British petroleum firm, found indications of worthwhile oil deposits off Green-
land’s west coast. The USGS suggested that the sea floor between Canada and 
Greenland holds major oil deposits. International mining companies are also 
interested in Greenland’s mineral wealth. A recent change in policy opened the 
door for mining of valuable rare-earth minerals. Other mining interests include 
gold, molybdenum, and gems (The Economist, 2010; Areddy and Bomsdorf, 
2013; Sorensen, 2008). 
 
on existing Arctic activity as well as increase the cost of future devel-
opment (AHDR, 2004).  
Textbox 4.9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Trend 3  
Expectations of higher prices and lower costs for Arctic resources may 
be overly optimistic but natural resource production will continue as a 
driving force of this economy. Future resource production will likely be 
concentrated as it is today. Production is most likely to occur in regions 
of lower cost. These include places of existing production which allows 
the use of existing infrastructure; places near tidewater that reduce the 
cost of transportation; and places with low taxes and efficient regulation. 
Production will also be concentrated around extremely rich or bonanza 
resource deposits that provide the scale to overcome the high cost of 
Arctic development.  
Textbox 4.10 
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Trend 4  
There will be continual changes in the institutional relationships that de-
fine the connection between local residents and resource development. In 
the last part of the 20th century there have been significant changes in 
these institutions in the North. Changes occurred in local control and 
ownership and these should increase the economic benefits of resource 
development for local residents. These changes have allowed residents to 
participate in decision-making and to receive a greater share of the re-
source rents from development. Continued institutional change is likely to 
influence the future of the Arctic economy.  
Trend 5  
There will be significant economic activity outside the North’s interna-
tional resource economy. The traditional economy will remain im-
portant for the residents of the North. The public sector will remain im-
portant to the overall economic well-being of residents providing in-
comes, services, and goods. In the recent past northern economies have 
increased economic activities outside of the resource and public sectors 
in tourism, international air freight, electronics, and finance. These activ-
ities and import replacement activities are likely to accompany increases 
in the North’s city population. 
Smelting of nickel ore in Monchegorsk, Kola Peninsula, Russian Federation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit: Rasmus Ole Rasmussen. 
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4.8 Summary  
The current Arctic economy looks much like the economy described in the 
first AHDR. The Arctic economy remains surprisingly large, especially 
when compared to its share of population. The economy experienced 
growth during the study period, and that growth slowed with the interna-
tional economic slowdown. The economic output of the Arctic is highly 
concentrated in particular countries, Russia and the US. Output is also 
concentrated within regions in the Arctic nations. This concentration re-
flects both the concentration of resources and urbanization in the North. 
The Arctic economy as in the first AHDR continues to rest on three pillars: 
large scale resource production for the international market, small-scale 
traditional production for local consumption, and transfers from higher 
levels of government. Traditional hunting, herding and fishing remain 
important to the economy of the Arctic. Finally, during the study period 
some of the diversification forecast by Duhaime in 2004 could be found in 
the non-resource based industries, like air cargo and electronics, found in 
the North. 
4.8.1 Gaps in knowledge  
This review has described the economy in the Circumpolar North. It has 
shown that the economy of the region is relatively large and experienced 
significant growth over the review period. The review has also shown 
that economic well-being is not evenly distributed across the North. This 
section presents some areas for research that will help to understand 
better the determinants of this economic pattern. Filling in these gaps in 
our knowledge of the Northern economy will also be helpful to policy 
makers charged with improving the economic well-being of the resi-
dents of the North. 
Gap 1  
What types of institutions work best to improve the economic well-
being of northern residents? One of the most significant changes in the 
northern economy identified in this chapter is the introduction of a vari-
ety of new institutions. These provide residents of the North with more 
control over local resource projects and allow them to share more of the 
benefits of these projects. The variety of the types, history, and extent of 
these institutional changes across the North provides a natural experi-
ment for developing an understanding of the institutional characteristics 
that promote the economic well-being of the residents.  
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Gap 2  
What is the economic role of large settlements in the economic growth 
of Northern regions? The North has a variety of settlement types from 
small villages to large cities. Cities and towns often serve as centers for 
providing services and hubs for transportation. The urban settlements 
may also help to generate new types of economic activity and change the 
cost of resource development. Better knowledge of the economies of 
these urban places in the North and their relationship to the economies 
of their surrounding regions will increase our understanding of the 
northern economy.  
Gap 3  
What is the role and significance of the traditional sector in the Northern 
economy? The traditional harvesting plays an important economic and 
cultural role throughout the North, but there are limited means of com-
paring this activity to activities that take place in the resource and public 
sectors in many countries. Developing measures of the extent and signif-
icance of this economic activity would allow a more complete picture of 
the Northern economy.  
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5.1 Introduction 
Governance is fundamental to the future of the Arctic region, both for 
the people who make the Arctic their home and for the lands and re-
sources that are of increasing global importance. For the purposes of 
this chapter, governance comprises political systems – the structures, 
processes, and actors involved in public decision-making for a political 
community, and geopolitics – the international relations among political 
communities. By international standards, the Arctic region has been a 
leader by constantly pushing the edges of governance innovation. Much 
of this innovation has been driven by the complexity of the issues facing 
the region and its peoples. The dramatic legal empowerment of Indige-
nous peoples over the past two decades has profoundly shaped new and 
emerging governance arrangements. At the same time, harsh climates, 
large geographic distances, persistent social challenges and limited or-
ganizational and administrative capacity, as well as new external drivers 
such as climate change and global energy demands, strain many subna-
tional and local governments in the Arctic region in ways that are simply 
incomparable to southern metropoles. 
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Part of the complexity of governance in the Arctic region is the multiple 
identities and political allegiances that Northern citizens hold. A person 
living in the village of Khatystyr in eastern Siberia, for example, may be-
long to a particular clan, but is also a citizen of the local municipality. He 
or she also shares a broader Evenk identity with other Evenk people, not 
only within Sakha Republic (Yakutia), but also with Evenk in other regions 
in Russia and, indeed, beyond the borders of Russia. That same person is 
also a citizen of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia) and a citizen of Russia. Ac-
cordingly, he or she may be a voting member of the local clan-based, self-
governing economic collective (rodovaya obshchina), and a citizen with 
defined political rights and obligations toward the municipal, republic and 
federal governments. The individual may also be an active member of the 
local Evenk organization and the republic (regional) level Russian Associ-
ation of the Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON).  
Sometimes the governments and organizations representing these 
different affiliations pursue common aims and hold common priorities; 
more often, they do not and are at odds with one another. A national 
priority to develop natural resources to export abroad may be at odds 
with local interests to preserve the environment. This does not even 
begin to speak of the complexity of governance at the international level 
within the Arctic. Northern residents, therefore, often have regional 
(province, state, or republic) citizenship, along with national citizenship 
rights and duties. Indigenous residents, in addition to regional and na-
tional citizenship rights, often have other political rights related to their 
cultural identity. 
Today, multi-level governance is at the center of Arctic political life, 
reflecting these attachments to different political communities. Indeed, 
much of the governance innovation that has taken place in the Arctic 
centers on reconciling the interests of various political communities. 
What has emerged is a range of different governments, agencies and 
organizations. This range includes governments and government forums 
at the local, regional, national and even international levels. It also in-
cludes non-governmental organizations that contribute to the admin-
istration of this vast region. Multi-level governance involves interaction 
vertically (across local, regional, national and international bodies) and 
horizontally (among government and non-government actors on the 
same level). Accordingly, this chapter organizes its exploration of Arctic 
governance trends through a multi-level governance lens. 
 
 
 
  Arctic Human Development Report 185 
Six trends in Arctic governance have evolved and/or have emerged 
since 2004: 1) devolution and tensions with centralization; 2) increasing 
Indigenous political and legal empowerment; 3) human capacity chal-
lenges; 4) fiscal capacity challenges; 5) challenges of defining political 
community and legitimate participation; 6) continued governance inno-
vation. Although the circumstances – the particular combination of peo-
ples, history, geography, and climate – that surround governance in the 
Arctic are unique to the region, many of the processes are not. Devolu-
tion and the ebb and flow of centralization versus decentralization have 
been a dominant theme in the recent history of Arctic governance. The 
devolution of authority from Denmark to Greenland, from the federal 
government in Canada to the three territorial governments, from the 
Russian federal government to regional subjects (as well as the recen-
tralization of authority) are just some examples of these complex pro-
cesses. It is important to stress that these processes are part of broader 
devolutionary trends globally.  
Paralleling the devolution of authority from national to regional gov-
ernments has been the waxing of Indigenous political rights and govern-
ance authorities (Coates and Poelzer, 2010a). This is profoundly shaping 
governance across the Arctic, from the North Slope of Alaska and Canada 
to Greenland and Finland. The number of Indigenous governance au-
thorities grew rapidly in the Russian Federation in the 1990s, but the 
process of devolution has been caught up in the broader recentralization 
of power that has been taking place over the last decade.  
Devolution and the political empowerment of Indigenous peoples 
have led to an increase in governance authorities at regional and local 
levels; this in turn has generated human and fiscal capacity challenges. 
Having governance authority is one matter, having the people and fi-
nancial resources to effectively exercise that authority is another issue 
altogether. The Arctic is not exceptional in terms of the human and 
fiscal capacity challenges confronting regional and local governments. 
Whether or not the basic issues of governance can be addressed will 
determine, fundamentally, whether or not social issues can be tackled, 
economic opportunities can be seized, transportation, communication, 
and housing infrastructure can be delivered, and land and environ-
ments can be managed. 
In regards to who should participate in governance, the Arctic Coun-
cil has broken new ground from its very founding in terms of including 
Indigenous perspectives and voices through the involvement of the 
Permanent Participants, organizations that represent many of the Indig-
enous peoples of the Circumpolar North. As the Arctic has grown in sig-
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nificance globally and domestically, defining political community and 
legitimate participation in Arctic governance has become increasingly 
important. This issue has arisen on a global level in the Arctic Council, as 
non-Arctic states have sought a seat at the Arctic governance table. But 
this issue also occurs at the domestic level. In countries such as Canada 
and Russia, there are considerable variances in terms of which sub-
Arctic regions are included and when they are included in governance 
and decision-making processes. It is likely these latter governance issues 
will become increasingly salient over the coming years.  
The final trend in governance is that innovation has not plateaued in 
the Arctic region. Political systems and geopolitics continue to evolve, 
placing the Arctic at the global forefront of finding solutions to accom-
modate both the vertical and horizontal dimensions of an increasingly 
complex multilevel governance system. 
This chapter will examine the main institutional features that influ-
ence Arctic governance at the local, regional, national and international 
levels, with a particular focus on developments since the first Arctic Hu-
man Development Report (AHDR, 2004). The chapter will begin by re-
viewing the national political contexts in North America, the Nordic 
countries and Russia. The next section will explore developments and 
trends in local and regional or sub-national governance in specific coun-
tries, as well as provide a general synopsis of national development 
strategies of the Arctic states. The last section will look at geopolitical 
and international governance in the Arctic. The discussion that follows 
uses the terms Arctic and Circumpolar interchangeably.  
5.2 National political systems in comparative 
perspective  
Political systems and geopolitics operate within historical contexts and 
through institutions heavily shaped by the political cultures of particular 
regions and countries. For an overview of the context of contemporary 
political systems and geopolitical environments, please consult Chapters 
4 and 12 of the Arctic Human Development Report (AHDR, 2004). This 
chapter outlines the current contexts. 
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5.2.1 North America: national majoritarian states and 
federal systems 
Governance regimes in North America (Canada and the United States) 
are generally characterized by two defining features: majoritarian de-
mocracy and federalism. In a majoritarian democracy, the person or 
party that wins the most votes or seats in an election is typically given 
the first opportunity to govern. In Canada, the political party that wins 
the most seats in an election forms the government, while the other par-
ties become the opposition. In the United States, authority is divided 
between different branches of power, but control over any one branch is 
still based on the majoritarian principle.  
While most national and regional (state, provincial and territorial) 
governments in Canada and the United States operate on the majoritari-
an principle, there are some important exceptions in the Canadian Arc-
tic. The governments of Northwest Territories and Nunavut both oper-
ate according to a consensus system of democracy. This means that deci-
sions are made with the consensus of those present, rather than by the 
more adversarial and competitive process that is common in other juris-
dictions. This consensus-based system of decision-making is consistent 
with traditional governance methods of the Indigenous peoples who 
inhabit Northern Canada.  
In a federal system of government, power is divided between differ-
ent orders of government such as a national government and various 
regional governments. Under this system the responsibilities of these 
orders of government are outlined (and protected) in a constitution and 
these arrangements cannot be changed without consent of the orders of 
government affected by the changes. The Canadian federal system con-
sists of a national or federal government and provincial and territorial 
governments. Of particular relevance to the Arctic are the territorial 
governments, which govern the regions north of the 60th parallel of 
latitude (there are small sections of the provinces of Quebec and New-
foundland and Labrador that extend north of the 60th parallel). Yukon 
Territory, Northwest Territories and Nunavut all have autonomy within 
the Canadian federal system, including their own legislatures and dele-
gated authority. These territories, however, do not have the equivalent 
status of provinces within the Canadian federal system and are depend-
ent on the federal government for much of their funding. Nevertheless, 
in recent years, the federal government has devolved province-like pow-
ers to Yukon (2003) and Northwest Territories (2013) and, in many 
respects, these territories operate like de facto provinces.  
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In the United States, the federal system divides power between a na-
tional or federal government and state governments. The State of Alaska 
is the only American territory within the Arctic region. Alaska has a 
number of autonomous regions or boroughs, including the North Slope 
Borough (NSB) and the Northwest Arctic Borough (NAB). Like the re-
gions of Nunavik and Nunatsiavut in Canada, the NSB and the NAB are 
nested within Alaska as political subdivisions of the state, and, therefore 
do not challenge the state’s territorial integrity. Adding to the complexi-
ty of governance in America’s only Arctic sub-national jurisdiction is the 
fact that although the United States has a constitutional obligation to 
deal with Indigenous tribes on a government-to-government basis, the 
state of Alaska does not have a similar relationship with the tribes with-
in its borders. The disparity in relations between the tribes and the fed-
eral government, and the tribes and the state government, leads to ten-
sions between governments at all levels (Kimmel, forthcoming). 
While federalism supports the idea of regional autonomy because it 
recognizes that sovereignty can be divided between different govern-
ments within a single political system, this system of government does 
not always accommodate regional aspirations for autonomy. For exam-
ple, large portions of the Canadian sub-Arctic, referred to as the provin-
cial Norths, are constrained by federalism because they are located with-
in the geographic boundaries of existing provinces. Although there are 
some examples of these Northern regions achieving greater autonomy 
within their respective provinces, for the most part, the provincial 
Norths are controlled politically and economically by their respective 
provinces. Communities situated in the provincial Norths have some 
limited autonomy through local government. In Canada, however, local 
government is not a recognized order of government and comes under 
the legal (constitutional) jurisdiction of the provincial governments.  
5.2.2 Nordic: consensus model of governance and unitary 
states 
The governance model of the Nordic countries of Northern Europe (Fin-
land, Norway and Sweden, Denmark (Greenland) and Iceland) has been 
described as consensual democracy. It has been observed that the basis 
for consensual democracy is a high degree of political, economic and 
ideological unity within a particular country or society (Elder et al., 
1998). For the most part, such unity existed in the Nordic countries for 
much of the post-war period. This model was reinforced by a robust 
social safety net called the Nordic Welfare Model (NWM) (Arter, 2001). 
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In the past decade, however, the NWM and consensual democracy have 
been affected by globalization, changing ideological norms and, in the 
case of Finland and Sweden specifically, the process of European inte-
gration. Although membership in the European Union (EU) does weaken 
the control that individual member states exert over their respective 
political and economic systems, the EU’s regional support and structural 
funds programs underlining principles of partnership and subsidiarity 
have worked together and even enhanced national regional policies in 
rural and northern areas of Sweden and Finland. The EU and its Nordic 
member states have also taken a leadership role in the Arctic through 
the Northern Dimension program, a policy that was initiated in 1999 
and renewed in 2006. The policy aims to “promote dialogue and con-
crete cooperation, strengthen stability, well-being and intensified eco-
nomic cooperation, and promote economic integration, competitiveness 
and sustainable development in Northern Europe” (European External 
Action Service, 2013). 
The Nordic countries are also characterized by unitary systems of 
government. Unlike federal systems that constitutionally divide gov-
ernment into different levels of sub-national regions and territories, a 
standard unitary system centralizes power in a national government. 
Central ministries, therefore, administer issues relating to Northern and 
Arctic development. Depending on the issue, these ministries might be 
general in scope, such as health or education, or a specific ministry re-
lated to regional development. For example, in Norway, the Ministry of 
Local Government and Regional Development is responsible for devel-
opment in all parts of the country, including its Arctic regions. The pri-
mary exceptions to the standard unitary model are the statuses of 
Greenland and the Faroe Islands within the Danish Kingdom, and Fin-
land, where municipalities are constitutionally protected and have ex-
tensive administrative powers. 
In unitary systems, national governments can also devolve power to 
regional and local governments, thereby allowing regions and communi-
ties a degree of autonomy. Unlike federal systems, however, those pow-
ers can always be reasserted by the national government. Throughout 
the Nordic countries, therefore, northern and remote regions do exercise 
a limited degree of autonomy. An example would be Norrbotten County 
in Sweden, which covers almost a quarter of the country’s landmass. 
Norrbotten is governed by the County Administrative Board, which is 
headed by a centrally appointed Governor. 
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With the exception of northwestern Russia, the Nordic countries con-
tain all of the Arctic regions of Europe. In terms of regional governance, 
among the most important political features of Arctic Europe are the 
parliaments that represent the Sámi peoples of Sweden, Norway and 
Finland. These parliaments provide the Sámi, one of the Indigenous peo-
ples of northwestern Europe, with limited levels of autonomy within 
their host states: the Sámi parliaments have the political autonomy to 
develop policy recommendations to their respective national parlia-
ments, but are limited in that the recommendations are advisory and not 
legally binding. 
5.2.3 Russian Federation: managed democracy and 
federalism 
The Russian Federation (Russia) has undergone a series of profound and 
far-reaching transitions since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. 
These transitions have political, economic and social dimensions. Political-
ly, Russia moved away from the one-party rule of the Communist Party 
toward a multi-party democracy. During the 1990s, the authority of gov-
erning institutions waned with a parallel movement toward decentraliza-
tion. Over the past decade, the Russian government has become a system 
of “managed” democracy in which the activities of opposition groups have 
become more limited. The political system was also centralized in an ef-
fort to increase the efficacy of governing institutions. As a consequence, 
the legislative branch of government, through the Parliament (Duma), and 
the federal system of territorial governance have both come under in-
creasing control of the executive branch of government. 
Russia has a hybrid system of presidential and parliamentary gov-
ernment. The executive and legislative branches of government are 
elected separately, but the President appoints the head of the Govern-
ment (the Prime Minister). Under the presidency of Boris Yeltsin in the 
1990s, the relationship between the Parliament and the President was 
much more balanced. Since Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000, the 
President has become the dominant political actor. One might even say 
that since 2000, power has become concentrated in the hands of Vladi-
mir Putin. Even during the period of 2008–2012, when Dmitry 
Medvedev assumed the position of President, Putin, his appointed Prime 
Minister, was still widely perceived to be the most powerful politician in 
Russia (Remington, 2011).  
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Russia’s federal system of government has its roots in the Soviet fed-
eral system. For the most part, the territorial configurations that existed 
in the Soviet federal system were simply replicated in the post-Soviet 
system. This is particularly important for Northern Russia because the 
Soviet system provided de jure autonomy for many sparsely-populated, 
yet geographically large Northern regions. For example, Russia’s auton-
omous okrugs (districts), most of which are located in the Northern and 
Arctic regions of the country, were remnants of the Soviet system. They 
were established in the 1930s to provide northern Indigenous peoples 
(malochislennyie narodi Severa) with a degree of administrative and 
cultural autonomy, albeit within the strict confines of a highly central-
ized authoritarian system of government (Wilson, 2003). In the post-
Soviet period, however, these regions gained real political and economic 
autonomy. In the 1990s, they were junior partners in the “parade of 
sovereignties” that challenged the power of the federal government. 
During the Putin era, the Russian federal system has become much 
more centralized. Whereas in the 1990s, regional governments routinely 
flouted federal legislation in key areas such as natural resource devel-
opment (Wilson, 2001), after 2000, the federal government systemati-
cally brought the regions into line. Reforms to Russia’s federal system of 
government had particular consequences for the North. In the early 
2000s, Putin introduced a system of federal districts as a means of con-
trolling the regions and, in particular, making sure that they complied 
with federal legislation. Russia’s northern regions, spread out across 11 
time zones and thousands of kilometers of territory, were divided 
among several such federal districts, the capital cities of which are all in 
the South. The autonomy that these regions had enjoyed as a result of 
the weakness of the federal government and the chaos of the first decade 
of the post-Soviet transition, quickly dissipated as the regions were ex-
pected to conform to the dictates of the centrally-mandated federal dis-
trict representatives.  
Another, more gradual series of changes have affected the abovemen-
tioned autonomous okrugs, which comprise a large territorial portion of 
the Russian North and Arctic. Over the last decade, there has been pres-
sure to merge these regions with larger, southern regions, as part of a 
general plan to consolidate the hold of those southern regions over the 
resource wealth of the North. Regional mergers, along with the creation 
of the federal districts, were also a way for the federal government to 
streamline the federation and reduce the number of regions (with over 
80 regions, and six different types of regions, the Russian Federation is 
by far the most complicated federal state in the world).  
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5.3 Levels of Arctic governance: local, regional and 
national 
Sakha Republic (Yakutia) Parliament, Russian Federation, 2014  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit: Vasiliy Kononov.  
5.3.1 Local level governance 
Local government is an important level of government because of the 
tasks it performs and its proximity to and interaction with the citizenry, 
relative to other levels of government. Local governments provide criti-
cal services that are essential to the proper functioning of communities, 
as well as a degree of local administrative control. This is particularly 
true in northern and remote regions where local government is often the 
only level of government that is controlled by and answerable to North-
erners. While provincial/regional and national governments obviously 
play a key role in the administration of northern regions, local govern-
ment is usually the point of first contact for northern residents. 
As indicated in the first AHDR, over the past several decades, two dis-
tinct local governance models have emerged in the Circumpolar North: 
public and Indigenous. A public model of local governance exists when 
participation in the activities of local government, such as voting in elec-
tions and running for office, are open to all citizens, regardless of their 
status or ethnicity. An Indigenous model of local governance exists when 
only recognized members of a particular Indigenous group are allowed 
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to participate in the activities of local government. The public govern-
ance model is more common in the Circumpolar North, but with the pro-
gress made towards Aboriginal self-government in some countries such 
as Canada, Indigenous forms of local and regional governance are be-
coming a reality.  
Norway 
Norway has a public model of local governance. As a unitary state, its 
central or national government (based in the capital Oslo) provides 
overarching political direction for the whole country. Below the central 
government, local administration is divided into two tiers: counties 
(fylker) and, located within the counties, municipalities (kommuner). 
There are 19 county authorities and 428 municipal authorities. The 
three Northern counties, encompassing the Northern half of the country 
are Finnmark, Troms and Nordland. Voters elect representatives to mu-
nicipal and county councils, and the number of representatives present 
in municipal councils depends on the size of the municipality. For exam-
ple, a municipality with a population under 5000 is expected to have at 
least 11 representatives on its municipal council (Norwegian Ministry of 
Local Government and Regional Development, 2008). By contrast, simi-
lar sized municipalities in Northern British Columbia in Canada only 
have 6 representatives.  
The structure and responsibilities of local government are governed 
by the Local Government Act (1992), a centrally mandated piece of legis-
lation. Over the last decade, there has been a great deal of discussion 
about expanding the responsibilities of local government in Norway. As 
one government publication notes: “Decentralisation of responsibilities 
and authority is a crucial step towards genuine local democracy and an 
efficient and user friendly public administration” (Norwegian Ministry of 
Local Government and Regional Development, 2008). Nowhere is this 
more relevant than in the North. Greater local autonomy provides 
Northerners with the capacity and authority to make decisions that are 
relevant to their particular circumstances.  
Canada  
Canada has both public and Indigenous models of local governance. Pro-
gress on Aboriginal self-government over the last decade has strength-
ened the legal capacity of Indigenous groups to manage their own af-
fairs. A number of studies demonstrate the importance that Indigenous 
people place on local level government; the local community is often 
their primary political identity and attachment. This is demonstrated 
through higher voter turnout at the local level compared to regional and 
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The Tłįchǫ Agreement  
In the Northwest Territories (NWT), the precedent setting Tłįchǫ Agreement 
came into effect on August 4, 2005. This tripartite agreement, concluded by the 
Dogrib Treaty 11 Council (Tłįchǫ), the Government of Canada and the Govern-
ment of Northwest Territories is the first combined land, resources and self-
government agreement in NWT. The Agreement provides the Tłįchǫ with owner-
ship of a single block of 39,000 square kilometers of land, including subsurface 
resources, adjacent to or surrounding the four Tłįchǫ communities of Behchoko, 
Whatì, Gamètì, and Wekweètì. A Tłįchǫ Community Services Agency, established 
under territorial legislation, is responsible for the management, administration 
and delivery of health, education and other social programs and services to all 
residents in the four Tłįchǫ communities and on Tłįchǫ lands, based on Tłįchǫ 
Laws and NWT Laws. Consistent with the Agreement, the Tłįchǫ Community 
Governments (TCGs) of Behchoko, Whatì, Gamètì, and Wekweètì were estab-
lished pursuant to territorial legislation on August 4, 2005. The TCGs replaced 
the Indian Act Bands and NWT municipal corporations that were in place prior 
to the effective date of the Agreement. The TCGs are responsible for municipal 
services and represent and serve all residents. The Agreement provides for 
guaranteed Tłįchǫ participation on the Wek’èezhìi Renewable Resources Board 
and the Wek’èezhìi Land and Water Board. This agreement underscores the 
increasing complexity of multilevel governance in the North. 
 
national level elections, a pattern that is opposite to the general popula-
tion (Berdahl et al., 2012). At the same time, these groups face signifi-
cant human and fiscal capacity challenges that prevent them from fully 
exercising their legal rights and responsibilities.  
In Yukon Territory, the Umbrella Final Agreement was signed be-
tween the federal, territorial governments and the Council of Yukon 
Indians (now the Council of Yukon First Nations (CYFN)) in 1993. This 
agreement served as a template for the negotiation of separate agree-
ments with individual First Nations in the territory. Eleven such final 
agreements have come into effect since 1993 (see, e.g., Yukon Govern-
ment, 2012). In addition, nine self-government agreements have been 
concluded by members of the CYFN, as well as by the Kwanlin Dün First 
Nation and Vuntut Gwich’in First Nation, who are not members of CYFN 
at the present time.  
Textbox 5.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While these agreements and that of NWT (see Textbox 5.1) represent a 
significant step forward in terms of self-government, many of these In-
digenous groups are small and often lack the capacity to carry out the 
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responsibilities that are outlined in the agreements (Dacks, 2004). Such 
capacity issues are replicated in other local jurisdictions in Northern 
Canada. It is important to note the different capacity challenges between 
public local governments and Aboriginal governments, especially for 
smaller communities. The responsibilities of public local governments in 
Canada are quite limited to areas such as municipal water and sanita-
tion, parks and roads. By contrast, most Aboriginal governments have 
responsibilities akin to provincial and territorial governments, including 
areas such as health and education, above and beyond what public local 
governments administer. This reality exacerbates the capacity challeng-
es that Aboriginal governments face. 
Local level governments also confront fiscal capacity issues. Public 
local government in Northern Canada, as in other parts of Canada, falls 
under the constitutional jurisdiction of the provincial and territorial 
governments. The authority of local governments, therefore, is defined 
by provincial and territorial legislation. Over the past several decades, 
local governments have seen their range of activities expand, in large 
part due to the downloading of responsibilities by senior (provincial and 
federal) governments. The ability of local governments to raise revenue 
(in the form of taxes) is limited and often these downloaded responsibil-
ities are not accompanied by new sources of revenue. Consequently, 
local governments are forced to do more with less or, at best, the same 
amount of revenue.  
Indigenous and public governance arrangements address one set of rep-
resentation issues. Another set is gender. Among municipal public govern-
ments, there were significant levels of participation by women in elected 
office. In 2013, the following percentages of mayors/council members for 
each territory were as follows: Yukon (50/33); Northwest Territories 
(20/43); Nunavut (20/34). Indigenous self-government and claims agree-
ments have generated instruments of multilevel governance among Indige-
nous governments on one side, and local and regional level governments on 
the other. An important instrument is co-management. One study of the 
gender representation on co-management boards in Yukon Territory, 
Northwest Territories, and Nunavut found that among the total 210 mem-
bers, 176 (84%) were men and 34 (16%) were women (Natcher, 2013). 
Among the 34 co-management boards, nine had entirely male members, 
and 18 boards, respectively, had only one female member. The reasons for 
this gender imbalance require further inquiry (Ibid.). 
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Russia  
Public local governance in Russia is characterized by many of the same 
challenges that are evident in other countries; namely, a lack of fiscal 
resources to pay for the myriad of programs and services for which local 
government are responsible. Like their counterparts in other parts of the 
Circumpolar North, northern local governments face particular chal-
lenges in terms of infrastructure, small population size (and, as a conse-
quence, small revenue-generation bases) and large territories. Addition-
ally, public local governments have also had to deal with the difficulties 
associated with the transition from central planning and communism to 
capitalism and democracy. The disintegration of the Soviet Union had a 
particularly egregious impact on small, remote, northern communities, 
as funding programs and other forms of economic support dried up with 
the collapse of the centralized state. 
In the 2000s, the Putin government introduced a series of reforms to 
local government (Young and Wilson, 2007). The main impact of these 
reforms was to lessen the responsibilities of local governments and, at 
the same time, significantly increase the number of local governments. 
While the curtailing of local government responsibilities took some of 
the pressure off these governments to offer services and programs, such 
reforms did not bode well for local autonomy. Moreover, the increase in 
the number of local governments placed severe capacity strains on local 
officials (Poelzer, 2013). Not only did the costs of administration grow as 
new governments were forced to fill new posts and acquire new infra-
structure, but democracy also suffered as local councils struggled to find 
citizens willing to serve as elected officials.  
United States  
The many layers of governance in Alaska complicate the ability of local 
communities to exercise effective governance. In addition to being sub-
ject to state and federal laws and regulations, each of the more than 220 
communities scattered throughout the state may fall within the govern-
ance authority of a city, a borough, and/or a tribe. Because of the way 
Alaska Native land claims were settled, tribal governments no longer 
have regulatory or taxation authority over traditional lands conveyed 
under the Settlement Act, posing unique challenges to their abilities to 
raise revenues and govern their people. The lack of recognized authority 
and capacity has led to innovations in shared governance between fed-
eral, tribal and sometimes state government. There are many agree-
ments to co-manage marine mammals such as the Alaska Eskimo Whal-
ing Commission, and subsistence resources on federal lands are man-
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aged through a system of Regional Advisory Councils that integrate local, 
rural users into decision-making processes (Kimmel, forthcoming). 
Trends: Local-level governance 
One of the defining features of local level governance in the Circumpo-
lar North is the degree of complexity compared to local governance in 
the southern regions of the eight Arctic states. Although local govern-
ance was caught in the general tide of recentralization in Russia, the 
trend toward increasing the authority of local government was evident 
in other Arctic countries such as Norway and Canada, including Indig-
enous governance in the latter case through the implementation of 
First Nations self-government agreements. In almost all cases, howev-
er, fiscal and human capacity challenges are felt the hardest at the local 
level (Poelzer, 2009). The enormous burden that local governments 
carry across the North needs to be underscored. In the south, residents 
have far greater access to regional and national government agencies 
where different respective program delivery responsibilities lie. In the 
North, local government is often the only government that residents 
encounter in their day-to-day lives (Coates and Poelzer, 2010b). As 
such, they are relied upon for meeting the needs of their residents, 
even though those responsibilities may not formally lie within their 
area of jurisdiction. Moreover, the general trend toward fiscal tighten-
ing by higher-level governments means there are fewer fiscal re-
sources to meet these needs. On top of it all, local governments in the 
North are often engaged in intergovernmental relations on a more in-
tense level than their southern counterparts because of environmental 
assessment processes and consultation requirements involving Indig-
enous rights, whether these be Indigenous governments or municipali-
ties. Thus, the strain on the human capacity of local governments is 
even higher. This trend is likely to wax unless greater resources for 
fiscal and human capacity are made available (Poelzer, 2011). 
5.3.2 Regional governance 
Over the last several decades, Arctic countries have pioneered the de-
velopment of many innovative regional governance models. Like local 
government, two different models characterize regional government in 
the Circumpolar North: public and Indigenous. One of the most im-
portant changes to occur in the last 40 years in the area of governance in 
the Circumpolar North has been the decentralization of authority to 
regional governments, both public and Indigenous. This trend towards 
decentralization has only intensified in the last decade. As noted previ-
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ously, this process of decentralization faces a number of challenges. 
While the decentralization of authority mainly involves the building of 
legal or legislative capacity, the more difficult tasks of building human 
and financial capacity to carry out the new responsibilities of decentrali-
zation take much longer to realize. 
Canada 
Regional governments in Canada have made considerable progress over 
the last decade in terms of expanding their autonomy. In 2003, the Yu-
kon government completed the final phase of its devolution process, as it 
took over land and resource management responsibilities from the fed-
eral government. This was followed in 2013 by the signing of a compre-
hensive devolution agreement between Northwest Territories (NWT) 
and the federal government with implementation beginning in 2014. In 
2008, Nunavut signed the Lands and Resources Devolution Negotiation 
Protocol between the Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated, the Government 
of Nunavut and the Government of Canada. Devolution discussions be-
tween the three parties are ongoing. Nunavut is proceeding with devolu-
tion at a slower pace than Yukon and the NWT. This is not surprising 
given the greater capacity challenges and the fact that the Territory was 
only established in 1999 (White, 2009). 
In contrast to the level of participation at the local level, the partici-
pation of women at the regional level as members of the territorial legis-
latures and cabinets (with one exception) is significantly lower. Women 
made up 19% of the elected members of the territorial legislatures (11% 
of Northwest Territories, 16% of Nunavut, but 32% of Yukon). At the 
national level in Canada women constitute 21% of the House of Com-
mons and 36% of the Senate. Within cabinet at the territorial level, few-
er than 9% of ministers were women (0% in Northwest Territories; 
11% in Yukon; and, 14% in Nunavut). At the national level in Canada, 
31% of ministers were women (Strapagiel, 2013).  
In other parts of the Canadian Arctic, Indigenous peoples such as the 
Inuit have negotiated land claims and/or self-government agreements 
with other levels of government. In 2005, the Inuit of Nunatsiavut in 
Labrador signed a land claim and self-government agreement with the 
government of province of Newfoundland and Labrador, and the federal 
government. The self-government arrangement in place in Nunatsiavut 
is an example of Indigenous regional government because there are cer-
tain restrictions on who can participate in governance activities. Other 
Inuit communities, however, have chosen (or are contemplating) public 
governance models. The Territory of Nunavut in the eastern Arctic, for 
example, has a public government. Nunavik in Northern Quebec is also 
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likely to follow this path. This region is currently in the process of nego-
tiating self-government agreements with the Québec government and 
the federal government. Like Nunatsiavut (but unlike Nunavut), this 
agreement, if ratified, will create a new autonomous region and regional 
government that will be “nested” within an existing constituent unit of 
the Canadian federation (Wilson, 2008). 
Some of the most fascinating features of Indigenous regional gov-
ernment in the Canadian Arctic are the development corporations that 
manage the funds obtained from land claim agreements on behalf of 
the Indigenous beneficiaries to those agreements (Wilson and Alcanta-
ra, 2012). Not only do development corporations, such as the Makivik 
Corporation in Nunavik, the Inuvialuit Regional Corporation in the 
Inuvialuit Settlement Region in the NWT and Nunavut Tunngavik Inc. 
in Nunavut, play an important economic role in their respective re-
gions, creating employment and other opportunities. They have also 
served as representatives of their regions in intergovernmental nego-
tiations on self-government. The involvement of Indigenous develop-
ment corporations in public administration and intergovernmental 
relations is yet another example of the broad and innovative nature of 
governance in the Arctic. 
United States  
Over the past four decades, resource development (in particular oil, gas 
and minerals) has played a critical, yet controversial, role in the econo-
my and politics of Alaska. Northeastern Alaska has been the site of in-
tensive resource development since the 1970s. There are certainly con-
cerns about the environmental consequences associated with such de-
velopment and its impact on fragile Arctic ecosystems and the 
traditional livelihoods of Alaska Natives. At the same time, the economic 
benefits of resource development, both at the community and state level, 
are also apparent. As is the case in other resource producing countries 
and regions in the Circumpolar North, Alaska has established a Perma-
nent Fund to invest a portion of the rents generated from resource de-
velopment for future generations.  
One of the most controversial issues in the Northern part of Alaska 
over the last decade has been the debate over drilling in the Arctic Na-
tional Wildlife Refuge (ANWR), a protected area located within the 
North Slope Borough. The coastal areas of ANWR contain large oil de-
posits that proponents of drilling argue could provide the United States 
with greater energy security. Opponents contend that oil exploration 
will destroy the Refuge’s fragile ecosystem. Moreover, they argue that 
the deposits in ANWR are not significant enough to provide the United 
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States with long-term energy security. The same tensions have been 
seen more recently at the proposed Pebble Mine development in south-
western Alaska. In many respects, the debate about whether to drill or 
mine reveals the extent to which the economic and ecological destiny of 
the Northern boroughs is controlled by outside actors at the state and 
national levels.  
Women from Alaska have played a prominent role in United States 
politics, as well as at the regional level through the bicameral legislative 
bodies of the State of Alaska. In 2013, women comprised 22% of the 
House of Representatives and 20% of the Senate, in Alaska, which is 
higher than the percentage of seats held by women in the respective 
national level houses of the United States’ Congress. 
Denmark 
Whereas most Arctic regions are content with having limited autonomy 
within an existing state structure, some aspire, or have achieved, either 
de facto or de jure statehood. In Denmark, there are two notable exam-
ples of this trend: Greenland and the Faroe Islands. Greenland was 
granted Home Rule from Denmark in 1979, a status that allowed it con-
siderable autonomy (Nuttall, 2008). Thirty years later in 2009, it 
achieved Self-Rule, a higher level of autonomy that also included greater 
control over its natural resource revenues. Although Greenland is not 
fully independent from Denmark, Self-Rule provides it with a considera-
ble degree of autonomy and many powers that are held by independent 
states. With the exception of Iceland, which gained independence from 
Denmark in 1944, it is the only example of an Arctic region that has 
achieved such wide-ranging autonomy in the post-war period. Green-
land is still financially and militarily dependent on Denmark. Neverthe-
less, many Greenlanders support full independence.  
Greenland has a public form of self-government, although, like other 
Inuit regions in Canada and the United States, the overwhelming ma-
jority of the population is Inuit and so it has a de facto Indigenous gov-
ernment. Since achieving Self-Rule, there have been a number of de-
bates about the exploitation of Greenland’s natural resource wealth 
(Wilson and Smith, 2011). The wealth is becoming more accessible due 
to climate change and the melting of Greenland’s huge ice sheets. Some 
political leaders in Greenland feel that resource exploitation should be 
used as a means of providing greater autonomy and even independ-
ence from Denmark. 
Self-Rule is major global accomplishment for Indigenous political 
representation; Self-Rule has also provided opportunities for meaningful 
political participation for women. In 2013, 36% of the 31 seats in the 
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Inatsisartut (Greenlandic Parliament) were held by women, as were 
25% of the eight seats in the Naalakkersuisut (the cabinet or executive 
branch of government). The level of representation by women in the 
Greenlandic Parliament is only slightly lower than that in the Danish 
Parliament (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2014; Inatsisartut, 2014). 
Like Greenland, the Faroe Islands have political autonomy within the 
Danish Realm. They still receive financial subsidies from Denmark, alt-
hough these have been reduced by approximately 50 per cent since 
2001. Islanders and the political parties that represent them are divided 
on the issues of whether the Faroe Islands should become fully inde-
pendent from Denmark. In 2011, the drafting of a Faroese constitution 
focused attention on the issue of independence. According to some ob-
servers, the draft constitution is not compatible with the Danish consti-
tution, so if the constitution were adopted, the Faroe Islands would have 
to declare independence from Denmark (Denmark and Faroe Islands in 
Constitutional Clash, 2013).  
Russia 
As mentioned above, the regional government system in Russia has 
changed under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, with a greater emphasis on 
consolidation and amalgamation. Some Northern okrugs quickly acquiesced 
to this new arrangement, in part because the short-term economic rationale 
for doing so was so strong, but also because they came under intense politi-
cal pressure from their host regions and the federal government. For exam-
ple, in 2005, the Evenkiiskii and Dolgano-Nenetskii (Taimyr) autonomous 
okrugs were merged into the more powerful and populated Krasnoyarsk 
krai (territory), following successful referenda in all three regions (Mereu, 
2005). Other okrugs, however, have resisted regional mergers. For instance, 
the Khanty-Mansiiskii and Yamalo-Nenetskii autonomous okrugs, the center 
of the Russian oil and gas industries, were politically, economically and 
demographically powerful enough to remain autonomous from their south-
erly neighbor, Tiumen oblast.  
Norway 
One of the most important developments in the area of regional govern-
ance in Norway in the past decade is the 2005 Finnmark Act. The Nor-
wegian Government passed the Act: “to facilitate the management of 
land and natural resources in the county of Finnmark in a balanced and 
ecologically sustainable manner for the benefit of the residents of the 
county and particularly as a basis for Sami culture, reindeer husbandry, 
use of non-cultivated areas, commercial activity and social life” (Finn-
mark Act, 2005: Section 1). The transfer of territorial control mandated 
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by this Act was a step forward in terms of local autonomy for the county 
of Finnmark and the Sámi Parliament. It also encourages greater collab-
oration across public and Indigenous governments in Norway.  
Trends: regional-level governance 
The single largest trend is that devolutionary pressures continue to be a 
defining feature of political systems in the Arctic. Greenland is increas-
ingly taking steps to build greater self-reliance and strengthen its auton-
omy from Denmark through Self-Rule. The federal government in Cana-
da continues to negotiate stronger authorities for the territorial gov-
ernments. In Russia, the picture is far more mixed; however, some 
regions, especially those with greater fiscal wherewithal have had great-
er capacity to resist a wave of recentralization and regional consolida-
tion. In spite of its unitary construction, Norway is finding creative solu-
tions to reconciling political communities at the regional governance 
level through instruments such as the Finnmark Act. In a similar manner 
to local government (though not as acute), regional governments face 
real challenges in terms of both fiscal and human capacity. Indeed, the 
Berger Report (2006) outlined the challenges that building regional gov-
ernments pose for other sectors. Often the only university educated local 
personnel are teachers, as teacher education programs are more readily 
available in Northern regions than any other university degree program. 
Graduates are often “poached” to staff administrative positions in re-
gional governments and, as a consequence, do not end up in the class-
room, undermining the ability to strengthen the school system. Yet, this 
poaching often does not even meet the staffing deficit in regional gov-
ernments such as Nunavut (Poelzer, 2011). On top of human capacity 
challenges, regional governments face rapidly mounting fiscal challenges 
to provide the necessary infrastructure for businesses to be competitive 
regionally, let alone globally, for governments to meet complex envi-
ronmental and other consultation and regulatory processes, and to 
maintain existing infrastructure – especially transportation and housing 
– in the face of climate change. These pressures on governing authorities 
are only going to increase in the future. 
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5.3.3 National level governance 
National level strategies 
Since 2004, all of the eight Circumpolar states have developed formal, 
comprehensive Arctic policy frameworks, encompassing both domestic 
and international policy goals and positions. The development of these 
national Arctic policies into singular policy statements is new for a num-
ber of reasons. First, the development took place concurrently, with all 
states vitally aware that the other seven were working on policy state-
ments. Second, the development of the respective positions anticipated 
the positions of both the seven other Arctic states and non-Arctic politi-
cal actors. Third, the policy statements reflect shared core policy priori-
ties that have emerged through inter-state cooperation, particularly 
through the Arctic Council, notwithstanding understandable expressions 
of national policy priorities particular to each respective state. Finally, 
each national policy framework integrates both international and do-
mestic policy positions, recognizing their interdependence and, concom-
itantly, the multilevel governance reality, from the local to the global, 
that define Arctic governance in the 21st century. 
The policy statements are outlined in the following documents:  
 
 The Norwegian Government’s High North Strategy (Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006); and The High North: Visions and 
Strategies (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011). 
 Foundations of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic to 
2020 and Beyond (2008). 
 Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future and 
Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy: Exercising Sovereignty 
and Promoting Canada’s Northern Strategy Abroad (Government of 
Canada, 2010). 
 Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands: Kingdom of Denmark 
Strategy for the Arctic 2011–2020 (Kingdom of Denmark, 2011); The 
Faroe Islands – a nation in the Arctic, opportunities and challenges 
(Kingdom of Denmark, 2012). 
 Sweden’s Strategy for the Arctic Region (2011). 
 A Parliamentary Resolution on Iceland’s Arctic Policy (Iceland, 2011). 
 Finland’s Strategy for the Arctic Region (2013). 
 The United States’ National Strategy for the Arctic Region 
(Government of the United States, 2013). 
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Arctic Five  
The Arctic Five is comprised of representatives (foreign ministers) from the 
Arctic Ocean littoral states (Russia, the United States, Canada, Denmark (Green-
land) and Norway). This group met in Greenland (2008) and in Canada (2010). 
In 2008, the group released the Ilulissat Declaration that emphasized the need 
for greater collaboration among the Arctic coastal states on issues not discussed 
in the Arctic Council, notably the management of the Arctic Ocean. This non-
institutionalized group has come under criticism from non-coastal Arctic states 
such as Sweden, who feel that pan-Arctic issues should be discussed by the wider 
Arctic Council.  
 
It is important to stress that none of the national policy statements were 
entirely new or simply reactions to the increasing global significance of 
the Arctic. Instead, each of these documents was typically either a revi-
sion of earlier policy statements or collations of previously disparate 
positions. For example, the Finnish statement builds on previous Finnish 
positions and includes emphases on domestic issues such as economic 
development, infrastructure, and Indigenous peoples. Notably, Finland 
places a priority on advancing Arctic interests not only through regional 
bodies such as Barents Euro-Arctic Council and the Barents Regional 
Council, but also through non-Arctic political bodies such as the Europe-
an Union. Canada’s strategy is similar in emphasis and scope, focusing 
specifically on domestic priorities such as devolution, social and eco-
nomic development, environmental management and exercising Arctic 
sovereignty. At the same time it highlights Canada's commitment to mul-
tilateral engagement in the international arena. Russia places similar 
emphasis on the human dimensions of Arctic governance, but under-
scores the military and security dimensions to a far greater extent. Nor-
way’s strategy is broad and places greater attention on capacity-building 
than the other polities, while at the same time emphasizing the im-
portance of relations with the Russian Federation. Sweden follows a 
similar course, but is notably critical of the approach taken by the five 
littoral states (the Arctic 5 – see Textbox 5.2). 
Textbox 5.2 
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Indigenous northern political organizations on the national level 
Across the Circumpolar North, there are a number of Indigenous politi-
cal organizations that play an important role in governance issues at 
the national level. With the exception of Iceland, all Arctic countries 
have national level Indigenous organizations that advocate for Indige-
nous interests within their respective national political systems. In 
some cases, such as the Sámi Parliaments in the Nordic countries and 
Russia, these organizations are formal political institutions. In other 
cases, such as the Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami in Canada, they are non-
governmental organizations.  
Indigenous governance in Norway is conducted through the Sámi 
Parliament, a national body that has political relations not only to the 
national government in Oslo, but also connections to municipal and 
county-level governments. The Sámi Parliament was established in 1989 
and is currently comprised of 39 representatives from seven constituen-
cies across Norway. The Parliament is based in Kárášjohka, a municipali-
ty in the northern county of Finnmark. Basically the responsibilities of 
the parliament are limited and connected mostly with matters pertain-
ing to culture, language, education and support to small scale industries. 
Increasingly, however, consultations have replaced hearings as a contact 
mechanism between the Parliament and the Norwegian state authori-
ties. The 2005 consultation agreement between the Sámi parliament and 
the Norwegian government has given the Sámi parliament a salient 
channel of influence on legislation, planning and concrete matters of 
importance for the Sámi population in Norway. Between 40 and 50 for-
malized consultations take place every year. Grounded in the Interna-
tional Labor Organization Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous 
populations and tribal people in independent nations, the consultations 
have to be conducted in good faith on the part of both parties, and with 
the objective of achieving an agreement. But challenges and setbacks are 
evident, as illustrated by the consultations on the bill for a new mining 
act where the parties failed to reach consensus. The Sámi parliament has 
also developed collaboration with public municipal and county-level 
governments (Josefsen, 2010).  
Very significantly, however, since 2004, the Sámi Parliament had an 
historic breakthrough of global significance: women parliamentarians 
constituted an absolute majority of this elected body. The percentage of 
female Sámi parliamentarians jumped from 18% (2001) to 51% (2005). 
At the same time, the Sámi Parliament elected Aili Keskitalo as its Presi-
dent, also an historical first. 
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In Canada, a parallel body is the Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (ITK), which 
is the national organization representing the 50,000 Inuit across all of 
Canada (Inuvialuit (Western Arctic), Nunavut, Nunavik (Northern Que-
bec), and Nunatsiavut (Labrador)). ITK is governed by a president, who 
is elected for a three-year term at the general assembly, and a board of 
directors. The Board of Directors consists of the Presidents of the four 
regional Land Claims Organizations, Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated 
(NTI), Makivik Corporation (Nunavik), Nunatsiavut Government, and the 
Inuvialuit Regional Corporation (Inuvialuit Settlement Region), who are 
all voting members, as well as (ex-officio) the presidents from the Na-
tional Inuit Youth Council, the Pauktuutit Inuit Women of Canada and 
the Inuit Circumpolar Council (Canada). A pan-Canadian approach to 
policy development is reflected for instance in the National Strategy on 
Inuit Education, which was spearheaded by the ITK in 2011 (Inuit Ta-
piriit Kanatami, 2011). 
Representatives to the Sami Parliament (2013–2017) for Norwegian Sámi Asso-
ciation for Southern Norway circuit (Anita Persdatter Ravna, Tor Gunnar Nystad 
and Kirsti Guvsám) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit: Kirsti Guvsám. 
Trends: regional governance 
Perhaps the single greatest trend at the national level is that northern 
issues have become mainstream and at or near the center of national 
policy agendas in almost all circumpolar countries. The drivers of global 
demand for natural resources, climate change, the possibilities for desti-
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nation and possibly even transit shipping mean that Arctic issues are 
likely to remain on the agendas of national governments for the foresee-
able future. Another issue that is likely to emerge over the coming years 
is the question of which northern regions are included in the policy 
community of the Circumpolar North. For example, parts of Northern 
Russia and the Canadian provincial Norths are included in some forums 
and not in others. This non-inclusive approach is likely to inhibit North-
ern governance interests in the long run as the Northern political voice 
is far weaker than if it was more inclusive, and not based on historical 
accident of where a territorial boundary was drawn or a permafrost line 
once existed. Dene, Evenk, Inuit and other Indigenous communities, as 
well as the non-Indigenous residents of northern communities are often 
excluded from participating in decisions about their Arctic and sub-
Arctic futures, even though language, culture, history, and economies 
suggest they should be at the center of public decision-making processes 
about northern futures. In some respects, it is apparent that the non-
Arctic state actors have a much greater voice. It would not be surprising 
to see calls for more politically and culturally relevant criteria for defin-
ing which northern political communities should regularly be included 
in policy making on Arctic and sub-Arctic issues. As a consequence, such 
a development would likely to lead to more effective northern strategies 
domestically and a stronger Arctic voice internationally.  
5.4 Geopolitics and governance among Arctic 
political communities 
Geopolitics in the Arctic region is shaped first and foremost by the actors 
of the region themselves. Non-Arctic actors such as China, India or the 
EU (not including Sweden, Denmark, and Finland), have taken greater 
interest in the Arctic region, but the Arctic actors – both state and non-
state – have the dominant voice in the affairs of the region. Among the 
Arctic actors, one of the major trends is the emergence of three distinc-
tive forms of managing geopolitical relations: a) bilateral, especially at 
the nation-state level; b) multilateral, but inclusive of actors from among 
a subset of Arctic countries; and c) pan-Arctic, aiming to include actors 
from all eight countries or at least all three geographic regions (North 
America, Russia, and Fennoscandia). Although the various forms of these 
relations among Arctic political communities create tensions from time 
to time, especially when some regions or actors feel excluded, the overall 
impact is to reinforce a pan-Arctic regional identity in the Arctic region. 
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5.4.1 Pan-Arctic region: multilateral governance 
The broadest level of governance in the Arctic region is at the pan-Arctic 
level. The multilateral governance bodies at this level encompass vari-
ous political actors, including national and sub-national governments, 
Indigenous organizations, and non-governmental organizations. The 
number and scope of these organizations has changed significantly over 
the last decade, in response to the challenges facing the Arctic region, as 
well as the changing ideas about who should be involved in the govern-
ance of this region.  
Arctic Council 
The most important and inclusive pan-Arctic body is the Arctic Council. 
The establishment of the Arctic Council in 1996 as a forum for interstate 
cooperation among the eight Arctic states was remarkable for its time, 
particularly the inclusion of Indigenous organizations as Permanent 
Participants. There is no other inter-state body that has such a promi-
nent role for Indigenous peoples in its decision-making. 
As a governance body, the Arctic Council works through a series of 
multi-level meetings and consultations. Specifically, the Council operates 
in the following manner. A host country is appointed for a two-year period 
and convenes the major meetings of the Arctic Council. The host country 
operates the Council through a secretariat, which manages the adminis-
trative affairs of the Arctic Council. The host country also sets the policy 
direction and the priorities, which are agreed to at the previous Ministeri-
al meeting. The Arctic Council operates through a multi-level series of 
meetings: a) Senior Arctic Officials (SAO) Meeting – senior representatives 
of the Member Nations and Permanent Participants; b) Ministerial Meet-
ing – biannual high level meeting of the top governmental officials with 
either international relations or Arctic affairs responsibilities; and, c) Op-
erational Activity – the Arctic Council conducts its detailed work through a 
number of specialized working groups and task forces.  
The Arctic Council does not have any formal legislative or legal pow-
ers. It works through consensus, review/evaluation and public discus-
sion of desired outcomes and progress toward established goals. The 
Arctic Council seeks to identify areas of concern, to develop practical, 
regionally appropriate solutions, and to mobilize governments to act 
accordingly. The Council uses moral political suasion rather than legisla-
tive authority to achieve its objectives. Given the complexity of the au-
thority systems between nation-states and existing international organi-
zations and legal regimes, it is hardly surprising that the Arctic Council 
has not operated, for the most part, as a formal decision-making body. 
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Notably, however, the Arctic Council has engaged in formal decision-
making in the recent case of Search and Rescue (SAR) (Poelzer, 2010) 
followed by the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Pre-
paredness and Response in the Arctic (Arctic Council, 2013).  
Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, Tromsö, Norway, 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit: Harald Finkler. 
 
One of the most important and, in many respects, unprecedented fea-
tures of the Arctic Council is the role played by the Permanent Partici-
pants, organizations that represent many of the Indigenous peoples of 
the Arctic. The Arctic Council includes six Permanent Participant organi-
zations, five of which represent Indigenous peoples in more than one 
country (the Sami Council, the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), the 
Gwich’in Council International, the Arctic Athabaskan Council and the 
Aleut International Association). The Russian Association of Indigenous 
Peoples of the North (RAIPON) represents 41 different Indigenous peo-
ples across the Russian Federation (Arctic Council, 2011). The work of 
the Permanent Participants in the Arctic Council is supported by the 
Indigenous Peoples Secretariat (IPS). The IPS was created in 1994 under 
the umbrella of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy and then 
became part of the governance framework of the Arctic Council when it 
was established in 1996.  
Although they do not have voting status, the Permanent Participants 
play an active role in the deliberations of the Council. They sit at the 
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Council alongside states, and take part in Council meetings and the vari-
ous working groups that comprise the Council. Often they are able to 
exert influence through the state delegations of the voting members.  
That being said, one of the on-going challenges in the operation of the 
Arctic Council is the capacity of the Permanent Participants to fulfill their 
roles as active members of the Council. Currently, fiscal support for Per-
manent Participants is highly uneven which makes meaningful participa-
tion by all Permanent Participant organizations very challenging. Moreo-
ver, Indigenous organizations often lack the capacity, in terms of person-
nel, to be fully engaged in all of the international and domestic files that 
are essential for their engagement. Progress on this front will require the 
Arctic Council as a whole, and the member states individually, to commit 
funds toward capacity building within Permanent Participant organiza-
tions, specifically in the area of Arctic policy development (Poelzer, 2010). 
Permanent Participants of the Arctic Council, SAO Meeting, Nuuk, Greenland, 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit: Harald Finkler. 
 
The Arctic Council can – and does – raise the profile of Arctic issues, 
identify opportunities for collaborative action, and encourage rapid ac-
tion on matters of pressing importance. It offers Indigenous Peoples’ 
organizations and regional governments with unprecedented access to 
high-level international diplomatic conversations, providing a global 
model for Indigenous engagement in the process. Although the Arctic 
Council operates in the realm of soft power, rather than hard power, 
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there is no denying the enormous impact that Indigenous people have 
played in shaping Arctic policy. This speaks to the effectiveness of moral 
suasion through the Arctic Council.  
There has been some public debate about the effectiveness and pres-
ence of the Arctic Council. Many observers feel that the organization 
needs to be strengthened and member states need to attach sufficient or 
appropriate priority to its deliberations, if the Arctic Council is to play a 
leading governance and policy-making role for the Arctic region. Despite 
these perceived weaknesses, there have been several important devel-
opments since the first AHDR report. First, the Arctic Council made a 
very significant step forward in governance in the Arctic region by con-
vening the eight Arctic Council States to negotiate the legally binding 
agreement on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arc-
tic. The member states agreed that it is binding on all eight Arctic states. 
Even though the Arctic Council is not party to the agreement, it is diffi-
cult to overstate this precedent setting step. It has opened the possibility 
of the Arctic Council operating not only as a facilitator of public policy 
research, by developing guidelines and encouraging public implementa-
tion, but also as a governance body capable of convening Arctic States to 
conclude agreements that are binding on member states. Second, the 
creation of a Permanent Secretariat was an important step in institu-
tionalizing the administrative capacity of the Arctic Council. The Perma-
nent Secretariat is an important instrument to assist the Arctic Council 
in providing continuity and effectiveness in pursuing pan-Arctic policy 
initiatives at a time when global attention on the Arctic and its resources 
has never been stronger. Third, the formal adoption, at the Kiruna Minis-
terial Meeting in May 2013, of the Arctic Council Observer Manual For 
Subsidiary Bodies consolidates the rules and conditions around the par-
ticipation of three categories of observers of the Arctic Council: (a) non-
Arctic States; (b) inter-governmental and inter-parliamentary organiza-
tions, global and regional; (c) non-governmental organizations. This 
arose out of increasing pressure from non-Arctic states to participate in 
the governance activities of the Arctic Council.  
Another important contributor to the evolution of the Arctic Council 
is the granting of observer status to non-Arctic states and other entities. 
As of 2014, there are over 30 accredited observers including the follow-
ing non-Arctic states: China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Repub-
lic of Korea, the Netherlands, Poland, Singapore, Spain, and the United 
Kingdom. Adding additional observers is contentious. On the one hand, 
proponents for expansion suggest that it is important to be proactive 
and bring non-Arctic state actors into the Arctic discussion, so that there 
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is broader international support for policies aimed at benefitting the 
Arctic region. On the other hand, there are strong concerns that North-
ern voices, notably those of Indigenous peoples, will be marginalized as 
the interests of powerful, non-Arctic state actors begin to unduly influ-
ence the priorities and processes of the Arctic Council. Currently, all 
Arctic Council States and Permanent Participant Organizations agree 
that the participation of observer states in the activities of the Council 
should be strictly limited. 
Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region and Standing 
Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region 
Whereas the Arctic Council represents executive branches of the nation-
al governments of the Arctic states, the Conference of Parliamentarians 
of the Arctic Region is a forum for the legislative branches. The Confer-
ence is held on a biennial basis and has representatives from the legisla-
tive bodies of the eight Arctic Council states and the European Parlia-
ment. Representatives coming from the eight Arctic states are not neces-
sarily from the Arctic regions of those countries, but represent the 
country as a whole. The Conference also engages the participation of 
Arctic permanent participants and observers, somewhat resembling the 
practices of the Arctic Council. The Standing Committee of Parliamentar-
ians of the Arctic Region is responsible for the work of the Conference 
between sessions and meets several times annually. Although the Con-
ference is able to influence debate on key Arctic issues, particularly 
those initiated and raised through the Arctic Council, the Arctic Council 
is undeniably the preeminent pan-Arctic political body. 
Indigenous diplomacy 
Indigenous organizations have a long history in geopolitics and govern-
ance at a pan-Arctic level and continue to play an influential role. The 
Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) has been one of the most active of all the 
Indigenous Arctic organizations. Founded in 1977, originally as the Inuit 
Circumpolar Conference, the ICC represents Inuit in four different Arctic 
Council member states: Russia (Chukotka); the United States (Alaska); 
Canada (Inuvialuit Settlement Region, Nunavut, Nunavik and 
Nunatsiavut) and Denmark (Greenland). Together with national-level 
Inuit organizations like the Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (ITK) in Canada, the 
ICC provides a voice for Inuit on an international stage (Abele and Ro-
don, 2007). The ICC has been and remains an active participant in the 
Arctic Council. It has also been involved in various United Nations’ fo-
rums, especially those concerning environmental issues such as Persis-
tent Organic Pollutants. As a trans-national organization, it falls outside 
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the realm of government and, like the Indigenous development corpora-
tions mentioned earlier, continues to push the boundaries of multi-level 
governance in the Arctic. It will be interesting to see how these transna-
tional and national organizations evolve in the future, especially as Inuit 
governments in regions such as Greenland and Nunavut continue to 
develop and take on new responsibilities. 
The Northern Forum  
Pan-Arctic cooperation has not been limited to nation-states. One col-
laborative body for sub-national regions is the Northern Forum (NF). 
Like other regional and pan-Arctic organizations, the NF was established 
following the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union. Its membership consists of sub-national regions from Arctic 
states as well as non-Arctic states, such as Japan and the Republic of 
Korea. The mission of the NF is “to improve the quality of life of North-
ern peoples by providing Northern regional leaders a means to share 
their knowledge and experience in addressing common challenges (and) 
to support sustainable development and the implementation of coopera-
tive socio-economic initiatives among Northern regions and internation-
al fora” (Northern Forum, 2013).  
5.5 Regional collaboration 
There are a number of examples of regional collaboration within the Arc-
tic. Three in particular are the Nordic Council (NC), the West Nordic Coun-
cil, and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC). The NC was established 
1952 as an inter-parliamentary forum for elected representatives from 
the Nordic countries of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. 
The membership of this organization has expanded over the years to in-
clude the Faroe Islands, the Åland Islands and Greenland. The three Baltic 
states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania currently have observer status. 
Connected to the NC is the Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM), an inter-
governmental forum for senior government officials. These organizations 
discuss matters of common interest, relating to trade, security and de-
fense, the environment and, most recently, the future of the Nordic wel-
fare state (Nordic Council, 2013). 
The West Nordic Council (WNC) was established in 1985 to address 
issues of particular regional importance to the Faroe Islands, Greenland, 
and Iceland. The Council consists of six members of parliament from 
each of the respective members and the Annual General Meeting is the 
Council’s highest authoritative body. Although the WNC addresses a 
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broad spectrum of issues, fishery policy stands out as perhaps the most 
prominent. This is not surprising, given the important role that the fish-
ing industry plays in the region’s economy.  
The BEAC is another intergovernmental forum that connects the 
countries of the Barents Sea region (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, 
Russia and the European Commission). The Council was established in 
1993, mainly in response to the collapse of the Soviet Union: creating 
and maintaining pan-regional connections were particularly important 
as Russia began its transition to democracy. The BEAC also has a region-
al body called the Barents Regional Council (BRC), which consists of 13 
member regions and an Indigenous representative from regional gov-
ernments of Norway, Sweden, Finland and northwestern Denmark. At 
present, the focus of the BRC is on the development of natural resources 
and resource industries through the Barents 2010 Strategy (Barents 
Euro-Arctic Council, 2013). 
Although the ICC is probably the only true pan-Arctic Indigenous or-
ganization, other Indigenous organizations have a very significant role 
on a regional level. Founded in 1956, the Sámi Council consists of fifteen 
plenary members drawn from nine Sámi associations among the four 
countries (Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Russia) that have Sámi popula-
tions. The Sámi Council participates not only in regional bodies such as 
BEAC, but also international bodies such as the Human Rights Commit-
tee of the United Nations and, of course, the Arctic Council. On the other 
side of the Atlantic, the Gwich’in Council International and the Arctic 
Athabaskan Council play a similar regional role, working across the bor-
ders of Alaska, Yukon, and the Northwest Territories.  
Bilateral issues  
Along with pan-Arctic relations, bilateral relations tend to capture much 
of the media attention because of the binary nature of some of the issues 
at stake. Border issues tend to dominate; however, cooperation in the 
areas of educational exchanges, scientific collaboration, and business 
development, though less prominent, have grown increasingly stronger 
and continue to cement the Circumpolar North as a region with its own 
set of policy concerns. Even in the area of challenging border issues, the 
trend since 2004 has been toward seeking resolution rather than exac-
erbating tensions.  
In 2010, Norway and Russia concluded a treaty that resolved a dec-
ades old dispute over the maritime border between the two countries in 
the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean. The resolution of this dispute is 
critically important as the region is rich both in energy and fishery re-
sources. At the same time, Canada and Denmark are working to resolve 
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their dispute over Hans Island, a small island located between Greenland 
and Ellesmere Island. The extensive border between the two countries 
has been settled for some time, including up to the shores of the island. 
However, the island itself has been the subject of media attention and 
minor diplomatic disputes between the two countries. Between Canada 
and the United States, the wedge in the Beaufort Sea remains an unre-
solved, though not a particularly contentious, issue (Coates et al., 2010; 
see also Chapter 6, Legal Systems). 
Bilateral issues are not restricted to nation-states; Indigenous govern-
ance bodies also play a significant role, infusing Indigenous values into 
policy processes. The Alaska-Yukon border is a case in point, where local 
communities are forging pathways around shared governance using sci-
ence and traditional knowledge through the Yukon River Inter-Tribal 
Watershed Council (YRITWC), a consortium of 70 Alaska Native tribes and 
Canadian First Nations in neighboring Yukon Territory. The YRITWC was 
established in 1997 by an international accord, and its mission is to pro-
tect the Yukon River for future generations through clean-up and water 
quality monitoring projects. The YRITWC houses one of the largest envi-
ronmental observing networks in the world, and is using the scientific 
data and traditional knowledge that they alone possess as a basis for as-
serting inherent governance rights over traditional lands and waters with-
in the Yukon River watershed (Kimmel, forthcoming).  
Despite the trend toward cooperation, traditional security issues, 
largely expressed as bilateral geopolitical issues, took on greater promi-
nence over the past decade. The Canadian government has placed great-
er emphasis on exercising Arctic sovereignty, especially as it relates to 
the Northwest Passage. Russia has also emphasized the strategic signifi-
cance of the Arctic, a region that had waned somewhat on the national 
policy priorities during the latter part of the twentieth century. Greater 
access to Arctic waterways resulting from climate change has height-
ened renewed interest in traditional security.  
Trends: Arctic geopolitics and governance 
There are several key trends in the geopolitics of the Arctic region. First, 
international relations operate from the local to the national levels and 
are likely to continue to do so, reinforcing a regional political community 
in the Circumpolar North. Second, Indigenous peoples and organizations 
are central actors in international forums and have a role unparalleled in 
other regions of the world in terms of their level of influence on geopo-
litical matters. Third, the pressure from non-Arctic state actors and non-
governmental organizations for inclusion on bodies and processes defin-
ing Arctic futures is almost certain to increase. This may have the conse-
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Areas for Further Research 
One area that requires further research and consideration, both by scholars and 
governments, is the question of how the North is defined. In many Arctic coun-
tries, the boundary between north and south is often ambiguous and, at times, 
arbitrary. In Canada, for example, the North is often defined, politically and ad-
ministratively, as the territory north of the 60th parallel of latitude, when in fact, 
there are significant portions of Canadian territory below this line that exhibit 
the geographical, demographic and socio-economic features of northern regions. 
Indeed, the residents of these regions identify themselves as Northerners. Paral-
lel situations occur across Russia and even parts of Fennoscandia. In many cir-
cumpolar states, arbitrary lines on maps, drawn by southern-based officials 
decades or even centuries ago, reinforce divisions within the North that are 
detrimental to the development of the region as a whole. Although some scholars 
have provided informed perspectives on the questions of what constitutes the 
North and how it should be defined (Coates, 1994; Coates and Morrison, 1992), 
more work needs to be done in comparative, circumpolar perspective. The cur-
rent reality is that many Northerners are disenfranchised from governance pro-
cesses and policy making about the North.  
Another area for future research is gender and gender relations in the North. 
Compared to other areas such as Indigenous self-government and self-
determination, regional and local government, economic development and pub-
lic policy, there has been limited research on circumstances and challenges fac-
ing women throughout the Circumpolar North in the area of governance and 
geopolitics. This is surprising given the significant political strides made by 
women in the Arctic. Viewing the political development of the Arctic through the 
lens of gender will bring different perspectives and insights about the region and 
its people, as well as shed new light on important governance issues relating to 
political and economic participation, policy development and implementation, 
representation and international relations.  
 
quence of weakening the role of Indigenous organizations and subna-
tional actors from Arctic regions. Fourth, regional organizations such as 
the Nordic Council of Ministers and the Arctic Five are likely to be more 
prominent, especially as non-Arctic actors such as the European Union, 
China, and India play a larger role in the economic future of the Arctic. 
Textbox 5.3 
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5.6 Key conclusions 
Upon closer inspection, the Arctic reveals a myriad of different and in-
novative governance structures. This multi-level system has both verti-
cal and horizontal dimensions. Vertically, it extends from the local and 
community level to the realm of international politics. Horizontally, it 
encompasses typical government structures and institutions at the local, 
regional and national levels, as well as new, non-governmental actors 
and bodies. Over the last decade, this governance system has evolved 
and grown, in large part as a response to devolution and demands for 
greater regional autonomy. At the forefront of this movement towards 
greater autonomy are the Indigenous peoples of the Circumpolar North. 
Their efforts to secure self-determination and self-government are influ-
encing Arctic governance in ways that will have a profound impact on 
the region and its inhabitants in the years to come. 
In the last ten years, we have seen significant progress in terms of re-
gional and local autonomy. New regions have come into being and older, 
more established regions have taken on new responsibilities. Although 
the devolution of authority brings great benefits to Northern regions and 
peoples, especially given the long history of colonization and control by 
southern-based governments, the transfer of authority also brings many 
challenges. Both the human and financial capacity of Northern govern-
ments is stretched as they attempt to take on the many new roles de-
manded by devolution. Building capacity in Northern regions is an on-
going priority, both now and in the future.  
The capacity of Arctic regions and peoples to manage change is being 
stretched even more thinly by the geopolitical developments facing the 
Circumpolar North. Indigenous organizations and regional governments 
are playing a more active role in international forums such as the Arctic 
Council. Such activity certainly brings new perspectives and voices to 
the table; but it also places considerable pressure on already over-
burdened governments, politicians and Indigenous leaders. This pres-
sure will likely mount now that new actors from outside the Arctic have 
started to play a more active role in the circumpolar governance bodies. 
The pressing issues that face the Arctic in the future will require a great 
deal of consideration and deliberation. Northern peoples and their gov-
ernments continue to insist that they play a central role.  
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The formal legal systems of the Arctic comprise the legal systems of the 
eight nation states (including the Danish autonomous territories of 
Greenland and the Faroe Islands), of which three are federal states (with 
law-making powers devolved in varying degrees to their northern sub-
units) and five are unitary states. Greenland has a distinctive status, 
having opted for Self-Rule in 2009. Global and regional norms of interna-
tional law are also significant, as are the norms of the European Union 
(EU) that bind Finland and Sweden as member states. In addition, as 
members of the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement Norway and 
Iceland apply many EU norms. A more pluralist account of legal systems 
includes less formal arrangements such as the customary norms of In-
digenous peoples (Watson Hamilton, 2013; Webber, 2013). There is a 
dynamic interaction between these different normative systems.  
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The legal chapter of the first Arctic Human Development Report ex-
plored the diversity of the domestic legal systems of the Arctic states and 
their different legal cultures while emphasizing the importance of global 
norms, especially global human rights norms (Bankes et al., 2004). It also 
examined in some detail the status of Arctic Indigenous peoples in both 
national and international law. More specifically, it examined the extent to 
which each Arctic state provides explicit constitutional protection to the 
rights of Indigenous people and how each state protects the language 
rights, land rights and the governance rights of Indigenous peoples. The 
chapter concluded that the domestic laws of Arctic states offered in-
creased recognition of language rights but observed that there was great-
er reluctance to recognize land ownership rights. The legal chapter also 
examined the property and resource regimes of the Arctic states and iden-
tified a trend within at least some Arctic states (e.g. USA\Alaska, Canada 
and Denmark in relation to Greenland and the Faroe Islands) for a transfer 
or devolution of authority from the center to the Arctic regions of these 
states (Bankes et al., 2004). 
This chapter builds upon the legal chapter in the first AHDR. It contin-
ues to emphasize the importance of global norms (human rights norms, 
environmental norms and the law of the sea), but it also examines the 
extent to which regional and national laws have emerged that are specific 
to the Arctic region. The chapter follows two important trends that have 
taken place since the first AHDR (2004). First, given the important role of 
Indigenous people throughout the Arctic (with the exception of Iceland), 
this chapter identifies the continuing elaboration of international instru-
ments that address the rights of Indigenous peoples, including the adop-
tion of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peo-
ples. Second, the chapter explores the practices of Arctic states in delimit-
ing their maritime boundaries with neighboring and opposite states, and 
in relation to extended continental shelf entitlements. While the media 
have tended to portray the Arctic as an area of conflict, the practices de-
scribed here emphasize cooperation between Arctic states and the pro-
gressive settlement of maritime boundary delimitations. The chapter con-
cludes that these trends add to legal certainty in this region, thereby facili-
tating Arctic human development. 
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Abbreviations 
 AAC: Arctic Athabaskan Council. 
 ACIA: Arctic Climate Impact Assessment. 
 ACPB: Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears. 
 CITES: Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Flora 
and Fauna. 
 ECE: Economic Commission for Europe. 
 EEA: European Economic Area (Agreement on). 
 EU: European Union. 
 ICESR: International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
 ICCPR: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
 ICRW: International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling. 
 ILO: International Labor Organization. 
 IMO: International Maritime Organization. 
 IWC: International Whaling Commission. 
 LOSC: Law of the Sea Convention. 
 LRTAP: Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution (Convention on). 
 NAMMCO: North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission. 
 NORDREG: Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone. 
 NORSEL: Nordic Research Network for Sami and Environmental Law. 
 NORSIL: Nordic Research Network for Sámi and Indigenous Peoples’ Law. 
 OAS: Organization of American States. 
 POPs: Persistent Organic Pollutants. 
 SAR: Search and Rescue (Agreement on). 
 UNFCCC: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
 WTO: World Trade Organization. 
Textbox 6.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1 The multiple legal orders of the Arctic  
The Arctic is subject to a variety of legal norms that govern law and poli-
cy in the Circumpolar North. As described in the first AHDR, global 
norms and domestic laws of general application continue to provide the 
primary sources of law for the region. However, the Arctic is also subject 
to regional norms as a result of the membership of Arctic states in dif-
ferent regional organizations. We note that the number of Arctic specific 
norms has increased since the first AHDR. 
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6.1.1 The importance of global norms in the Arctic 
The Arctic is mostly governed by domestic laws and policies of general 
application, and by global international treaties and customary norms. 
These global norms include the Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC), the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
and the international human rights covenants described in the first 
AHDR (Bankes, 2004). When the Arctic Ocean was mostly ice-covered 
there was little need to consider the practical implications of the LOSC 
applying to the Arctic Ocean but the loss of sea ice caused the Central 
Arctic Ocean coastal states to emphasize the importance and applicabil-
ity of LOSC with the adoption of Ilulissat Declaration in 2008. In that 
Declaration, the United States, Russia Canada, Norway and Denmark 
confirmed that the existing international legal framework provided “a 
solid foundation for responsible management by the five [Central Arctic 
Ocean] coastal states and other users of the Arctic Ocean through na-
tional implementation and application of relevant provisions.” The par-
ties confirmed that there is “no need to develop a new comprehensive 
legal regime to govern the Arctic Ocean”. The Central Arctic Ocean 
coastal states took a similar position at a later meeting in Chelsea, Que-
bec specifically in the context of shipping and fisheries (DFAIT, 2010). 
While some, including non-governmental organizations such as the 
World Wildlife Fund (Koivurova and Molenaar, 2009) and Arctic Parlia-
mentarians (2012), continue to urge the negotiation of a comprehensive 
legally binding treaty for the Arctic, others urge a more functional, prob-
lem solving approach that will focus on particular issues in developing a 
“governance or regime complex” (Rayfuse, 2007; Rayfuse, 2008; Rayfuse 
2009; Young, 2011). The EU Parliament initially advocated an Antarctic 
treaty approach for the Arctic in its 2008 resolution (European Parlia-
ment, 2008), but now recognizes that there is a plurality of relevant in-
struments for the Arctic and thus “concludes that the Arctic region is not 
to be regarded as a legal vacuum, but as an area with well-developed 
tools for governance; nevertheless . . . due to the challenges of climate 
change and increasing economic development, those existing rules need 
to be further developed, strengthened and implemented by all parties 
concerned” (European Parliament, 2011, para. 42). 
The global nature of the environmental problems that face the Arctic 
such as climate change and ozone depletion requires states and other 
actors to consider how Arctic concerns can be addressed through other 
levels of governance (the problem of scale). In some cases, Arctic states 
have taken complementary measures to reinforce global developments. 
The Arctic Climate Impact Assessment is a prominent example (ACIA, 
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2005). In other cases, Arctic states have been able to use regional fora 
such as the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UN ECE) to pursue 
Arctic goals (the ECE includes all Arctic states, although Canada, the USA, 
and Russia are less involved in some of the ECE's initiatives). One exam-
ple was the elaboration of the Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) Pro-
tocol to the Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution 
(LRTAP) that was subsequently scaled up globally with the adoption of 
the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (Downie and 
Fenge, 2003). A more recent example is the effort to consider revisions 
to the 1999 Gothenburg Protocol to Abate Acidification, Eutrophication 
and Ground-level Ozone in order to regulate emissions of black carbon 
(UN ECE, 2010; Boone, 2012). However, some commentators have ar-
gued that the Arctic Council needs to step up its policy development 
work to adequately address the regional implications of global develop-
ments (French and Scott, 2009; Duyck, 2012).  
The treatment of Arctic issues within multilateral treaty regimes 
There are examples of multilateral regimes taking up Arctic issues. For 
example, there has been increased interest in Arctic species among the 
parties to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
(CITES) and the Convention on Migratory Species (the Bonn Convention) 
(Bankes, 2013). The United States has proposed uplisting polar bear 
(Ursus maritimus) from Appendix II to Appendix I at the last two meet-
ings of the CITES Conference of the Parties (Parsons and Cornick, 2011; 
Clark et al., 2013). The proposals failed: those opposed argued that the 
species did not meet the criteria to warrant an Appendix I listing. Simi-
larly, the EU has tried to focus attention on narwhal within the context of 
the "significant trade review" procedure of CITES (Fitzmaurice, 2009; 
Bankes, 2013). This procedure is triggered when a state identifies con-
servation concerns with a species listed on Appendix II. Once the proce-
dure is triggered, range states for the species (in this case, Greenland 
and Canada) must justify why trade in the listed species should be al-
lowed to continue. Such efforts to deal with Arctic issues at a global level 
are often contentious. If polar bear uplisting provides one example, an-
other, that of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling 
(ICRW), offers an even more compelling illustration (Gillespie, 2002). 
Some Arctic states have responded to the ongoing moratorium under the 
ICRW on the taking of large whales with various strategies including 
catching under the category of Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling (King-
dom of Denmark and the United States), withdrawal from the Conven-
tion (Canada), taking reservations (Norway and Iceland), and creating 
an organization, the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission (NAM-
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MCO), that is more responsive to the needs and values of Arctic states 
(Gillespie, 2002; Caron, 1995). Some Arctic states have followed similar 
strategies under CITES and the Bonn Convention (Bankes, 2013). 
6.1.2 The application of different regional norms in the 
Arctic 
Regional norms introduce new concepts and ideas to the Arctic, even 
when these norms only bind some Arctic states. For example, the Euro-
pean Union is an important source of new normative ideas in such di-
verse areas as energy market liberalization (Johnston and Block, 2012), 
networks of protected areas (EU, 1992) and marine environmental poli-
cy (EU, 2008; Long, 2011). Similarly, the Convention for the Protection of 
the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR Convention) 
provides critical guidance in relation to dumping activities and more 
generally in relation to offshore oil and gas activities. The Council of 
Europe and the broad range of treaties adopted under its auspices deal 
with such diverse topics as minority rights and the conservation of flora 
and fauna. In addition, the membership of Canada and the United States 
in the Organization of American States (OAS) gives Arctic relevance to 
the jurisprudence of the Inter American Court of Human Rights and the 
Inter American Commission on Human Rights. While neither Canada nor 
the United States is party to the American Convention on Human Rights 
(and therefore not bound by the rulings of the Court with respect to the 
Convention) it is clear that the decisions of the Court influence the 
Commission in its deliberations and in its interpretation of the cognate 
provisions of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. 
Both the United States and Canada are subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Commission with respect to the Declaration by virtue of their member-
ship in the OAS. 
In sum, there are various regional regimes operating at different 
scales which serve to introduce new ideas and concepts which are rele-
vant to human development in the Arctic.  
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European Union Law, international trade law, human rights law and the 
Arctic seal hunt  
A good example of how various legal orders are relevant in the Arctic is EU Regu-
lation (EC) No. 1007/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
September 2009 on trade in seal products (the Seal Regulation). This regulation 
has a strong impact on Arctic livelihoods and has led to serious legal and political 
controversies. The Regulation was adopted due to public concerns over animal 
welfare as a result of the hunting methods used in the commercial seal hunt, in 
particular in Atlantic Canada. Notwithstanding the fact that the Regulation con-
tains an exemption for seal products “from hunts traditionally conducted by 
Inuit and other Indigenous communities and which contribute to their subsist-
ence,” the adoption of the Regulation has triggered various disputes and legal 
action by both Inuit and non-Indigenous hunters, organizations and seal prod-
ucts processors before the EU’s General Court (GC) and by Canada and Norway 
in the World Trade Organization (WTO).  
In the GC action the Inuit argued (unsuccessfully) that the seal products ban 
seriously decreased the demand for seal products irrespective of the hunting 
methods and origins of the seal products. In its argument the EU referenced the 
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the importance of the 
Inuit hunt as an integral part of their culture and identity, to justify exempting 
from the Regulation products from seals harvested by Indigenous people. 
The case demonstrates the complexity of modern day regulation. For the EU, the 
matter is framed as a matter of market harmonization – a measure aiming to 
improve conditions for the establishment and functioning of the internal market 
– given that two of its member states had already banned trade in seal products 
while others were in the process of doing so. For Canada and Norway the Regula-
tion breaches the EU’s legal obligations under the WTO agreements. For the 
Inuit, it is a matter of human rights. 
The seal products ban affected the EU’s application for observer status to the 
Arctic Council. Using the slogan “No Seal, No Deal” Inuit organizations tried to 
convince the Canadian government not to accord the EU observer status in the 
Council. The Council deferred acting on the EU’s application at the Kiruna minis-
terial meeting in May 2013.  
 
 
Textbox 6.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
228 Arctic Human Development Report 
Textbox 6.2 continued 
 
The WTO panel issued its report in November 2013 (WTO, 2013). The Panel 
concluded that while the EU Regulation violated some basic disciplines under the 
Agreement on Technical Barrier to Trade (TBT) and the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), those violations were in principle justified as neces-
sary to protect public morals. In so concluding the Panel, unlike the EU General 
Court, found that the dominant purpose of the Regulation was the protection of 
public morals and not the proper functioning of the internal market. The Panel 
also found that the EU had not properly justified the exceptions in the Regulation 
and in particular an exception for seals placed on the market taken in a man-
agement harvest in the EU Baltic states and the Indigenous community harvest 
exception. The Panel Report directs the EU to bring these non-conforming as-
pects of the Regulation into conformity with the agreements. This requires ad-
justments to the exceptions rather than to the basic approach underlying the 
Regulation. Both Canada and the EU have appealed the Panel Report to the 
WTO’s Appellate Body. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Heading out for Seal Hunt, Greenland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: GridArendal; photo by Lawrence Hislop. 
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6.1.3 Arctic specific norms 
While most of the norms that apply in the Arctic are general (i.e. national 
laws that are of general application and global norms) there is a limited 
amount of law, both domestic and international, that is specific to the 
Arctic. Some of these specific norms have a relatively long history. For 
example, there is the agreement relating to the creation of the interna-
tional ice patrol (dating back to 1913 immediately following the sinking 
of the SS Titanic, and currently based on the 1956 Agreement Regarding 
Financial Support of the North Atlantic Ice Patrol), the unique Spitsber-
gen Treaty of 1920, the 1973 Agreement on Conservation of Polar Bears 
(ACPB), and the 1992 agreement establishing the North Atlantic Marine 
Mammal Commission (NAMMCO). And there is one article in the LOSC 
(Article 234) that addresses the rights of coastal states to adopt and 
enforce pollution laws in relation to ice-covered areas (McRae and 
Goundry, 1982; Bartenstein, 2011b).  
The Arctic Council is the most important institutional exception, but, 
importantly, the Council was established by a political accord rather 
than by a treaty (Bloom, 1999; Koivurova and Vanderzwaag, 2007). 
Nevertheless the Arctic Council (and its precursor, the 1991 Arctic Envi-
ronmental Protection Strategy) has been responsible for the creation of 
guidelines, manuals and other soft-law instruments that are specific to 
Arctic conditions. 
Seen in this light, the adoption by the eight Arctic States of the Agree-
ment on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in 
the Arctic in 2011 at the Nuuk Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council 
(the SAR Agreement) is important. As the first international treaty to 
come out of the Arctic Council, it establishes that even if the Arctic Council 
cannot enact binding decisions for its members, it can act as a forum for 
negotiating Arctic-specific treaties (Vasiliev, 2013). An additional legally 
binding agreement on oil spill preparedness and response was adopted by 
the eight Arctic States at the Arctic Council’s Kiruna Ministerial Meeting in 
May 2013. Both agreements are firmly anchored in existing global agree-
ments (the 1979 International Convention on Maritime Search and Res-
cue, the 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation and the 1990 
International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-
operation) and implement these conventions in the Arctic setting. There is 
also growing interest in the negotiation of an Arctic Ocean fisheries 
agreement, initially proposed by the United States Congress in 2008. The 
scientific community and non-governmental organizations are pressing 
for the adoption of such an agreement and preliminary discussions have 
commenced. 
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Hilary Clinton signing Arctic Council’s Nuuk Declaration, Greenland, May 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit: Harald Finkler. 
 
Another example of the development of an Arctic or polar specific legal 
regime is the process within the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO) to adopt a legally binding Code to make Arctic navigation safer 
and environmentally more sustainable in an increasingly ice-free ocean 
(Lalonde, 2013). This would replace the current non-legally binding 
2009 Polar Code (Guidelines for Ships Operating in Polar Waters, IMO 
2009) (Jensen, 2008; Boone, 2012). 
There are also efforts within existing Arctic instruments to deepen 
cooperation in response to external threats, especially environmental 
threats. The ACPB, for example, has been revitalized as a result of the 
decision of the Parties (in this case the five range states) to convene 
regular formal meetings and to develop management approaches for 
polar bear in response to the loss of polar bear habitat (sea ice) caused 
by climate change (Tromsø, 2009 and Iqaluit, 2011 and Federation of 
Russia, 2013).  
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Figure 6.1: Timeline of Arctic Specific Agreements/Bodies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Arctic specific norms in domestic law 
Arctic states have also developed their own domestic Arctic-specific regu-
lations, especially in relation to marine areas. For example, in July 2012 
the Russian President signed new legislation for the Northern Sea Route 
(Federal Law No. 132) while Canada made its Northern Canada Vessel 
Traffic Services Regulations (NORDREG) mandatory as of July 2010 (Bar-
tenstein, 2011a; McDorman, 2012). Likewise, the decision of the US North 
Pacific Fisheries Management Council (2009) to ban all new industrial 
fisheries in its waters north of the Bering Strait, including the Chukchi and 
Beaufort Seas evidences an Arctic specific focus. Similarly, there are laws 
that recognize self-governance or co-management for Indigenous peoples 
in the Arctic, such as Norway’s Finnmark Act (2005), Greenland’s Self-
Governance Act (2009) and various land claims agreements and self-
governance arrangements in Canada. Other initiatives include the decision 
of the United States to list polar bear as threatened (2008) under its En-
dangered Species Act and the proposal of 2011 for uplisting of ringed seal 
and bearded seal. 
6.1.4 Emerging research and scholarship on Arctic and 
polar law 
Developments in Arctic-specific governance arrangements are also re-
flected within the growing interests of the community of legal scholars 
that conceptualize the Arctic as a distinct region worthy of study. Nota-
ble advances over the past decade in this context include the launch of 
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two new legal journals, one with an Arctic focus (Arctic Review on Law 
and Politics) since 2010 (Ravna, 2010) and one with a polar focus (Year-
book of Polar Law) since 2009. Integral to the Yearbook of Polar Law is 
the annual symposium on polar law. The crystallization of the Arctic 
within the legal imagination has fostered the development of Arctic and 
Polar law graduate programs, curriculum, and teaching materials, nota-
bly the Polar Law Textbooks (Loukacheva, 2010; Loukacheva, 2013). Of 
equal note is the Thematic Network on Arctic Law, an initiative led by 
the Northern Institute for Environmental and Minority Law at the Uni-
versity of Lapland and launched in 2010 under the auspices of the Uni-
versity of the Arctic. Regional initiatives such as the Nordic Research 
Network for Sámi and Indigenous Peoples’ Law (NORSIL) program 
based at the University of Tromsø complement these broader pan-Arctic 
and polar programs. 
6.1.5 Summary: legal orders and norms 
The legal norms that apply in the Arctic are principally global norms and 
national laws of general application. Regional norms are also important in 
the Arctic although the “region” in question is frequently not the Arctic 
itself but some other regional grouping (e.g. the EU) which includes some 
but not all Arctic states. However, there is also evidence of the increasing 
importance of Arctic specific norms. While there have long been Arctic 
specific treaties, such as the Spitsbergen Treaty, the number of Arctic-
specific instruments is growing and comprises both soft-law arrange-
ments of the Arctic Council and Arctic-specific treaties such as the SAR 
Agreement and the Agreement on Oil Spill Preparedness and Response. 
6.2 Developments in international law pertaining to 
Indigenous peoples 
As outlined in AHDR (2004), there are two distinct approaches to de-
veloping international human rights law to protect the rights of Indig-
enous peoples. One approach is to elaborate specific norms recogniz-
ing the rights of Indigenous peoples. Examples of this approach include 
the International Labor Organization’s Convention concerning Indige-
nous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (ILO Convention 
169) (Swepston, 2011; Yupsanis, 2011), the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and the proposed American Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples within the OAS. The second ap-
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proach is to recognize that the rights of Indigenous peoples may be 
protected through the application of general human rights norms. Ex-
amples of this approach include the application of the minorities’ pro-
vision of the ICCPR (Article 27) (Möller, 2011) and the property rights 
protections offered by regional human rights instruments (Pen-
tassuglia 2011; Bankes, 2011a; Bankes, 2011b; Kovler, 2012). Both 
approaches continue to evolve.  
6.2.1 The Indigenous-specific approach 
The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples  
The Indigenous-specific approach culminated in the adoption of the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples by the General Assem-
bly (UN DRIP, 2007). Initially, two Arctic states voted against adoption 
(USA and Canada) and one abstained (Russia). However, both the USA 
and Canada have since endorsed the Declaration but expressed concerns 
(Sweden did likewise at the time of adoption). Russia has yet to endorse 
the Declaration but has indicated that it will take the fundamental prin-
ciples underlying the Declaration into account in developing new legisla-
tion provided that those principles do not conflict with the Constitution 
of the Russian Federation (Andrichenko, 2011).  
Figure 6.2: UN Declaration: the position of Arctic States on the UN Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples  
Country Stance on the declaration 
Canada Voted against, then endorsed with reservations (10 November 2010; http://www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/eng/1292354321165), noting that the Declaration is aspirational and not 
legally binding and expressing “concerns with various provisions … including provisions 
dealing with lands, territories and resources; free, prior and informed consent when used 
as a veto; self-government without recognition of the importance of negotiations; intellec-
tual property; military issues; and the need to achieve an appropriate balance between 
the rights and obligations of Indigenous peoples, States and third parties.” “These con-
cerns … remain.” 
 
Denmark 
(Greenland) 
 
Denmark voted in favor with no explanation of its vote.  
Finland Voted in favor emphasizing that the adoption of the Declaration “would strengthen the 
rights of Indigenous peoples worldwide and serve as a comprehensive framework for 
cooperation in implementing new minimal international standards for Indigenous people’s 
rights.” 
 
Iceland No explanation but voted in favor (no Indigenous peoples in the country).  
 
Norway Voted in favor and explained that the Declaration “set the standard of achievement to be 
pursued in a spirit of cooperation” but emphasized that “several articles in the Declaration 
dealt with the exercise of self-determination and stipulated that such rights should be 
exercised in the framework of international law.”  
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Country Stance on the declaration 
The Russian 
Federation 
Abstained from voting and has yet to endorse the Declaration. Russia explained that, 
overall, it “supported the rights of Indigenous people and the development of internation-
al standards in that regard” but that the process to produce the Declaration was non-
transparent and did not enjoy consensus. Russia also argued that the Declaration “was not 
a truly balanced document, in particular regarding land and natural resources or the 
procedures for compensation and redress” but that it would still continue to “foster 
cooperation in order to protect and promote the rights of Indigenous peoples.”  
 
Sweden Voted for but with serious reservations as to the existence of group rights. Sweden stated 
that the declaration includes several references to collective rights and explained that “While 
the Swedish Government had no difficulty in recognizing such rights outside the framework 
of international law, it was of the firm opinion that individual human rights prevailed over the 
collective rights mentioned in the Declaration.”  
 
The United 
States 
Voted against and then endorsed with a full explanation (15 December 2010) of its under-
standing (http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/184099.pdf) of what the Decla-
ration requires, also noting that the Declaration is not legally binding, but has moral and 
political force. On the basis of a thorough review, the USA explains, e.g. that the Declara-
tion advances a distinct international concept of self-determination specific to Indigenous 
peoples, which “promote[s] the development of a concept of self-determination for 
Indigenous peoples that is different from the existing right of self-determination in inter-
national law. In addition, the USA supports the strong articles of the declaration as regards 
Indigenous after peoples’ rights over their lands, territories, and natural resources: United 
States stresses the importance of the lands, territories, resources and redress provisions 
of the Declaration in calling on all States to recognize the rights of Indigenous peoples to 
their lands, territories, and natural resources. Consistent with its understanding of the 
intention of the States that negotiated and adopted the Declaration, the United States 
understands these provisions to call for the existence of national laws and mechanisms for 
the full legal recognition of the lands, territories, and natural resources Indigenous peo-
ples currently possess by reason of traditional ownership, occupation, or use as well as 
those that they have otherwise acquired.” 
Main source:http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/ga10612.doc.htm 
 
The Declaration has been referred to in domestic court proceedings and 
even in international arbitral practice (see for example Grand River En-
terprises Six Nations Ltd et al. v. United States). Domestically, there are 
several Canadian cases in which the petitioner has relied upon the Dec-
laration in framing its case (see, for example, Hupacasath First Nation v. 
Canada, 2013 FC 900) and the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian 
Federation has also referred to the Declaration (December 3, 2012, No. 
VAS-12173/12).  
Similarly, the Declaration is cited in international debates within the 
International Whaling Commission (IWC) in an Arctic-specific context. 
For many years, the ICRW parties recognized that aboriginal subsistence 
whaling should be permitted to continue notwithstanding the 1982 gen-
eral moratorium on the taking of large whales. However, it is still neces-
sary for the IWC to approve the necessary amendments to permit this to 
occur. For example, in 2010 at the 62nd Meeting of the IWC, Denmark 
renewed an application to permit a Greenlandic harvest of humpback 
whales and an adjustment to the quota for minke whales. Speaking in 
support of the application, the Greenlandic minister referred to the UN 
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Declaration but so also did many other states, who “spoke in support of 
the rights of Indigenous people, the need for aboriginal subsistence 
whaling quotas and the requirement for the IWC to act in the spirit of 
the UN Declaration” (IWC, 2010, 19–20). Similar sentiments were ex-
pressed a year later by Sweden and other states at the 63rd meeting in 
the context of establishing an Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling Working 
Group (IWC, 2011, 23–25). 
Other Indigenous-specific instruments 
Another important development is the proposal of the Nordic states and 
the Sámi peoples of Norway, Finland and Sweden to produce a Nordic 
Sámi Convention. The parties released a Draft of the Convention in 2005 
(Sámi Council, 2005) and negotiations are currently underway to final-
ize an international treaty on the basis of the draft (Åhrén, 2007; Koi-
vurova 2006/7; Koivurova, 2008; Bankes and Koivurova, 2013). 
The only modern Indigenous-specific convention currently in force is 
ILO Convention 169. Of the seven Arctic states with Indigenous peoples 
in their territory, only Denmark (Greenland) and Norway have ratified 
the Convention. Finland and Sweden are exploring the possibility of do-
ing so and ratification of the Convention is an explicit goal of the present 
Government of Finland and written into its plan for its term of office. 
Ratification is not on the agenda for any of the three federal states in the 
Arctic: Canada, Russia and the USA. 
6.2.2 The general human rights approach 
Global norms 
The general human rights approach – especially the work in the treaty-
monitoring bodies of UN human rights treaties – has also increasingly 
addressed the rights of Indigenous peoples, including Arctic Indigenous 
peoples. One discernible trend is that the human rights treaty monitoring 
bodies associated with the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) have commenced a consistent practice of asking 
states to address the position of Indigenous peoples under common Arti-
cle 1 (the right of all peoples to self-determination) in their regular re-
ports. In doing so, both the Human Rights Committee and the Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights take the view that Indigenous 
peoples are peoples within the meaning of Common Article 1 to the ICCPR 
and the ICESCR. The monitoring body for the latter has asked Russia to 
report on its Indigenous peoples under common Article 1 and the former 
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has asked USA, Canada, Norway, Sweden and Finland to do the same for 
their respective Indigenous peoples. These monitoring bodies have con-
cluded that Indigenous peoples possess collective rights enshrined in 
Common Article 1. Both committees have also started to view their trea-
ties in light of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. We 
identify this as an important development for two reasons. First, it helps 
“mainstream” the significance of this instrument in the broader normative 
human rights framework, and, second, it helps to confirm the normative 
significance and status of the Declaration, which some prefer to view as a 
purely aspirational rather than declaratory document. 
Regional human rights norms 
The Inter-American system has been very active in protecting the land 
and resource rights of Indigenous peoples in Central and South America in 
cases before the Inter-American Court, such as Awas Tingni v Nicaragua 
(2001), Saramaka v Suriname (2007), three cases involving Paraguay 
(2005, 2006, 2010), Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v Ecuador 
(2012) and several decisions of the Inter American Commission including 
Maya Communities v. Belize (2003) (Bankes, 2011b). These decisions sup-
port the proposition that the State parties to the Inter American Conven-
tion on Human Rights are obliged to delimit, demarcate and title lands 
that Indigenous communities occupy in accordance with their customary 
norms. However, while Canada and the USA are members of the OAS, they 
are not State Parties to the Inter American Convention on Human Rights 
and are thus not subject to the jurisdiction of the Inter American Court. 
In the first Arctic specific petition made to the Commission, the Inuit 
alleged that the USA could be legally responsible for the human rights 
violations of the Inuit as a result of climate change. The Commission 
ultimately took the view that the petition was not admissible, because 
the information it provided was insufficient for it to make a determina-
tion. While unsuccessful, the petition did provoke a lot of discussion on 
the relationship between human rights and climate change (Osofsky, 
2009; Heinämäki, 2009). On April 23, 2013, the Arctic Athabaskan Coun-
cil (AAC) filed a similar petition with the Commission, this time targeting 
Canada and asking the Commission to declare that Canada is undermin-
ing the petitioners’ human rights by not adequately regulating emissions 
of black carbon (soot), a short-lived climate pollutant which contributes 
to Arctic warming and melting (AAC, 2013). 
Indigenous peoples have been less successful in raising their issues, 
especially land rights issues, within the European regional human rights 
system (Koivurova, 2011). Some suggest that this is because the Euro-
pean system is based firmly on protecting individual rights, not group 
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On the treatment of gender in international instruments pertaining to 
Indigenous peoples 
Human rights instruments pertaining to Indigenous peoples sometimes, but not 
always, specifically address gender. At the national level, Canada’s constitution 
specifies that the protection of aboriginal and treaty rights is “guaranteed equal-
ly to male and female persons.” At the international level Article 44 of the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples makes it clear that the rights 
and freedoms recognized in the Declaration are “equally guaranteed to male and 
female Indigenous individuals” while Article 22 calls upon States to pay particu-
lar attention “to the special needs of Indigenous elders, women, youth, children 
and persons with disabilities” and to take special measures “to ensure that In-
digenous women and children enjoy the full protection and guarantees against 
all forms of violence and discrimination.” Similarly, Article 3 of ILO Convention 
169 provides that “The provisions of the Convention shall be applied without 
discrimination to male and female members of these peoples.” By contrast, there 
is no specific non-discrimination clause in the operative text of the Draft Nordic 
Saami Convention (Koshan, 2013). 
 
rights, while others point to the systemic problems associated with 
prosecuting land rights issues before the European Court of Human 
Rights and in particular the requirement that the petitioner must first 
exhaust its local remedies in a state-based system that is designed to 
protect settler titles and land uses rather than Indigenous titles and uses 
(Bankes, 2011a). Judge Ziemele drew attention to this systemic problem 
in her dissenting opinion in Handölsdalen Sami Village v Sweden (2010), 
a case dealing with Sámi reindeer grazing rights.  
One possible European forum for dealing with Indigenous peoples is 
the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (a 
Council of Europe agreement) which has the capacity to deal with Indige-
nous rights in Sweden, Finland, Norway, the Russian Federation and Swe-
den (Council of Europe, 2004). The monitoring body of the Convention, 
the Advisory Committee on National Minorities, issues opinions, provides 
comments on state reports and produces thematic commentaries includ-
ing those concerning Indigenous minorities. For instance, in its 2008 the-
matic commentary on the Effective Participation of Persons belonging to 
National Minorities in Cultural, Social and Economic Life and in Public 
Affairs, the Committee underlined the participation rights of representa-
tives of Indigenous peoples in any decision-making affecting the use of 
land in their traditional areas of residency because their economic situa-
tion is closely connected to land (Commentary, 2008).  
Textbox 6.3 
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6.2.3 The implications of international norms for 
domestic law 
While we can identify a clear trend in the consolidation of Indigenous 
rights in international law, this trend has only penetrated the domestic 
legal systems of the Arctic states in a limited fashion. This is particularly 
the case in the three large federal Arctic states, the USA, Canada and the 
Russian Federation, although as noted above there has been some lim-
ited engagement with the Declaration within the judicial systems of at 
least Canada and Russia. The four Nordic states with Indigenous peoples 
living in their territory (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland), and espe-
cially Norway, have been more open to influences from international law 
(Graver and Ulfstein, 2004). Each of these states is party to the two in-
ternational covenants and Norway and Denmark are both parties to the 
ILO Convention 169. Denmark has enacted a new self-governance act, 
which entitles the Inuit of Greenland to self-determination as a people 
(Kleist, 2010).  
The Greenland flag in the capital Nuuk, Greenland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: GridArendal; photo by Peter Prokosh. 
 
Norway has implemented ILO Convention 169 in part through the Finn-
mark Act, by which Norway accords 95% of Finnmark (northernmost 
county of Norway) to the so-called Estate, consisting of an equal number 
representatives of Sámi parliament and other residents of Finnmark 
(Ravna, 2011). Even if the Finnmark Act has been criticized for not im-
plementing the ILO 169 properly (including the criticism that it has not 
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been implemented in marine and other Sámi regions), it concretely con-
solidates Norway’s obligation to identify and recognize Sámi lands (Spe-
cial Rapporteur, 2011; Ravna, 2013).  
One relevant way to track domestic legal developments in the area of 
Indigenous peoples’ rights is through the Arctic Social Indicators re-
ports. The first ASI report identified two domains of human develop-
ment indicators that correspond particularly well to the evolution of 
international norms pertaining to Indigenous people (ASI, 2010). First, 
cultural well-being and vitality are concepts enshrined in the UN Decla-
ration on the Rights of Indigenous People, and operationalized within 
the ASI. The ASI identifies cultural indicators such as rights to language 
use and retention as a way of documenting “state recognition for foster-
ing . . . cultural development” (ASI, 2010: 99). Similarly, the extent to 
which a state uses Indigenous languages “in government and legal pro-
ceedings . . . and official documents” likewise indicates support for In-
digenous cultures and is also consistent with provisions of the Declara-
tion. Cultural well-being indicators also identify state recognition of cul-
tural and ethnic institutions as indicative of governmental support of the 
legal rights to culture, a concept consistent with principles contained 
within the Declaration. 
The second relevant set of indicators contained in the first ASI report 
is the notion of fate control. Defined as the ability for people to control 
their own destiny, “fate control” parallels the right to self-determination 
identified in the Declaration (ASI, 2010: 130). Notably, the ASI developed 
indicators necessary to measure fate control at a collective as well as 
individual level, making this approach relevant to Indigenous communi-
ties where collective identity is critical to cultural values. This indicator 
measures legally enforceable rights to land and sea resources as a key 
component of fate control, as well as the ability to “effectively govern the 
use of the resources” (ASI, 2010: 136, 137). Finally, fate control 
measures in the ASI use “recognition of human rights” as an indicator of 
human development (ASI, 2010: 142, 144, Tables 7.1 and 7.3).  
Overall, despite important developments in the international law re-
lating to Indigenous rights since the first ADHR, these developments, 
except in the cases of Norway and Denmark\Greenland, have not had a 
significant impact on the domestic legislation of the Arctic states. Even if 
most Arctic states see themselves as strong supporters and promoters of 
Indigenous and human rights around the world, they have not done 
much to advance Indigenous rights on the basis of international law 
standards at home. Similarly, even though Arctic states have accorded 
Indigenous peoples a unique standing in the Arctic Council as permanent 
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participants, this status has generally not helped these Indigenous peo-
ples to convince their governments to incorporate and implement inter-
national law guaranteeing Indigenous rights in domestic law (Koivurova 
and Stepien, 2011; Bankes, 2009b). This does not mean that Indigenous 
rights are not protected in these countries since clearly there are im-
portant protections in their domestic legal systems, but it does mean 
that most Arctic states are reluctant to have their domestic laws meas-
ured against international standards in a rigorous and authoritative way. 
6.2.4 Summary: international law and Indigenous peoples 
There have been important developments in international human rights 
law as it pertains to the rights of Indigenous peoples since the first 
AHDR. These developments include Indigenous-specific norms and gen-
eral human rights law, both global norms and regional norms. The most 
important development was the adoption of the UN Declaration. The 
work of the Inter American Court of Human Rights in developing a juris-
prudence on the Indigenous right to property is also very significant. We 
anticipate that both Indigenous-specific and general human rights 
norms will continue to develop as part of the general decolonization of 
international law as it pertains to Indigenous peoples. 
6.3 The delimitation of continental shelf boundaries 
between Arctic states and the extended 
continental shelf entitlements of Arctic states 
The law of the sea has become a prominent object of discussion, in aca-
demic, non-governmental and governmental policy-making contexts 
within the Arctic. This is mainly due to the retreat of sea ice, driven by 
climate change (ACIA, 2005). The significant decrease in sea-ice in the 
summer of 2007 and the almost simultaneous planting of the Russian 
flag on the sea-bed underneath the North Pole provoked the media, and 
led some international relations scholars (BBC, 2007) to argue that there 
is a scramble for Arctic Ocean resources between Central Arctic Ocean 
coastal states. In the eyes of these observers, the Arctic Ocean had sud-
denly become a place for a scramble for resources, perhaps even trigger-
ing traditional military security challenges (Borgerson, 2008; since qual-
ified in Borgerson, 2013). As the 2008 Paper from the High Representa-
tive and the European Commission to the European Council argued, "the 
increased accessibility of the enormous hydrocarbon resources in the 
  Arctic Human Development Report 241 
Arctic region is changing the geo-strategic dynamics of the region with 
potential consequences for international stability and European security 
interests” (European Commission, 2008 a, section 6).  
The actual record however does not support these claims. Rather, 
there is steady and peaceful progress between the Arctic states in de-
limiting overlapping maritime boundaries, thereby enabling invest-
ments in resource development in these areas. Moreover, the delinea-
tion of the outermost limits of the continental shelves has progressed 
in the Arctic Ocean in the manner required by the LOSC and by the law 
of the sea in general. 
6.3.1 Settlement of maritime boundaries between Arctic 
coastal states 
Since land is the basis of all claims to maritime zones it is hardly surpris-
ing that in the Arctic, where the continents converge, there are many 
overlapping claims. These overlapping claims must be resolved either by 
agreement or international litigation or arbitration. This is an area in 
which we have seen important developments in the Arctic since the first 
AHDR. Arctic states have continued to resolve their disputes in accord-
ance with international law, including Article 83 of LOSC for the delimi-
tation of continental shelf boundaries between adjacent and opposite 
states and Article 76, which prescribes criteria and a process for defin-
ing the outer limits of an extended continental shelf (Byers, 2013). The 
LOSC delimitation rules are generally considered to have codified cus-
tomary law and as such are binding on the United States even though the 
United States has yet to accede to the Convention.  
Figure 6.3 describes the status of delimitations as between Arctic states.  
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Figure 6.3: Maritime delimitation arrangements between Arctic States 
Description Status Basis of arrangement 
Canada\United States, Beau-
fort Sea 
 
No agreement  
Canada\Denmark, Davis Strait Settled (except for Hans 
Island, and Lincoln Sea) 
Agreement of 17 December 1973 delimit-
ing the Continental Shelf (CS)  
 
Canada\Denmark, Lincoln Sea Tentative agreement Tentative agreement, November 28, 2012, 
will extend the current equidistance line to 
200 NM from the coasts of Ellesmere Is and 
Greenland 
 
United States\Russia Ber-
ing\Chukchi Sea 
Treaty signed, entered into 
force provisionally, but not 
yet ratified by Russia 
 
Agreement settling the maritime boundary, 
1 June 1990 
Denmark & Greenland\Iceland Settled Agreement between Denmark and the 
Home Rule Government and Iceland 
delimiting the CS and Fishing Zone (FZ), 11 
November 1997 (1) 
 
Denmark & Faroe Islands Settled Agreement on the Maritime Border be-
tween the Faroe Islands and Iceland, 2 
February 2007 
 
Denmark & Greenland\Iceland, 
CS Area beyond 200 NM, 
Irminger Sea (Kunoy, 2013) 
 
Agreed Minutes (not 
formally binding) 
Agreed Minutes on the Delimitation of the 
CS beyond 200NM, Irminger Sea 16 Janu-
ary 2013 
Denmark and Norway re Faroe 
Islands 
 
Settled Agreement of 15 June 1979 delimiting the 
CS and FZ 
Faroe Islands, Iceland and 
Norway, Southern Part of the 
Banana Hole, NE Atlantic, Area 
beyond 200NM (Kunoy, 2013) 
 
Agreed Minutes (not 
formally binding) 
Agreed Minutes, between Faroe Islands, 
Iceland and Norway, Southern Part of the 
Banana Hole, NE Atlantic, Area beyond 
200NM, 20 September 2006 
Denmark and Norway re. Jan 
Mayen and Greenland 
Settled, 1993 ICJ Judgment Agreement of 18 December 1995 delimit-
ing the CS and FZ and Protocol of 1997(1) 
 
Denmark & Greenland\Norway 
re Svalbard 
Settled Agreement of 20 February 2006 delimiting 
CS and FZ 
 
Iceland and Norway (Jan 
Mayen) 
Settled. Conciliation Com-
mission Report of 1981 
Agreement of 22 October 1981 on the CS 
and Protocol of 1997 (1) 
 
Norway and Russia Settled Agreements of 15 February 1957 re Va-
rangerfjord, 11 July 2007 Varangerfjord 
area and 15 September 2010 re Barents 
Sea and Arctic Ocean. The latter contains 
two important annexes dealing with 
fisheries matters and transboundary 
hydrocarbon deposits 
Notes: 
1. These agreements followed consultations between Norway, Iceland and Denmark concerning the 
final delimitation of the maritime waters between Jan Mayen, Iceland and Greenland where the 
delimitation lines of the three states intersect. 
2. The delimitation of the continental shelf in the Hatton Rockall area between Iceland, UK, Ireland 
and Denmark Faroe Islands remains unsettled. 
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In the period since the first AHDR, the most significant development in 
Arctic delimitation practice has been the conclusion of the Treaty be-
tween Russia and Norway concerning Maritime Delimitation and Coop-
eration in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean in 2010 (Henriksen and 
Ulfstein, 2011; Ørebech, 2012). The treaty brings to an end a forty-year 
process and supports orderly governance within the region at a time 
when the loss of sea-ice will lead to increased navigation and marine 
transport (Henriksen and Ulfstein, 2011). 
The general picture that emerges of Arctic delimitation practice is 
that Arctic states have made steady progress towards resolving their 
maritime boundary issues. In one case (Norway\Denmark regarding Jan 
Mayen) the International Court of Justice effected the delimitation and in 
another case (Iceland\Norway) an International Conciliation Commis-
sion helped the parties reach a mutually satisfactory conclusion. Most 
delimitation disputes have been resolved by negotiations. 
In some cases there remain minor outstanding matters to be resolved 
(e.g., Hans Island, between Canada and Greenland), and at least one im-
portant boundary (between the United States and Canada in the Beau-
fort Sea) still needs to be delimited. Canada has traditionally taken the 
position that the maritime boundary should follow the 141st line of lon-
gitude (which is the land boundary between Yukon and Alaska) while 
the United States prefers an equidistance line. More recently, Baker and 
Byers (2012) note that Canada may have reason to re-think its position 
in the context of an extended shelf claim insofar as an extended shelf 
equidistance line will trend northwest and ultimately cross back over 
the 141st longitude line. There is another set of outstanding issues in 
relation to Svalbard, especially as regards the legal status of surrounding 
waters (Churchill and Ulfstein, 2010; Anderson, 2009). 
6.3.2 Claims to an extended continental shelf: a scramble 
for resources or evidence of cooperation? 
The procedures for establishing an extended continental shelf are pre-
scribed in the LOSC and as such apply to the parties to the convention. 
The United States has also been participating cooperatively (especially 
with Canada in the Beaufort Sea area) in the scientific work that is re-
quired in order to justify an extended shelf entitlement. Article 76 of 
LOSC stipulates that the continental shelf that accrues to the coastal 
state comprises the seabed and subsoil beyond the territorial sea 
throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer 
edge of the continental margin (or 200 nautical miles, whichever is the 
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greater), subject to some overall limits prescribed by the technical lan-
guage of this Article. States are to delineate the outer limits of their shelf 
entitlement by working through the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf. Thus, LOSC contemplates that a party to the Conven-
tion shall submit information about the outer limits of its continental 
shelf to the Commission within ten years of becoming party to the Con-
vention. This deadline has been relaxed by virtue of decisions taken by 
the Meeting of States Parties to the Law of the Sea (SPLOS). The Com-
mission shall then examine the submission and “make recommenda-
tions” “to the coastal state with respect to the outer limits of the shelf”. It 
is the coastal state itself that ultimately establishes the outer limits of its 
shelf. The Convention provides that limits established “on the basis of 
these recommendations shall be final and binding” (Elferink, 2001; Mac-
nab, 2004; McDorman, 2013). 
Russia, Norway, Iceland, Denmark and Canada have all made submis-
sions to the Commission. Russia was the first to make a submission in 
2001 but the Commission asked for further information relating to the 
Central Arctic Ocean basin, data that Russia is still collecting. The Gov-
ernment of Denmark together with the Government of the Faroe Islands 
made two partial submissions one in respect of the area north of the 
Faroe Islands, and one in respect of the Faroe-Rockall Plateau Region. 
The Government of Denmark together with the Government of Green-
land also made two partial submissions; one in respect of the Southern 
Continental Shelf of Greenland and one in respect of the area northeast 
of Greenland. Still outstanding is a submission in respect of areas north 
and northeast of Greenland. Iceland made a partial submission as re-
gards Ægir Basin area in 2009 and in the southern and western parts of 
the Reykjanes Ridge, but not including the Hatton-Rockall area, which is 
the subject of overlapping claims by other states. In December 2013, 
Canada filed a partial submission in respect of the outer limits of its con-
tinental shelf in the Atlantic Ocean and preliminary information in re-
spect of the outer limits of its continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean.  
There has been a remarkable degree of collaboration between Arctic 
states in completing the scientific work required to support the various 
submissions. For example, Canada has conducted four joint surveys with 
the USA in the Beaufort Sea as well as a number of joint surveys with 
Denmark, and has also cooperated with Russia. A similarly cooperative 
approach has been displayed by states in allowing the Commission to 
consider applications notwithstanding the possibility of a dispute be-
tween adjacent or opposite states.  
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This co-operative practice and the statement in the 2008 Ilulissat 
Declaration to the effect that the Central Arctic Ocean coastal states “re-
main committed to this legal framework [law of the sea] and to the or-
derly settlement of any possible overlapping claims” together make it 
clear that suggestions in the media that there is a political power game 
between the Central Arctic Ocean coastal states as to who gets to occupy 
seabed resources are exaggerated (Ilulissat Declaration, 2008). 
Figure 6.4: International Maritime Boundaries in the Arctic 
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6.3.3 Summary: marine boundary delimitation issues 
Arctic coastal states have made steady progress in delimiting their 
maritime boundaries and in completing their extended continental 
shelf filings with the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. 
The most notable delimitation agreement is that between Norway and 
Russia. Both activities establish that the coastal states are committed 
to continuing cooperation in the Arctic Ocean and are committed to 
applying the global norms of the law of the sea in their relationships. 
We anticipate that this trend will continue and that Arctic states will 
amicably resolve remaining delimitation issues in relation to their 
maritime boundaries. 
6.4 Chapter conclusions and gaps in knowledge 
This chapter has dealt with three main topics. The first was the interplay 
between Arctic specific norms and global norms. Both play important 
roles and while we can discern a trend towards the increased adoption 
of Arctic specific norms, global norms will always play an important role. 
In part this is because of the issue of scale. A problem such as climate 
change cannot be solved locally or even regionally. Globalization in all its 
forms (economic, cultural, communication, etc.) also requires global 
norms to deal with the associated regulatory challenges.  
The second main topic dealt with was the development of interna-
tional human rights law in relation to Indigenous peoples. Here, much of 
the interplay continues to be between general human rights norms (e.g. 
the protection of property) and the Indigenous specific norms of the UN 
Declaration and ILO Convention 169. While there is some evidence of 
the development of more specialized regional norms, such regional pro-
cesses (within the Nordic states and within the Americas) have yet to 
result in the adoption of final instruments. The interplay between inter-
national law and domestic law is more limited, especially in the three 
federal Arctic states. However, as the language of the UN Declaration (in 
particular the language of free, prior, informed consent) is increasingly 
mainstreamed in a variety of fora from the International Whaling Com-
mission to the European Court of Justice we may see increased interplay 
between the two normative orders.  
The third main topic was the delimitation of maritime boundaries 
and extended continental shelf delineation. Here the main message is 
that notwithstanding media accounts of conflict, Arctic coastal states are 
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going about both exercises peacefully, cooperatively and strictly in ac-
cordance with LOSC and general international law.  
As was the case with the legal chapter in the first AHDR, this chapter 
has necessarily been selective. It has also operated, like the first AHDR at 
the apex of the legal hierarchy, concerning itself with international and 
constitutional norms rather than detailed regulations and interactions 
between legal rules and the daily lives of Arctic residents. The legal 
chapter in the first AHDR (2004) called for a more rigorous and system-
atic comparative law of the Arctic; it also called for studies of actual 
practice in relation to the implementation of laws and the interaction 
between state norms and folk norms. There continue to be gaps in our 
understanding of the relevance of law for the attainment of sustainable 
development and a greater emphasis on these issues and laws of human 
relationships (e.g., criminal and family law) rather than issues of re-
source governance might usefully be taken up and assume more promi-
nence in a legal systems chapter in a third edition of the Arctic Human 
Development Report. 
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7.1 Introduction  
Resource governance plays a critical role in human responses to condi-
tions of rapid change in the Arctic (Young, 2005; Young, 2012; Arctic 
Council, 2013). The importance reflects the special relationship Arctic 
peoples have to land and resources and the role of the Arctic in global 
affairs (Huntington et al., 2005; Klein et al., 2005; Nuttall et al., 2005; 
Hovelsrud and Smit, 2010). Interest in the North is intensifying as a 
source of renewable and non-renewable resources for southern 
markets, and because of the strong climate signal observed across the 
region. The options for humans to respond to social, economic and envi-
ronmental changes, whether through mitigation, adaptation, or trans-
formation, are best achieved through effective systems of resource gov-
ernance (Young, 1996; Berkes et al., 2005; Biermann, 2007; Young, 
2009a; Armitage and Plummer, 2010).  
Resource governance refers to the collective efforts of society to de-
fine and achieve societal goals related to human interactions with the 
environment (Dietz et al., 2003; Folke et al., 2005; Young et al., 2008; 
Kofinas, 2009). Governance is a device to navigate and address societal 
challenges. It is the process by which citizen groups, non-governmental 
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organizations (NGOs), government agencies, businesses, local communi-
ties and partnerships of individuals and organizations interact in re-
source stewardship, a process that may or may not involve government 
(Young et al., 2008; Kofinas, 2009). Resource governance is shaped both 
by formal and informal rules, policies, norms, and conventions that de-
termine power relationships among groups, provide certainty in social 
interactions, and potentially restrict or enhance human choice (Ostrom, 
2009). In the context of human development in the Arctic, resource gov-
ernance addresses problems of maintaining natural and social assets 
that are important to sustaining ecosystem services – the benefits to 
humans derived from ecosystems (Chapin et al., 2006; Young, 2012). 
The Arctic has historically been bountiful in renewable and non-
renewable resources derived from its terrestrial, aquatic, and marine sys-
tems (AHDR, 2004). For millennia, northern Indigenous peoples co-evolved 
with their ecosystems. Today the human footprint in the Arctic environ-
ment is significant (Nellemann et al., 2001; AMAP, 2010), with actors within 
resource regimes ranging from individuals and families, to nation states, to 
some of the largest and most profitable global multinational corporations. 
For many Arctic residents, continued access to Arctic resources is linked 
closely to livelihoods, long-term economic development, and overall well-
being (Anderson et al., 2002; ASI, 2010). For Indigenous peoples of the 
North, cultural survival is closely tied to access to living resources and a 
meaningful role in resource governance (Nuttall, 1998). 
The first Arctic Human Development Report (AHDR) focused on re-
source governance as supporting Arctic livelihoods and issues of power 
relations, including property rights and the state of Indigenous peoples 
securing rights in governance, the legitimacy and utility of traditional 
knowledge, and devolution and co-management arrangements (Caulfield 
et al., 2004). The issues of power and power sharing associated with 
Arctic resource governance continue to be of critical importance. How-
ever, since the publication of the first AHDR, the challenges of resource 
governance have expanded to consider changes in climate, land use, and 
economies (Arctic Council, 2013). These conditions suggest that to meet 
the challenges of sustainability, adaptive approaches to governance 
must be implemented (Berkes et al., 2005; Armitage et al., 2007; Young, 
2012). While adaptive resource governance in the Arctic includes a 
power dimension, it also demands flexibility in decision making, high 
levels of responsiveness, decision making in conditions of high uncer-
tainty, on-going and systematic monitoring of social and ecological sys-
tems, the active integration of knowledge systems, and development of 
decision-support systems that are accessible to a wide range of stake-
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holders across multiple levels (Armitage et al., 2007; Young, 2009b). 
Realizing these objectives will require considerable transformations in 
today’s paradigms of resource management, social networks, and politi-
cal institutions (Chapin et al., 2009; Arctic Council, 2013).  
Arctic resource governance has emerged as an array of polycentric, 
multi-scaled and novel arrangements that in some cases provide for 
Indigenous self-governance, or for shared governance between many 
layers of governments, ranging from Indigenous to state to international. 
Resource governance in the Arctic occupies a unique international envi-
ronment that includes co-management arrangements for wildlife and 
land resources, Indigenous land claims agreements, national research 
programs recognizing the value of traditional knowledge, and the trans-
actions of the Arctic Council (Young, 2005; Arctic Council, 2009; 
Koivurova et al., 2009). Yet in spite of significant changes in Arctic gov-
ernance, colonial legacies, institutional deficiencies, and power imbal-
ances continue to challenge resource governance especially in the ab-
sence of funding and community capacity. This is especially the case in 
northern Europe and Arctic Russia where co-management and recogni-
tion of land and resource rights are mostly absent (Forbes, 2008; 
Hovelsrud et al., 2010).  
Climate change, increased resource development, and social and eco-
nomic change add layers of unpredictability in what is already a stressful 
milieu for the players involved, particularly those who possess less eco-
nomic or political power. These rapid and dramatic changes in the Arctic 
up the ante of what is required to steward resources, and challenge the 
capacity of current governance systems to address power inequities 
while being responsive to social-ecological change and innovative in 
problem solving.  
The emerging need for adaptive governance in the North recognizes 
that sustainability goals should consider how social-ecological systems 
are buffered from the trajectories and shocks of new conditions. The 
seven case studies in this chapter illustrate principles of adaptive gov-
ernance in resource stewardship, and highlight the challenges that result 
when unresolved issues such as on-going colonialist attitudes hamper 
the capacity of institutions to respond. 
How these tensions are manifesting and when and how they are be-
ing resolved across the Circumpolar North are the foci of this chapter. 
The chapter presents a set of crosscutting issues related to resource 
governance in a changing North, followed by case studies that illustrate 
points made in the general text. The chapter identifies best practices as 
well as shortcomings in resource governance, with a view to improving 
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present conditions toward more desired outcomes for both Arctic peo-
ples and Arctic rim nation-states. 
7.2 Putting Arctic resource governance in a global 
context 
Arctic resource governance is front and center on a world stage of atten-
tion. There is increasing awareness that the fate of Arctic resources af-
fects the well-being of people in distant regions. On the other hand, the 
lack of action on climate change by southern governments has potential 
negative effects on northern peoples and raises questions about the ex-
tent to which the North bears the burden for southern consumption. The 
emergence of technology, the Internet and global communication net-
works, along with greater political skill, provides increased opportuni-
ties for Arctic residents to influence the future of the North.  
7.3 Local resource management systems  
Local resource governance systems are fundamental to sustaining im-
portant living resources and cultural integrity of northern peoples. In 
many cases, local resource management functions through informal insti-
tutions based on kinship and community interactions independent of re-
gional and national scale arenas. Formal bureaucratic systems often over-
lay local informal systems, creating conflict with local cultures and con-
straining local response capability. In other cases, formal local resource 
management systems have emerged in innovative ways that display 
greater capacity, particularly where funding is available to support these 
systems. In those cases, many First Nations have developed highly active 
research and monitoring capabilities, such as GIS mapping and video pro-
duction studies (Berkes and Jolly, 2002; Nemes et al., 2007; Gearheard et 
al., 2011; Bali and Kofinas, 2014). However, the lack of financial and hu-
man resources in some areas means that limitations to organizational 
capacity and development persist.  
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7.4 From co-management to adaptive  
co-management?  
The first AHDR highlighted formal “co-management” arrangements. Co-
management emerged in the 1970s and 1980s in North America as a 
way of sharing power between governments and resource users to re-
duce conflicts over common resources and achieve sustainability. Since 
that time, variants of these types of power sharing arrangements have 
proliferated in many northern regions (Berkes, 2009; Clark and 
Slocombe, 2011). For Indigenous peoples these arrangements increas-
ingly provide greater authority in resource decision-making, and for 
governments, these agreements improve compliance with regulations 
and policies. Several new international arrangements have been negoti-
ated among Indigenous organizations, with limited to no national gov-
ernment involvement (Meek et al., 2008). In many situations, these ar-
rangements have evolved from co-management structures to adaptive 
co-management, a dynamic process where institutions and understand-
ings of ecological change are constantly tested and revised to reflect 
complexities of the particular socio-ecological systems (Berkes and 
Armitage, 2010; Berkes, 2012). While there has been considerable inno-
vation in co-management in many regions, such as Canada, Alaska, and 
parts of Fennoscandia, in other cases, such as in many parts of Russia, 
there is little to no local decision-making authority.  
7.4.1 Non-renewable resource extraction in the Arctic 
The “development” (exploration, extraction, and delivery) of northern 
non-renewable resources is controversial and has both direct and indi-
rect social and environmental impacts on northern residents (Walker et 
al., 1987; Chapin et al., 2006; AMAP, 2010). Today, Arctic resource ex-
traction activities are extensive, operating with varying governance sys-
tems shaping environmental quality and human well-being (AMAP, 
2010). The distribution of benefits to residents from these activities also 
varies (Haley, 2004; Forbes, 2008). In some cases, local resident glean 
considerable financial and employment benefits, and in others, local 
residents bear the burden of responding to changes caused by extractive 
industries, while receiving limited remunerations. The global need for 
oil and gas resources has pushed exploration offshore where jurisdic-
tional boundaries may not be well defined, and the risk of oil spills and 
other potentially devastating consequences is significant.  
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7.5 Responding to climate change  
Since the completion of the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) in 
2004–2005, climate change has become the predominant narrative in 
defining drivers of Arctic change. This narrative often describes north-
ern residents as passive actors rather than agents in their own regard. 
This view overlooks the importance of existing and developing local and 
regional institutions in complementing and facilitating adaptation. It is 
also important to understand climate change as one of many factors and 
drivers challenging people and governance institutions in the future.  
The rapid retreat and thinning of Arctic sea ice at rates faster than 
those predicted by the ACIA (2005) and IPCC (Anisimov et al., 2007) is 
among the most dramatic changes since the first AHDR. These changes 
have major implications for marine mammal management, access to 
high latitude pelagic fisheries, and stores of oil and gas. With the retreat 
of ice, it is expected that Arctic shipping will increase exponentially 
(Robards, 2013). Climate change creates additional challenges, such as 
increases in boreal and tundra wildfires, thawing of permafrost and its 
implications to ecosystems and human infrastructure, and changes in 
plant communities and their effects of grazing systems such as caribou, 
reindeer, and musk ox. The possible cumulative effects of these interact-
ing forces are not well understood, and suggest that without concerted 
efforts by all stakeholders, future resource management may be reactive 
rather than proactive. For example, in Alaska, the combination of de-
creases in sea ice and thawing permafrost has resulted in coastal erosion 
and the need to relocate several villages. While many recognize these 
problems, there are significant institutional deficiencies that hamper the 
ability to adequately address them. Despite the absence of financial re-
sources and formal protocols for village relocation, some communities 
are proactively responding by addressing local needs and creating new 
institutions with limited government support (Bronen, 2011; Kates et 
al., 2012; Bronen and Chapin, 2013).  
7.6 Integrating knowledge systems in Arctic resource 
governance 
In the early to mid 1980s, when many of the first northern co-
management arrangements were established, few decision makers made 
explicit reference to “Indigenous,” “local” or “traditional knowledge.” In 
the ensuing three decades, the concept gained considerable traction 
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(Berkes, 2012), both as rhetoric and in practice. The concept has since 
been applied in many ways, including to assert a role for local resource 
users in various resource management functions and to suggest that 
local knowledge provides opportunities for more complete understand-
ing of Arctic change (Huntington, 2000; Krupnik and Jolly, 2002; 
Krupnik et al., 2010). Since the first AHDR, a proliferation of studies have 
documented local and traditional knowledge, and in some cases, sought 
to “integrate” this knowledge (Huntington et al., 2005; Kumpula et al., 
2010; Gaup Eira et al., 2013). Calls for funding proposals now commonly 
require that the knowledge and involvement of local residents be in-
cluded in study designs. New “observation systems” that include Indige-
nous and local knowledge have also been implemented, some experi-
menting with GPS technologies that capture real time observations of 
local users (Gearheard et al., 2011; Galginaitis, 2012; Kumpula et al., 
2012). Most advances have occurred in North America, some in Fen-
noscandia, and few in Russia. However, there continues to be conceptual 
confusion, with many scientists and agency resource managers viewing 
traditional knowledge as a data source separate from its underlying 
worldview and day-to-day utility in practice (e.g., how to harvest). Evi-
dence also shows how in some cases there are problems with ignoring 
the cultural underpinnings of knowledge. Yet in spite of both a growing 
interest and a deep misunderstanding, the increased legitimacy of local 
knowledge bodes well for making resource governance in the Arctic 
more adaptive.  
7.7 Case studies 
7.7.1 Partnering across the Bering Strait to support 
resilient walrus-human relations  
By Chanda L. Meek, Martin D. Robards and Vera K. Metcalf 
 
This case study illustrates the evolution of adaptive governance in an 
international setting. The Pacific walrus population ranges between the 
United States and Russian Federation, necessitating coordinated actions 
by both countries to conserve walrus at a range-wide scale. The U.S. and 
Russia have formal collaborations, including the 1972 Bilateral Agree-
ment on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Protection and the 
2009 U.S.-Russia Presidential Bilateral Commission. These collabora-
tions are enriched and made more resilient by an active Alaska Native-
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to-Chukotka Native relationship (Meek et al., 2008). This case study il-
lustrates the value of informal, international networking institutions in 
building adaptive governance through sharing strategies to reducing 
disturbance to subsistence resources and building the adaptive govern-
ance capacity of managers and hunters through joint learning and coor-
dinated collective action.  
Government management of Pacific walrus hunting in Alaska did not 
begin until after the commercial exploitation of walrus had decimated 
their herds in the nineteenth century, leading to starvation in some In-
digenous communities along the Bering Sea coast (Fay 1982). Environ-
mental conditions and federal protections supported a population re-
bound in the 1970s and 1980s, which was so successful that they were in 
danger of exceeding the ecosystem’s carrying capacity. This rebound led 
to fears of another decline, which, in conjunction with continued uncertain-
ty over management authority, led to several Alaskan communities coming 
together in 1978 to create the Eskimo Walrus Commission (EWC). The EWC 
provided a mechanism for Alaska Native hunters to participate in Pacific 
Walrus management (Langdon, 1989). In 1994, the U.S. Congress 
amended the Marine Mammal Protection Act to formalize co-
management arrangements between federal agencies and Alaska Native 
organizations like the EWC. The subsequent co-management agreements 
for Pacific Walrus have strengthened and expanded harvest monitoring 
programs in Alaska (and Chukotka), documented Indigenous knowledge 
and best hunting practices, and enhanced efforts to develop locally 
based subsistence hunting ordinances.  
The collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s precipitated a de-
cline in economic vitality for Chukotka, necessitating a return to subsist-
ence-based diets that includes walrus (Metcalf and Robards, 2008). As a 
result, even in the midst of this political transformation, or perhaps because 
of it, transborder walrus management collaboration intensified and led to a 
series of international and interlocal (i.e. transboundary community-to-
community relationships) discussions about bilateral walrus manage-
ment (Meek et al. 2008). The interlocal relationships established be-
tween communities eventually gave rise to a series of international 
frameworks to share information and management ideas.  
During the early 2000s, with the cooperation of Alaska Native groups, 
bilateral monitoring agreements were developed to ensure the long-
term health of the walrus population through the National Park Service 
Beringian Heritage Program (a U.S. federal agency) and the Pacific Wal-
rus Conservation Fund (a non-governmental organization (NGO)). These 
agreements have primarily focused on monitoring of Alaska walrus 
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hunts, but have also facilitated data collection on Chukotkan haul-outs 
and traditional knowledge. In recent years, Alaska and Chukotka Natives 
have begun to formalize stewardship activities in relation to hunting and 
the protection of haul-outs. Communities and partner agencies on both 
sides of the Bering Strait (e.g., U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and Chukot-
TINRO) are rapidly adapting to new conditions. Communication connec-
tions across the Strait have facilitated rapid uptake of traditional 
knowledge-tested practices used in Russia for the establishment of 
community-led emergency measures (e.g., media management, fly-over 
restrictions, disturbance restrictions, etc.) in areas where walruses have 
hauled out en masse. In Alaska, hunter-based organizations such as the 
Eskimo Walrus Commission, have shared findings from communities, 
scientists and regulators evaluating the impact of industrial develop-
ment on walruses to evaluate Russian oil and gas development plans.  
Through an ongoing history of governance interactions, walrus and 
subsistence users alike have benefited from protections that reduce 
disturbance, minimize mortality of walrus, and directly support the con-
tinued use of walrus for subsistence. Interlocal institutions have allowed 
partners to continually share strategies across the Strait and evaluate 
the success of both models. Nevertheless, funding remains a difficult 
challenge, as US agencies (e.g., the National Park Service and Fish and 
Wildlife Service), charitable foundations, and NGOs (e.g., World Wildlife 
Fund and the Wildlife Conservation Society) absorb much of the costs 
for conservation work on both sides of the border. 
Community-to-community relationships contribute to upholding the 
rights and interests of the Indigenous peoples and to ensuring greater 
food security and other inter-related economic, social, and cultural 
rights. Recently, unfavorable ice conditions and low levels of hunting 
success are testing community resilience, but communities, agencies and 
NGOs involved in governing the social-ecological system within the Ber-
ing Strait have undoubtedly strengthened resilience through strong, 
adaptive partnerships. However, the addition of more formal channels of 
cooperation between tribal governments and federal agencies may also 
be needed to adaptively govern the region as a whole. 
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7.7.2 Nordic reindeer governance in the context of 
contemporary protected areas and species  
By Hugh Beach 
 
In an increasingly interconnected world of growing demands on limited 
physical resources challenged by rapid climatic change, how can the 
rights and protective clauses be forged to sustain Indigenous livelihoods 
and protect cultures? To what extent might livelihoods improve rather 
than deteriorate in the face of these changes? The case of Nordic rein-
deer governance in Sweden provides insights into these questions, illus-
trating how on-going conflicts and the failure to recognize fully Indige-
nous people’s rights can lead to a degradation of conditions. 
Indigenous peoples are often accused of wanting “special rights” over 
land and resources, which non-Indigenous peoples, many with long gen-
erational depth of permanent local residency, do not share. The degree 
to which this question is considered by law (e.g., through treaties or 
courtroom precedent) or political policies varies among and within 
northern nations over time. The last half of the last century witnessed 
the birth of the Sámi parliaments and the revision of Sámi herding laws. 
Of course, such proclamations and land-claims settlements do not erase 
the ongoing debates and struggles over resources in the North. In Swe-
den, court cases contesting the immemorial right of Sámi herders to 
utilize winter grazing on lands in forested areas owned by settlers have 
become frequent, since the state has thus far refused to pass general 
legislation on Sámi resource rights (as opposed to the rights of herders).  
Sweden has not ratified the International Labor Organization (ILO) 
Convention 169, concerning Indigenous Peoples, and, in at least one 
instance, has acted against the principles contained in the Convention 
(ILO 169). Article 14 of the ILO Convention calls for the strengthening of 
Sámi ownership claims to land, but in 1993, Sweden confiscated Sámi 
small-game hunting rights, without due process or just compensation, 
claiming that game was in sufficient abundance for the state to assert a 
parallel hunting right and to sell its own licenses. Similarly, the UN Dec-
laration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples has held little added value 
for the Sámi, whose attainments in a broader social and economic set-
ting are due primarily to policies resulting from liberal welfare ideolo-
gies (UN DRIP, 2007).  
Currently, reindeer herding, the main idiom of Sámi culture and re-
pository of Sámi rights, struggles for survival in Sweden in light of the 
massive damages inflicted by inadequate predator protection policies, 
rampant destructive mineral prospecting and mining, and the estab-
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lishment of huge so-called “wind parks.” In its quest to meet clean ener-
gy goals as part of its commitment to international environmental re-
sponsibilities and in the wake of the Fukushima disaster, Sweden has 
installed thousands of wind-power turbines on reindeer ranges. The 
Sámi have fared far better in Norway during the last decades, with the 
acceptance in 2005 of the Finnmarksloven, the Finnmark Law, in which 
the state specified Sámi resource rights while it simultaneously secured 
rights for non-Sámi in the Finnmark area (Svensson, 2005; Beach, 2012). 
The ongoing domestication of the northern Fennoscandian wild lands 
is analogous to the domestication of wild animals like the wolf when 
their every movement, their reproduction, and survival, become matters 
of human legislation. The compensation that provided the herders for 
their lost reindeer is often conceived as a subsidy to reindeer herding. It 
would be more logical to class it as a subsidy to wolf ranching (Beach, 
2004), for under Swedish wolf governance, the destruction caused by 
wolves is no longer an uncontrollable act of nature, but a consequence of 
human legal construction. The combination of herding law, taxation pol-
icy, predator policy, and other regulatory constraints on the one hand, 
along with new technological developments and government catastro-
phe aid for starving reindeer on the other, shape the variable responses 
of herders when it comes to labor investment and animal-handling tech-
niques. On the collective sameby (a Sámi social and territorial grazing 
unit) level, the gradually advancing implementation of the wage system 
funded by membership herding fees results in greater labor efficiency, 
but also alters settlement patterns and on occasion, increases herding 
extensivity (less control over and contact with the reindeer), loss of 
skills, and often reduces internal sameby solidarity.  
There has been a strong trend recently towards acknowledging cogni-
tive rather than physical human–land relations, together with the interna-
tional harmonization of policies. The dramatic proliferation of World Her-
itage Sites, such as northern Sweden’s Laponia, bestowing protected sta-
tus on areas of unique natural and cultural value, is one example.  
The increasing scope of human power, heated by population growth 
and rapid technological change – occurring at a rate far faster than that 
of rapid climatic change – gives humankind the potential to have an un-
precedented environmental impact. Regardless of how this human pow-
er is actually exercised – even were specific regions removed from hu-
man influence by creating parks, nature reserves, or World Heritage 
Sites, – it signifies a form of human colonization of the world. As such, 
the world becomes increasingly governed by the exercise of human 
choice. Even when the choice taken is one for environmental preserva-
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tion, either with a “hands off” policy (forcibly removing people from 
their homelands) or with policies of active repair, wilderness becomes 
tamed. It becomes our nature preserve, our environment (Beach, 2012). 
The Nordic countries illustrate a difficult problem. Improvements in 
living conditions for Indigenous individuals who adopt and benefit from 
the technologies and comforts of the increasingly globalized ambient 
society, cause them to lose the necessary sympathy of the democratically 
controlling majority for whom “indigeneity” might be supported, but 
only when possible to regard it as vulnerability in need of corrective 
welfare. Consideration for Indigenous rights over limited resources 
tends to wane rapidly along with the equalizing of observable prosperi-
ty. As this case demonstrates, such rights are revoked or reduced to priv-
ileges that can in turn be reduced to insignificance under the noble ban-
ner of equal justice for all, regardless of ethnicity. 
Path marker, informing hikers of reindeer corral ahead, Swedish Sámiland 
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7.7.3 Sámi fishing rights and Indigenous participation in 
Norwegian fisheries governance 
By Camilla Brattland 
 
Although the Sámi Parliament has grown in power and currently has a 
central role in co-managing marine resources in Norway, the Norwegian 
state has not recognized the historical fishing rights of the Sámi people. 
This is happening at a time when fish stocks are moving north with the 
warming climate, traditional capture fisheries are met with competition 
from a globalized fisheries industry, and northern coastal communities 
are searching for appropriate and effective mechanisms for coping with 
and responding to change. Broderstad and Eythórsson (2014) argue that 
northern Norwegian fishing communities’ capacity to respond to change 
is largely dependent on political and institutional reforms as well as 
ecological variables. This case study illustrates the extent of current 
political recognition and implementation of Sámi fishing rights and In-
digenous participation in resource governance, as well as its limitations.  
When the Norwegian Sámi Parliament was established in 1989, it 
represented a variety of Indigenous Sámi communities, individuals and 
institutions. With limited but increasing power and responsibilities, the 
Sámi Parliament interacts with the Norwegian state in matters of im-
portance to Sámi culture, livelihoods, and cultural survival. Fisheries 
management for small-scale commercial fisheries is one area of active 
involvement. Although the rights to access marine resources are not 
exclusively Indigenous, fisheries governance affects Sámi traditional 
livelihoods and opportunities to participate in and benefit from com-
mercial fisheries. 
Before 1990, Sámi fishers constituted a marginalized group in the 
Norwegian fisheries management system (Eythórsson, 2003). The local 
fish stocks upon which many Sámi communities relied were not suffi-
ciently recognized and managed, and overfishing and conflicts between 
locals and foreign fishers on limited fish stocks in inshore areas were 
frequent. The fisheries closure and introduction of a vessel quota system 
in 1990 meant that many Sámi fishers were excluded from accessing the 
increasingly licensed coastal fishery. However, Sámi fishers emerged as 
an important new stakeholder in fisheries management with the crea-
tion of the Sámi Parliament in 1989. Shortly thereafter, the Ministry of 
Fisheries implemented measures for strengthening Sámi fisheries within 
the existing regulatory framework, and the Sámi Parliament began to 
participate in annual quota negotiations and regulatory meetings (Sámi 
Parliament, 2004). This co-management framework facilitated coopera-
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tion between the Sámi Parliament and the fisheries authorities resulting 
in a new governance policy for all fishers within a geographically defined 
management area.  
Since the Sámi management measures were applied universally for 
all ethnic groups, they have come to encompass large parts of the north-
ern Norwegian small-scale fishing fleet. The area has grown from a 
handful of municipalities in 1990 to 26 municipalities and 20% (1,200 
out of approximately 5,800) of the northern fishers (Norwegian Direc-
torate of Fisheries, 2013). However, the funding available to the Sámi 
Parliament from the Norwegian Government has not correspondingly 
increased, either for small-scale fisheries, or for Sámi fishers in particu-
lar. Similarly, some of the special management measures for protecting 
Sámi culture implemented by the Ministry of Fisheries are covering 
more and more fishers. What used to be a distinct management policy 
for a minority of Sámi fishers has changed into an integrated, Norwe-
gian-Sámi small-scale industry policy for a growing group of northern 
people. This is advantageous in that Sámi fishers are no longer excluded, 
but it has become difficult for the Sámi Parliament to represent only the 
Sámi people in marine resource governance. This new challenge is even 
more evident as new legislation has further cemented the Sámi fisheries 
management area as a priority area for small-scale fishers in general.  
This challenge became clear in the 2005 Consultation Agreement be-
tween the Sámi Parliament and the Norwegian government. This 
Agreement changed the governance relations between the two parties 
and elevated the Sámi Parliament from one among many stakeholders to 
a body that was to be consulted separately and exercise decision-making 
power through consenting or withholding consent for policy proposals 
pertaining to Sámi matters. Despite this change, the Norwegian Parlia-
ment (Storting) did not acknowledge the historical fishing rights of the 
Sámi people, instead offering to legislate the fishing rights of small-scale 
fishers in the Sámi fisheries management area and increase the maxi-
mum quota for this group of fishers. The Sámi Parliament made it clear 
that the question of the historical fishing rights of the Sámi had not been 
settled, but consented to the rest of the proposals, and in 2011, the new 
Fishing Rights Agreement came to be. 
With the new consultation procedures and the new, integrated small-
scale fishery policy where the Sámi Parliament has a central role, the 
political influence of the Sámi Parliament in marine resource governance 
has grown considerably. However, the current solution has its 
limitations. As the 2011 Fishing Rights Agreement illustrates, 
recognition of Indigenous fishing rights is subject to political 
  Arctic Human Development Report 267 
negotiations and consensus among the majority population, and 
ultimately by the Norwegian Parliament. The issue of the historical fish-
ing rights of the Sámi people as an Indigenous group in northern Norway 
remains an issue due to opposition from the National Fisheries Union 
and a majority of the Norwegian political parties, who do not see the 
utility of recognizing rights as long as the material basis is secured 
through quota allocations (Jentoft and Brattland, 2011).  
In 2014, the Sámi Parliament and the three County Councils (Fjord-
fiskenemnda) created a new advisory board for northern inshore (fjord) 
fisheries. The board’s mandate is to propose measures for strengthening 
coastal fisheries with special regard for Sámi communities. In a situation 
where cod stocks are moving north and the abundance of cod in the Bar-
ents Sea reached a record high (2014) while the ability to improve utili-
zation of market demand is low, any improvements in the ability of 
coastal communities to benefit are welcome. In terms of the capacity to 
respond to rapid change on the local level, the new board may be more 
adept than the conventional governance system. With limited powers of 
decision-making, however, it remains to be seen whether the new mech-
anisms will have real effects on not only the legitimacy of Indigenous 
participation in resource governance, but on relations between Sámi 
fjord fishers, coastal communities, and markets. 
The new fishing rights regime moves towards an increasingly user-
regulated resource governance regime in Arctic Norway. Decision-making 
power is increasingly devolved to stakeholders like the Sámi Parliament 
and others. Brattland (2012) argued that the increasing integration of 
Sámi rights and policies into resource governance is creating a new form 
of ethno-ecological governance regime. This regime does not necessarily 
mean that Indigenous peoples have increased their power as stakeholders 
and are co-governors of resource governance systems, but that states 
have translated Indigenous rights and policies into their own language 
and established co-governance structures and consultation. Relative to the 
larger Arctic context where Indigenous groups are emerging as 
increasingly instutionalized stakeholders and co-managers in resource 
governance, the Norwegian integration of Sámi policies in the overall 
resource governance structure may illustrate the limits to the growing 
power of current Arctic Indigenous institutions. While not an ideal ar-
rangement in terms of full recognition of Indigenous fishing rights, man-
agement measures aimed at protecting Indigenous fisheries are actively 
discussed, even if not agreed to, among the majority population as a legit-
imate part of national resource governance.  
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Ansgar Hansen tending his nets during the cod fishing season in Kåfjord, Norway, 
2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photo Credit: Camilla Brattland. 
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7.7.4 Indigenous-industrial relations in the tundra zone of 
Russia’s Timan-Pechora and West Siberian Basins  
By Bruce C. Forbes 
 
As Russia increases its share of hydrocarbon exports to Europe and 
North America, it steadily becomes more of a de facto international 
actor, even as the enterprises producing the oil and gas are functional-
ly state-held monopolies with few genuine western shareholders. How 
do the current and foreseen governance regimes account for the fact 
that current and proposed future oil and fields of the Nenets Autono-
mous okrug (NAO) and Yamal-Nenets Autonomous okrug (YNAO) 
overlap territories relied upon by Indigenous nomads for their liveli-
hoods (reindeer herding, hunting, fishing, gathering)? This case study 
reviews the extent to which contemporary governance regimes in 
these regions either facilitate or hinder adaptation by Nenets nomads 
of the tundra zone.  
The Timan-Pechora and West Siberian Basins are neighboring re-
gions where both reindeer management regimes and the extent of en-
gagement with the hydrocarbon extraction industry differ substantially 
(Stammler and Wilson, 2006; Stammler and Peskov, 2008; Kumpula et 
al., 2011, 2012). Whereas the linked social-ecological system of Yamal’s 
tundra Nenets has demonstrated a remarkable level of overall resilience 
in recent decades, the Nenets in the NAO just west of the Ural Mountains 
have fared less well by comparison (Forbes et al., 2009; Kumpula et al., 
2012; Forbes, 2013). On the other hand, the level of direct dialogue be-
tween Indigenous, state, and industrial stakeholders in NAO has general-
ly exceeded that demonstrated so far in the Yamal region (Stammler and 
Wilson, 2006; Stammler and Peskov, 2008; Stammler and Forbes, 2009). 
At the local level, joint efforts to provide for mutual coexistence between 
nomadic herders and the oil and gas industry are impressive. This co-
existence is possible as long as experienced people from industry are 
present on the ground and have authority commensurate with the tasks 
at hand, such as facilitating migration through rapidly expanding infra-
structure (Stammler and Forbes, 2009; Kumpula et al., 2012). A key fac-
tor related to the coastal geography of Russian Arctic hydrocarbon de-
velopment is the overlap between the major onshore deposits of Timan-
Pechora and West Siberia with extensive areas used by Indigenous peo-
ples for reindeer herding, hunting, fishing and gathering (Forbes et al., 
2009; Stammler and Forbes, 2009; Kumpula et al., 2011, 2012).  
 
 
270 Arctic Human Development Report 
The post-Soviet climate for foreign investment in the oil industry has 
been unstable and risky, so international integration to date has been 
minimal (Locatelli, 2006; Andreyeva and Kryukov, 2008). Issues con-
cerning rights to territories and resources are neither legislatively nor 
administratively resolved, resulting in uncertainties for stakeholders 
and conflicts between groups of Indigenous peoples and industrial com-
panies (Andreyeva and Kryukov, 2008; Stammler and Forbes, 2009; 
Stammler, 2011). As in the West, the strength and extent of environmen-
tal governance in the Russian North has been highly variable in the post 
WWII era, fluctuating according to political and economic winds. At the 
same time, state governmental structures encourage implementation of 
sustainable development principles regarding exploration of hydrocar-
bon and renewable resources (Andreyeva and Kryukov, 2008).  
To date, almost all of the developed Russian oil and gas fields are lo-
cated onshore, and many of the most important giant fields are north of 
the Arctic Circle (Bishop et al., 2011). As these new sources come online 
they are expected to more than offset the declines of older fields farther 
south (Offerdal, 2007). Coastal provenance translates into a greater de-
gree of freedom in terms of the mode and direction of product delivery, 
especially for liquid hydrocarbons (Andreyeva and Kryukov, 2008). As of 
Spring 2013, serious attention is being paid to the potential for hydraulic 
fracturing, or “fracking,” within West Siberia’s massive Bazhenov shale 
deposit, which is seen as cheaper to exploit and carrying far less risk 
than the Arctic seabed (Chazan, 2013). In a sign of the shifting outlook, 
in late summer 2013, Novatek – Russia’s second largest gas producer 
after Gazprom – announced that it was looking to sell a major stake in its 
Yamal liquefied natural gas development (Shiraevskaya, 2013). Shell 
halted exploration in Alaska’s Beaufort Sea in 2013 while outlining plans 
for shale oil development with Gazprom in the Pechora, East Siberian, 
and Chukchi Seas (Quinn, 2013). At the same time, North America’s 
shale boom is making it less dependent on foreign sources of gas, freeing 
up liquefied natural gas for European customers (Anonymous, 2013).  
One of the biggest challenges both offshore and onshore is the poten-
tial hazard associated with drilling in permafrost (Bishop et al., 2011). 
For onshore deposits, resource governance under the rubric of “best 
practices” is generally designed to avoid chemical and mechanical dam-
age to permafrost terrain that, even under low intensity disturbance, can 
subside and quickly incapacitate costly infrastructure as well as cause 
lasting harm to frozen soils, tundra vegetation, freshwater systems and 
wildlife populations (Crandall et al., 2010; Bishop et al., 2011; Kumpula 
et al., 2011, Kumpula et al., 2012; OGP, 2013). Offshore guidelines tend 
  Arctic Human Development Report 271 
to be general and pose obligations of intent on the national states, but 
few of them are binding (Offerdal, 2007; PAME, 2009). Petroleum indus-
try groups have also established International Best Practices for onshore 
discharges, emissions, and wastes commonly generated during normal 
operations. Yet the individual operational standards of most petroleum 
companies are often much more stringent than International Best Prac-
tices or the performance standards set by individual countries. Russian 
company performance standards, at least on paper, are some of the most 
stringent in the world (Crandall and Thurston, 2010).  
In general, difficulties associated with extractive industries operat-
ing in the Arctic may arise if exploration and production strategies 
conflict with existing plans for protection or development of the region 
(OGP, 2013). A major ongoing problem is the inequitable distribution 
of the wealth within the main oil and gas bearing regions. The hydro-
carbon industry has raised the income and living standards for the 
specialized high wage earners who have migrated to YNAO and NAO. 
However, little of the money reaches the villages, let alone nomadic 
households on the tundra (Baffrey et al., 2010; Stammler, 2011), and 
barter remains common practice in and around active gas fields 
(Forbes, 2013). In practice, the distribution of revenues is hotly con-
tested and there is fierce competition between Moscow, the regional 
governments, and the oil and gas companies over their respective 
shares of the profits (Stammler and Wilson, 2006). As the federal gov-
ernment and industry accrue ever-larger proportions of the income, 
the net result of this competition is reduced investment in social ser-
vices at the okrug level (Baffrey and Thurston, 2010). 
From the perspective of full-time tundra dwellers, employment in 
this emerging cash economy cannot easily replace hunting or herding 
since traditional foods are not interchangeable with imported foods, and 
cash will not compensate for loss of services outside the market econo-
my. Herders and hunters often lack the skills and experience needed to 
participate in the wage employment provided by industrial develop-
ment, and often these activities conflict with traditional cultural practic-
es (Baffrey et al., 2010).  
Likewise, tundra disturbances cause conflicts for traditional practic-
es. Arctic Council guidelines assert that “physical disturbance due to 
[offshore] exploration activities has declined over the last two decades 
due both to a reduction in activities and due to improvements in tech-
nology and best practices” (PAME 2009, p. 7). Impacts linking the off-
shore to the onshore are recognized and addressed specifically in Gaz-
prom’s strategy for its Yamal megaproject (Gazprom, 2013). In its draft 
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Program for the Comprehensive Development of Fields on the Yamal 
Peninsula and in the Adjacent Offshore Areas, Gazprom’s goals have 
been to minimize environmental impacts to lands and waters relied up-
on by Indigenous populations. These guidelines are detailed in English 
and Russian on their website and include: a) sustained environmental 
monitoring during field pre-development and operation periods; b) 
planning of technological and special-purpose activities mitigating nega-
tive impacts on the surface air; c) utilization of water recycling systems 
that prevent pollution of surface reservoirs and soils; d) application of 
special technologies for reducing thermal and mechanical impacts on 
frozen ground; e) utilization of technical solutions to decrease the extent 
of land withdrawal areas, coupled with reclamation; f) prohibiting con-
struction and installation activities during the spring bird nesting sea-
son; g ) water intake through fish protection systems; and viii) arranging 
for an unobstructed migration of reindeer herds through infrastructure. 
Nomadic Nenets reindeer herders camp during summer migration through the 
Bovanenkovo gas field on Yamal Peninsula, Northwest Siberia, Russian Federation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photo Credit: Bruce Forbes.  
 
Gazprom’s socio-economic goals are to minimize impacts to and con-
flicts with Indigenous populations and include: a) protection of tradi-
tional areas of economic activities, archaeological and cultural sites of 
the indigenous population; b) utilization of advanced pre-development 
and operation technologies for oil and gas fields to minimize environ-
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mental risks and damage to the economic activities of the nomadic tun-
dra population; c) reclamation of lands disturbed during oil and gas ex-
ploration in the 1980s to increase forage acreage for reindeer herding; 
d) construction of reindeer meat and fish processing complexes to sup-
ply shift personnel with high quality products, and employment of the 
Native population at such complexes; and e) ensuring efficient interac-
tion between subsurface users and reindeer herders (Gazprom, 2013). A 
useful model can be drawn from Timan-Pechora Basin of NAO. There, 
older residents in the tundra zone have excellent knowledge of best 
practices dating from the early post-Soviet years at the Ardalin oil field 
(ConocoPhillips, 2013; Forbes, 2013). Mitigation measures at the field, 
operated by the Polar Lights Company since 1992, have been strictly 
adhered to, including bans on alcohol, drugs, firearms, fishing nets, and 
pets. The company is being careful to minimize the footprint on the 
ground rendered by infrastructure and associated terrain disturbance. 
Meanwhile on Yamal, from 1989 to 1996, one of the big producers, Amo-
co Eurasia, invested heavily in cultural heritage, financing archaeological 
work in areas slated for infrastructure development (Fitzhugh, 2004), as 
well as research on reindeer rangelands (Martens et al., 1996) and re-
vegetation of disturbed tundra (Martens, 1995). Tundra nomads in both 
regions took close notice, and began to hope that the language of mutual 
coexistence introduced broadly across the country under Soviet-era 
resource governance would shift from rhetoric into concrete actions 
(Fitzhugh, 2004; Stammler and Forbes, 2009; Stammler, 2011; Kumpula 
et al., 2011; Forbes, 2013).  
Since the withdrawal of Amoco Eurasia from the Yamal Peninsula in 
the mid-1990s, no other Western major company has stepped in to take 
its place. Although Statoil has had some serious discussions about part-
nering with Novatek in recent years (Nilsen, 2011), Gazprom remains 
the dominant force in resource governance of the Yamal tundra. Not-
withstanding relatively small-scale production via joint ventures, such 
as that between ConocoPhillips and Rosneft, in NAO the main players 
continue to be Russian majors like Lukoil. Formal governance is now 
less haphazard than during late Soviet and early post-Soviet times, yet 
still the onus for adaptation – much of it informal – has been on those 
Nenets who remain resident with their herds much or all of the year 
within the tundra zone. Key segments of resource governance, including 
the pasture compensation and free right of passage through active ex-
traction fields, have become highly institutionalized and function as well 
as can be expected at least in the high traffic areas which are closely 
monitored, such as the Bovanenkovo gas field (Kumpula et al., 2012; 
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Forbes, 2013). The current feeling is that tundra nomads can live with 
the unavoidable but manageable damage to the terrestrial and aquatic 
ecosystems, to which people have decades of experience adapting.  
Still, the anticipated underwater pipeline from Taz Peninsula to 
Yamal is considered by some to be a risky venture, with the potential for 
methane leaks that would degrade the highly prized Ob river and delta 
fisheries (Florian Stammler, Personal Communication, 1 July 2013).  
A warming climate may present significant challenges in the near fu-
ture if, for example, autumn/winter/spring reindeer pastures become 
more frequently and intensely ice-encrusted (Bartsch et al., 2010). En-
croaching infrastructure, such as new roads and railways, may impede 
timely movement of large numbers of animals unless proper consultation 
leads to adequately planned and provisioned crossing points (Forbes et 
al., 2009; Kumpula et al., 2011; Kumpula et al., 2012). For now, herders 
place a higher priority, relative to climate-related issues, on managing 
relations with the various stakeholders surrounding hydrocarbon extrac-
tion (Forbes and Stammler, 2009). The decades-long coexistence of herd-
ers with the gas industry in the south of YNAO has shown that in the long 
run, both ways of using the land can survive in close proximity to each 
other, even though some of the adaptations were painful for herders who 
had to change and abandon traditional migration routes (Stammler, 2011; 
Kumpula et al., 2012). The sheer existence of laws and rules on paper is 
not sufficient to address the diversity of problems that arise during the 
practice of coexistence. The need for more intensive consultation will 
increase in urgency as the tundra zone in both NAO and YNAO becomes 
more crowded (Stammler and Forbes, 2009). In the end, climate is just 
one of many drivers with the potential to challenge the adaptation of tun-
dra dwellers to hydrocarbon extraction activities that will almost certainly 
continue for several decades (Stammler and Wilson, 2006; Stammler and 
Forbes, 2009; Kumpula et al., 2012). 
7.7.5 Greenland’s legal framework for non-renewable 
resource exploitation: The challenges of creating 
transparent public consultation processes  
By Mitdlarak Lennert 
 
Despite Greenland’s wealth of resources, the level of resource exploita-
tion has been modest compared to other Arctic regions. With great po-
tential for subsurface mineral exploitation, Greenland today may be on 
the threshold of becoming a mining nation. The challenges associated 
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with governance and sustainability in relation to these activities will be 
to ensure sovereignty over these resources in and around Greenland, to 
ensure that the society benefits economically by creating jobs and edu-
cation possibilities, and to avoid potential environmental problems. 
Greenland became a Danish colony in 1721. In 1953, Greenland was 
recognized as a county within the Danish realm. Subsequently, the legal 
framework for non-renewable resource management was based on the 
Danish legislation. In 1960, a Danish-Greenlandic Commission was creat-
ed to consider the management of future mineral exploitation activities. 
Consequently, the first law on non-renewable resources in Greenland was 
passed by the Danish parliament in 1965 (Sørensen, 1983; BMP, 1999). 
The question of rights to minerals and energy resources was an im-
portant part of the Commission’s negotiations prior to the establishment 
of Home Rule in 1979. The Greenlanders in the Commission demanded 
full rights to all subsurface resources, but the Danish Government only 
accepted the Greenlanders’ rights to the renewable resources (Skyds-
bjerg, 1999). The compromise was to recognize that Greenlanders hold 
fundamental rights over the natural resources and that a joint decision-
making body consisting of representatives of the Danish state and the 
Government of Greenland, the Joint Committee on Mineral Resources in 
Greenland should be established. This Committee consisted of five Dan-
ish and five Greenlandic members, appointed respectively by the Folke-
ting (the Danish Parliament) and the Landsting (the Greenlandic Parlia-
ment). The Danish Queen appointed the chairman for periods of four 
years and the Committee held meetings alternating in Denmark and 
Greenland. The main tasks of the Joint Committee were to assess the 
mineral resources in Greenland and make recommendations to the 
Greenland Home Rule Government and the Danish Government on fun-
damental issues related to mineral exploration (BMP, 1999) 
In 1998, negotiations between the Government of Greenland and the 
Danish Ministry of Environment and Energy resulted in an agreement to 
transfer the administration of mineral resources to the Government of 
Greenland. Greenland then held sole responsibility for managing the 
administration of all mineral and energy resource activities, as well as 
promoting Greenland’s mineral potential to the international mining 
industry (BMP, 1998). With the introduction of self-governance in 
Greenland in 2009 and the passage of the Mineral Resources Act in 
2010, the Greenlandic Government assumed responsibility over all as-
pects of mineral resources and the Joint Committee was abolished. Since 
January of 2010, the Greenlandic authorities have held responsibility for 
the non-renewable resources and subsurface rights.  
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The Danish state still assumes responsibility for a number of activi-
ties in Greenland and Greenland receives an annual block grant from the 
Danish state to cover the expenses associated with the activities for 
which the Greenlandic authorities have taken over responsibility. If the 
Greenland government acquires revenue from mineral resource activi-
ties, the block grant will be reduced by an amount equal to half of the 
revenue beyond a set annual amount. Further negotiations on the future 
economic relations between the Danish state and the Greenland self-
government will be held when the Danish state’s contribution to the 
Greenland government is reduced to zero.  
With the warming climate, the melting of the Arctic sea ice and the 
increasing global need for a variety of minerals over the past years, 
there is a rising interest in non-renewable resources in Greenland. 
While the total number of exclusive exploration licenses in 2002 was 
17, the number had increased to 94 licenses in 2011 (BMP, 2011). In 
addition, the Greenland government is eager to see renewable re-
source development become a bigger component of economic devel-
opment. The 2012 report from the Greenlandic Economic Council ar-
gued that there is a need for a more diversified economy to maintain 
Greenland’s standard of living. The development of non-renewable and 
energy resources is seen as a means to create more “pillars” to the 
Greenlandic economy, reduce the dependency on the annual block 
grant from Denmark and ultimately to become economically self-
sufficient (BMP, 1997; Grønlands Økonomisk Råd, 2012)  
Since the introduction of self-governance in 2009, and the assump-
tion of authority over the mineral resources in 2010, the Greenland gov-
ernment has established a number of structures to facilitate public par-
ticipation throughout the process of mineral exploration and extraction. 
The Mineral Resources Act came into effect in 2010, and is the legal 
foundation for granting licenses. Furthermore, the Act also aims to en-
sure that activities conform to safety, health, and environment stand-
ards, use proper consultation practices, and incorporate best interna-
tional practices. The Mineral Resources Act requires all applicants to 
undergo an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and a Social Sus-
tainability Assessment (SSA). These processes require companies to 
send the reports for public consultation to project stakeholders. 
The Mineral Resources Act places formal responsibility for the public 
process and citizen involvement with the Greenland Government and 
the Mineral License and Safety Authority (formerly the Bureau of Miner-
als and Petroleum (BMP)). The main part of the public process occurs in 
the context of corporate EIA and SSA reports and the organization of 
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public meetings. The guidelines require, as a minimum, that the mining 
companies organize and hold a public information meeting prior to the 
commencement of the EIA and SIA and hold another public meeting to 
present the results (BMP, 2013).  
In practice, the public process is about information flowing from oil 
and mining companies to the public and the transfer of responsibility for 
public participation from the government to the mining companies is 
problematic (Aaen, 2012). The purpose of transferring responsibility for 
the process to the government, in a situation of power asymmetry, is to 
ensure that it will not be possible for the strongest stakeholder to take 
over the process and thus control the debate. By leaving parts of the 
process to the companies that are already the most powerful stakehold-
ers, there is a risk of exclusion of stakeholders who do not share inter-
ests with the company. 
Problems with the public participation process are illustrated within 
one of the largest proposed development projects in Greenland. The UK-
based London Mining Company is planning to develop an iron mine at 
the edge of the ice cap at the bottom of the Nuuk Fjord, with an estimat-
ed 1.1 billion tons of iron. In addition to the prospects of a much-needed 
boost to the Greenlandic economy, the Isua Project would support up to 
450 local jobs with the potential of more after training programs start 
(London Mining, 2013).  
Reviewing the public consultations meetings concerning the Isua 
Project, one can identify a number of trends and challenges. Over the 
course of four public meetings arranged by the Government of Green-
land and facilitated by a private consultancy, the discussions centered 
more around the process, or lack thereof, of involving the public, than on 
a comprehensive discussion of the Isua project. The structure and loca-
tion of the public meetings were far from ideal, as the first three meet-
ings were held outside the city in Ilimmarfik (the university campus), 
and the last meeting in the cultural center Katuaq. Invitations to the con-
sultation meetings were sent out late, and resulted in between 50 and 
160 participants, with officials comprising the majority in the first meet-
ings. The meetings consisted of presentations from representatives of 
London Mining Company and the government, followed by group ses-
sions and discussions. The duration of the meetings was critiqued, and 
there was a concern that members of the public often did not receive 
answers to questions right away, that there was no real dialogue, and 
criticisms were not taken seriously. Finally, the fact that answers and 
debates often had to be handled in two, and often three, languages pro-
vided a set of problems unique to Greenland.  
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The lack of transparency on decision-making processes by the gov-
ernment, as well as London Mining, in addition to information regard-
ing the project being unavailable or inadequate, raised questions as to 
who controls the agenda and an expressed concern among the popula-
tion to become spectators in their own country. The need for inde-
pendent expert opponents to analyze and assess the information being 
given was stressed by both the public and NGOs. A comprehensive re-
port on the democratic legitimacy of the consultation processes in 
Greenland criticized the information meetings for being conducted by 
the companies, rather than the government or neutral parties, as well 
as noting that the period for public comments and discussions was too 
short and a belief was held by the vast majority of Greenlanders that 
their opinion didn’t matter (Aaen, 2012).  
More education, among other initiatives, and more people actively 
participating in debates and consultations, are essential to empowering 
Indigenous peoples in Greenland. To balance the needs of a company 
that has to answer to investors, time and money, and the needs of a 
country and a population that face some of the largest industrial projects 
in their history of their homeland, continuous, informed and seriously 
conducted consultations and a constructive dialogue with the public is of 
the utmost importance. 
7.7.6 Transformation and restructuring in forestry: 
examples from Sweden  
By E. C. H, Keskitalo 
 
This case study reviews the ways in which forestry is currently chang-
ing and being restructured in Sweden, with a focus on impacts at the 
local level. While this section reviews the case of Sweden, similar pro-
cesses are also ongoing in other regions of Fennoscandia. Largely a 
result of globalization, the structure of large-scale land use sectors is 
changing, including a shift towards internationalization and higher 
international competition. Changes in traditional uses of pulp and pa-
per with the decline in print media result in less demand and require 
re-organization and development of new products in forest industry. 
Forestry related employment has also declined due to far-reaching 
technological shifts that substitute labor with technology. Local logging 
teams have been replaced by hired contractors who serve multiple 
sites. The historical role of forestry in supporting employment in rural 
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areas is thereby also shifting while retaining the economic output of 
forestry (Keskitalo, 2008).  
In Sweden, products from forestry and forest industry make up 
about 3% of GDP and about 10% of export value. Much of this value 
comes from the boreal forest, which is subject to multiple competing 
uses (Swedish Forest Agency, 2013a; Swedish Forest Agency, 2013b). 
Given its strong economic and historical importance in Sweden, forest-
ry is well institutionalized and can be seen as given primacy in certain 
cases, both legislatively and in relation to other sectors. For instance, 
the key legislation of the Forest Act of Sweden lies separate from the 
Environmental Code, thereby fundamentally separating forest man-
agement from environmental issues in general. The Forest Act is also a 
“framework act” rather than detailed law, and therefore fundamentally 
leaves forestry managers open to select the ways in which legal re-
quirements are fulfilled. Forest management is similarly not part of the 
otherwise strong municipal planning monopoly at the local level 
(Stjernström et al., 2013).  
This situation may also result in conflicts with other land uses. For 
instance, forest owners (including the state, large multinational corpora-
tions, small-scale forest farms and other private owners) in northern 
Sweden hold ownership rights to the same lands on which reindeer 
herders possess parallel user rights. While forestry is in many areas 
required to undertake consultations with reindeer husbandry, these 
consultations cannot negatively influence what is considered ongoing 
forest use (in most cases active forestry). Conflicts may thus arise be-
tween different user and interest groups. These are further complicated 
by the need to consider biodiversity and conservation within forestry 
management. As a result, forest certification as a voluntary, market-
based mechanism has become one important additional means to sup-
port environmental biodiversity and social considerations in forestry 
(Keskitalo, 2008; Keskitalo et al., 2009). 
While forestry has traditionally gained strong local support as a 
source of local employment, increasing internationalization today limits 
the number of people directly employed in forestry at a local level. Ur-
banization and changes in resource use (including technology shifts) 
result in increasing out-migration from rural areas, and forest owners 
are increasingly less dependent on profits from their forest holdings. 
Many forest owners concurrently maintain other employment and may 
increasingly embrace urban values that may include an increasing focus 
on conservation. Forest owners today also often receive land due to in-
heritance and today comprise a larger number of women, which may 
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result in changes both in demography and values of forest owners as 
well as in activity within forest management. These new forest owners 
may thus include a focus on conservation, or on other land uses than 
forestry, and/or may express less active or direct involvement in forest 
management (Nordlund and Westin, 2011). 
The decrease in employment in forest-related occupations in rural 
areas has further resulted in discussions of new options for rural em-
ployment, with some focus being placed for instance on tourism and in 
the present also mining development. The general intensification in 
resource use in society is resulting in increased pressures on resource 
use and thereby in increased discussion of the potential benefit of re-
source extraction at large to local areas. As a result the distribution of 
costs and benefits in forestry and mining, as well as the role of local 
planning, are currently being re-considered in Sweden (Keskitalo, 
2008; Stjernström et al., 2013). Some similarities to this situation with 
regard to restructuring in forest management can be seen for instance 
in Finland (cf. Keskitalo et al., 2009).  
7.7.7 The role of the Arctic Council in resource governance 
By Oran Young and Paula Kankaanpää 
 
Is there a role for a regional body like the Arctic Council (AC) in resource 
governance? If so, is this role likely to grow or develop in new directions 
during the coming years? To address these questions, we need to start 
with some observations about the nature of the Arctic Council and the 
development of its place in Arctic affairs over time.  
The 1996 Ottawa Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic 
Council launched the Council as a high level forum for "promoting coop-
eration, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States with the 
involvement of the Arctic indigenous communities and other Arctic in-
habitants on common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable 
development and environmental protection" (Arctic Council, 1996). 
Several features of the declaration make it clear that those who crafted 
its provisions intended a limited role for the Council in resource govern-
ance issues. The Council is a soft-law arrangement; it lacks the authority 
to make decisions that its members are required to accept, much less 
obligated to implement within their own jurisdictions. The Council’s 
focus, moreover, is on regional issues requiring "intergovernmental con-
sideration." It is not designed to address domestic concerns like estab-
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lishing and operating co-management regimes governing human-
environment interactions on a local or sub-regional scale. 
Yet the Arctic Council also has constitutive features that provide 
openings for addressing issues of resource governance. Unlike its pre-
decessor, the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), the 
Council is authorized explicitly to address "issues of sustainable devel-
opment" and environmental protection. It therefore has a mandate to 
consider economic and social or cultural matters, rather than sticking 
to the biophysical issues that are central to environmental protection. 
Unlike the AEPS, moreover, the Council includes an explicit role for 
Permanent Participants (PPs) "... to provide for active participation and 
full consultation with the Arctic Indigenous representatives within the 
Arctic Council" (Arctic Council, 1996). Because the use of natural re-
sources is a central feature of the economic, cultural and spiritual sys-
tems of the Arctic’s Indigenous peoples, the practice of including the 
PPs in all the Council’s activities ensures that issues relating to human-
environment interactions and the effectiveness of governance systems 
designed to manage these interactions will surface on a regular basis in 
Council deliberations. 
Despite the limits imposed by the Ottawa Declaration, the Council has 
emerged as a significant force in Arctic affairs. Its most striking success-
es to date involve what is described in policymaking literature as agenda 
setting (Kingdon, 1995) and, more specifically, the identification of 
emerging issues, the framing of these issues for consideration in public 
settings, and the promotion of selected issues to prominent places on the 
Arctic agenda. The most significant cases center on assessments carried 
out under the auspices of the AEPS and the Council, including the AMAP 
report on Arctic pollution issues (AMAP, 1998), the Arctic Climate Im-
pact Assessment (ACIA, 2004; ACIA, 2005), and the Arctic Marine Ship-
ping Assessment (Arctic Council, 2009). In each case, the Council’s work 
drew attention to the relevant issues and helped set the terms of the 
subsequent debate about how to come to terms with them. In some in-
stances, these assessments have influenced the course of Arctic affairs 
and the treatment of issues in global forums. The contributions of the 
Arctic Council regarding the impacts of persistent organic pollutants on 
human health, for example, are widely credited with influencing the 
negotiation of the 2001 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic 
Pollutants (Downie and Fenge, 2003). The ACIA documented the onset of 
climate change in the Arctic. In the process, it played a role in shifting 
the global debate about climate change from a modeling exercise to an 
examination of observable impacts (Nilsson, 2009). The importance of 
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co-management through stakeholder participation was acknowledged 
already in 1997 as part of the Guidelines for Environmental Impact As-
sessment in the Arctic (AEPS, 1997). Today, these guidelines have more 
relevance than they did at the time of their adoption. 
In recent years, as transformative changes bring the Arctic to the at-
tention of policymakers worldwide, the Arctic Council’s role has ex-
panded to include policymaking as well as policy-shaping (Kankaanpää 
and Young, 2012). The Agreement on Cooperation in Aeronautical and 
Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic, negotiated under the auspices 
of the Council and signed at the 2011 Ministerial Meeting, exemplifies 
this development. The Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollu-
tion, Preparedness and Response in the Arctic, signed at the 2013 Minis-
terial Meeting, continues this trend. The terms of the Ottawa Declaration 
impose clear limits on the development of the Council’s role in policy-
making. But the sharp rise of human activities in the Arctic arising from 
commercial shipping, oil and gas development, ship-based tourism, and 
(potentially) commercial fishing have brought an array of policy con-
cerns into focus and generated pressures to address them sooner rather 
than later. It would be a mistake to expect the members of the Arctic 
Council to revise and expand the Council formally to provide it with the 
authority to make legally binding decisions on a range of emerging poli-
cy issues. But the practices of the Council are likely to continue to evolve 
towards resource governance and co-management policy making. The 
2013 Kiruna Declaration (Arctic Council, 2013) highlights the im-
portance of sustainable use of resources and economic development as 
well as the role of business and corporate social responsibility. 
The substantive work of the Arctic Council is generally conducted 
through working groups (Koivurova and VanderZwaag, 2007). The Otta-
wa Declaration speaks of "... sustainable development and environmental 
protection" as parallel concerns, implying that they should generate dis-
tinct and roughly comparable programmatic activities. Thus, the Council is 
to "... oversee and coordinate the programs established under the AEPS" 
and "... adopt terms of reference for, and oversee and coordinate a sus-
tainable development program" (Arctic Council, 1996). On the strength of 
this mandate, the Council transformed the AEPS Task Force into the Sus-
tainable Development Working Group and charged this working group 
with the function of defining the place of sustainable development within 
the overall system of international cooperation in the Arctic.  
Defining sustainable development, however, is easier said than done. 
To begin, the process of devising terms of reference for the SDWG pro-
duced protracted debates pitting issues of human-environment relations 
  Arctic Human Development Report 283 
directly against concerns about creeping international jurisdiction that 
could interfere with domestic policies of member states (Koivurova and 
VanderZwaag, 2007; Kankaanpää and Young, 2012). Equally complex 
has been clarifying the relationship between sustainable development 
and environmental protection in the practices of the Council. In some 
cases, the pursuit of sustainable development necessitates tradeoffs 
among ecological, economic, and social considerations. In the case of 
resource governance, such trade offs often surface in tensions between 
the needs of subsistence users and the recommendations of ecologists 
and population biologists.  
Within the Arctic Council there are roadblocks to organizing pro-
grammatic activities along these lines. The Ottawa Declaration did not 
mandate any restructuring of the programmatic activities inherited 
from the AEPS. The environmental protection working groups (e.g. the 
Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, the Working Group on 
the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna) were well-established by 
the time the SDWG came along. They were not about to place them-
selves under the umbrella of sustainable development and, in the pro-
cess, to subordinate their efforts to the vision and priorities articulated 
within the SDWG. 
The difficulties experienced by all who have sought to translate the 
overarching idea of sustainable development into a set of criteria that 
are sufficiently precise and operational to be used to guide a coherent 
work program have also hampered the efforts of the SDWG (Parris and 
Kates, 2003). The SDWG has become a vessel containing a disparate 
collection of projects that have appealed to various constituencies in a 
position to mobilize the resources needed to carry them out. Some of 
these projects (e.g., the project on reindeer herding and adaptation to 
climate change) clearly have implications for resource governance. 
Others seek to generate empirical data relevant to sustainable devel-
opment (e.g., the Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic), to draw at-
tention to socially important concerns (e.g. the Arctic Human Health 
Initiative), to bring intellectual capital produced in other settings to 
bear on Arctic issues (e.g., the Arctic Resilience Report), or to address 
emerging issues now coming into focus as a result of the transforma-
tive changes occurring in the Arctic (e.g., the project on Adaptation 
Actions for a Changing Arctic). 
One initiative that has helped to frame the agenda of the SDWG is the 
first Arctic Human Development Report (AHDR, 2004). Completed in 
2004, the AHDR formulated a set of social indicators designed to sup-
plement those included in the UN Human Development Index with indi-
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cators that are particularly appropriate to the assessment of human 
well-being in the Arctic. Of particular importance regarding resource 
governance is the follow-up effort to develop empirical indicators useful 
in assessing performance relating to ongoing contact with nature, social 
cohesion, and fate control (ASI, 2010). 
The decision to revisit these issues in a second volume of the AHDR 
provides a critical opportunity to identify trends, noting both areas in 
which progress is being made and areas where problems have arisen or 
become more severe since the completion of the first AHDR. Over time, 
these reports can play an increasingly important role in providing the 
data needed not only to evaluate the success of the SDWG’s program-
matic activities but also, and particularly relevant to the focus of this 
chapter, to allow the Arctic Council to play a useful role in assessing the 
performance of resource regimes and offering suggestions for improving 
their performance over time. 
To sharpen their ability to perform this assessment function, those 
operating under the auspices of the Arctic Council could endeavor to join 
together general knowledge about resource regimes (Young, 1982), in-
cluding methods of environmental impact assessment and permit pro-
cesses, and in-depth assessments of resource governance systems in 
place in the Arctic (case studies this chapter). The goal of this effort 
would be to take advantage of the development of a large body of 
knowledge dealing with matters like the processes involved in creating 
resource regimes and the conditions that determine the effectiveness of 
these arrangements, while simultaneously paying attention to the specif-
ic conditions prevailing in the Arctic and even contributing to our gen-
eral understanding of resource governance through a detailed examina-
tion of Arctic experience (Young and Osherenko, 1993). In cases involv-
ing highly migratory species (e.g., birds and marine mammals), the 
Arctic Council might well be able to initiate a constructive dialogue with 
those seeking to deal with matters of resource governance regarding 
specific species (e.g., grey whales, brant geese) during the stages of their 
migratory cycles when they are located outside the Arctic.  
The resultant activities would be politically sensitive, requiring the 
Council to take an interest in activities occurring within the jurisdiction 
of individual states (e.g., the harvesting of bowhead whales by Alaska 
Natives within the Exclusive Economic Zone of the United States). Han-
dled with care, this should not present an insurmountable problem. The 
value added from the Council’s efforts stems from bringing together 
more general knowledge pertaining to resource governance with an in-
depth understanding of the issues surrounding resource governance 
  Arctic Human Development Report 285 
under the conditions prevailing in the Arctic and from forging bonds 
among those concerned with the management of highly migratory spe-
cies. The application of the resultant insights would be advisory; it 
would not entail any adjustment in the existing structure of authority 
regarding such matters. But the result could be an improvement in the 
effectiveness of resource governance in a variety of settings. 
Arctic Council, Salekhard, Russian Federation, 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit: Harald Finkler  
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7.8 Conclusion 
In light of the rapid pace of environmental change and the strong push to 
extract both renewable and non-renewable resources from the Arctic, 
understanding the interrelationships between Arctic peoples and re-
source governance is more critical than ever. With or without additional 
climate warming, certain sectors of the Arctic are bound to experience 
significant new resource development in the coming years, as is de-
scribed in many of the cases highlighted in this chapter.  
7.8.1 Insights from case studies 
Our case studies encompass both terrestrial and marine systems, and a 
mix of regional, national and international resource regimes. Together 
they represent a cross section of some of the most important and wide-
spread renewable and non-renewable resources subject to governance 
in today’s Arctic: reindeer herding, fisheries, marine mammal hunting, 
forestry, mining and hydrocarbon extraction.  
These cases identify three important trends in resource governance 
with major implications for long-term sustainability and self-
determination. The first trend is the increasing complexity of Arctic re-
source governance, as illustrated by Sámi fisheries and Nordic forestry 
and reindeer herding. The second trend is the increasing acknowledg-
ment of cognitive rather than physical human–land relations. A third 
trend is the increasing adoption of best practices, for example within the 
Russian oil and gas fields. 
In terms of outcomes, the new and rapidly evolving co-management 
in Sámi fisheries offers positive lessons for how such a regime might be 
implemented in Eurasian terrestrial systems. The case studies make 
clear that Nordic reindeer and forestry management, in particular, face 
serious challenges in developing legitimate management regimes with 
user participation (see also Ulvevadet, 2008, 2011). Informal institutions 
at the regional and international levels can be the basis for highly flexi-
ble and responsive governance systems such as in Bering Strait Walrus 
management and Russian oil and gas. An informal, interlocal relation-
ship persists as the key locus for international Bering Strait walrus man-
agement coordination. Yet in spite of emerging informal networks, there 
is clearly a need for formal rights and specified laws with meaningful 
enforcement, instead of a system allowing industry to select the ways in 
which legal requirements are fulfilled, such as in Nordic rein-
deer/forestry governance and Russian oil and gas. Establishing Arctic 
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World Heritage Sites, as in Sweden, represents international harmoniza-
tion of policies, but also raises questions regarding the future of Indige-
nous land use rights. Several cases point to the increasing need for 
meaningful consultation processes to replace those that vary widely in 
terms of their intent, efficacy and outcomes. As seen in Greenlandic and 
Russian non-renewable resource exploitation, it takes more than legisla-
tion to ensure effective public participation. Operationalizing effective 
public involvement is a multi-level and social learning enterprise, involv-
ing education systems, communities, and those managing resources and 
their exploitation. Greenland is an interesting contrast with Russia, as 
Greenland is typically considered a haven for Indigenous self-
governance, and Russia as home to a more paternal governance regime, 
so it is particularly illuminating to see both myths challenged and out-
comes contrary to what some may expect. 
Finally, in the Arctic Council we see a challenge to Arctic rim coun-
tries to aim higher than acting as advisors. For example, the oil and gas 
guidelines discussed in the Russian case study are based on obligations 
of intent, rather than binding. Despite this limitation, it can be argued 
that the Council has demonstrated influence not only within but also 
beyond the Arctic. In terms of the latter, examples of positive outcomes 
cited include negotiation of the Stockholm Convention on Persistent 
Organic Pollutants and the global examination of climate impacts trig-
gered in part by the increased awareness following the Arctic Climate 
Impact Assessment. 
Northern residents perceive “contact with nature” as essential to 
their well-being (ASI, 2010). How well people with resource based live-
lihoods navigate this need within contemporary governance regimes 
bears strongly on their capacity to effectively respond within a world 
characterized by rapidly changing socio-economic, political and envi-
ronmental drivers. In some case studies presented here, informal ar-
rangements are already working reasonably well without regulatory 
enforcement. Documenting these experiences in more detail is needed 
so their basic lessons can be transferred within and among different 
legal systems and proper consultation procedures can be implemented 
more broadly. Russia, comprising nearly half of the Arctic geographically 
and home to a large number of Indigenous cultures, is typically an outli-
er in political and resource regimes. Despite its occasionally fierce geo-
political stance, it must be noted that Russian practices directed toward 
coexistence between Arctic Indigenous peoples and resource develop-
ment in at least some areas have improved in recent years. In light of 
this positive outcome, longer-term engagement based on truly participa-
288 Arctic Human Development Report 
tory science with policy relevance is more likely to have an impact than 
short-term environmental activism designed to completely halt Arctic 
resource development. Maintaining a constructive resource governance 
dialogue at the circumpolar scale requires including Russia.  
7.8.2 Outstanding questions 
While the case studies and general observations of this chapter high-
light common patterns and conditions in resource governance across 
the Arctic, they also raise many questions, pointing up the need for 
future study. The Walrus and Yamal case studies suggest the need to 
understand better the capacity of informal institutions to complement 
formal institutions in ways that insure high sensitivity and responsive-
ness in resource management across scales. The Swedish cases on 
reindeer herding and fisheries raise complex questions about how well 
Indigenous peoples who pursue traditional livelihoods can work 
alongside other local non-Indigenous interest groups. The Greenland 
case suggests the need to cultivate and enhance public participation 
and poses the question of the extent to which public participation can 
shape sustainable policies in the face of rapid large-scale and highly 
profitable resource development. The Yamal study raises the questions 
of how groups access funds to support involvement in resource gov-
ernance and what are the consequences for groups that are marginal-
ized and excluded.  
Likewise, broader questions remain. To what extent will limited 
funding for community involvement, social and ecological monitoring, 
and research in resource management leave resource managers (and co-
managers) with the information they need to respond to the inevitable 
changes that are to occur? On a broader scale is the question of whether 
established “power sharing” or co-management relationships can be 
transformed to systems of governance that facilitate social learning and 
adaptation. Finally, the international scale transactions of the Arctic 
Council have proven successful in a number of areas in spite of holding 
limited formal authority. The extent to which the Arctic Council and its 
groups, like the SDWG, can continue and perhaps broaden its initiatives 
is also worthy of on-going inquiry.  
These questions underscore the highly dynamic nature of resource 
governance in the Arctic, and the need for a greater awareness of the 
critical role of institutions, formal and informal, in supporting future 
human development in the North.  
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8.1 Introduction  
Several international organizations promote health and well-being 
across Arctic countries and regions. A variety of monitoring programs 
and research networks collect and share a variety of health data. In re-
cent years, Arctic health research is increasingly focusing on the health 
and well-being of Indigenous peoples of the North. This priority recog-
nizes the major changes experienced by Indigenous peoples in terms of 
their living conditions. Indigenous people in some regions continue to 
suffer poorer health status compared to the majority populations of the 
Arctic nations and redressing such disparities requires the attention of 
policy makers and health service agencies. The increasing interest in the 
development of the Arctic has resulted in several initiatives, such as the 
Arctic Social Indicators project (ASI, 2010; ASI, 2014) and the first Arctic 
Human Development Report (AHDR, 2004). 
Among emerging threats for human health and well-being are the ef-
fects of a warming climate resulting in worsening food and water securi-
ty; changes in the pattern of infectious diseases, and impact on health 
care infrastructure; and mental health problems including suicide, acci-
dents and domestic violence. Since the publication of the first AHDR in 
2004, much has changed in the health and well-being of the diverse 
populations in the Arctic. Improvements continue to be made, while 
certain problems remain intractable. The major trends and patterns will 
be presented in this chapter. 
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8.2 Health and well-being in the Circumpolar North 
The development of international collaborative efforts in data collection, 
management and dissemination facilitates monitoring the health of Cir-
cumpolar peoples. Notable examples include Arctic Council projects 
such as the Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic (SLiCA), a circum-
polar review involving interviews of more than 7,000 Indigenous people 
in the Arctic; the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP) 
which reported on human health assessments that have collected and 
analyzed data on the effects of environmental contaminants since 1991; 
the International Circumpolar Surveillance of Emerging Infectious Dis-
eases (ICS), a collaboration of public health departments and laborato-
ries from several circumpolar countries that collects information on 
invasive bacterial diseases and tuberculosis; the Inuit Health in Transi-
tion Study; and the Circumpolar Health Observatory (CircHOB), a web-
based, interactive resource which presents freely downloadable tables 
and maps of a series of health indicators for all northern regions, the 
majority of which are derived from publicly available sources (Young et 
al., 2010). Major surveys like the Aboriginal Peoples Survey and Inuit 
Health Survey in Canada and SAMINOR in Norway have focused on the 
conditions of Indigenous peoples. There is also some information about 
health and well-being of the non-Indigenous peoples in northern regions 
as part of national health surveys. 
Several international organizations promote health and well-being 
across Arctic countries and regions. The International Union of Circumpo-
lar Health was formed in 1981, a federation of national scientific and pro-
fessional organizations in Canada, the Nordic countries, United States, and 
the Soviet Union (later the Russian Federation). It organizes a triennial 
international circumpolar health congress, an important forum for the 
exchange of information and interactions among health care profession-
als, researchers and policy-makers. The Circumpolar Health Research 
Network (CirchNet, 2013) is an organization that focuses specifically on 
health research and supports academic exchanges, organizes summer 
institutes in health research, and publishes the International Journal of 
Circumpolar Health. In 2008, the Arctic Council’s Sustainable Development 
Working Group created a subsidiary, the Arctic Human Health Expert 
Group (AHHEG), to provide expert advice on health matters.  
The training of health care providers and researchers with a focus on 
the North occurs in several centers, linked together through the University 
of the Arctic (UArctic) (see Chapter 9, Education and Human Capital). The 
thematic networks of the UArctic form a natural framework for the devel-
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opment of education and research to increase and share knowledge across 
the North. The Health and Wellbeing in the Arctic network was estab-
lished in 2005, and now member universities and institutes within the 
network offer international Masters (since 2009) and PhD programs 
(since 2012). Future activities of this thematic network include increasing 
the exchange of researchers and teachers and developing courses for 
health staff about the special features of Arctic health.  
Health is also a major concern of Indigenous peoples’ organizations. 
For example, the Inuit Circumpolar Council proposed the Inuit health 
strategy in 2009 to improve Inuit health and wellness. It aims to influ-
ence international, national, and regional health and social policies and 
programs, improve awareness of the Inuit’s situation in the Arctic 
among health professionals, and promote research on health and well-
ness that reflects the communities’ priorities.  
It is clear that many institutions, projects, and groups are now active-
ly engaged in monitoring, understanding, and improving the health and 
well-being of Circumpolar peoples. This chapter reviews the current 
state of health and well-being around the Arctic to assist organizations 
in determining priorities and identifying promising practices. 
Alaska Native Medical Centre, Anchorage, Alaska, USA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit: Diane Hirshberg. 
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8.3 Continuing health disparities 
The people in the Circumpolar North do not all enjoy the same health. 
There are substantial disparities among countries and regions, and with-
in regions among population subgroups, particularly between Indige-
nous and non-Indigenous people.  
At the level of the eight Arctic States, there are clear inter-country 
disparities in the overall index of well-being such as the United Nations 
Human Development Index, a composite index of health, education and 
living standards. In 2012, Russia ranked behind the others, at 55th, 
whereas the other Arctic States were all within the top 20 countries in 
the world (UN HDI, n.d.). 
In general terms, circumpolar regions basically fall into four groups 
in terms of their health status: 
 
 The Nordic countries – these rank the highest in every health 
indicator, and there is generally little difference between north and 
south, or between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people. 
 Alaska, Yukon, and Northwest Territories – health status in these 
jurisdictions is comparable to, or even better than, the national 
average of the United States and Canada; however, within these 
regions, there are significant disparities between Indigenous and 
non-Indigenous people. 
 Greenland and Nunavut – with over 85% of the population 
Indigenous, there is a wide gap in health status between these 
regions and Denmark and Canada. 
 The Russian Arctic – while the regions in the European North tend to 
fare better than those in Siberia, for almost any health indicator, the 
Arctic regions of Russia tend toward the lower end of the spectrum. 
 
During the period between 2005–2009, the regions with the greatest 
health disparities experienced lower life expectancy (see Chapter 2, Arc-
tic Population and Migration), higher infant mortality, and higher rates of 
tuberculosis, sexually transmitted diseases, and some cancers. Injury, 
homicide and suicide rates also tend to be higher in the Circumpolar 
North. Each is discussed in brief below. 
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8.3.1 Infant mortality rate (IMR) 
IMR varies from less than 5 per 1,000 live births in the Nordic countries 
(as low as 2 in Iceland) to over 10 in Nunavut and Greenland, and over 20 
in some Russian regions, and is as high as 28 in the Koryak okrug.i There is 
little regional difference (between the northern and southern regions) in 
Nordic countries (Figure 8.1). Greenland is about thirty years behind 
Denmark in IMR rates, i.e., the rate for Greenland today is similar to that 
observed in Denmark 30 years ago (Young and Bjerregaard, 2008:32).  
Figur 8.1: Infant mortality rates among circumpolar regions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Mean of 2005–09, rates expressed as infant deaths per 1,000 live births. 
AO – autonomous okrug; the Evenkia, Koryak, and Taymyr AO were dissolved in 2007 although 
some data were continued to be collected and reported for these regions: 
Nordic countries 
USA and Canada 
Russia 
Source: Circumpolar Health Observatory [http://circhob.circumpolarhealth.org], based on data as 
reported by national statistical agencies. 
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8.3.2 Tuberculosis 
The mean national incidence rates for tuberculosis in the Nordic coun-
tries, Canada and the United States are less than 10/100,000. The rates for 
Greenland (130/100,000) and Nunavut (150/100,000) are more than 10 
times higher. Meanwhile, the mean rate of the northern Russian regions is 
about 80/100,000, among them is Koryak okrug, with a rate as high as 
450/100,000, almost 100 times the rate of Iceland and Faroe Islands. TB 
affects the Inuit in Canada, Alaska and Greenland disproportionately, 
where its incidence reached its peak in the 1950s. The decline in incidence 
of the disease has been impressive (Figure 8.2), although a substantial gap 
still exists between the Indigenous and non-Indigenous populations.  
Fig. 8.2: Trend in incidence of tuberculosis in selected circumpolar populations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Reproduced by permission from Circumpolar Health Atlas, p.96. 
8.3.3 Sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) 
Other infectious diseases also vary substantially across circumpolar 
regions, a notable example being gonorrhoea (Figure 8.3). Greenland has 
a high number of cases of gonorrhoea. Its incidence increased steadily 
during the 1950s and 1960s. A systematic intervention strategy that 
included partner tracing and treatment had resulted in an impressive 
decline, but the current level is still over 200 times higher than in Den-
mark. The pattern of chlamydia infection tends to parallel that of gonor-
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rhoea, with Greenland, Nunavut, Northwest Territories, and Alaska re-
porting the highest rates.  
Given the high rates of STDs, there was much fear of the human im-
munodeficiency virus (HIV) spreading to the Arctic when the epidemic 
began in the 1980s. This has not happened, but HIV/AIDS nonetheless 
represents a major public health threat. The distribution of risk groups – 
men having sex with men, heterosexual contacts and injection drug us-
ers – vary across regions. There is a long incubation period between HIV 
infection and the onset of the clinical symptoms of AIDS. Most jurisdic-
tions report these HIV and AIDS separately, but given that the extent of 
HIV testing in the population varies, cross-national comparisons should 
only be done with caution. 
Fig. 8.3: Map showing incidence of gonorrhea in circumpolar regions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Reproduced by permission from Circumpolar Health Atlas, p.98. 
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Cancers: Cancer incidence also varies across regions. Among the most 
common cancers is lung cancer: the highest incidence can be found in 
Nunavut, Greenland, and some Russian regions (Figure 8.4). While rates 
tend to be higher among males than females, the sex difference is partic-
ularly pronounced in Russian North, where the male rate may be as high 
as 10 times the female one, reflecting the very low smoking prevalence 
among Russian women.  
Fig. 8.4: Incidence of lung cancer in Arctic States and their northern regions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Mean of 2005–09; AO – autonomous okrug, O – Oblast, R – Republic; cross-hatched area in 
bars represents the female rate, total length of bar represents the male rate: 
Nordic countries 
USA and Canada 
Russia 
Source: Circumpolar Health Observatory [http://circhob.circumpolarhealth.org], based on data as 
reported by national statistical agencies. 
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An international review of cancer among the Inuit reveals that cancer 
(all combined) has increased in all Inuit regions over a 35-year period 
from 1969–2003. The increase is particularly marked for lung and colo-
rectal cancers, while cervical cancer has declined. For the 1989–2003 
period, the overall risk of cancer among Inuit men and women was not 
in excess of that among non-Inuit. Inuit continue to be at extreme high 
risk for certain so-called “traditional” cancers such as nasopharyngeal 
and salivary gland cancer. However, Inuit today also have the world’s 
highest incidence rate of lung cancer. The likeliest cause is the exceed-
ingly high smoking rate, approaching 60% among adults (Circumpolar 
Inuit Cancer Review Working Group, 2008).  
8.3.4 Cardiovascular disease 
Across Russia, cardiovascular disease mortality rates are much higher 
than in the other regions. Within Scandinavia, northern regions have 
higher rates than the national averages. Among Alaska Natives, mortality 
from ischemic heart diseases increased during the 1980s, and began to 
decline during the mid-1990s. At the same time, rates have declined 
dramatically among Americans nationally. The Alaska Native rate is still 
lower than that of the state or national all-race rates.  
“Alaska Natives are the Healthiest People in the World” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit: Diane Hirshberg. 
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8.3.5 Injury, homicide and suicide 
Injury is an important indicator of health, but also of social well-being, as 
it comprises both the unintentional (“accidents”) and intentional (in-
cluding suicide and violence). Russia and its regions have the highest mor-
tality rates from injuries (Figure 8.5). In Alaska and Northern Canada, the 
age-standardized mortality rate for injury is two to three times higher 
than the respective national rates. Greenland’s rate is more than four 
times that of Denmark. In northern Fennoscandia, the rates are little 
different from the respective national rates. In all jurisdictions, injury 
mortality is higher among men than women. Within the North, there is 
also substantial difference between Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
people. In Alaska, the rate for all injuries among Alaska Natives is three 
times that of the USA all-races rate.  
Fig. 8.5: Map showing injury mortality rate in circumpolar regions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Mortality rate (per 100,000) age-standardized to the European standard population. 
Source: Reproduced with permission from Circumpolar Health Atlas, p.111. 
  Arctic Human Development Report 307 
The northern regions of Fennoscandia generally do not show an excess 
of homicides, compared to rates in their respective countries as a whole. 
The highest rates of homicide are found among Alaska Natives and 
Greenlanders. Greenland’s rate exceeds 10 times that of Denmark. While 
the rate for Alaska Natives is only twice that of the USA-all races rate, 
this is due to high homicide rate in the United States nationally, which 
exceeds all other circumpolar countries, and is comparable to those of 
the northern territories of Canada. 
Fig. 8.6: Evolution of the suicide epidemic in three circumpolar indigenous 
populations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data from Jack Hicks, as presented to the Hope and Resilience: Suicide Prevention in the 
Arctic Conference in Nuuk, November 2009. 
 
Suicide among youth is particularly high in Greenland and Nunavut, a 
phenomenon observed also among Alaska Natives. Suicide is not as com-
mon in the non-Indigenous populations in most northern regions. Among 
the Inuit, the increase in suicide rates occurred first in Alaska, later in 
Greenland, and still later in Canada, with each later epidemic more severe 
than the preceding one (Figure 8.6). One characteristic of youth suicides is 
their tendency to occur in clusters, with devastating impacts on small 
communities. Suicide statistics are only the tip of the iceberg – for every 
suicide there are many more suicide attempts and individuals harboring 
suicidal thoughts. In an effort to help curb the high rates of suicide, the 
Government of Nunavut has created a Suicide Prevention Strategy (Nu-
navut Suicide Prevention Strategy Action Plan, 2011). Surveys among 
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Indigenous people in several regions such as SLiCA provide some measure 
of the extent of suicidal ideation, as well as people’s perception of suicide 
as a community problem (Larsen et al., 2010). 
8.4 Emerging issues  
Human health and well-being are the result of complex interactions 
among genetic, economic, social, cultural, political and environmental 
factors. Due to globalization and climate change, there are many poten-
tial new challenges and threats for individuals and communities in the 
Arctic (see Megatrends, 2011 and Chapter 10, Globalization). The Arctic 
is already and will continue to be less isolated than in the past. The pace 
of natural resources development such as oil and gas and mining, and 
the scale of human activities such as shipping and tourism have acceler-
ated. Traditional livelihoods have come into conflict with new ones in 
many areas. Socioeconomic and environmental changes have created 
new groups at risk of marginalization.  
As with the rest of the world, the Arctic is facing increasing urbaniza-
tion, which brings with it challenges for human health and well-being. 
Large cities with populations close to or exceeding 300,000 can be found 
in Russia (such as Murmansk, Arkhangelsk and Yakutsk), and Alaska 
(Anchorage); cities with population around 100,000 can be found in the 
Nordic countries (e.g., Umeå, Oulu), whereas in Canada’s North and 
Greenland, no cities have populations exceeding 30,000 people.  
8.4.1 Food and water security 
A major factor in the deteriorating food and water security situation in 
the Arctic is the changing climate, characterized by degradation of per-
mafrost, reduced ice cover, and extreme weather conditions (such as 
floods and storms). These changes impact the harvest from fishing and 
hunting, affect the health of animals and the safe storage of food, and the 
nutritional status of Indigenous people who depend on traditional foods 
for subsistence (Nilsson and Evengård, 2013).  
Health care can also be affected by the changing climate. It has been 
documented that in Arctic Russia, the reindeer herding Nenets people 
are “stuck” in the tundra for longer periods of time waiting for snow and 
have to leave their villages earlier before the snow melts in order to 
reach medical care (Fedotov et al., 2011). The frequency of fishing and 
hunting accidents and drownings in Northwest Alaska (Brubaker et al., 
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2011) and among the Nenets (Davydov and Mikhailova, 2011) has in-
creased due to thin ice or changes in snow cover.  
Surveys in northern Canada have found food insecurity affecting over 
60% of Inuit households (Huet et al., 2012). The situation in the Russian 
Arctic has also deteriorated (Dudarev et al., 2013). Decreased access to 
safe food and water is associated with an increase in infections such as 
gastroenteritis, respiratory infections and vector-borne diseases. The 
warming climate may introduce new host species and pathogens into 
new habitats that may lead to infections in humans. Increases in the 
morbidity rates of zoonotic infectious diseases (such as tick-borne en-
cephalitis, tularaemia, brucellosis, rabies and anthrax) among humans, 
domestic animals and wildlife in the Russian Arctic (Revich et al., 2012) 
and Alaska (Hueffer et al., 2013) have been reported. Climate change in 
the Russian Arctic and Alaska has been more pronounced than in the 
other parts of these countries. However, there are also some positive 
effects of warming in terms of food security in the Circumpolar North, 
for example, an increasing potential for agriculture during the longer 
growing seasons (AMAP, 2011). 
Textbox 8.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Nilsson et al., 2013a, Nilsson et al., 2013b. 
 
 
Indicators of food and water security in an Arctic health context 
 Healthy weight (BMI, ratio >30, also for children). 
 Self-estimated proportion of traditional food in diet. 
 Non-monetary food accessibility. 
 Monetary food accessibility. 
 Food-related contaminants. 
 Food-borne diseases. 
 Per capita renewable water. 
 Accessibility of running water. 
 Waterborne diseases. 
 Drinking water contaminants. 
 Authorized water quality assurance. 
 Water safety plans. 
 
These 12 indicators suggested are based on existing WHO and FAO indicators, 
and they will be a starting point for monitoring both Indigenous and non-
Indigenous populations in rural and urban areas in the Arctic. 
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During the Swedish chairmanship of the Arctic Council (2011–2013), 
food and water security was declared one of its priority issues, and a 
joint project was initiated, aimed at providing a basis for indicator selec-
tion that is relevant for food and water security in the circumpolar areas 
and which could be used in international collaborations of surveillance 
in the Arctic (Nilsson and Evengård, 2013). An attempt was made to 
identify key indicators to follow changes in food and water security in 
Arctic populations. Such indicators are recommended to be gender-
based, since food and water insecurity affect men and women different-
ly. The results of an extensive literature search and critical review were 
presented to a joint workshop of the Sustainable Development Working 
Group’s (SDWG) Arctic Human Health Expert Group and the Arctic Moni-
toring and Assessment Program’s (AMAP) Human Health Assessment 
Group, which selected 12 candidate indicators for future monitoring 
(Nilsson et al., 2013a; Nilsson et al., 2013b).  
8.4.2 Environmental contaminants 
For more than 20 years, AMAP has monitored the levels of persistent 
organic pollutants and heavy metals in circumpolar countries. AMAP has 
regularly published reports on human health and the trends of environ-
mental contaminants such as mercury and lead in traditional/local foods 
and their body burden in humans (AMAP, 1998; AMAP, 2003; AMAP, 
2009; AMAP, 2011; see Textbox 8.2). Future research is needed that 
would combine bio-monitoring of contaminants with dietary surveys in 
order to provide more accurate estimates of exposure and better dietary 
advice. Several joint research and educational projects have been 
launched, such as the multidisciplinary EU-funded ArcRisk project led by 
AMAP (ArcRisk, 2013), which aims to determine how climate-mediated 
changes in the environmental fate of contaminants affect the exposure of 
human populations via the food-web, both now and in the future. The 
levels of the old persistent organic contaminants will decrease in the 
environment and in humans in the future but there will be differences 
among regions and among contaminants (Nost et al., 2013). There are 
now “hot spots” in industrial areas in the Russian North. Increased 
amounts of persistent environmental contaminants and heavy metals, 
especially mercury, are being released from the frozen soil and contami-
nate drinking water (Dudarev, 2012; Dudarev et al., 2013). Increased 
traffic and tourism, together with oil and gas and mining activities, will 
bring contaminants closer to people in new ways. Previously, most con-
taminants entered the Arctic through long-distance transport. Such 
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Relevant key findings of Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme 
 Levels of legacy POPs in human tissues are declining in many regions of the 
Circumpolar Arctic. New sources and patterns are being seen in Arctic Russia. 
 Levels of mercury in human tissues are declining in several Arctic regions. 
Inuit continue to have the highest exposure levels of mercury in the Arctic 
and most often exceed blood guidelines. 
 Traditional foods are an important source of nutrients for many Arctic resi-
dents. These foods are also the main source of exposure to contaminants. 
 New evidence indicates that POPs, mercury, and lead can affect the health 
of people and especially children at lower levels of exposure than previ-
ously thought. 
 Climate change may increase the mobilization of POPs and mercury, and lead 
to higher releases of contaminants within the Arctic. 
 
The 2011 AMAP Assessment “Mercury in the Arctic” concludes: “It has been 
shown that exposure to mercury at the current levels in the Arctic can have 
adverse impacts on human health, particularly for the developing fetus and 
children, although further research is required to determine if the subtle effects 
of Hg on human health are persistent.” (AMAP 2011: 168). 
changes will present new challenges to the health and well-being of all 
Arctic residents.  
Textbox 8.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: AMAP, 2009; AMAP, 2011. 
8.4.3 Dietary transition 
The change from “traditional” foods based on hunting and fishing to a 
“western” type of diet has steadily progressed in many Indigenous com-
munities around the Arctic. These changes have led to increased rates of 
modern diseases such as obesity, diabetes and cardiovascular diseases. 
Various circumpolar countries and regions have promoted dietary rec-
ommendations to ensure a balanced and nutritious diet (Jeppesen et al., 
2011). However, achieving this balance is difficult. Many remote Arctic 
communities are only accessible by air or marine transport, although 
some have road access. Transportation costs are high, which result in high 
food prices that may be beyond the reach of many people. Even those who 
engage in harvesting fish and game animals require expensive hunting 
equipment, fuel and vehicles. Long delays in shipments due to weather 
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conditions often result in spoiling of perishable items. Those who rely 
mainly on market foods become increasingly dependent on cheaper, un-
healthy choices, further affecting food security, nutritional status, and 
overall health (Jeppesen et al., 2011; Bjerregaard and Mulvad, 2012). 
8.4.4 The aging population 
Societal values in many countries consider the younger generation as 
particularly vulnerable and requiring special attention as the pace of 
Arctic development increases. The working force or middle-aged gener-
ation is considered a key factor in shaping the social and economic 
agenda of the region. However, the “grey” population – elderly people, 
many of whom are retired – is often neglected in many kinds of analyses 
of Arctic populations. This “grey” population is a viable resource for 
regional capacity building. The phenomenon of the aging population 
manifests itself differently across the Arctic, due to the varied contribu-
tions of declining fertility, mortality and immigration (Emelyanova and 
Rautio, 2013; Lewis, 2013; Nordic Population Aging, 2013).  
Despite common concerns associated with the growing size of older 
population, such as strains on the pension and health care systems (es-
pecially the cost of long-term care), senior residents of the Arctic make 
important contributions to the local community: late age labor participa-
tion, experience in decision-making, unpaid “volunteering” and the in-
tergenerational transmission of cultural values and practices.  
There are urgent questions for policy makers in the Arctic related to 
this sector of the population. How will Arctic societies adapt to the aging 
population and what impact will it have on not only the health of sen-
iors, but on the entire population? What kind of political will is needed 
to make policy adjustments, for example, in working life, pension re-
forms, living arrangements, and health services? It is often not recog-
nized that the elderly person is a powerful but underutilized resource 
for Arctic development. 
The process of population aging can be expected to continue in the 
coming decades. For policy responses to be effective in optimizing socie-
tal well-being, they must be based on scientific understanding of the 
critical dynamics associated with population aging (Emelyanova and 
Rautio, 2013). Both conventional and prospective methodologies pro-
vide such evidence. “Conventional” tools such as the United Nations in-
dicators on aging (World Population Aging 1950–2050, 2007) are based 
on the concept of “chronological” age. More recently, “prospective” indi-
ces have emerged based on the concept of prospective age and remain-
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ing life expectancy (Sanderson and Scherbov, 2008). Generally, a slower 
speed of aging is observed when changes in longevity over time (pro-
spective approach) are taken into consideration. Clearly, a group of very 
aged Scandinavian countries is a forerunner in population aging within 
the Arctic (Emelyanova and Rautio, 2012).  
More evidence is required to understand the complexity of aging in 
Arctic populations and to support the development of a comprehensive 
Arctic strategy to address the health and well-being of older people. 
Qualitative research methods are needed to investigate both the needs 
of older people and available capacities of regional policy-makers to 
respond to those needs. Large gaps in our understanding of Arctic de-
mography remain, for example, variations in movement (in- and out-
migration), gender (male and female aging), patterns of settlement (ur-
ban vs. rural), and nomadic patterns (Indigenous vs. non-Indigenous) in 
the cross-territorial context. Access to vital statistical data at the region-
al and municipal levels likewise remains limited.  
8.5 Changing quality of life 
The term “development” appears in the title of both this report and the 
first AHDR (AHDR, 2004). There has been a paradigm shift in how this 
concept is operationalized and measured. Whether Gross Domestic Prod-
uct (GDP) can adequately assess development in a broader sense has been 
discussed for quite some time. Globally, considerable attention has been 
given to developing alternative measures for development to supplement 
or even substitute GDP because of concerns that GDP is often misleading 
when used to quantify subjective well-being, quality of life or happiness. 
Within the last decades, a large number of initiatives have been launched 
to better grasp the complexity embedded in the terms “individual well-
being”, “quality of life” and “happiness”. These initiatives include: the 
United Nations Human Development Index (UN HDI, n.d.), the European 
Quality of Life Index (Eurofound, 2012); the European System of Social 
Indicators (GESIS, ZUMA) (ZSI, nd), the Happy Planet Index (HPI, 2014), 
the Bhutanese “Gross National Happiness Index” (GNHI, 2014), the OECD 
Better Life Index (OECD, n.d.), the so-called Sarkozy initiative that resulted 
in a number of recommendations from a group of prominent scholars on 
measuring human development (CMEPSP, n.d.), and most recently, “Well-
being and Policy” (O’Donnel et al., 2014).  
The terms “subjective well-being”, “quality of life” and “happiness” 
increasingly appear in a variety of assessments, surveys and analyses in 
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the Arctic. Recent examples include the Arctic Human Development Re-
port (AHDR, 2004), the Arctic Social Indicators project (ASI, 2010; ASI, 
2014), the Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic (SLiCA) (Andersen 
and Poppel, 2002; Kruse et al., 2008; Poppel, 2014), chapters focusing on 
well-being in the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (Nuttall et al., 2005), 
and in the Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost in the Arctic Report (SWIPA) 
(Hovelsrud et al., 2011). This trend reflects discourses about human 
development, not only in the Arctic, but also on a global scale in both 
political and academic fora. In discussions related to Arctic human de-
velopment, this might be seen as an indication of an increasing demand 
from Indigenous and other Arctic residents to be acknowledged as active 
participants in developing the Arctic, and not passive recipients of the 
consequences of rapid social and economic changes. 
“Be Smoke Free” – Anti-smoking logo from Nunavut, Canada 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit: Public campaign. 
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8.5.1 The Arctic Human Development Report (AHDR) 
The first Arctic Human Development Report (AHDR, 2004) focused on 
well-being in the “Human Health and Well-being”-chapter. Well-being 
was considered in close relation to and determined by a number of dif-
ferent health aspects as well as some more overall living conditions di-
mensions like “local control” and “spiritual values” (AHDR, 2004:157). 
Furthermore, the first AHDR stated:  
“’[c]ommunity cohesion’ and individual and community ’resilience’ are important 
for well-being, but these factors are seldom reflected in health statistics. We need 
to find ways to quantify these factors and their role in quality of life in a way that 
makes it possible to compare the situation across the Arctic nations.”  
(AHDR, 2004: 166) 
The AHDR then concluded, “[r]esidents of the Arctic – settlers as well as 
Indigenous peoples – regularly emphasize the importance of at least 
three dimensions of human development over and above those included 
in the HDI: 
 
 Fate Control (controlling one’s own destiny). 
 Maintaining cultural identity. 
 Living close to nature (AHDR, 2004: 240). 
 
The AHDR argued that “it would be a mistake to ignore perspectives on 
human development, especially in areas of the world like the Arctic where 
distinctive cultures remain influential” (AHDR, 2004: 241) and recom-
mended that “[t]he Sustainable Development Working Group should or-
ganize a workshop to begin the process of devising a small number of 
tractable indicators to be used in tracking changes in key elements of hu-
man development in the Arctic over time” (AHDR, 2004: 242). 
This section assesses research and statistics on well-being and Arctic 
human development measured by different social indicators, and assesses 
the trends that might potentially be apparent since the first AHDR. 
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8.6 Application of the United Nations’ Human 
Development Index (HDI) to the Circumpolar 
Arctic 
Following the original intention of the first AHDR, the following para-
graphs attempt to apply the UN HDI to the Arctic regions. 
The United Nations’ Human Development Index, HDI, is a composite 
index combining indicators on health (infant mortality and life expec-
tancy), education (measured by educational attainment) and income 
(GDP per capita). Whereas the UN HDI is computed at a state level, a 
regional approach is needed to compare human development in the Cir-
cumpolar region. The increased focus on human development in the 
Arctic has initiated a number of efforts to gather and organize data to 
facilitate inter- and intraregional comparisons of human development 
and socioeconomic conditions in the Arctic. The sources of the data in 
this section are primarily ArcticStat (n.d.) and the Circumpolar Health 
Observatory (CircHOB, 2012) and websites of national and regional sta-
tistical institutes as well as UN, OECD and IMF, to add to and substanti-
ate these data archives. Furthermore, a number of initiatives like Sus-
tainable Arctic Observing Network (SAON), Arctic Observing Network 
(AON) and Arctic Observing Network – Social Indicator Project (AON-
SIP) (see Kruse et al., 2011) have been developed in the Arctic to ensure 
standardization and thus comparability of Arctic socio-economic data 
(the initiatives are often collaborative efforts with the natural sciences). 
These efforts combined with data from national and regional statistical 
institutes make it possible to compare indicators. 
As noted above, the Arctic falls into four groups (ranked according to 
a number of health indicators): 
 
1. The Nordic countries. 
2. Alaska, Yukon and Northwest Territories. 
3. Greenland and Nunavut. 
4. The Russian Arctic. 
 
Two of the health indicators applied in the HDI, infant mortality and life 
expectancy, both substantiate this conclusion. Comparing the 2004–2009 
average to the 2000–2004 average, it is important to note that the regions 
ranking lowest (primarily regions of the Russian Arctic with a few excep-
tions: the Koryak okrug, the (former) Evenki okrug and Magadan oblast 
not only experienced a decrease in infant mortality and an increase in life 
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expectancy, but also made significant progress in these important health 
issues compared to most other Arctic regions (see Figure 8.1; also, Chap-
ter 2, Arctic Populations and Migration, Figures 2.6 and 2.8). 
Regional educational attainment levels reflect not only the self-
initiative of young people and residents desirous of an education, but 
also the demand for an educated work force in both the public and pri-
vate sector. Often, this demand is met by immigrant laborers who move 
to the region on either a short or long term basis. The five-year average 
for 2000–2004 shows major differences for educational attainment: 
under 20% for Greenland and some of the Russian regions, to a high of 
about one-third in Alaska, Yukon and Northwest Territories. Data were 
not available for the Russian Arctic for the period 2005–2009. Compar-
ing the five-year average attainment level for the period 2005–2009 for 
the other Arctic regions shows that averages have increased in all re-
gions (except Alaska), and education levels for women have increased 
everywhere more than that of the male population. This development is 
not distinct to the Arctic region but seems to follow a trend that we see 
in most of the Arctic states. 
The third dimension of the Human Development Index, income, is 
measured by “Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita” (UN HDI). GDP 
is measured in domestic currencies of each country and each country 
experiences different consumer patterns, price levels and inflation rates. 
Comparing GDP per capita thus presupposes a procedure that converts 
GDP (in basic prices) in domestic currencies to a common currency 
(USD) and creates a common “consumer basket” via the so-called pur-
chasing power parities, or “PPP”. The geographical delimitation used to 
categorize and rank the Arctic regions according to the health indicators 
does not directly reflect the ranking according to income. There are par-
allels, though. In 2000, the per capita GDP in most of the Russian regions 
(except Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous okrug (AO), Khanti-Mansy AO and 
Nenets AO) were the lowest in the Circumpolar region, and below USD 
PPP 15,000. The regions with the highest GDP per capita (USD 25,000 
and above) included Alaska and the three Canadian Arctic regions as 
well as the Arctic regions of Finland and Norrbotten (northern Sweden). 
GDP data for the last year of the first decade of the 21st century have not 
been available for all regions and GDP developments for these regions 
have thus been measured for the period including the last year where 
data are available. The GDP time series for the three Finnish Arctic re-
gions are only available for the period 2000–2005, and for three of the 
Russian Arctic regions (former Evenki AO, former Taymyr AO and for-
mer Koryak AO) GDP data are only available for the period 2000–2007.  
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The more significant changes in the GDP indicator (GDP USD PPP in 
fixed prices) include:  
 
 The decrease of more than 20% in the Icelandic GDP from 2000 to 
2009 (due to the huge impacts of the financial crisis – see, e.g. 
Matthiasson, 2010). 
 The substantial decrease from 2000 to 2005 in the GDP of former 
Koryak AO and former Taymyr AO. 
 The decrease (Oulu/Pohjois-Pohjanmaa) and relatively low 
percentage increase in the Finnish Arctic region respectively from 
2000 to 2007. 
 The generally high percentage increases in most Russian Arctic 
regions – especially Nenets AO (more than doubling of GDP from 
2000 to 2009) and Chukotka (more than trebling of GDP from 2000 
to 2009). 
 
In Figure 8.7, two of the UN human development indicators are illustrated: 
“green” indicates a better situation during the first decade of the 21st mil-
lennium, “yellow” indicates status quo, and red indicates a retrograde step. 
As 2009 was the first whole calendar year after the beginning of the 
financial crises, it is not possible to predict the outcome for the regions 
where data are lacking. Subject to these deficiencies, though, it appears 
that the overall distribution of the 28 Arctic regions by GDP is much the 
same at the end of the decade as in the beginning. Eight out of ten of the 
regions with highest GDP per capita in the period 2005–2009 were also 
among the top-ten in 2000, and nine out of ten were among the regions 
with lowest GDP in both 2000 and in the period 2005–2009. It seems to 
be justified to compare the average GDP of the lowest ranking regions 
and the highest-ranking 10 regions in 2000 and in the period 2005–
2009. The overall conclusion based on these averages is that the differ-
ence between the countries with the lowest and the highest GDP per 
capita has narrowed. In 2000, the GDP per capita average of the ten low-
est ranking regions was roughly one fifth of the ten highest ranking.  
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United States
Alaska
Canada
Yukon
Northwest Territories
Nunavut
Northern Canada
Denmark d.n.a.
Greenland
Faroe Islands
Iceland
Norway
Nordland
Troms
Finnmark
Northern Norway d.n.a.
Sweden d.n.a.
Västerbotten
Norrbotten
Northern Sweden d.n.a.
Finland
Kainuu * 2000-2007
Oulu/Pohjois-Pohjanmaa * 2000-2007
Lappi * 2000-2007
Northern Finland * 2000-2007
Russian Federation
Murmansk Oblast
Kareliya Republic
Arkhangelsk Oblast
- Nenets AO
Komi Republic
Yamalo-Nenets AO
Khanty-Mansi AO
Taymyr AO ** 2000-2005
Evenki AO ** 2000-2005
Sakha Republic
Magadan Oblast
Koryak AO ** 2000-2005
Chukotka AO
Northern Russia d.n.a.
Total Northern Regions d.n.a. d.n.a.
d.n.a.: data not available
indicates negative development
Country/Region Life expectancy 
2000-4 to 2005-
09. Percent 
change.
GDP-change 2000-2009*. 
Fixed prices (2000 = 
100).Percent change.
indicates positive development
indicates no change
Figure 8.7 Development of two indicators of the UN HDI: Life Expectancy and Gross 
Domestic Product, GDP in the first decade of the 21st century. Percent changes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: ArcticStat (http://www.arcticstat.org/) and The Circumpolar Health Observatory (CircHOB) 
(http://circhob.circumpolarhealth.org/), validated, substatiated and with additions from websites of 
national and regional statistical institutes as well as UN, OECD and IMF. 
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The data from 2009 – and for some regions the 2005 and 2007 figures 
respectively – indicates a narrowing to one fourth, and thus a somewhat 
decreased disparity between the Arctic regions measured by the gross 
production value of the regions. The background for the decreased dis-
parity between Arctic regions is an economic growth – primarily in the 
Russian Arctic – based on oil, gas and mineral resource exploitation. 
It should be noted, however, that GDP only tells us about the total add-
ed value of production (e.g., Goldsmith, 2009: 34–35) and gives no indica-
tions about potential negative externalities (environmental problems, for 
example) or about the distribution of income. Resource development 
might have regional economic spin-offs and generate income locally, but 
major extractive activities often are decoupled from both local and re-
gional economic activities and therefore contribute more to economic 
activities and to large corporations and economic centers outside the Arc-
tic (e.g., Duhaime, 2004). Furthermore, it is important to understand that 
the non-renewable resources that have been extracted for the region rep-
resent a loss of wealth for future generations (Mäenpää, 2009). 
In sum, almost all Arctic regions have experienced positive develop-
ments in the indicators constituting the overall UN Human Development 
Index. The inequalities and disparities between the Arctic regions of 
Arctic states and the Arctic states, between the Arctic regions and also 
within the Arctic regions still exist. But when it comes to child mortality, 
life expectancy and GDP per capita, the data substantiates the perception 
that these inequalities narrow. Koryak okrug seems to be the most sig-
nificant exception to this overall statement. 
8.7 Including additional dimensions in the 
assessment of human development 
The first Arctic Human Development Report (AHDR, 2004) recommended 
developing measurable indicators within six domains; the three domains 
of the UN HDI as well as “fate control”; “maintaining cultural identity”; 
“living close to nature”. The Arctic Social Indicators report (ASI, 2010: 
157; see Chapter 1, Introduction), further elaborated on the six dimen-
sions in an Arctic context and developed a number of indicators to as-
sess well-being in the North: 
 
 Infant Mortality (Domain: Health/Population). 
 Net-migration (Domains: Health/Population and Material Well-being). 
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 Consumption/harvest of local foods (Domains: Closeness to Nature 
and Material Well-being). 
 Per capita household income (Domain: Material Well-being). 
 Ratio of students successfully completing post-secondary education 
(Domain: Education). 
 Language retention (Domain: Cultural Well-being). 
 Fate Control Index (Domain: Fate Control). 
 
Data are not available – either from statistical institutes/associations or 
collaborative research projects – to make circumpolar wide comparisons 
including all regions and applying the indicators for the three additional 
AHDR-/ASI-dimensions: “closeness to nature” (consumption/harvest of 
local foods); “cultural well-being” (language retention); “fate control” 
(an index composed by indicators for: political control, control over 
land/resources, economic control, control over knowledge construc-
tion). There are regional and national examples, though, that might be 
considered “prototypes” for developing comparable data. Examples in-
clude the annual updates “Subsistence in Alaska” that the State of Alaska 
has produced since 1990 (Alaska Department of Fish and Game, 2014), 
and the assessments that Statistics Canada has conducted on language 
abilities (Statistic Canada, n.d.) 
8.8 What can we learn about human development 
from different community, regional, national, 
circumpolar studies? 
A number of assessments and research projects focusing on Arctic hu-
man development have been conducted in recent years. The assess-
ments and research projects fall into three main categories: 
 
 Studies assessing Arctic human development by a number of key 
social indicators. Examples are: the Arctic Social Indicators project 
(ASI, 2010; ASI, 2014); Aboriginal Peoples Survey (APS) (Wallace, 
2014) SAMINOR (Brustad et al., 2014); and the Inuvialuit Baseline 
Indicators (IBI). 
 Studies assessing Arctic human development by measuring 
subjective or community well-being/quality of life either by 
constructing composite indices or by people’s self-evaluation. 
Examples are Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic (Poppel et al., 
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2007); (Rethinking the Top of the World (Canada Centre for Global 
Security Studies, 2014); Aboriginal Quality of Life (NAEDB, 2012); 
The Community Well-Being Index (CWB) (Aboriginal Affairs and 
Northern Development Canada, 2012); The North Slope Social 
Indicator Survey (NSSIS).  
 Both types of studies can be carried out at the community, regional, 
national or international level and can be based on the total 
population or focussing on groups of the residents – most often the 
Indigenous peoples. 
 A third category of data collection of importance, primarily for future 
research and assessments, are data archives (like Arctic Stat) and 
databases that are being constructed to contain a variety of socio-
economic and other key indicators. Examples are: Arctic Observing 
Network (AON), Arctic Observing Network – Social Indicator Project 
(AON-SIP) and the Sustaining Arctic Observing Network (SAON). 
 
Only few of the abovementioned studies make it possible to do time 
series studies, but they may nevertheless provide useful insight. Some of 
the studies will be presented in brief. The findings presented will pri-
marily be from North American studies as few surveys and social indica-
tor studies are conducted in Fennoscandia (the focus has primarily been 
on health studies) and the Russian Arctic (an increased focus on human 
development has resulted in a number of studies).  
8.9 Findings from studies assessing Arctic Human 
Development by a number of key social indicators 
8.9.1 Arctic Social Indicators Project (ASI) II 
The recommendation to develop indicators reflecting different dimen-
sions and thus measuring human development more holistically became 
the point of departure for the Arctic Social Indicators (ASI) Project, a 
direct follow-up to the first AHDR. In the first phase of the ASI project the 
working group focused on elaborating and developing indicators within 
the three United Nations Human Development Index domains and for 
three additional domains recommended in the first AHDR (ASI, 2010). 
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Relaxing near a corral during calf-marking, Sweden 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit: Hugh Beach. 
 
The second report of the Arctic Social Indicators project selected four 
regions as pilot study regions for further analyses, applying the selected 
social indicators: 
 
1. Sakha – Yakutia, Russian Federation. 
2. Northwest Territories, Canada. 
3. West-Nordic region. 
4. Alaska Inuit, USA. 
 
 
Generally, the second ASI report’s conclusion about human development 
in the four regions is that the results suggest a general improvement, but 
that considerable differences exist among regions, and between rural 
and urban areas in the Arctic (ASI, 2014).  
The study of Northwest Territories is an example of this overall con-
clusion. It examines the 15-year period from 1991 to 2006 and states 
that whereas a general improvement in human development has taken 
place there are major regional discrepancies especially when it comes to 
material well-being (Chapter 3 of ASI, 2014). This leads Petrov and King 
to distinguish between a small group of communities/cities that are 
“haves” and a larger and more remote group that are “have-nots” (Ibid.). 
When measured by “language retention” (cultural well-being) and har-
vest and consumption of local food (contact with nature), the smaller 
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and more remote Indigenous communities are better off, whereas lan-
guage retention for Northwest Territories as a whole has declined. 
The Sakha Republic (Yakutia) in the Russian Federation is another 
example of a regional application of the ASI indicators, with a different 
context and development than Northwest Territories but with overall 
results that are much the same: a general improvement in human devel-
opment with major rural-urban differences, but for areas inhabited by 
numerically small peoples most of the indicators show lower-than-
average attainment (Chapter 2 of ASI, 2014). The results also suggest 
different developments in the different indicators: a substantial increase 
in material well-being and positive developments in the education level 
and increased time spent on the land (“contact with nature” indicator) 
whereas the ASI-indicators for “cultural vitality” and “contact with na-
ture” are ambiguous (Ibid.). 
8.10 Studies assessing Arctic human development by 
measuring subjective or community well-
being/quality of life 
8.10.1 Canadian Community Well-Being (CWB) Index  
Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada has developed and 
published The Community Well-Being (CWB) Index for 1981, 1991, 1996, 
2001, and 2006 (Penney et al., 2012). The index is based on Statistics Can-
ada’s population census data and composed by indicators on income (in-
come per capita), education (high school and university completion rates), 
housing (housing quantity and quality), and labor force activity (employ-
ment and labor force participation rates). A special study has been con-
ducted comparing the communities in the four Inuit settlement regions 
(including both Inuit and non-Inuit residents), Inuit Nunangat: 
Nunatsiavut (Northern Labrador); Nunavik (Northern Quebec); the terri-
tory of Nunavut; the Inuvialuit Settlement Region (Northwest Territories) 
with First Nations communities and with non-Indigenous communities. 
Figure 8.8 shows that, whereas all indicators have increased in the 
quarter of a century since 1981, for all four Inuit regions, the scores for 
“Education” and the “Labor Force Activity” declined from 2001 to 2006.ii 
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Figure 8.8. Canadian Community Well-Being Index: Component scores over time, 
Inuit Nunangat, 1981–2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Penney et al. , p. 10, 2012.  
Figure 8.9. Canadian Community Well-Being Index. Average scores over time, 
Nunangat, 1981–2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Penney et al., p. 11, 2012.  
 
All four Inuit regions are better off in 2006 than in 1981, measured by 
the CWB Index, but only Nunatsiavut has better scores in 2006 than in 
2001 (Figure 8.9). As the increase in the CWB Index for non-Aboriginal 
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communities continued a positive development ever since 1981, it 
means that the gap between most Inuit regions and non-Aboriginal 
communities has widened since 2001.iii  
8.10.2 The Aboriginal Economic Benchmark Report  
In 2012, the National Aboriginal Economic Development Board, 
(NAEDB) published The Aboriginal Economic Benchmark Report 
(AEBR). The National Aboriginal Economic Development Board was 
established in 1990 and is “appointed by Order-in-Council to provide 
policy and program advice to the federal government on Aboriginal eco-
nomic development” (NAEDB, 2012: 2). The 2012 report focuses on the 
economic progress of First Nations, Inuit, and Métis in Canada and builds 
on three core indicators: “employment”, “income” and “wealth and well-
being” as well as five underlying indicators: “education”, “entrepreneur-
ship and business development”, “governance”, “lands and resources” 
and “infrastructure” and builds on official statistics from Statistics Cana-
da as well as a number of other sources to establish baseline indicators. 
In total, more than 100 indicators are used to assess the economic de-
velopment of Indigenous peoples in Canada and to compare the findings 
with the development for non-Indigenous Canadians (NAEDB, 2012). 
The NAEDB Report compares socio-economic conditions among the 
different aboriginal and non-aboriginal groups and the community well-
being index is calculated according to this typology. As all Inuit communi-
ties are located in the Canadian North, some results concerning Inuit and 
Inuit communities are briefly introduced. It should be noted that “Inuit 
communities” also include non-Inuit residents of these communities. The 
report’s conclusions, in brief, about Inuit and Inuit communities state:  
“Inuit have generally seen little improvement in key indicators over the peri-
od 1996 to 2006. For example, Inuit have the lowest education completion 
rates of any Aboriginal heritage group. As a result, there are sizeable gaps be-
tween the economic outcomes of Inuit and non-Aboriginal Canadians living in 
the same regions.”  
(NAEDB, 2012: 9) 
Based on the CWB developed by Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Devel-
opment Canada, the AEBR further concludes, “Inuit communities have a 
CWB score 15.1 points (on a 100 point scale – author) below other Ca-
nadian communities” (NAEDB, 2012: 37) and that “70% of Inuit com-
munities had stable or increasing CWB scores between 2001 to 2006, as 
compared to 90% of other Canadian communities” (NAEDB, 2012: 17). 
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8.11 Findings from studies assessing Arctic human 
development by measuring subjective or 
community well-being/quality of life 
A number of measures have been developed to better express the indi-
viduals’ subjective perception of their life situation. “Happiness” is one 
such measure. The question often asked in international surveys, in or-
der to identify “the happiest countries in the world”, is: “How satisfied 
are you with your life as whole?” This question was also part of the ques-
tionnaire applied in the Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic, SLiCA 
and in “Rethinking the Top of the World: Arctic Security Public Opinion 
Survey” and some key findings will be presented below. 
8.11.1 Quality of life among Inuit and Sámi and Indigenous 
peoples of Chukotka and the Kola Peninsula – SLiCA 
The Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic, SLiCA, is an attempt to 
measure quality of life among Inuit, Sámi and the Indigenous peoples of 
Chukotka and the Kola Peninsula (see Textbox 8.3) both by addressing a 
variety of living conditions and by asking about people’s self-evaluation. 
The “quality of life as a whole” question was asked in three SLiCA survey 
regions (Alaska, Greenland and Sweden) whereas a question asking about 
“quality of life in this community” was asked in all SLiCA survey regions.  
Textbox 8.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic (SLiCA) 
The SLiCA project was launched at a workshop in 1998 and the SLiCA core ques-
tionnaire was developed in partnership with representatives of the respondents 
(the Inuit, Sami and Indigenous peoples of Chukotka and the Kola Peninsula) 
until 2000. Eight thousand face-to-face interviews were conducted in different 
periods in the different survey regions until 2008 (see e.g. Andersen and Pop-
pel, 2002; Kruse et al., 2008; Eliassen et al., 2012; Poppel, 2014). Only in Green-
land were non-Indigenous residents included in the survey. 
The reason to develop a new research design to investigate living conditions, 
subjective well-being and quality of life of Indigenous peoples of the Arctic was 
the assumption that conventional social indicators do not fully reflect the wel-
fare priorities of the Indigenous peoples (Andersen and Poppel, 2002). 
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Figure 8.10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Data Not Available for Canada, Chukotka, Norway and the Kola Peninsula. 
** Source: Poppel et al., 2007 and Poppel, forthcoming. 
 
Among Indigenous people in Greenland, Northern Alaska and Northern 
Sweden, nine-in-ten are “somewhat” or “very satisfied” with their life as 
a whole (see Figure 8.10). Taking into account that living standards are 
Textbox 8.3 continued 
 
Individual well-being was defined as covering all aspects of living including the 
individuals’ perception of their resources and overall satisfaction with the quality of 
their lives. The SLiCA questionnaire (ca. 200 questions) made it possible to analyze a 
number of dimensions: Communication and Technology, Community viability, Dis-
crimination, Education, Employment/Harvest, Environ-ment/Resource manage-
ment, Family relations and social networks, Health, Household economy, Housing, 
Identity management, Justice/Safety, Language, Mobility, Political resources, Reli-
gion/Spirituality, and Work/Leisure (Andersen and Poppel, 2002). Furthermore it is 
possible to analyze the correlation between a number of living conditions indicators, 
for example, “satisfaction with quality of life” and “self-rated health”. 
The first SLiCA results from the Inuit settlement regions were published in 
2007 and almost 600 tables were organized in six domains according to the 
AHDR recommendations (Poppel et al., 2007). In 2011, the first article based on 
data from all SLiCA survey regions was published, including the results of the 
Inuit settlement regions, Chukotka and the Sámi in Northern Norway, Northern 
Sweden and the Kola Peninsula (Poppel, 2011). 
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typically lower among the Indigenous peoples of the Arctic than among 
non-Indigenous peoples, these findings support the assumptions that 
other than material factors influence subjective well-being. 
Analysis of the data for Greenland and Alaska combined concluded 
that satisfaction with an individual’s actual job or outcome of actual fish-
ing and hunting activities were less important to overall satisfaction 
with life compared to job opportunities and the amount of fish and game 
locally available. This means that “availability” and “accessibility” seem 
to mean more to the quality of life of Inuit than satisfaction with the 
actual job and actual catch. Also important in explaining overall well-
being is the combination of market and non-market activities (hunting 
and fishing, for example) and the influence people have over natural 
resources and the environment (Kruse et al., 2008; Poppel and Kruse, 
2009; Poppel, forthcoming).  
Figure 8.11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Data Not Available for Canada, Chukotka, Norway and the Kola Peninsula. 
** Source: Poppel et al., 2007 and Poppel, forthcoming. 
 
Figure 8.11 refers to “satisfaction with quality of life in this community”, 
i.e., the perceived quality of “community life” where the respondent 
lives, including the quality of life of the respondent. Interviews were 
conducted in different periods in the different regions/countries due to 
lack of coordination between funding agencies: Northern Canada 
(2001); Alaska (2002–03); Greenland (2004–06); Chukotka (2004–06); 
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Northern Norway (2006–08); Northern Sweden (2006–08) and Kola 
Peninsula (2006–08). Of those interviewed, more than three out of four 
Sámi living in northern Sweden and northern Norway and Inuit in 
northern Alaska were somewhat or very satisfied with the quality of life 
in their community. The corresponding figure in Greenland was seven 
out of ten. A significantly smaller proportion – only one out of seven – of 
the Indigenous people of Chukotka and the Kola Peninsula were some-
what or very satisfied with the quality of life in their community. Other 
SLiCA findings suggest a correlation between a low rating of satisfaction 
with quality of life in respondent’s community, different kinds of social 
problems such as unemployment, domestic violence and suicide, lower 
self rated health, and poor health care among Indigenous people in the 
two Arctic Russian survey regions (Poppel, forthcoming). 
8.11.2 Quality of Life in Northern Canada –“Rethinking the 
Top of the World: Arctic Security Public Opinion 
Survey”  
In a report, Rethinking the Top of the World: Arctic Security Public Opin-
ion Survey, a number of living conditions, perceptions and attitudes were 
analysed. The analyses were based on an international comparative 
study (9,000 interviews). Almost 3,000 people were interviewed in Can-
ada (of which 744 were in Northwest Territories, Yukon and Nunavut). 
The analysis compared responses in northern and southern Canada and 
reached the following conclusions:  
 
 Northerners are dissatisfied with the human and environmental infra-
structure in their region. It is therefore surprising to find that, in terms of 
how they rate their lives and their health, residents of the North are 
modestly more likely to see themselves as healthy. Northern residents 
are significantly more likely to rate their quality of life as excellent than 
those in the South. Northerners appear to be very optimistic about 
future well-being. This resilience and optimism was one of the more 
surprising study findings (EKOS Research Associates, 2011: vi). 
 Sociocultural identity and preservation of traditional ways of life 
(language and culture) are deeply entrenched and are a very important 
priority for the North (EKOS Research Associates, 2011: vii). 
 Respondents from Northern Canada are more likely to rate their 
quality of life as good (75%), compared to respondents from Southern 
Canada (67%) (EKOS Research Associates, 2011: xiii). 
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 In Northern Canada, Yukon residents provide the most positive assess-
ment of their quality of life (84% say good), while residents of Nunavut 
are less upbeat (65%). Perceived quality of life increases progressively 
with income (91% of those with a household income of over USD 
120,000, compared to just 54% of those earning less than USD 40,000), 
education (87% of university graduates, compared to 56% of those 
limited to a high school education), and age (82% of those over 60, 
compared to 56% of youth) (EKOS Research Associates, 2011: 3). 
Textbox 8.4: Examples on studies of well-being in the Arctic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Arctic 
The Arctic Observing Network, AON, Social Indicators project was initiated to 
develop datasets relevant to the scientific community and identify gaps in exist-
ing observation systems. It also makes recommendations on appropriate actions 
to fill those gaps (Kruse et al., 2011), for example, in the fields of climate–human 
interactions, subsistence hunting, tourism, marine transportation and commer-
cial fishing (Ibid.). 
 
Alaska 
North Slope Social Indicator Survey: This project looks at the well-being of North 
Slope residents. It is important because their well-being may be affected by 
offshore oil and gas exploration and development. Monitoring well-being will 
help identify and mitigate impacts. The North Slope Social Indicators Project is 
designed to build on the work of previous studies by including the best indica-
tors from them and comparing the well-being of residents today with those in 
2003, 1988, and even as far back as 1977. It will also be possible to monitor 
changes in well-being in the future. 
 
Canada 
In the report Rethinking the Top of the World: Arctic Security Public Opinion 
Survey different views on living conditions, perceptions and attitudes were ana-
lyzed in Northwest Territories, Yukon and Nunavut. The analysis compared 
responses in northern and southern Canada and showed that residents of the 
North feel themselves more likely to be healthy in the spite of the dissatisfaction 
of Northerners with the human and environmental infrastructure in their re-
gion. Northerners are significantly more likely to rate their quality of life as 
excellent than those in the South. Northerners appear to be very optimistic 
about their future well-being. This resilience and optimism was one of the more 
surprising study findings (see EKOS Research Associates, 2011). 
The Community Well-being (CWB) Index was developed to help measure the 
quality of life of First Nations and Inuit communities in Canada relative to other 
communities and over time. CWB Index scores are derived from Canada's Cen-
suses of Population, which are conducted every five years. Scores have been  
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Textbox 8.4 continued 
 
calculated for 1981, 1991, 1996, 2001 and 2006. A community's CWB index 
score is a single number that is composed of data on income, education, housing 
conditions and labor force activity (INAC, 2010). 
The Inuvialuit Baseline Indicators (IBI) project is a collaborative effort among 
researchers associated with the Resources and Sustainable Development in the 
Arctic (ReSDA) and the Arctic Social Indicators (ASI) projects with the Inuvialuit 
Regional Corporation (IRC). The goal is to develop a set of measurable, reliable 
and accessible indicators to monitor socio-economic conditions in the Inuvialuit 
Settlement Region (ISR) with an emphasis on tracking impacts of resource de-
velopment. This effort is focused on creating a framework to be used by local 
actors to collect, manage and analyse community-based data.  
The Institute for Research on Public Policy (IRPP, founded in 1972) is an in-
dependent, national, nonprofit organization, which has launched a new research 
program on the quality of life of Aboriginal people in Canada, like the broad 
issues related to the quality of life and well-being of Aboriginal people, some of 
the innovations that are ameliorating their living conditions and the linkages 
between quality of life and governance in Aboriginal communities. The paper 
also identifies the areas in which further exploration might be needed, and pro-
poses new directions for policy-relevant research (IRPP, 2014). 
 
Russia 
The strategy of development of the Russian Federation Arctic zone until 2020 
states, “there is a low quality of life among Indigenous peoples of the North” 
(Strategy, 2013).  
The emphasis on “quality of life” in the Russian Arctic strategy follows an 
emerging interest in recent years among Russian researchers studying quality of 
life in the Russian Arctic. The following references are a few prominent examples:  
Shats, Shevchenko, Zhideleva and Kaptsein have studied quality of life of 
populations in the Russian North, focusing on migrant workers’ health prob-
lems, acclimatization as well as identification of the ways to raise the general 
quality of life (Zhideleva and Kapstein, 2006; Shevchenko, 2009; Shats, 2010).  
Naberejnaya assessed and modelled quality of life with an economic focus 
based on studies from Sakha-Yakutia republic (Naberezhnaya, 2007). 
Whereas the abovementioned authors focused on quality of life of all popula-
tion groups, other Russian researchers have investigated Indigenous peoples’ 
health and well-being related to a number of impacting factors and indicators of 
quality of life, particularly among Nenets, Yamalo-Nenets and Sakhalin minorities 
(Dregalo and Ulyanovskiy, 2007; Belyaeva, 2009; Kholodilova, 2010; Novikova and 
Stepanov, 2010), but also within the European, Siberian and Far Eastern North 
(Kozlov et. al, 2012). Others have focused on specific population groups such as for 
example the elderly people in the Yamalo-Nenets autonomous area and the Ar-
khangelsk region (Kabanov, 2009; Golubeva, 2012) or children and students in the 
European North (e.g., Chesnakova and Gribanov, 2012).  
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8.12 Gaps in knowledge 
8.12.1 Violence in families  
Violence in families is a specific and largely silent health, security and hu-
man rights problem. It ranges in a continuum from harassment and psycho-
logical abuse to murder, and it happens all over the world (WHO, 2005; UN 
Women, 2011). In addition to silence, it has been – and still is – deeply asso-
ciated with shame and normalization (WHO, 2005; EC, 2010). Historically, 
many of the forms of violence in families were not recognized at all, and 
those that were, were seldom treated as a serious crime (EC, 2010). Preva-
lence studies are limited. Some data are available from Arctic Canada and 
Greenland (see Megatrends, 2011), and useful data comes out of the Alaska 
Victimization Survey (2014). In many communities, the topic is highly sensi-
tive. There are historical, cultural, social and psychological factors that in-
fluence how people conceptualize violence, and its occurrence is often con-
sidered an inevitable burden of life, or purely a private secret. Violence is a 
known risk factor for suicide, mental disorders and substance abuse in Arc-
tic communities (Allen et al., 2011; Gone and Trimble, 2012). 
One of the first global reports on violence in interpersonal relation-
ships, specifically violence in families, is the World Report on Violence 
and Health (WHO, 2002). It argues that the home is one of the most 
common settings for violence worldwide. While women and children are 
particularly at risk, the elderly also experiences violence. Typically, vic-
tims know the perpetrators and abuse takes place in a familiar location. 
People who experience family violence are often emotionally involved 
with and dependent on the person(s) who victimize them. This 
strengthens the possibility that being unsafe becomes a life context for 
the victim (WHO, 2002; Johnson et al., 2008; EC, 2010).  
The Arctic is no exception. Rates of violence women experience at 
home are high in Iceland, Greenland (Curtis et al., 2002; Poppel, 2006,), 
Finland (Piispa et al., 2006) and Russia (UN Women, 2011). Further, the 
data also reveal very high rates of violence against Indigenous women 
(Megatrends, 2011; Alaska Victimization Survey, 2014). For example, in 
the United States, the rate of violence in families against Alaska Native and 
American Indian women are nearly three times higher than those of white 
women (Bohn, 2003). Some researchers attribute this to historical trauma 
induced by colonization, cultural assimilation, and forced attendance at 
boarding schools, which have been internalized and passed on from gen-
eration to generation. The power imbalance between women and men 
that exists in many cultures is a further contributing factor (Smith, 2005).  
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Textbox 8.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Sunnari, 2010. 
 
The UN Secretary-General’s World Report on Violence Against Children 
demonstrates that violence against children is widespread (Pinheiro, 
2006) and it constitutes serious violations of children’s rights. The vio-
lence against children in families can be even more complex than that 
experienced by women (EC, 2010). The exact extent and severity of such a 
complex health and security problem is difficult to estimate. In addition to 
experiencing violence directly, children often witness violence at home, 
which is a serious mental health issue in its own right (Curtis et al., 2002). 
8.12.2 Discrimination and racism 
Scientific knowledge regarding Sámi health and living conditions in 
Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia is limited compared to the detailed 
data on the health and socio-economic situations of Indigenous peoples 
in North America and Greenland. The SAMINOR study in Norway is a 
rare example of a large-scale population-based survey of health and 
living conditions in areas with both Sámi and Norwegian populations. 
Data was collected during 2003–2004 in 24 municipalities, in which at 
least 5% of the residents were of Sámi ethnicity. All together 16, 865 
Sexual harassment 
The culturally maintained status difference between men and women is often 
gendered, and sexualized, and learned indeed starting from childhood. This was 
discussed in Vappu Sunnari’s research that focused on physical sexual harass-
ment experienced by 11–12 year old children at school (Sunnari, 2010). There 
were 1,738 children from northern Finnish and northwest Russian school clas-
ses who answered a group of questions concerning their experiences on physical 
sexual harassment at school or on the way to school. The results of the research 
inform that every fifth of the northern Finnish and every fourth of the north-
western Russian girls experienced physical sexual harassment at school or on 
the way to school. Every tenth of the Russian boys and every twentieth of the 
Finnish boys had partly corresponding experiences. A girl was groped in nine 
cases out of ten by a male classmate in both the Russian and Finnish data. If the 
harassed child mentioned more than one perpetrator, which was quite common 
for the Russian children, at least one of the harassers had been a boy. But, the 
boys’ harassers were not commonly girls. Typically Russian victims of physical 
sexual harassment did not want to tell the details of what had happened. The 
most common reason they mentioned was shame.  
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people (Sámi and non-Sámi) participated in the survey, which included 
questionnaires, a clinical examination and analyses of blood samples 
(Lund et al., 2007). An important finding from this study was that the 
prevalence of self-perceived ethnic discrimination and bullying among 
Sámi was twice as high as that for the majority population. Those who 
experienced ethnic discrimination were more likely to also report infe-
rior self-perceived health (Hansen, 2010). A second phase of the SAMI-
NOR, initiated in 2013, focuses on gender based violence, ethnicity and 
health, SAMINOR II will be the first study to investigate these issues in 
the Sámi population (Eriksen et al., 2012). 
While the severity of health disparities between the Indigenous peo-
ples and the rest of the population varies from country to country, it is 
clear that such health inequalities exist, even in highly developed coun-
tries such as the Arctic States. But why? Health disparities, measured for 
decades, have been attributed to social determinants of health. More re-
cently, it has been proposed that structural racism and its intergenera-
tional impacts may provide new understanding into the causes of health 
disparities experienced by Indigenous peoples worldwide. Structural rac-
ism is defined as the macro-level systems, social forces, institutions, ideo-
logies, and processes that interact with one another to generate and rein-
force inequities among racial and ethnic groups (Powell, 2008). By looking 
at the residential school and boarding school experiences of Indigenous 
peoples through the lens of racism at the structural level, these experienc-
es from different countries can provide a deeper understanding of their 
present day impact on Indigenous people’s health and well-being.  
Within the confines of residential schools and boarding schools, In-
digenous children from a very young age were taught that their own 
culture and heritage was “less than” that of the dominant society. How 
does this affect Indigenous identity, which is at the very core of health 
and well-being? And what are the intergenerational impacts of such 
treatment? Recent studies have documented that individuals who report 
experiencing racism have greater rates of illnesses (Williams and Mo-
hammed, 2009; Chae et al., 2011). While this type of research is im-
portant to give a greater understanding of root causes of health inequi-
ties, it still places the experiences of racism at the individual level (Wil-
liams and Mohammed, 2009; Gee and Ford, 2011; Paradies and 
Cunningham, 2012). Gee and Ford suggest that studies of disparities 
should more seriously consider the multiple dimensions of racism as 
fundamental causes of health disparities, particularly structural racism. 
In the Canadian context, residential schools resulted in stigmatization, 
marginalization, loss of cultural identity, and a health status that falls 
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below that of mainstream Canadians (Health Canada, 2002). A review of 
the literature of colonization in Canada’s Far North establishes the posi-
tion that colonization is a determinant of health (Moffit, 2004). Residen-
tial school experiences in Canada paralleled with emerging discussions 
of boarding school experiences in the Nordic countries can add to the 
discourse about racism at the structural level and its link to the present 
health inequalities experienced by Indigenous peoples (see Textbox 8.6). 
Textbox 8.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Juutilainen et al., 2014.  
8.12.3 Well-being indicators 
Major knowledge gaps remain, especially concerning the “non-
conventional” (AHDR/ASI) indicators measuring closeness to nature, 
cultural well-being and fate control. The challenge is not merely gathering 
data on these dimensions, but also developing concepts, agreeing on 
definitions and standardized measures, and ensuring that data are stored 
in ways that both ensures confidentiality and accessibility. To minimize 
the response burden, available administrative registers (i.e., regional and 
national wildlife harvest and health registers) will have to be used 
wherever possible. Circumpolar collaborative initiatives on data gathering 
and data management like Arctic Observing Network (AON), Arctic Ob-
serving Network – Social Indicator Project (AON-SIP) and the Sustaining 
Arctic Observing Network (SAON) will help to facilitate future assess-
ments on Arctic human development. If the ultimate goal of examining 
Residential school and boarding school systems 
Residential school and boarding school experiences were studied in Canada (Six 
Nations of the Grand River) and Finland (Inari municipality). Results from Cana-
da and Finland found that negative impacts to Indigenous identity included 
language and cultural loss, fractured identity, and negative self-worth, all of 
which have far reaching impacts to health and well-being. Despite the negative 
impacts that require on-going healing, it was also emphasized that there was 
power at the personal level to stop generational abuses and the resilience of 
Indigenous peoples to keep their languages and culture alive and retain a strong 
Indigenous identity (Juutilainen et al., 2014). There are very few studies in the 
Nordic countries about boarding school attendance and its impact on health and 
well-being of Sámi. Further studies about Indigenous identity, resilience and 
impact of racism at the structural level may provide valuable insight into health 
disparities experienced by Indigenous peoples worldwide.  
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different aspects of living conditions and developing social indicators is to 
assess and compare subjective well-being and quality of life over time and 
between regions and population groups, it will be necessary to conduct 
representative surveys regularly (e.g., every five or ten years) to capture 
different aspects of human development. 
The main gap in knowledge includes the health and well-being of 
both Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples in the Russian Arctic (es-
pecially those living in cities); the health and well-being of Sámi in the 
Nordic countries, and accidents and domestic violence across the Cir-
cumpolar North. These gaps in knowledge can only be filled through a 
joint and orchestrated effort in creating and maintaining national and 
regional health statistical databases, which require collaboration be-
tween health authorities, the research community, and Indigenous peo-
ples’ organizations. It is important that vital statistics and disease regis-
try data be supplemented by regular health and social surveys that cap-
ture the diverse aspects of human development, subjective well-being 
and quality of life. 
8.13 Key conclusions  
The people in the Circumpolar North do not all enjoy the same health. 
There are substantial disparities among countries and regions, and within 
regions among population subgroups, particularly between Indigenous 
and non-Indigenous peoples. Efforts are needed to integrate older people 
in Arctic societal life, and to appreciate their productive participation. As 
climate and environmental change affect living conditions, these changes 
also impact health, subjective well-being, and quality of life.  
There is a need for health promotion programs, disease prevention 
strategies and redressing social inequalities. Indicators of food and wa-
ter security should be used together with surveillance and monitoring 
programs in all circumpolar countries. Health care reform, education 
and research are also major challenges in the future.  
Generally, the change in human development measured by indicators 
included in the UN Human Development Index (health, income and 
education) has been positive since the beginning of the 21st century. At 
the same time, there is a lot of variation between rural-urban regions. 
The indicators originating from the specific AHDR/ASI dimensions 
“closeness to nature”, “cultural well-being” and “fate control” create a 
more complete picture. “Language retention” (as a measure of cultural 
well-being), for instance, is increasing (or at a stable high level) in some 
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regions like Greenland and some of the Canadian Arctic regions, whereas 
a decline has been experinced in the Inuit region of Alaska. Furthermore, 
comparisons are often complicated because of lack of data or because 
data can be difficult to interpret. 
People’s self-evaluation of well-being and quality of life has been the 
focus of two surveys and the findings in both studies – one comparing 
Canadian Arctic residents with Canadians living in the south and the 
other one focusing on Inuit, Sámi and Indigenous peoples of Chukotka 
and the Kola Peninsula – are intriguing and puzzling, as “satisfaction 
with life” (and thus subjective well-being) is rated high among the 
residents of the Arctic despite high rates of unemployment and low 
household income. The Indigenous peoples of Chukotka and the Kola 
Peninsula is an exception to this overall finding. 
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Endnotes for chapter 8 
 
i) During the decade under consideration by this report, the Koryak Autonomous okrug was merged with the 
Kamchatka oblast to form the Kamchatka Territory (kray): the Koryak okrug now forms an administrative 
division of the Kamchatka territory. The Evenki Autonomous okrug and Taymyr Autonomous okrug were 
merged into the Krasnoyarsk Territory, as administrative districts (rayony).  
 
ii) In an e-mail of 17th November 2014 from Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, AANDC it 
is stated that following a verification of their historic CWB data, the federal government department decided 
that two communities included in the 1981 calculations should have been excluded due to missing data. One 
of these was an Inuit community, in the region of Nunavik. The corrections have not been completed, but 
based on existing information, the CWB averages for 1981, particularly the housing component, and the 
Nunavik regional scores, will probably be a little lower than the published averages. Furthermore AANDC 
informs that a planned release of updated 2011 data is meant to include corrections. 
 
iii) See endnote 2. 
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9.1 Introduction  
Since the publication of the first Arctic Human Development Report 
(2004), there have been significant changes in formal education systems 
throughout the Circumpolar North. In some countries, for example, Rus-
sia, the federal government has introduced major reforms while in oth-
ers, for example, USA/Alaska, local efforts are changing the look of 
schooling. In this chapter, we look at the major trends in education 
across the North. The first part of the chapter focuses on the unique 
challenges facing primary and secondary education systems in the Arc-
tic. It updates the state of K-12 education since the first AHDR, and ex-
pands into countries and regions that were not addressed in the first 
report, specifically Greenland, the far north in Canada, and the Faroe 
Islands. The second part of the chapter assesses human capital and 
knowledge production as it pertains to human development and well-
being of Arctic societies. Human capital is the stock of knowledge and 
skills embodied in a human population. This section discusses patterns 
and trends in postsecondary educational attainment and attendance in 
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Arctic regions and related formal and informal education. It provides an 
assessment of human capital and knowledge production in the Arctic as 
it pertains to human development and well-being of Arctic societies. 
In most formal school systems, education is typically classified into 
three major levels: primary, secondary and post-secondary. Primary, or 
elementary, education follows pre-school and generally includes stu-
dents from around age 6 to 12, or in grades 1–6. Secondary education 
(also known as upper secondary or high school) generally refers to 
schooling for students age 13 to 18, and culminates with a diploma. Post-
secondary education (also called higher education or tertiary education) 
is a third stage education that includes undergraduate and postgraduate 
education, and vocational and professional training. Post-secondary 
academic education is distinct from post-secondary career and technical 
education. Adult education refers to a formal and informal learning that 
takes place after leaving initial education and training, and that most 
often is not linked to pursuit of a degree or certificate. Adult education 
programs are offered in a broad array of settings, including folk schools, 
community organizations and institutions of higher education. 
University of the Arctic class 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit: Amanda Graham. 
  Arctic Human Development Report 349 
9.2 Education and educational systems in the Arctic 
9.2.1 Primary and secondary education in the 
Circumpolar North  
In this section, we discuss the challenges inherent in circumpolar educa-
tion due to the remote nature of many northern communities, men-
tioned but not explicated in the first AHDR. These challenges include 
consolidation and closing of small, remote schools, providing sufficiently 
comprehensive education opportunities to keep students in small 
schools, and the recruiting and retaining of teachers for remote commu-
nities. We address issues of language of instruction in schools in terms of 
efforts to retain heritage languages and to ensure that students acquire 
the national languages of commerce and higher education. We also ad-
dress Indigenous education, focusing on efforts to increase Indigenous 
control over education and new ways to use and transmit that Indige-
nous knowledge and ways of teaching and learning, whether within or 
external to the formal school systems. And finally we look at student 
achievement issues, focusing especially on the gender gap between fe-
males and males and on the continuing underperformance of Indigenous 
students across much of the North. 
We present data on student learning outcomes. In the first AHDR, the 
authors expressed a desire for education indicators allowing compari-
sons of education functions and outcomes, such as graduation rates, per 
capita spending, educator recruitment and retention and so on (Johans-
son et al., 2004). The lack of consistent primary and secondary educa-
tion data across circumpolar regions continues to be a problem; the Arc-
tic Social Indicators project only includes post-secondary indicators, 
which is symptomatic of this problem (Rasmussen et al., 2010). Our 
hope is that there is a movement among circumpolar nations to collect 
and disseminate consistent and comparable data on primary and sec-
ondary education before another decade passes. 
Defining education 
In the first AHDR, the authors defined education as contributing to the 
development of human capital, a non-neutral “promotion of skills, val-
ues, history, languages, and ways of thinking and behaving” and a for-
malized process by which nations “perpetuate their values and beliefs 
from one generation to the next” (Johansson et al., 2004: 170). While we 
agree that this definition describes typical government-imposed systems 
of formal schooling, this definition does not accurately describe the edu-
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Self-determination in education  
The efforts we describe in this chapter are being made against a backdrop of an 
increasing push for self-determination in education among many Indigenous 
peoples. Self-determination in education is recognized internationally as a hu-
man right. Article 14 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indige-
nous Peoples (2007) states, “Indigenous peoples have the right to establish and 
control their educational systems and institutions providing education in their 
own languages, in a manner appropriate to their cultural methods of teaching 
and learning” (UN DRIP, 2007).  
But self-governance is also a key factor in creating systems that improve ed-
ucational outcomes for Indigenous students, not just in the north, but across the 
globe (Smith, 2003; Hill et al., 2012).  
In some places, such as Greenland, this effort is occurring alongside the 
move from colony to home rule, though education reform efforts in the country 
still face resistance from many within the country and in Denmark. In other 
places, such as Alaska, this work is happening within a state-run education sys-
tem that is not necessarily supportive of such efforts, under a state government 
that does not recognize the legal sovereignty of tribes, and in a federal context of 
accountability that has pushed many schools to narrow mainstream curricular 
offerings in the quest to improve student standardized test scores. In Canada, 
the level of self-determination varies from province to province, with First Na-
tions peoples in southern provinces just winning some of the rights that Inuit in 
the northern regions have had for several decades. 
cation envisioned by many parents, community leaders and educators 
seeking to create systems that reflect the diverse cultures of the North. 
Across much of the Circumpolar North, Indigenous peoples had common 
experiences within education systems based on “Western” ways of 
teaching, learning and knowledge and operating with the intent of as-
similation. Now, across the North and elsewhere, such as New Zealand 
and Hawaii, Indigenous peoples are working to create Indigenous-
controlled education systems based not on the Western form of school-
ing imposed on them for the past century (or longer) but rather based 
on Indigenous epistemologies and worldviews. In some circumpolar 
regions, these efforts are happening alongside the dominant Western 
education system, while in others, the Western systems are being re-
placed entirely.  
Textbox 9.1 
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Textbox 9.1 continued 
 
As one Indigenous leader noted: 
“The success of Native education is directly related to the amount of 
community control and involvement there is in the school system. Only 
when Native people feel a part of that system, that they have a stake in it, 
will they assume responsibility in a meaningful way and become commit-
ted to its success.” 
Mary Simon, President, Inuit Circumpolar  
Conference, 1989, (Darnell and Hoem, 1996: 149-150) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Moreover, while many distinguish between formal and informal educa-
tion in the transmission of traditional knowledge, some scholars argue 
for re-thinking these definitions. For example, Christensen (2012: n.p.) 
contends “there is a need to reframe the question of schooling and how 
we think about education to get beyond notions of formal and informal 
learning.” In studying the learning young people do during hunting, she 
found it possible “to rethink education from within a different social 
context than the institutionalized and state-based one, namely the so-
cial context of hunting. The activity of hunting and/or land-based prac-
tices organizes individuals relative to hunting as a culturally specific 
way of living and of being in the world. To view hunting as a way of 
being in the world brings out more profound perspectives than view-
ing hunting as in informal or traditional technique.” Some of the educa-
tion reforms underway in northern nations ground formal schooling in 
the Inuit or Inupiaq ways of living and being, and thus make fluid the 
relationship between “formal” education and “traditional” learning, so 
that in Barrow, Alaska whaling can be both the backbone of the com-
munity and a foundation on which learning is built in school. This re-
thinking of the definition also allows for inclusion of differing educa-
tional goals for parents and students, whether it is enabling young 
people to continue on in formal schooling and pursue a professional 
career in a location away from their home community, or developing 
the skills that enable them to stay in their home and be a successful 
subsistence hunter or herder. 
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And so we look at education as including both formal and informal 
processes that prepare students for future success in their communities, 
further education and the workplace, in whatever they choose to do and 
wherever they choose to live. These processes ground students in their 
own culture, values and beliefs and enable them to successfully negoti-
ate the socio-political and economic world beyond their own communi-
ties. We also acknowledge the importance in Indigenous communities of 
instruction in heritage languages as well as in western languages.  
9.2.2 Trends in education across the Circumpolar North 
Across the North we see a number of trends in education. While these 
may not be occurring in every circumpolar nation, they are affecting the 
majority. These include challenges in delivering education in rural and 
remote locations, including school consolidations and closures, provid-
ing access specifically for secondary education, and difficulties in re-
cruiting and retaining teachers. There also are challenges around edu-
cating in and maintaining heritage languages. Low achievement and high 
dropout rates among Indigenous populations also continue to be prob-
lematic. The gender gap between males and females continues, with 
females generally achieving at a higher level than males and also going 
on to obtain more formal schooling. Other trends include the increased 
use of Indigenous knowledge and ways of teaching and learning in some 
formal school systems. All are discussed below.  
9.2.3 Challenges of delivering education in rural and 
remote locations 
School closure and consolidation 
Rural communities are losing their local schools across the North. The 
reasons behind school closure vary, from outmigration and falling school 
age populations leading to too few students to keep a school open (see 
Chapter 2, Arctic Populations and Migration), to funding issues, to par-
ents opting to send their children to larger schools (often boarding 
schools) in order to have access to a broader, more comprehensive edu-
cation. This can have a number of impacts on students and communities. 
When students are educated away from their home, there often is a lack 
of connection between the school and the home and between the school 
and the culture of the home community. Across North America, boarding 
or residential schools contributed to language and culture loss for sever-
al generations of Indigenous students. But perhaps more dramatically, it 
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can affect the sustainability of a community as a whole. First, parents in 
communities without a school may choose to move to a different com-
munity with a school rather than sending their child away. Second, stu-
dents who leave home for school may choose not to return to their home 
community once graduated. Both outcomes can lead to entire communi-
ties dying, as has happened in Alaska. 
The Russian Federation is experiencing falling school age popula-
tions, resulting in many school closures, especially in rural communities 
where the number of schools has decreased by almost 25% in past dec-
ade (Nikolaev and Chugunov, 2012). Operating schools is especially hard 
in northern herding communities. There are some “nomadic schools” in 
Siberia where the teachers follow the reindeer herders and also some-
times utilize educated parents alongside regular teachers. Small taiga 
schools also offer education in small rural communities, not far from 
where the herders work. However, keeping these alternatives to board-
ing schools open has proved difficult (Lavrillier, 2013). 
On top of this, the 2007 “Priority National Project ’Education’” Russian 
federal reform mandated that schools be financed based on the size of the 
student population, which encourages school consolidation and the clo-
sure of smaller schools (Chevalier, 2012). However, a new national educa-
tion law, “On Education in the Russian Federation”, which became effec-
tive as of 1st September 2013, prohibits the closing of rural schools “with-
out consulting the residents of the rural community” (Russian Federation, 
2012: Chapter 3, Article 22, #12). It is too soon to know whether this law 
will slow the rate of school closures in the Russian North. 
In the Faroe Island, national education policy is that every child be able 
to attend lower primary school in their home community, no matter the 
size. Some schools are as small as one teacher with fewer than ten stu-
dents. School closures are an issue in small rural communities, especially 
when parents choose to take their children out of the local school and 
either home school them or move to a larger community. Once a school 
closes, it cannot be reopened without permission of the municipality. 
School closure threatens the viability of small rural communities 
across Norway, Sweden and Finland. In all three countries the propor-
tion of small rural schools is high, approximately one in three (Har-
greaves et al., 2009). In Norway, low student numbers and the munici-
pal economies are among the most frequent reasons for closure or 
amalgamation of schools (Utdanningsdirektoratet, 2010). Consolida-
tion means longer school transportation distances, creating a new chal-
lenge. Communities in the three northernmost counties in Norway all 
have experienced school closures recently. Since traditionally the Sámi 
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homeland consists of small rural communities within municipalities 
with less income, school closure due to economic reasons is not un-
common. 
In Alaska, the state currently supports schools in any community 
with at least 10 students. Students in communities with too few students 
to support a school can opt for home schooling, participate in a corre-
spondence school program, or attend one of three secondary public 
boarding schools in the state, if their family does not want to relocate. 
Since the legislature increased the minimum number of students for a 
school to receive funding from eight to ten, twenty-seven rural Alaska 
schools have shut down (DeMarban, 2012). 
9.2.4 Accessibility of secondary education 
In many circumpolar regions, students can attend primary school in 
their home community but must go away to a residential program to 
attend upper secondary or high school. This is true in Greenland and the 
Faroe Islands, as well as for parts of Iceland and the Russian Far North. 
This situation can affect graduation rates, as not all secondary students 
have the maturity or skills to manage living away from home, and other 
family demands sometimes require that students return to their family. 
The Faroe Islands have about 120 settlements but only nine upper 
secondary schools. There are no boarding schools in the Faroe Islands. 
Students who do not live in or near one of the larger communities with a 
secondary school must stay with relatives or live by themselves (e.g., in 
student housing). In Iceland, while many small compulsory schools are 
located outside of Reykjavik, including some as small as 10 students, not 
every community has one. Students in some rural communities some-
times have to attend secondary programs away from home, and live in 
boarding facilities (Rønning and Wiborg, 2008). In Siberia, the second-
ary school options for most students are either boarding schools or 
schools in little settlements, which don’t provide the same quality as the 
boarding schools (Lavrillier, 2013), leading to many parents opting for 
boarding schools for their children, as noted above. However, dropout 
rates from boarding schools are high, and compulsory attendance is not 
enforced (Dudeck, 2013).  
Problems recruiting and retaining teachers 
A common problem across northern schools is recruiting and retaining 
well-prepared teachers. In many regions, there are too few educators 
who are from the North and used to the challenging living conditions or 
proficient in the local languages. In Nunavut, there are multiple chal-
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lenges around staffing schools successfully. These include a shortage of 
available and interested trained Inuit educators to deliver Inuit language 
instruction, high turnover among non-Inuit teachers, a lack of orienta-
tion and training in culturally responsive curriculum and pedagogy for 
non-Inuit teachers, and geographic isolation from support networks 
including infrastructure, administrative, and program support staff 
(Berger and Epp, 2007, Berger et al., 2006). Likewise in Nunavik, non-
Inuit teachers from the southern parts of Québec or elsewhere in Canada 
are hired to teach in grades three and up. Generally, they have not re-
ceived specialized training to work in this particular cultural context, 
and are unable to teach in the local language. Many stay only a few years 
in the remote Nunavik schools. 
Greenland has also faced difficulties in hiring qualified teachers. In 
2005–2006, fully one third of teachers did not have teaching qualifications, 
and many of these were teaching in the remote settlements (Wyatt, 2012). 
In Alaska, rural and remote schools face difficulties in hiring and re-
taining teachers. While the student population in rural Alaska is primari-
ly Indigenous, the educators in rural schools are overwhelmingly non-
Native – less than 5% of certificated teachers are Indigenous people, and 
fewer yet are administrators. Most are also from outside Alaska; the 
University of Alaska system prepares only 20% of the teachers hired by 
districts each year. Average teacher turnover rates in rural school dis-
tricts vary tremendously, from a low of 7% to a high of 52%; ten out of 
53 have turnover rates over 30%, and as a whole rural districts average 
20% turnover per year (Hill and Hirshberg, 2013). In Siberia, finding 
teachers for the schools serving nomadic communities is difficult; non-
Indigenous teachers are not prepared for the lifestyle challenges and 
teacher turnover rates can be high in taiga schools (Lavrillier, 2013; 
Dudeck, 2013).  
Teaching in heritage languages 
In the first Arctic Social Indicators report (ASI, 2010), cultural well-being 
and vitality was measured in part by the use of Indigenous languages in 
both the home and in formal schooling, and the retention of language 
among heritage language speakers (Schweitzer et al., 2010). The concept 
of Fate Control in the first ASI also includes language retention within 
the category of Knowledge Construction (Dahl et al., 2010). And yet, the 
use of Indigenous languages in circumpolar schools serving Indigenous 
students varies considerably, due both to formal policies and challenges 
around finding certified educators who speak heritage languages and 
educational materials in those languages. 
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The Nunavut Education Act (GN, 2008) requires that by the year 
2019–2020, the school system must deliver programs that are fully bi-
lingual from kindergarten through grade 12. In most schools, language 
instruction will follow a model of high Inuit language instruction in the 
elementary years, moving towards 50% of instructional time split be-
tween Inuit language and English or French at the secondary level. This 
goal is currently being implemented, but is challenged by the need for 
more educators who have high quality Inuit language and instructional 
skills at all grade levels and in all courses, as well as access to appropri-
ate teaching resources and learning materials (Aylward, 2010). Chal-
lenges arise from the extra time involved in building a bilingual educa-
tion context and the day-to-day operations associated with working in at 
least two languages (McGregor, 2010). 
The Kativik School Board (KSB), which governs the whole education-
al system in the Nunavik region, has chosen to educate the pupils in their 
mother tongue, Inuktitut, from kindergarten to grade three (KSB, 2013). 
When children get to grade two, families must decide in which of the two 
official languages of the province (French or English) they want their 
children to be educated. After grade three, the children pursue their 
schooling in either French or English, while continuing to learn Inuktitut 
language and culture, since a few courses are integrated into their pro-
gram (KSB, 2013). An important educational priority shared among the 
people and the KSB is the maintenance and development of the Inuktituk 
language and culture. Educational instruction in the learner’s home lan-
guage in the first years of schooling has been identified as a relevant 
means to develop a solid educational foundation for youth. Therefore, 
competent Inuktitut-speaking teachers are required to work with the 
pupils. When KSB was created, a teacher-training program was devel-
oped and implemented, according to the training needs in this particular 
context, by KSB in collaboration with McGill University (de Krom et al., 
2011; Cram, 1987).  
The Sámi languages are vital to the Sámi people across the Nordic 
countries. The language is central to Sámi identity, and is considered 
essential to their survival as a people (Gaski, 1998). Finland, Norway and 
Sweden have all ratified the European Charter for Regional and Minority 
Languages (CETS 148, 1992). Accordingly, there is emphasis in the edu-
cation systems to respond to the requirements; however there are gaps 
to be filled. The existing international and national regulations regarding 
Sámi language and education rights are implemented in different ways 
in each of the nations. 
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While the principal language of instruction in Russian Federation 
schools is Russian, citizens have the right to be educated in their native 
language in basic general education (grades 5–9). Those operating the 
schools choose the language of instruction (NIC ARM, n.d.). However, the 
federal curriculum only allots two hours per week to the study of local 
languages (Chevalier, 2012). The loss of heritage languages in Russia’s 
northern communities is a significant problem to which education con-
tributes, although education can also be the means for preserving the 
languages (Dudeck, 2013; Lavrillier, 2013; Chevalier, 2012). In Siberia, 
“national” schools are secondary schools that offer instruction in Indige-
nous languages. Many of these schools are reducing the amount of in-
struction in Indigenous languages, due largely to the Unified State Exam-
ination (Chevalier, 2013). Passing the Russian language and mathemat-
ics portions of the Unified State Examination is required for graduation, 
and these exams are entirely in Russian. In some cases, falling levels of 
Russian language proficiency among rural children have led families to 
move from rural areas served by “national” schools into urban areas.  
The new national education law in the Russian Federation reinforces 
the idea that while students have a right to study their heritage lan-
guages, that right has limits. On the one hand, the law states:  
Citizens of the Russian Federation shall have the right to pre-school, primary 
and general basic general education in the mother tongue of the number of 
languages of the peoples of the Russian Federation, as well as the right to 
study their native language among the languages of the Russian Federation 
within the possibilities offered by the system of education, in accordance 
with the legislation on education.  
(Russian Federation, 2012: Chapter 1, Article 14 #4) 
On the other hand, it also stipulates that “teaching and learning of the 
official languages of the republics of the Russian Federation shall not be 
to the detriment of teaching and learning the state language of the Rus-
sian Federation” (Russian Federation, 2012: Chapter 1, Article 14 #3). It 
is too soon to know the impact of the new law on education across the 
Russian Federation, and in the North specifically, but the loss of heritage 
languages is not likely to be stemmed. 
Greenland’s situation is quite different from other Arctic regions; 
Greenlanders do not have to revitalize the native language as it is the 
language of instruction in schools (Wyatt, 2012). Students study in both 
Greenlandic and Danish starting in the early years, and then add English 
and, if desired, another foreign language in later years. The challenge 
Greenland students face is developing sufficient proficiency in Danish 
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and English so that they can pursue a post-secondary education, because 
even within Greenland most of the high school and post-secondary edu-
cation offerings are in Danish, not in Greenlandic (Boolsen, 2009; EU 
Commission, 2013). 
Low achievement and graduation rates 
Across the North, student achievement as measured by secondary grad-
uation and dropout rates continues to be problematic in many regions, 
especially for Indigenous students. In Nunavut, graduation rates (calcu-
lated by dividing the number of graduates by the number of estimated 
17 and 18 year olds) ranged between 32% and 38% over the past four 
years (Nunavut Bureau of Statistics, 2012). Students continue to miss 
between a third and a quarter of instructional time, and in the context of 
the other complexities of education in Nunavut outlined here, educators, 
parents and community members all continue to express concerns about 
the standard of achievement amongst students and to what extent they 
are on par with other Canadian students. 
In Nunavik, as in Nunavut, the high school diploma achievement rate 
of Inuit youth is very low compared to the overall national rates. In Qué-
bec, fewer than one student in five successfully completes Secondary V 
(the final year of secondary school). Very few Inuit students attend post-
secondary studies (Gouvernement du Québec, 2011).  
Greenland also has problems with students dropping out from aca-
demic high schools. There are only four of these, all located in towns, 
which means that students from villages have to leave home to complete 
their high school education. Between 2005 and 2008, the number of stu-
dents in high school increased by 17%, and the number of graduates went 
up by 37%, but the number of dropouts also increased by 34%. These 
numbers are very different from vocational training outcomes, where the 
number of dropouts has decreased by 3% even as the total number of 
students has increased by 31%, the number of apprentices has gone up by 
20%, and the number of graduates has risen by 25% (Boolsen, 2009). 
In Alaska, while non-Native student achievement mirrors or even ex-
ceeds national averages, Alaska Native student achievement is generally 
poor, particularly in small villages. Alaska Native students today drop out 
at rates triple the national average, and most who attend college need 
remedial work (Martin and Hill, 2009, McDiarmid and Hill, 2010). The gap 
between Alaska Native and non-Native students in Alaska is wide. In 
2012–13, Alaska Natives made up 22.7% of students in grades 7–12, but 
34.7% of the dropouts from those grades. They had a dropout rate of 
6.2%, compared with 4.0% for all students in those grades (AK EED, 
2013). The high-school graduation rate for all Alaska students in 2012–
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2013 was 71.8%, but just 57.1% among Alaska Native students – the low-
est among all racial and ethnic groups in the state (AK EED, 2013).  
Upper secondary completion rates in Iceland are not very high. 
Among students starting upper secondary in 2003, only 44% had com-
pleted their program after four years, and that number increased to only 
62% seven years after starting. Still, these numbers represent a signifi-
cant increase over the educational attainment of earlier generations of 
Icelanders; the rate of upper secondary completion amongst Icelanders 
age 25–64 in 2011 was only 36.7% (Statistics Iceland, 2013). 
Barrow High School, Alaska, USA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit: Diane Hirshberg. 
9.2.5 Indigenizing education  
Many Indigenous communities in the North are moving toward creating 
educational models within the formal school system that are based on 
traditional ways of teaching and learning. Many of these efforts are part 
of government driven or sanctioned school reform efforts, and others 
occur despite prevailing policies and trends. 
In Alaska, the education model in most schools is still very western, 
even in communities where the great majority of students are Indige-
nous. In Spring 2012 the Alaska Board of Education adopted new guide-
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lines for implementing the “Alaska Cultural Standards Educators”, and is 
focusing on disseminating these widely (AK EED, 2012; Chris Simon, 
personal communication, 20th February 2013). However, this has not 
yet led to widespread change around the state. That said, there are plac-
es where Indigenous education models are in place or being implement-
ed. In the Ayaprun Elitnaurvik Yupik Immersion School in Bethel, an 
elementary school, students learn fully in Yupik in grades K-2 and then 
are introduced to English starting in grade three. Pedagogical approach-
es mix traditional Yupik ways of teaching and learning with more West-
ern styles. Students in the school generally outperform district averages 
on standardized tests, and graduates have gone on to be valedictorians 
in their high school class.  
The North Slope Borough School District in Alaska begins its mission 
statement by saying “Learning in our schools is rooted in the values, 
history and language of the Iñupiat.” The district has developed the Iñu-
piaq Learning Framework and is now developing curriculum and peda-
gogical approaches to create an Iñupiaq education system based in local 
epistemologies but also preparing students to succeed in the Western 
system. The school board has driven this reform, and hired a superin-
tendent who is implementing its vision. The reform effort is based on 
extensive work with elders, educators, and community members across 
all borough villages, to determine what children should know when they 
graduate, based in Iñupiaq culture, values and beliefs rather than in the 
system imposed by external Western educators. 
In Greenland, the 2002 School Act states that schooling: “shall create 
the basis for the pupil’s development of his/her knowledge about and 
understanding of his/her own social identity, culture and values” 
(Greenland Government, Chapter 2, §5). The education reform effort 
that emerged from this Act, known as “Atuarfitsialak”, focused on creat-
ing a culturally compatible education model in pre-K through higher 
education, and included restructuring teacher education and profession-
al development. While the Act did not explicitly mention strengthening 
Greenlandic identity and culture, the reformers set that as a goal for the 
reform effort. The effort differed from other northern school reform 
efforts because it did not focus on language revitalization, and indeed 
explicitly supported strengthening Danish, while also trying to strength-
en the use of the Greenlandic culture in the schools. 
In Nunavut, the 2008 Education Act lays out “Fundamental Principles 
for Education”, which start with “The public education system in Nu-
navut shall be based on Inuit societal values and the principles and con-
cepts of Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit” (Nunavut Government, 2008, Chapter 
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15, § 1(1)). Nunavut is the only jurisdiction in Canada in which the entire 
public education system (kindergarten to grade 12) is legally required to 
address the educational needs and desires of an Indigenous (Inuit) pop-
ulation (McGregor, 2012b). Education staff and administrators in Nu-
navut are also required to ensure that all aspects of schooling reflect and 
reference the values, principles and approaches of Inuit knowledge. This 
has necessitated a great deal of research with Elders and start-from-
scratch program development by Nunavut educators and curriculum 
support staff (Aylward, 2009; Aylward, 2012; McGregor, 2012a). Nu-
navut aims to develop entirely culturally-responsive and locally-relevant 
curriculum, programs, materials and assessments that also ensure their 
students have access to post-secondary and university entrance re-
quirements (Nunavut Department of Education, 2007). For example, the 
former grade 12 standardized social studies examination has been re-
placed by a project-based assessment model developed in Nunavut to 
facilitate student assessment that combines local topics, cultural content 
as well as 21st century skills.  
There are Sámi schools in each of the national areas of northern Fen-
noscandia, under the respective national school systems operating un-
der special regulations/mandate and/or funding models. The concept of 
Sámi education differs throughout the area. On the Norwegian side there 
are two national curricula for the basic education 1–13, the Norwegian 
and the Sámi. The Sámi school concept for grades 1–10 reflects groups, 
classes or schools which are municipally owned and which follow the 
Sámi National Curriculum, several specialized Sámi schools, and for the 
upper secondary level two state operated schools. Also, all students are 
required to learn about Sámi themes according to syllabi grades 1–13.  
In Sweden, five schools operate at levels 1–6 under a separate state 
unit, the Sámi School Board. Elsewhere the Sámi language is integrated 
into mainstream schools as a minority language. There is a Sámi Educa-
tion Center in Jokkmokk. In addition, the Lapplands gymnasium, the 
northernmost upper secondary school in Sweden, organizes a national 
level program with a Sámi focus including the study of reindeer herding.  
In Finland, there is no actual Sámi school, but Sámi education re-
fers to classes/groups where the Sámi language is the language of 
instruction; Sámi language programs otherwise are delivered within 
regular public schools. The municipal schools in the Sámi Domicile 
Area offer Sámi language programs, and one municipality organizes a 
Sámi program. Daycare in Sámi language is also offered in Northern 
Finland: for example the city of Oulu has a daycare service in Sámi 
language in one center for children age 1–6 who comes from Sámi-
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speaking families. The daycare centers also address cultural issues 
and support for Sámi identity. The Oulu center also offers courses in 
the Sámi language for Sámi children in grades 1–9 in cooperation 
with a local elementary school.  
Norway implemented the “Knowledge Promotion 2006”, a com-
prehensive reform, with a partly revised and partly new national 
curriculum along with a national Sámi curriculum. The Sámi parlia-
ment was responsible for developing the Sámi language syllabi and 
the Sámi traditional handicraft (duodji) syllabi, and otherwise was a 
consulting partner in the process. The implementation of the Sámi 
curriculum faced challenges such as a lack of teaching materials and 
teachers. The situation is worse in the lule- and south Sámi area and 
in marginal north-Sámi areas. The Norwegian state also operates two 
upper-secondary Sámi schools with a special focus on Sámi educa-
tion, including integrated or specialized traditional knowledge pro-
grams (arts/craft/reindeer herding/music), and there are multiple 
county upper-secondary schools throughout the country delivering 
Sámi language programs.  
9.2.6 Gender gap 
In general, across the globe girls outperform boys on measures of learn-
ing such as international and national tests and measures of overall 
achievement, including grades and graduation rates. While boys outper-
form girls on a few individual subjects, overall girls are doing better in 
terms of formal schooling. This holds true across the Circumpolar North.  
In 2012, males across Alaska graduated at a rate of 66.3% while fe-
males had a much higher graduation rate of 73.1% (AK EED, 2013). 
The gaps between males and females differ considerably by race; the 
highest gap between males and females was for African American stu-
dents, with almost 12.5% more females graduating. The next largest 
gap was among Alaska Native students, with almost 11% more Alaska 
Native females graduating than males. Alaska Native males had the 
lowest graduation rate – 47.7% – of any ethnic/gender group (Brian 
Laurent, personal communication, 3rd November 2013). In Nunavut, in 
the past decade women graduated high school at a higher rate than 
men in all but one year, though both had relatively low rates, between 
42% and 50% for males and between 46% and 58% for females (Nu-
navut Bureau of Statistics, 2012). 
In Russia, while information specific to the North is not available, da-
ta from the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) 
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exam shows nationwide a gap between female and male achievement, 
with girls outperforming boys to a greater extent than in other Organiza-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. 
Across almost all OECD countries, females are more likely than males to 
graduate from upper secondary education, including Norway, Denmark 
and Finland, though Finland has the lowest gap between males and fe-
males in terms of dropout rates (OECD, 2011). 
9.3 Human capital and knowledge in the Arctic 
The Arctic is often viewed as a treasure chest of natural resources. Alt-
hough natural resources have a great importance, the true treasure of 
the Arctic is its people. Since pre-historic times Arctic residents have 
developed skills and knowledge that enable them to survive and thrive 
in harsh conditions. It has been observed that northerners have a good 
grasp of matters important for their livelihoods and possess unique and 
diversified knowledge on how to ensure their well-being (Megatrends, 
2011). At the same time, the ability of Arctic societies to benefit from 
standardized codified knowledge and formal education has been rather 
limited. As a result, Arctic regions demonstrate substantial gaps in terms 
of development of local human capital. 
The first AHDR (2004) does not explicitly discuss human capital issues. 
However, it addresses conditions associated with schooling and their im-
pact on Arctic communities (Johansson et al., 2004). The report concludes 
that the most critical concerns regard control, relevance, and access to 
education. It argues that education systems and learning practices need to 
adapt education services to fit local needs and conditions. The report ad-
vocates a shift from viewing knowledge as a standardized commodity to 
seeing it as a distributed resource that has led to pressures for decentrali-
zation of control and decision-making, local adaptations, and increased 
use of technology to access knowledge. The attainment of education 
(whether formal or not) is an investment in human capital. The outcome 
of this investment is knowledge production and transfer that ensures the 
livelihoods and prosperity of Arctic communities. This section extends the 
discussion of the relevance of formal and informal education and 
knowledge in human development in the Arctic. We provide an assess-
ment of human capital and knowledge production in the Arctic as it per-
tains to human development and well-being of Arctic societies. 
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9.3.1 The need for knowledge and human capital 
Human capital can be defined as the stock of knowledge and skills embod-
ied in a human population that has economic value. It most generally re-
fers to formal and tacit knowledge and skills, which can be deployed to 
general economic returns. Human capital incorporates three components: 
general skills (literacy), specific skills (related to particulate technologies 
and operations), and technical and scientific knowledge (mastery of spe-
cific bodies of knowledge at advanced levels). There is a broad agreement 
in the literature that human capital is closely related to both individual 
and aggregated labor outcomes: higher individual wages and enhanced 
employability on one hand and greater productivity and accelerated tech-
nological progress on the other (De la Fuente and Ciccone, 2002).  
All three components of human capital are closely tied to schooling. 
The general skills (functional literacy) level is typically achieved at the 
primary education level. Specific skills are acquired during secondary 
education and advanced scientific and technical knowledge obtained 
through higher education. However, formal education is not a sole 
source of human capital. In fact, recent studies suggest that in the Arc-
tic human capital is less related to formal levels of schooling than it is 
in the south (Petrov, 2008; Petrov and Cavin, 2013). This difference is 
very important and is attributable to the human capital associated with 
traditional skills and knowledge, not obtained through attending edu-
cational institutions. In this chapter we discuss both human capital 
accumulated through formal schooling and human capital based on 
local and Indigenous knowledge (LIK). Certainly, measuring the latter 
is a more challenging task given the difficulty of quantifying the value 
and scope of LIK. It is worth noting that the lack of one (e.g., formal 
education) may be partially compensated, albeit indirectly, by another 
(LIK) in terms of human development.  
Human capital is a crucial factor of regional economic growth and de-
velopment and a key attribute of a modern post-industrial economy. First, 
human capital is the most important ingredient in the “knowledge sector”, 
which includes technologically advanced industries and services (e.g. in-
formation technology, high tech manufacturing, financial services, etc.) – 
the most intensively growing elements of modern economy that define the 
overall success and competitiveness of regional economic systems in a 
globalizing world. Second, knowledge underpins “old” industries including 
the whole array of primary (e.g., extractive industries, agriculture), sec-
ondary (manufacturing) and tertiary (services) sectors. In fact, 50% of 
GDP in OECD countries is based on knowledge production and utilization 
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(Megatrends, 2011). In other words, the modern economy is an economy 
heavily based on knowledge (Bell, 1973; Jacobs, 1984).  
Just as other regions of the world, the Arctic is touched by globalization 
and the emergence of the knowledge economy (see Chapter 10, Globaliza-
tion). While ties between Arctic economies and resource and government 
sectors are persistent (see Chapter 4, Economic Systems), globalization has 
brought new opportunities and challenges that create a competitive edge 
for Arctic communities in the new knowledge-driven world economy. 
Northern regions can become “learning” regions (Morgan, 1997) that adopt 
and adapt innovations while developing their own body of economically 
relevant knowledge and skills based on local experiences and traditions. 
In this respect, a development strategy based on enabling local hu-
man capacities to advance economic development is appealing. Howev-
er, the Arctic faces formidable challenges to become such a region: “en-
dogenous growth” is inhibited by limited local capacities (institutional, 
financial and infrastructural) and, most importantly, by the shortage of 
human capital (Petrov, 2011). Evidence from northern success stories 
suggests that human capital’s economic returns tend to be more con-
nected to local economies. This connectedness is partially determined by 
the endogenous nature of the knowledge-based economy in general, but 
also by a tight relation of human capital with other forms of societal 
capital in the periphery (Aarsæther, 2004). In addition, communities can 
capitalize on Indigenous knowledge and tradition and facilitate institu-
tion building and formation of civic society. 
9.3.2 Human capital and human development 
The accumulation of human capital is necessary to maintain a stable and 
expanding economic base and ensure human well-being. Education is an 
integral part of human development as identified both by the UN and 
Arctic Social Indicators project (ASI, 2010). Both the first AHDR and ASI 
emphasize the role of education in ensuring economic well-being, fate 
control (empowerment), and cultural continuity, especially if standard 
schooling practices are intertwined with local and traditional contexts. 
ASI (2010) identified education as one of the six key domains of human 
development in the Arctic. 
Studies show that in the EU, for each additional year of schooling, an 
individual gains 6.5% in wages. The figure is even higher in North America 
(De la Fuente and Ciccone, 2002; Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004). 
Post-secondary education provides even more substantial gains: for ex-
ample, the average private return to post-secondary education for Euro-
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pean men is estimated at 12% (OECD, 2011). This is even higher for In-
digenous residents: in Saskatchewan, Canada the lifetime earnings of an 
Indigenous male were found to increase by 38% if a university degree was 
completed, and for Indigenous women this increased by 59% (Howe, 
2011). Higher education levels are also associated with greater labor force 
participation and lower unemployment. Schooling has a role in reducing 
poverty and providing means for economically disadvantaged groups to 
improve their standard of living (ASI, 2010). In Canada, studies show that 
completion of university education is the most financially rewarding in 
terms of improving earnings of Aboriginal Canadians, followed by the 
completion of non-university post-secondary education (Hossain and 
Lamb, 2012). In addition to benefitting an individual, investment in educa-
tion also increases overall productivity by as much as 5% per additional 
year of schooling (De la Fuente and Ciccone, 2002) and competitiveness of 
national and regional economies. There are other positive outcomes of 
education that are felt both in households and society at large, such as the 
increased ability of educated women to manage their lives and financial 
situations through reproductive control (Oxaal, 1997).  
The link between education and empowerment is key. One aspect is 
the empowerment of the individual where a growing proportion of stu-
dents are able to continue past primary through secondary school and 
further on to post-secondary institutions. The empowerment gains are 
especially significant for women. Individuals may be empowered to ful-
fill important functions in the community and their education may pro-
vide them with a reason for staying. On the other hand, educational at-
tainment may also empower them to start looking for other opportuni-
ties, including leaving the Arctic.  
In this context it is clear that empowerment is a multi-dimensional 
concept with often divergent consequences. ASI (2010) offered a new 
way to conceptualize empowerment – through the notion of fate control, 
i.e. ability of individuals and communities to define their own destiny. 
According to the ASI I report, education is an integral part of fate control. 
Stronger fate control may strengthen communities, making them able to 
resist the pressure from the outside, at least for a while. It may, however, 
be less responsive to the marked differences in both gender and genera-
tional foci in relation to the development process, which may eventually 
result in unexpected and unwanted out-migration patterns, and thus the 
loss of the new human capital gained, for example, through the expan-
sion of educational opportunities. Another possible consequence of for-
mal education is the erosion of cultural identity and loss of contact with 
nature (ASI, 2014; Battiste, 2000). 
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A common problem of non-metropolitan, peripheral regions is the 
“flight” of human capital (see Chapter 2, Arctic Populations and Migration). 
With an increased level of education the ability (and desire) of local resi-
dents to find employment or new educational opportunities elsewhere 
grows as well. An increasing number of northerners, especially women, 
move away from the Arctic to receive or use their education. At the same 
time, many Arctic regions are attracting human capital from the south as 
skilled professionals take advantage of high earnings in certain Arctic 
sectors (mining, oil, etc.). Unfortunately, however, most of them stay in the 
Arctic only for a limited time, and, as surveys indicate, remain fairly de-
tached from each other (Voswinkel, 2012). Departing educated Native 
northerners and returning migrants create a “brain drain” from the Arctic 
(Handland, 2004; Petrov and Vlasova, 2010). This brain drain in many 
regions also coincides with a “brain turnover” (intensive in- and out-
migration of human capital) and “brain waves” (surges and dips of human 
capital associated with the boom-and-bust economic cycle (Heleniak, 
2010)). As a result, the study of human capital mobility may illuminate the 
ways in which human capital can be retained in place and/or attracted 
(back) to the Arctic. With the growing access to education for Arctic resi-
dents in their regions and elsewhere, the issue of retention becomes even 
more critical (Megatrends, 2011; Petrov, 2010).  
Arctic Design Show, Rovaniemi, Finland, 2014 
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9.3.3 Educational attainment and attendance statistics in 
the Arctic 
The most typical indicators utilized to measure human capital deal with 
levels of educational attainment – the highest level of education that an 
individual has completed. More advanced education is an investment in 
someone’s human capital. A higher level of schooling is considered to 
indicate greater human capital. Although there are many levels of educa-
tional attainment (from primary to tertiary), the most common indicator 
used deals either with high school, post-secondary or university educa-
tion. ASI makes a strong argument for including this measure to assess 
human development:  
If we are to make a snapshot assessment of the contribution of education to 
the well-being of a community, it must include taking a look at the highest 
levels of educational attainment that people are pursuing; anything short of 
that would present an incomplete picture.  
(Rasmussen et al., 2010: 82) 
The main problems with educational attainment as an indicator are the 
availability of data and difference in definitions of schooling levels. Rele-
vant data are largely collected from censusses since in most jurisdictions 
individuals are the only source of such information. Consequently, the 
existing data only coincide with census years (every 5th or 10th year), 
and definitions used in subsequent censuses may not be the same. Dis-
crepancy in defining educational attainment is also marked among Arc-
tic countries, which use diverging models of higher education (see sec-
tion 1). Direct comparisons are therefore difficult.  
Another relevant notion is educational attendance, i.e., enrollment in 
an educational institution. The advantage of this measure is that most 
educational establishments produce these data based on enrollments in 
each respective level of education. For that reason, ASI (2010) recom-
mends using educational attendance and completion rates statistics in 
addition to educational attainment to measure the education domain of 
human development. The Report also suggests as an indicator the reten-
tion rates of post-secondary education graduates who stay in northern 
communities 10 years after graduation. All these measures are related to 
human capital and important for estimating well-being in Arctic com-
munities. Given high mobility of human capital, retention rates can be 
especially informative. Unfortunately, the data on retention are not 
available in most Arctic regions. 
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In this report we consider the key indicator: the proportion of resi-
dents with post-secondary education, which includes all levels of educa-
tion following secondary school. Post-secondary education corresponds to 
acquisition of advanced specific skills and technical and scientific 
knowledge. In other words, people who completed post-secondary educa-
tion have the highest human capital (its formal schooling component). In 
the following section, we analyze regional differences and temporal dy-
namics of post-secondary education in general as well as its components: 
university degree and tertiary education. Note that only formally obtained 
education is included in this analysis.  
9.3.4 Growing access to post-secondary education in the 
Arctic and educational attendance 
In the recent decades, Arctic regions saw an increase in the number and 
capacity of post-secondary institutions. Colleges and universities exist in 
all major Arctic jurisdictions, although there are more in the Russian and 
Nordic sectors (Figures 9.1). Umeå University, the University of Alaska 
system, Luleå University, University of Oulu, University of Iceland, Arctic 
University of Norway, and Murmansk State Technical University are the 
leading Arctic institutions by enrollment. All of these universities are 
associated with larger cities, although some have branch campuses in 
rural areas. Remote regions are served to a much lesser degree. In most 
Arctic colleges and universities, female students constitute the majority 
of enrollment (see below for further discussion). Another continuing 
trend is the growing level of control over post-secondary education by 
Indigenous people (Stonechild, 2006). Higher education institutions 
serving indigenous populations exist in various jurisdictions, e.g., Sámi 
University College (Norway), Taimyr College (Russia), Nunavut Arctic 
College (Canada), and Ilisagvik College (Alaska).  
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Figure 9.1: Major Arctic colleges and universities: Enrollment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Russian North has the most extensive system of post-secondary 
education of all the Arctic nations. As of 2011, in the nine northern re-
gions there were 136 institutions of higher education, including 25 flag-
ship universities and 111 branch campuses. The overwhelming majority 
are state institutions. While these are impressive numbers compared to 
most other Arctic jurisdictions, the level of attendance is relatively mod-
est. The number of students per 10,000 residents in all northern regions 
is below the national benchmark. Not surprisingly, the proportion of 
highly educated individuals (any form of post-secondary education) in 
the Russian North is generally lower than country’s average. At the same 
time the trend is positive, and in the last decade most northern territo-
ries experienced gains in student attendance and educational attainment 
(Figure 9.2). Perhaps, the most spectacular increase has been observed 
in Yamal-Nenets region, although it still lacks a flagship university. 
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Figure 9.2. Enrollment in post-secondary institutions in the Russian North 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In northern Fennoscandia, the university and college level offerings are 
quite substantial with many institutions, delivery sites and programs 
including distance education. There are both larger universities and 
smaller university colleges. Northern Norway has two universities and 
four university colleges. The tendency has been consolidation towards 
larger entities with university colleges merging with University of Trom-
sø. Northern Sweden has two universities as does northern Finland. 
Finland also organizes Universities of Applied Sciences, including three 
in northern Finland.  
Iceland has seven nationally accredited higher education institutions. 
The state runs four and private entities run three (with some state sup-
port). Of the seven, two are agricultural institutions, one is an art acade-
my, and four are comprehensive universities. There are also numerous 
adult education learning opportunities in Iceland, including institutions 
that specifically target the 35% of the Icelandic workforce who did not 
complete upper secondary education. Continuing and adult education are 
offered across a broad array of institutions, from upper secondary institu-
tions to higher education institutions to centers and colleges for continu-
ing education to private company and association offerings.  
For those who want to pursue a higher education in Greenland there 
is one university and a College for Social Pedagogy. The University of 
Greenland, Ilisimatusarfik, is located in Nuuk, the capital, and College for 
Social Pedagogy is located in Ilulissat. The Government of Greenland 
runs these institutions. The language of instruction is Greenlandic, Dan-
ish or English, depending on the instructor and curricula. The university 
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and college together had about 665 active students in the year 2012. In 
this same year, 406 Greenlandic students attended colleges and univer-
sities in Denmark, and 17 in other countries. 
University of Akureyri, Iceland. Year 2014. This northern university has been 
growing significantly in size both in terms of student population and physical 
capacity over the past 10 years 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photo credit: Daníel Starrason. 
 
The University of the Faroe Islands, the only university in the Faroe Is-
lands, is a small, state-run institution, consisting of two faculties in “Hu-
manities, Social Sciences and Education” and “Natural and Health Sci-
ences.” Located in Tórshavn, the capital, it enrolls about 800 students. 
The language of instruction is Faroese. Vocational education is also 
available through a vocational college. Otherwise, many students attend 
college in Denmark or other countries. 
In North America, the contrast is considerable between Alaska and the 
Canadian Arctic. Canada is the only circumpolar country to lack a universi-
ty north of the 60th parallel. Canada’s principle adult and post-secondary 
institutions in Nunavut, Yukon, and Northwest Territories remain com-
munity colleges. The territorial college system began in the 1960s as voca-
tional and adult education centers located in a handful of communities. 
Since then it has grown to include regional campuses and community 
learning centers. In Nunavut and Northwest Territories the majority of 
students are Indigenous, whereas in Yukon, Indigenous students comprise 
about one-third of the post-secondary students. Significant progress in 
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delivery of post-secondary education in northern Canada has been made 
in a relatively short period of time. Yet access to education remains an on-
going challenge, especially as it relates to geographical access. Still, change 
is imminent; on 30th June 2011, Canada’s three territorial governments 
announced that they had signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
to further explore university models. The MOU establishes a tri-territorial 
committee, which will develop options on how the three territories can 
advance university development in Canada’s North. 
Access to post-secondary education in Alaska is fairly widespread. 
The largest provider of post-secondary education is the state-funded 
University of Alaska (UA) system. The UA system has three main cam-
puses in Fairbanks (UAF), Anchorage (UAA) and Juneau (Southeast, or 
UAS), and 11 community campuses, in hub communities ranging from 
Kotzebue to Dillingham to Valdez. Alaska is also host to a few small, pri-
vate post-secondary institutions. For instance, Alaska Pacific University, 
a small, private, liberal arts institution, has operated in Anchorage since 
1960. There are also several career and technical training institutes. The 
state’s only tribal college, Ilisagvik College, is based in Barrow. A part of 
the North Slope Borough, Ilisagvik offers two-year degrees and voca-
tional and technical certificates. 
In addition to national systems of post-secondary education, the Uni-
versity of the Arctic (UArctic) has built an international and inter-
institutional higher education framework. UArctic is a key player in 
promoting, standardizing and facilitating educational exchange in the 
Arctic. It is also an umbrella for innovative teaching, distance learning 
and collaborative research (see Textbox 9.2).  
Textbox 9.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Higher education spotlights 
The University of the Arctic (UArctic) was founded in 2001 and is a cooperative 
network of universities, colleges, and other organizations committed to higher 
education in the North. In 2013 UArctic membership totals 157 higher education 
institutions and research centers, Indigenous peoples organizations, and others 
as well as associate members from outside the Arctic region.  
The overall goal is to create a strong, sustainable circumpolar region by em-
powering peoples of the north in general, and Indigenous peoples in particular. 
This is done through organizing members’ collaboration and synergy within 
thematic based multilevel networking of several kinds in education and re-
search; and through training; sharing of experiences, expertise and facilities; and 
organizing mobility programs for students and faculty. UArctic aims, through its 
members’ collaboration and networking, to generate knowledge and improve 
access to relevant post-secondary education. UArctic respects the Indigenous  
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9.3.5 Post-secondary education in the Arctic: patterns and 
trends 
Regional differences 
The Circumpolar North has different historical legacies of post-
secondary education, leading to regional differences in levels of post 
secondary educational achievement. Russia and the Nordic countries 
have a relatively high proportion of the population with post-secondary 
education, while parts of northern Canada and Alaska show a relatively 
low level. While post-secondary education has been emphasized as an 
important tool in both regional and minority development in Russia and 
in the Nordic countries, a similar trend has been missing or been entered 
into quite recently in substantial parts of the North American continent. 
Regional differences in the percentage of people in the North with post-
secondary education are illustrated in Figure 9.3.  
 
Textbox 9.1 continued 
 
peoples’ integral role in northern education by engaging Indigenous organiza-
tions and institutions in UArctic’s governance system, and seeks to engage In-
digenous organizations and institutions, in a reciprocal manner, in different 
activities and in developing understanding of traditional knowledge as one 
among different learning systems. UArctic also aims at reaching out with experi-
ence distribution and learning options in cooperation with and for the peoples 
and the communities of the North through programs, conferences, publications 
and other outreach activities. 
UArctic works in close partnership with the Arctic Council, the Arctic Parlia-
mentarians, regional scientific organizations, national authorities and Indige-
nous peoples’ organizations. The ultimate goal is to contribute to a sustainable 
North in an interdependent world by reflecting the diversity of peoples and 
cultures and knowledge systems of the Arctic. 
State Polar Academy is an institution of higher education located in St. Pe-
tersburg and designated as Russia’s “university for peoples of traditional cul-
tures.” The Academy was established in 1991 and has since graduated over 
2,000 students. The student body includes representatives of 57 Indigenous 
groups from Russia and abroad, mostly from the Arctic. The academy awards 
bachelor, master and PhD degrees. Many students return to home regions where 
they pursue careers in administration, business and other sectors (State Polar 
Academy, n.d.). 
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Figure 9.3a: Proportion of people with post-secondary education 
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Figure 9.3b: Proportion of people with tertiary education 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The differences in post secondary education policies make it difficult to 
compare jurisdictions. However, we can see patterns emerge that super-
sede national boundaries and historical legacies. Witness the high level 
of education in major resource regions, such as Yamal-Nenets district in 
Russia, and in more diversified regional economies, such as Yukon in 
Canada. Such high levels are also seen in the more urbanized parts of the 
Arctic, including Murmansk region of Russia, northern Scandinavia, and 
Iceland. Studies indicate that the bulk of human capital there are “new-
comers” or non-Indigenous residents (although there are some excep-
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tions) mostly working in resource sectors and public administration 
(Megatrends, 2011; Voswinkel, 2012). Human capital is also heavily 
concentrated in urban settlements, e.g. Tromsø in northern Norway, 
Rovaniemi in Finland, Murmansk, Salekhard, Magadan, and Noril’sk in 
northern Russia, Whitehorse and Yellowknife in Canada and Anchorage, 
Fairbanks and Juneau in Alaska. 
To provide a more revealing picture of post-secondary education at-
tainment in the Arctic and avoid definitional and historical discrepancies 
among Arctic regions, we can analyze the location quotient (LQ) of peo-
ple with a university degree, sometimes referred to as the Talent Index 
(TI) (Florida, 2002). Since LQ measures relative proportion of educated 
people in the total population, it allows comparing regional figures in the 
Arctic with a baseline, which in this case is represented by a respective 
country, illustrating human capital accumulation relative to country’s 
average. Northern regions of Canada, especially Yukon, have high con-
centration of educated professionals (in fact, in 2006 Yukon had the 
largest share of adult population with post-secondary accreditation 
among Canadian provinces and territories – 53.6% (YBS, 2008). For 
example, Anadyr (the capital of Chukotka) has a LQ 1.72, compared to 
Moscow with an LQ of 1.79. More urbanized and resource-rich Yamal-
Nenets and Murmansk regions have higher proportion of residents with 
post-secondary education compared to the rest of Russia, so do several 
Alaskan boroughs and Nuuk in Greenland. 
In fact, many Arctic cities demonstrate relatively high LQ of people 
with a university education. Very high LQs are also observed in other re-
gional (and national) capitals both in Russia and across the Arctic, includ-
ing Salekhard, Yakutsk, Umeå, Magadan, Juneau, Yellowknife, Tromsø, 
Reykjavik and Nuuk. Another large cluster of highly educated labor force 
is observed in the Yamal-Nenets region of Russia. In addition to its capital, 
Salekhard, Novy Urengoy and Nadym have LQs above 1.4. This may reflect 
the influx of educated labor migrants in the last decade as LQs in these 
cities grew substantially between 2002 and 2010. 
At the same time, the majority of Arctic territories lag behind their 
southern metropoles in formal education levels. This gap is especially 
evident in areas with relatively high Indigenous populations, such as 
Nunavut, rural Alaska, and the Nenets, Koryak and Taimyr regions of 
Russia. Small remote urban communities, such as Iqaluit, Dudinka, Tura, 
and Susuman, also have low levels of educational attainment. Slightly 
higher, but still a relatively low Talent Index is observed in the “old” 
industrial cities of the Russian North: (e.g. Noril’sk, Apatity, Olenegorsk, 
Monchegorsk, and Vorkuta).  
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Tertiary education (beyond first post-secondary degree) is skewed 
by the differences in educational systems. North American jurisdictions 
to have high levels of tertiary education (post-baccalaureate), while the 
Scandinavian and Russian North demonstrate a lower prevalence of 
tertiary degrees because post-secondary education frequently ends with 
a masters-equivalent degree. Important differences are found within 
countries: for instance, the gap between Yukon, NWT and Nunavut, Nu-
navik and Labrador in Canada, or between affluent regions of western 
Siberia and the rest of the Russian North (Figure 9.3b). 
This analysis demonstrates two gaps in Arctic post-secondary education: 
the gap between the Arctic and southern regions and the gap between ur-
ban/industrial Arctic territories and the rest of the Arctic. Generally, the 
pattern of less formal post-secondary education in the North is prevalent.  
Whereas human capital in the Arctic is typically viewed as underde-
veloped, such a view fails to reflect the variability and diversity of Arctic 
regions. Recent research points to substantial levels of creativity based 
on non-codified informal knowledge, which might not conform the con-
ventional notion of human capital (Aarsæther, 2004; Copus and Skuras, 
2006; Petrov 2007; Petrov, 2008; Petrov and Cavin, 2013). Creative hu-
man capital is critical for economic development and socio-economic 
transformation in the Arctic, as it often becomes the engine of economic 
reinvention and revitalization of a region (see Textbox 4.6 in Chapter 4, 
Economic Systems).  
Salekhard Pedagogical College, Russian Federation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit: Harald Finkler. 
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Human capital dynamics and turnover: successes and challenges in the 
Russian Arctic  
Migration plays a key role in regulating human capital accumulation in urban 
communities. Faced with the collapse of the Soviet economy and/or bust-and-
boom cycles of the resource sector many educated residents leave the Arctic 
(Petrov, 2006; Petrov, 2010). At the same time industrialization and attractive 
labor compensation brings an influx of human capital to the North during favora-
ble times. Both processes create considerable volatility and turnover in human 
capital in the region. The most effective mitigation strategy for this problem is 
education and retention of local youth. In the recent years many northern cities 
increased their own educational capacities. Yukon Territory heavily invested in 
Yukon College, Greenland developed its own university, and some Russian cities 
increased the number of institutions of higher education. In fact, the number of 
students pursuing higher education in Russia’s Territories of the Extreme North 
and Equated Areas more than doubled between 1999 and 2009 (Rosstat, 2012).  
Nonetheless, out-migration of college students is one of the primary problems 
for many northern regions. In a pilot survey conducted by the University of 
Northern Iowa and State Polar Academy in St. Petersburg, Russia (Van Drasek, 
2012), most student-northerners (90% Indigenous people) who left the Arctic in 
order to receive education in St. Petersburg indicated that there were few or no 
opportunities for higher education in their respective home regions. Prospects 
for professional success were also generally considered lower at home and stu-
dents felt compelled to pursue opportunities elsewhere. At the same time when  
 
 
Changes in post secondary education accessibility and attainment  
Access to post-secondary education is a key component in harnessing hu-
man capital. The first AHDR concluded that educational opportunities for 
Arctic residents are improving. Today, there are more educated people in 
the Arctic than a decade ago, and options for post-secondary training in the 
regions have increased. Almost every jurisdiction has a university or a col-
lege. However, regional differences within the Arctic persist: post-
secondary educational opportunities are still more extensive in northern 
Europe and Russia than in the far north of Canada and the United States. 
There is a relatively lower proportion of people with post-secondary educa-
tion in the Canadian Territories and Alaska. In addition, the ability of Indig-
enous people to access institutions of higher learning, while improving, is 
still problematic (Stonechild, 2006; Preston, 2008; Megatrends, 2011) 
While opportunities are improving, many Arctic residents are still com-
pelled to pursue education elsewhere, and their return to the home region 
after completing their education is far from guaranteed (Textbox 9.3).  
Textbox 9.3 
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Textbox 9.3 continued 
 
asked about plans to return to their home regions, the vast majority of partici-
pants replied that jobs and career prospects were the most important factors. 
Many students also indicated that they may not return to the same town, village, 
or community, but would be interested in relocating to a larger city within their 
home region. Many, but not most, also indicated that they would have stayed to 
pursue their studies and careers in the Arctic if the similar professional and 
educational and educational opportunities existed in their home region. When 
asked what could be done to improve opportunities for young people to pursue 
creative careers in their home regions most students suggested an increase in 
government spending on institutions of higher education, related infrastructure, 
and university instructors. Investment in skilled trades and jobs in Northern 
regions was also cited as a possibility to train and employ local residents rather 
than lose them to other regions.  
These results are indicative of two things. One is that Russian northern cities are 
not well positioned to educate and retain human capital. Another is that young 
northerners are willing to consider being educated and living in their home 
regions, if educational and job opportunities are good. Investment in education 
in Arctic cities in Russia and in other Arctic counties is an important priority that 
can assist in sustaining a long-term economic viability of Arctic cities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gains in post-secondary education in the last decade have been ob-
served in many Arctic regions. For example, in 1999, in NWT 46.5% of 
the population over the age of 15 had a certificate, diploma or degree 
beyond high school. This increased to 47.6% in 2009 (NWTBS, 2009). 
However, in the same period, the percent of population with a university 
degree jumped from 14.0% to 19.3%. Likewise, in 2009 there were 3.3 
times more Aboriginal people with university education than in 1999 
(NWTBS, 2009). Whereas Indigenous residents still had a dramatic uni-
versity education gap compared to non-Indigenous residents (4.9% vs. 
32.3%), the gap has been slowly closing. In addition, higher education 
institutions still struggle to retain and graduate Indigenous students. For 
example, in 2010–2011, the retention rate for Indigenous students at the 
University of Alaska was 59% compared with 75% for all students, and 
the 6-year graduation rate was 12% compared with 28% overall. Special 
programs, such as the Post-Secondary Student Support Program in Can-
ada, have been established in many Arctic countries to provide direct 
support to Indigenous students to complete post-secondary degrees 
(Usher, 2006). For example the U.S. government launched the Initiative 
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on American Indian and Alaska Native Education that seeks to expand 
post-secondary education opportunities and improving education out-
comes for all American Indian and Alaska Native students (WH, 2011). 
Figure 9.4a: Gender distribution of Arctic residents with post-secondary education 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9.3.6 Gender: feminization of human capital  
Marked changes in gender patterns of education took place during the 
last 10–15 years. Figure 9.4 illustrates how women dominate the realm 
of education in most of the Arctic. In the 1990s, women had become the 
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majority group in relation to higher education in several countries, and 
by the late 1990s, this occurred throughout most regions in the Arctic. 
Everywhere in the Arctic, with the exception of the Faroe Islands, there 
are more women with tertiary education than there are men. Northern 
Scandinavia, Russia and Alaska are three areas with the most feminized 
human capital. Some resource regions in Canada and Russia, as well as 
Greenland, Iceland and Faroe Islands show a dominance of males in rela-
tion to post-secondary education, a situation attributable to both wom-
en’s departure to pursue educational opportunities and an influx of edu-
cated male labor force attracted by the resource sector.  
Figure 9.4b: Gender distribution of Arctic residents with tertiary education 
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Many young women tend to leave the region to pursue their educa-
tional goals. This situation is prevalent in the Faroe Islands where 
more than 60% of students, especially women, leave home to study, 
predominantly in Denmark (Megatrends, 2011). There they pursue 
careers where they are able to take advantage of their acquired skills. 
This has also been the pattern in Greenland, due to the limited level of 
social acceptance traditionally afforded to highly qualified women. 
However, in recent years, women have assumed an increasing number 
of positions requiring higher education.  
The feminization of human capital is a rather new phenomenon. In 
Greenland, males dominated the educational system until around 1990, 
with 5–10% more boys than girls finishing a secondary or post-
secondary diploma or degree. However, during the 1990s and the 2000s, 
between 10 and 20% more girls than boys finished an education, and 
since 2003 more than 60% of the persons finishing an education have 
been girls (Rasmussen et al., 2010). Differences are also clearly seen in 
educational choices. Among the boys registered as active students, al-
most 70% are in vocational training and 30% in short and long term 
academic programs. Among the girls, however, there is an almost equal 
division between vocational and academic training (53% and 47% re-
spectively (Megatrends, 2011)). 
Alaska is another region where feminization of human capital over 
the last decade has led to an increase in women with post-secondary 
education (52.3% as compared to 47.7% among men). Alaskan women 
are also more educated: 29.8% of female Alaskans have post-secondary 
education as opposed to 25.2% of males. At the same time, men lead 
among adult residents with post-baccalaureate degrees (especially in 
professional and doctorate degrees, where the male to female ratio is 
1.5:1) (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012).  
Data from NWT show that while there are still more men with post-
secondary education, women experienced steady gains in the last 10 
years and by 2009 constituted 46% of post-secondary educated popu-
lation over the age of 15 (NWTBS, 2009). Women are traditionally bet-
ter represented in certain fields of study (e.g. healthcare, education 
and training, humanities) and less represented in others (engineering, 
applied sciences). However, in recent decades women gained consid-
erable ground in some male-dominated fields such as engineering, 
applied sciences, mathematics, computer and physical sciences. In the 
Russian Arctic, women dominate among residents with higher (post-
secondary) education. The gap between men and women is fairly sub-
stantial: for example, 24.5% of adult female residents of Murmansk 
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oblast’ have completed a post-secondary degree, compared to 20.8% of 
male residents. In Yamal-Nenets okrug, a region with quite different 
population structure and settlement history, the gender gap is even 
more pronounced: 31.1% of women attain post-secondary education 
and 22.8% of men. However, in rural areas the gap is less significant or 
men comprise a larger percent of university graduates than women 
(e.g. in Murmansk oblast). The Yamal-Nenets data also indicate that in 
the last decade the gender gap in favor of women was widening, par-
ticularly in urban areas (Rosstat, 2013).  
9.3.7 Indigenous vs. non-Indigenous human capital: 
closing the education gap 
The levels of engagement in post-secondary education among Indige-
nous and non-Indigenous people clearly illustrate an “education gap”. 
Closing this gap is not only beneficial for Indigenous individuals in terms 
of lifetime earnings (Howe, 2011; Hull, 2005), but will likely inject mil-
lions in the economy (Sharpe et al., 2007). It is dramatic in some regions, 
and less evident (but still present) in others. NWT is the case in point as 
a region with a drastic education differential: only 4.9% of NWT Aborig-
inal residents held university degrees in 2009 compared to 32.3% of 
non-Aboriginal persons (NWTBS, 2009). Although Indigenous people in 
NWT made formidable gains in the last decades (only 1.8% had universi-
ty degrees in 1999), the gap is still wide (NWTBS, 2009).  
In Russia, the discrepancy between Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
population can be approximated using statistics for urban (predomi-
nantly non-Indigenous) and rural (heavily Indigenous) areas. The gap in 
percent of formally educated individuals with a post-secondary degree 
varies from region to region between 5 and 20%. For example, only 
14.3% of rural residents in Yamal-Nenets okrug have attained the post-
secondary level compared to 29.2% of urban dwellers. Similarly, in Chu-
kotka higher education is reported by 7.6% of adults living in rural areas 
in contrast to 28.4% of adults living in urban settings. Only 5.9% of rural 
men in Chukotka (mostly Indigenous people) have a post-secondary 
degree, reflecting both the deep urban-rural and Indigenous – non-
Indigenous education gaps (Rosstat, 2012).  
The differences in education attainment likely arise from a variety of 
factors including differences in entrance requirements, varying levels of 
individual academic and social integration, conflict between educational 
activities and needs of traditional economy and the interplay between 
the institution and the surrounding community (Barnhardt and Ka-
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wagley, 2004; Darnell and Hoëm, 1996; Keskitalo, 1998; Rasmussen et 
al., 2010). Mainstream (western) education systems are not always ad-
justed to consider local context, community needs and aspirations of 
young Indigenous people. As noted above, pursuit of post-secondary 
education often requires a departure from northern communities, relo-
cation within their region or to outside southern cities. Many students 
felt that detachment from families and native land were difficult trade-
offs of their decision (Van Drasek, 2012). A major concern is a drop-out 
rate from both school and higher education institutions (Gilmore, 2010; 
Berger, 2006; see Part 1 of this chapter).  
Difficulties in the secondary education system faced by Indigenous 
students and low graduation rates shrink the number of northerners 
who pursue post-secondary, including trade certificates, college diplo-
mas or university degrees. The problem is exacerbated because skills 
acquired by northerners in high school (including literacy/proficiency in 
English or other language used in the post-secondary system) are not 
always at a level acceptable to many post secondary institutions. North-
erners (both Indigenous and non-Indigenous) may also be disadvan-
taged by the lack of appropriate courses and resources in their local 
schools, and by the shortage of qualified teachers. Finally, a pursuit of 
post-secondary, especially university education, most often requires 
leaving home community or even relocate outside the Arctic. 
Literature on Indigenous education strongly argues that a more effec-
tive education system in the Arctic must be based on systemic integra-
tion of a western science, knowledge and traditional (local and Indige-
nous) knowledge (Barnhardt, 2005; Berger, 2006). The integrated cur-
riculum aims to connect both cultural and instrumental needs and 
aspirations, and provide balanced training to develop skills and personal 
values commensurable with local culture (Rasmussen et al., 2010). The 
emphasis on practical skills may also curtail dropout rates, decrease 
absenteeism and enhance student performance by making studies more 
relevant and culturally valuable. These principles, for example, are em-
bedded by the new Nunavut high school curriculum developed in coop-
eration between educators and Inuit elders (CBC News, 2012). 
9.3.8 Human capital and local and Indigenous knowledge 
(LIK) 
Northern communities have informal, highly adaptive traditional 
knowledge systems that have ensured the survival of many generations 
in harsh environment conditions (Cruikshank, 2005). These systems, 
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known here as Local Indigenous Knowledge (LIK) systems, include tech-
nologies, “know-how” skills, practices and beliefs that have been trans-
ferred between generations in Arctic societies. LIK is a set of experiences 
generated by Indigenous people developed in order to adapt to local 
environments. It is embedded in community practices, institutions, and 
rituals (Berkes, 1993; UNESCO, 2013).  
The limited role of LIK in formal education, and the lack of recogni-
tion afforded to LIK as a component of human capital capacity of Arctic 
regions continues to curtail competitiveness and well-being of northern 
communities and societies. The ASI recognized the need to shift this 
practice, and more fully incorporate LIK into Arctic educational and eco-
nomic systems as a way of ensuring prosperity, improving material well-
being, and advancing human development (ASI, 2010).  
Integrating LIK requires reversing a historic trend. Throughout the 
Arctic, western educational systems have historically marginalized and 
rejected LIK. Modernization, acculturation and assimilation went hand 
in hand with the erosion of LIK. Indigenous languages, one key compo-
nent of LIK, have been under siege by education systems that use and 
impose the “colonial” language. Language retention, which is a key issue 
in ensuring empowerment and cultural vitality of Indigenous people, is 
also critical for maintaining the breadth of LIK (see Chapter 3, Cultures 
and Identities). The loss of LIK system, its replacement by the imported 
knowledge while may provide some new opportunities for local resi-
dents, also results in the deterioration of traditional economies and so-
cial institutions, brings about negative consequences that can negate 
benefits of modernization.  
Arctic societies have a unique combination of human, social and civic 
capital that provides opportunities for enhancing material well-being 
while simultaneously ensuring cultural vitality and sustaining tradition-
al livelihoods. Recent studies revealed that human capital accumulation 
and creativity of the Arctic labor force is not always associated with the 
western educational paradigm (e.g., Petrov, 2008). This is especially true 
for cultural capital (see Textbox 4.6 in Chapter 4, Economic Systems), a 
form of human capital based on economic engagement of cultural activi-
ties and practices. Cultural capital in northern communities is not corre-
lated with levels of post-secondary education, but rather is strongly as-
sociated with the vibrancy of Indigenous culture and LIK (Petrov and 
Cavin, 2013).  
Another strong economic endowment, associated with LIK and social 
and civic capital, is social economy. Indigenous societies have a long-
lived tradition of cooperation, sharing and community-building to sus-
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tain their prosperity. This knowledge finds its use in the growing social 
economy of the Arctic. For example, northern cooperatives in Canada are 
a major economic actor and an example of successful integration of 
western knowledge of business and technology and LIK (SERNNoCa, 
2012). The Arctic Co-operatives Limited in Canada is a federation of 31 
co-ops in NWT and Nunavut owned and controlled by 22,500 members. 
In 2011 co-ops reported CAD 197 million in total revenues and em-
ployed 800 workers (ACL, 2012).  
Textbox 9.4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Local and Indigenous knowledge, culture and post-secondary education 
Across Norway, Sweden and Finland, numerous academic and vocational post-
secondary programs are based in the Sámi culture. The universities in Tromsø 
(Norway), Umeå, (Sweden) and Oulu (Finland) are regarded as national hubs for 
Sámi education and research and all have specially organized Sámi study and 
research centers. Additionally in Finland both the University of Helsinki and 
University of Lapland offer Sámi language programs and Sámi-related programs 
as well as organized Sámi research. The Giellagas Institute for Sámi studies, 
located at the University of Oulu as an independent organization, has a nation-
wide responsibility to organize, introduce and provide Sami language and cul-
tural studies and research at the academic level. One adult training center in 
Finland, the Sámi Institute in Inari, offers a range of programs for the Sámi area 
including Sámi language and reindeer herding programs and organizes universi-
ty level courses together with universities.  
The Sámi University College in Norway is a college specializing in Sámi higher 
education, running programs and administration in northern Sámi language. It 
runs several types of Sámi teacher training including virtual delivery of programs. 
The college offers up to master’s degree in traditional Sámi craft (duodji), language 
and Sámi/Indigenous journalism. The college also offers programs including tradi-
tional knowledge, such as a reindeer husbandry bachelors program.  
In Canada, a unique initiative for teaching and learning traditional knowledge 
is located in Clyde River, Nunavut. Part of Nunavut Arctic College, Piqqusilirivvik is 
a cultural learning center dedicated to enabling the transfer of traditional Inuit 
culture, knowledge, lifestyle, skills, and values, taught in the Inuit language and 
based on Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit guiding principles. Students 18 and over who 
can speak the Inuit language come from all over Nunavut to attend Piqqusilirivvik 
programs. The center houses students for four-month programs (two per year) 
and programming is based on the season cycle of the year and traditional Inuit 
activities. Programs involve a mix of land-based activities, classroom courses, and 
hands-on learning. Students also learn and use digital technology like cameras, 
GPS, and computer video editing programs to document their learning and share 
traditional knowledge. Piqqusilirivvik had its grand opening in May 2011. It has 
two satellite programs, in Baker Lake and Igloolik, Nunavut. 
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9.4 Summary and trends 
In the ten years since the first AHDR, significant changes have occurred 
in northern education. Post-secondary education attainment is increas-
ing in many Arctic regions. New technologies are providing increased 
opportunities for distance education at all levels. There is growing 
recognition of the importance of local and Indigenous knowledge (LIK) 
at both the K-12 and post-secondary education levels. Indeed, the latest 
shifts in education systems described in this chapter indicate a move-
ment towards integrating different knowledge systems (Barnhardt, 
2005; Rasmussen et al., 2010) in order to maximize human development 
in the Arctic (Textbox 9.4). As western and LIK educational systems are 
increasingly intertwined, they serve individuals and communities in 
enhancing material and cultural well-being of northern populations. LIK 
not only enhances the opportunities for increased prosperity for Arctic 
communities, it gives these communities a competitive, yet untapped, 
edge in a globalized economy. 
Education and human capital development is key to economic well-
being, fate control and human development in general. And yet, numer-
ous tensions obstruct the provision of both academic and career and 
technical education. For example, there is a tension between providing 
education that is local, place-based, and based on LIK, and schooling to 
prepare students to be globally competitive. Incorporation of local and 
Indigenous knowledge into educational and economic systems of the 
Arctic is a cornerstone of Arctic prosperity in the future. But the limited 
role of LIK in formal education and lack of LIK’s utilization to enhance 
Textbox 9.4 continued 
 
The University of Alaska recently established a PhD program in Indigenous 
Studies with emphases in areas of research, education, Native languages, leader-
ship, Indigenous knowledge systems and Indigenous sustainability. This new 
PhD is designed to integrate the tools and approaches of the natural and social 
sciences in a cross-cultural and interdisciplinary framework for analysis to bet-
ter understand the emerging dynamic between Indigenous knowledge systems, 
western science and higher education. Emphasis is placed on the interface be-
tween Indigenous knowledge and science on an international scale, with oppor-
tunities for collaboration among Indigenous peoples from throughout the Cir-
cumpolar region. 
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human capital capacity of Arctic regions curtails the competitiveness 
and well-being of northern communities and societies. Creating an edu-
cation system based on LIK and one aimed at producing students pre-
pared for the global economy are not inherently conflicting goals, and in 
some places (e.g., North Slope Borough School District in Alaska) these 
are seen as complementary goals. Still, many educators and policymak-
ers see these as incompatible. 
Another tension is around where schooling is provided. While mandat-
ing that students attend boarding schools is controversial, due in part to 
past abuses and the loss of culture resulting from these institutions, in 
some places residential schools are seen as preferred or only options. 
Providing access to a broad curriculum and resources is difficult in small 
and remote schools. Moreover, maintaining local schools in many remote 
northern communities is difficult due both to population outmigration 
and fiscal constraints. 
Yet another tension exists around the use of Indigenous languages in 
education: There is both an increasing use of Indigenous languages in 
formal schooling and a continuing threat to Indigenous languages. There 
is a strong push in many northern school systems to offer education in 
the languages of the Indigenous people from those regions, particularly 
in Canada and across Norway, Finland and Sweden. At the same time, 
Indigenous languages continue to face threats across northern Russia 
and Siberia and in much of Alaska.  
Gaps persist in education outcomes across northern regions, including 
between the Arctic and southern regions, urban/industrial arctic territo-
ries and the rest of the Arctic, and between Indigenous and non-
Indigenous population in the Arctic. In addition, there is a growing gender 
gap in education and feminization of human capital: Women dominate the 
realm of education in most of the Arctic, especially in rural and remote 
communities. Across the Arctic girls outperform boys on standardized 
measures of achievement and graduate from high school at higher rates. 
Moreover, already in the 1990s women had become the majority group in 
relation to higher education in several countries, and by the late 1990s 
virtually all regions in the Arctic had moved into this situation.  
High dropout rates continue to be a major concern in the Arctic both 
from secondary schools and higher education institutions, especially 
among Indigenous students. Likewise, the high mobility of human capital 
in the Arctic is a considerable challenge; there is for much of the North a 
lot of population loss, and a prevalence of “brain drain”, “brain turnover” 
(intensive in- and out-migration of human capital) and “brain waves” 
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(surges and dips of human capital associated with the boom-and-bust 
economic cycles). 
Arctic communities will not progress without an education system 
that adequately prepares students to address all of the challenges raised 
in this report, from climate change to health threats to economic devel-
opment needs. Our hope is that the trends toward increasing graduation 
rates, integrating LIK into education systems and growing opportunities 
for women are joined by better outcomes for male students, improved 
access to education for rural and remote students and a system that 
prepares students to be successful within local and global communities. 
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10.1 Introduction 
Arctic or far-northern areas are increasingly connected into a globalizing 
international system (Aarsæther and Bærenholdt, 2001; Keskitalo, 2008; 
Keskitalo, 2004; and Heininen and Southcott, 2010; Southcott, 2005). 
Impacts of globalization vary across a range of factors: in some cases 
globalization represents an intensification of processes with which Arc-
tic communities have a long history of involvement, while in others, 
globalization brings new benefits and new challenges (Vaughan, 2007; 
and McGhee, 2004).  
This chapter discusses the impact of globalization on human devel-
opment in the Arctic, and describes the changes in systems due to glob-
alization. In comparison with other chapters in this volume that focus 
more on specific aspects of human development, this chapter considers 
how human development across these various arenas may be changing 
as a result of globalization. The chapter describes how the influence of 
globalization in the Arctic region may be similar to or different from 
globalization processes in other parts of the world and how impacts vary 
among different northern regions. Relationships between globalization 
and specific factors such as age, gender, and identity are also described.  
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10.2 Globalization as a concept and its potential 
impacts on the Arctic 
This chapter describes three main types of globalization – economic, 
political, and cultural/social, and their relevance to human development 
in the North.iv The term globalization is defined here as the process of 
increasing economic, political and socio-cultural connections. However, 
while there is general agreement that globalization compresses time and 
space and increases global interaction, there is a lack of consensus about 
its essential components, and even more disagreement about the im-
pacts on nations and communities (Ritzer, 2003).  
Although networks and linkages have always connected the Arctic to 
the rest of the world, modern globalization means more connectivity 
through information and communication systems (including internet 
technologies), and expanded global trade networks. To a large extent, the 
Arctic is influenced by globalization in the same ways as other regions 
around the globe. However, given a relatively sparse population, some 
effects of globalization such as economic pressures towards increasingly 
large-scale organization may be felt particularly keenly in the region.  
The impacts of globalization vary highly across the region, depend-
ing amongst other things on its large internal variation. The fact that 
we today talk about “the Arctic” as a region is itself a result of political 
globalization where eight separate states across a large proportion of 
the world’s area have been able to be grouped together. Variations in 
impact of globalization are not surprising given that the region itself 
has differing patterns of historical development between the “Old 
World” of Europe, where processes originated much earlier in time and 
under less developed state power, and the “New World” of North 
America, where processes are of more recent origin and have resulted 
in large social change over a shorter period, with large impacts on local 
areas. Thus, while Indigenous communities in northern Canada, Alaska, 
Greenland and Russia have in some cases only been exposed to large-
scale external change for a few generations, the impacts of globaliza-
tion have been more gradual and protracted in other areas such as the 
Fennoscandian North. Here, groups have interacted over historically 
longer times and comparatively smaller distances which are relatively 
well connected through physical infrastructure (roads and rails, for 
example) (Keskitalo, 2004).  
The impacts of globalization also differ around the Arctic region due 
to the large variation internally in any given area. A group or individual 
may well oppose certain aspects of globalizing tendencies while embrac-
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ing and welcoming others. Some organizations or industries may be 
more equipped than others to “jump scale” from operating locally to 
globally (e.g., proficiency in international languages, large networks). 
Certain groups organizing as international non-governmental organiza-
tions may be able to drive their issues on the United Nations level, while 
others may continue to act locally. Some economic actors may have the 
capacity to target new markets in other areas of the world as conditions 
change, while others may not have financial capacity to reorganize (e.g., 
in forestry or fishing, in response to increased resource conflict or to 
changes that are concurrent with globalization, such as climate change 
or extreme weather impacts) (cf. Keskitalo, 2008).  
A noodle shop in Reykjavik, Iceland, as an example of globalization in food culture 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit: Amanda Graham. 
10.3 Economic globalization: local interests, external 
actors and unstable markets 
Economic globalization in the Arctic results in internationalizing the 
economic decision-making relevant to local and sub-regional econo-
mies. Mining, oil and gas, fishing, and forestry companies, for example, 
are increasingly multinational in nature: as a result, both their deci-
sion-making and primary concerns reflect interests beyond the local, 
making local situations relevant largely in terms of resource use rather 
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than long-term employment (as would be the case more with a locally 
or even nationally based company). Economic globalization thus 
means that the role of the world market and competition for employ-
ment in resource extraction may involve distant locations that may be 
relevant to the same corporations. With the increase in large-scale 
international resource exploration, exemplified for instance by the 
current increase in resource development, mining, oil and gas regula-
tion as well as local development benefits are increasingly subject to 
discussion, as competing land-use priorities, the extent of local em-
ployment, and long-term viability are considered (e.g. Knobblock and 
Pettersson, 2010) (see Textbox 10.1).  
Textbox 10.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Globalization of economic decision-making relevant to local level  
Multiple examples can be identified of international companies that both originate in 
and come to influence Arctic states – but in most cases, moving decision-making 
farther from national, sub-regional and local contexts. The Canadian exploration 
company Dalradian Resources Inc. recently entered an agreement with private ven-
dors for 5% of the aggregate land mass and mineral rights in Norway, and Statoil – a 
now global though originally Norwegian company, which acquired the North Ameri-
can Oil Sands corporation and oil sands leases in Alberta, Canada (New Europe, 2013; 
Statoil, 2013). In 2007, one of the world’s largest aluminum producers, Alcoa Inc., 
which holds a large number of aluminum rights in Canada, the US, and Europe, 
opened a smelter in eastern Iceland, followed by another in Greenland, as part of an 
Arctic expansion (Alcoa 2013). Renewable resource companies follow the same 
pattern: forestry companies SCA and Stora Enso, of Swedish and Finnish origins, have 
operations in multiple countries (SCA, 2013; Stora Enso, 2013). 
In some cases, companies based in far northern areas have gone global. One 
example is the Royal Greenland Trading Company, established in 1774 as a Danish 
trade company with a monopoly on trading in Greenland. Royal Greenland was set 
up as a separate company in 1985, and after Greenland obtained Home Rule in 
1979, the company became a cornerstone of the Greenland government’s econom-
ic development strategy. In the first decades of Home Rule the strategy focused on 
a combination of small and large-scale activities, investing heavily in offshore 
trawlers and fishing industries in order to generate jobs in the larger towns. How-
ever, as village-based activities were declining, and prawn export became Green-
land’s dominant source of income, Royal Greenland became the world’s largest 
exporter of coldwater shrimp, its operations concentrated in a few of the larger 
towns, including the capital, Nuuk. In the 1980s over 3,000 people were employed 
in the fish-processing industry in Greenland (Rasmussen 2000a; Rasmussen, 
2008). After acquiring factories in Wilhelmshaven and Cuxhaven in Germany in 
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the 1990s, and attempts at the division of Royal Greenland in Aalborg, Denmark, to 
increase competitiveness, the company expanded into new markets. Today, the 
company’s Greenland operations, which include a total of 21 units, remain, provid-
ing jobs and income. A few of these units involve large-scale operations, but most 
involve small-scale production primarily for the home market. At present, Royal 
Greenland’s global workforce numbers 1,888, of whom 793 are in Greenland and 
the remaining 1,095 at two plants in Denmark, two plants in Germany, one in 
Poland, and one in Canada (Royal Greenland, 2011). To local areas, the Royal 
Greenland story could be read as a success in terms of its continuation and de-
velopment as a regional company and continual provision of local labor. On the 
other hand, it illustrates the decline in local low-skilled jobs that are replaced by 
technology – a common prerequisite for competition on a global market.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Historically, northern societies have often been seen as internal econom-
ic peripheries, or internal colonies, of nation states, which has an ad-
verse impact on the long-term development of diversified economies in 
northern regions (Coates, 1985; Forsyth, 1994; Haycox, 2002). Some see 
globalization as the continuation and extension of these forces. The in-
creased volatility of commodity markets, neo-liberal economic policies 
whereby regions are not compensated for their status as resource pe-
ripheries, and the limited competitive advantages due to long transport 
distances to markets, may have negative consequences for the Arctic. In 
general, the increased mobility of capital results in higher competition 
for capital and more difficulties for states to tax capital. This leads to a 
number of impacts with social consequences, which may include the 
decline of the welfare state, impacts on the power of labor unions, and 
impacts on the environment in the form of less stringent regulations. 
This may have particularly high impact on low populated areas with 
high resource values (Lyck, 2001; AHDR, 2004; Standlea, 2006). 
On the other hand, economic globalization may also have a more pos-
itive impact on northern societies: it may contribute to increasing the 
speed of development, international labor mobility, and economic 
growth – for instance, in the tourism industry. Thus, some highlight that 
globalization might be viewed as an opportunity to break internal na-
tional colonialist or imperialist processes and to become better connect-
ed to, and better able to benefit from, international markets (McMicheal, 
1996). Economic globalization may support easier access to global mar-
kets as the Internet and other tools increase interaction with consumers 
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Globalization, Indigenous peoples and the oil and gas industry in Northern 
Canada 
Oil and gas developments have been important economic drivers in the Canadian 
North for almost 100 years. Large scale oil deposits were first discovered in the 
Northwest Territories in 1969 followed by a number of oil and gas discoveries in 
the years following. The problem with these deposits was that there was no way 
to transport the oil and gas profitably to market. In 1974 a group of international 
oil and gas companies was formed to propose the construction of a pipeline 
down the Mackenzie River Valley in order to get Arctic gas to southern markets. 
Initially the Indigenous population of the region was opposed to the pipeline. 
They were concerned with the impacts these developments would have on their 
traditional lifestyles. They were also against the idea that these developments 
would occur before the settlement of their respective land claims. Their opposi-
tion led to the establishment of a royal commission of inquiry headed by Justice 
Thomas Berger. This inquiry reported in 1978 that there be a moratorium on 
pipeline construction until Aboriginal land claims were settled.  
and buyers, and the potential to customize products and services to the 
market. Such developments could potentially also strengthen economic 
diversification and create opportunities to create and maintain employ-
ment at remote locations (see, e.g., Crate, 2006; Anderson, 2006). It has 
also been pointed out that at least some of the larger northern urban 
areas have managed to adapt and harness the potential of economic 
globalization to the benefit of the region (Cooke, 2001) – not the least 
drawing upon networks existing as part of advanced industrial states.  
The potential to utilize economic globalization and an increasingly glob-
alized market to support regional centers and diversification of the econo-
my is to a large extent dependent on existing structure and legislation, e.g., 
on revenue and taxation from development, coupled with the ability to at-
tract investments. For example, the case of diamond mining in the Arctic 
illustrates how benefits to local communities and governments differ widely 
based on the country in which mining is taking place. Within Russia, the 
physical act of mining diamonds has always been a state-controlled affair, 
with multi-nationals coming into the picture only to sell on the world mar-
ket, whereas in other northern countries like Canada, multi-nationals have 
been the ones to stake the claims and operate the mining process (Crate, 
2006; Crate and Yakovleva, 2008). Improved requirements upon regulation 
and contracting between these groups for mining operations, such as im-
proved impact agreements, could support mutual long-term benefits such 
as environmental protection, compensation and profit sharing (Crate, 2006; 
Crate and Yakovleva, 2008; Kirsch, 2002) (see Textbox 10.2). 
Textbox 10.2 
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The settlement of land claims following this decision has served to significantly 
change the position of aboriginal peoples in the region, resulting in effective 
empowerment of Indigenous communities through these new comprehensive 
treaties (Dana et al., 2008).  
Unlike the situation in Norway, for instance, where the state dominates oil and 
gas developments, the oil and gas industry in the North American Arctic is largely 
managed by global private sector companies that are increasingly aware that they 
need to negotiate benefits and environmental safeguards, or a social license, with 
local stakeholders. Land claim organizations such as the Inuvialuit Regional Cor-
poration have been able to negotiate partnerships with major players in oil and 
gas development projects and are poised to become a major provider of subsidiary 
services (Nuttall, 2006). While concerns continue to exist in the region about the 
environmental and social consequences of oil and gas developments, and about 
the level of benefits that will go to local communities, positive attitudes to such 
developments may thus exist among many of the Indigenous peoples of these 
areas. However, this also means that treaty-based Indigenous organizations can 
appear to have vested interests in ensuring that projects such as the Mackenzie 
Gas Pipeline go ahead, sometimes resulting in difficult positions when global envi-
ronmental NGOs work to counter new oil and gas initiatives. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Royal Arctic Line – a transport line owned by the Greenlandic Home Rule government 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit: Harald Finkler. 
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A variation in how areas are impacted may in particular also exist be-
tween urban and rural areas. More people globally live in cities today 
than ever before in history, at least partly driven by the increasing mo-
bility of capital and economic globalization at large. At the same time, 
the increasing importance of international markets requires that busi-
ness be transacted in the English language and that production be in-
creasingly rationalized, meaning that fewer people are employed in tra-
ditional rural resource industries, even if their value to GNP remains 
high. This contributes to a transformation of northern areas similar to 
postindustrial developments and a focus on service economies occurring 
in many other areas. While the resource industry remains economically 
important, the more limited employment in resource industry over time 
complicates employment diversification and the potential to maintain 
services in rural areas in comparison with, for instance, urban regional 
centers. There is also an increasing difference between the internal mi-
grations patterns of men and women, where women may be more likely 
to move out of the region for work (Hamilton and Seyfrit, 1993; Mega-
trends, 2011; see also Chapter 2, Arctic Population and Migration).  
The ways in which these changes play out is strongly related to un-
derlying structural impacts and the demographic situation (Huskey and 
Southcott, 2010), e.g., related to the aging (European) population vs. the 
younger (North American) population in northern areas. In northern 
Europe, many rural communities are characterized by a largely aging 
population as the general trend of an aging population is combined with 
outmigration for work. With regard to small-scale land ownership, for 
instance, family forestry in northern Europe is characterized by a trend 
of absentee owners: property owners may retain ownership of family 
land but no longer live at or depend on income from the property, as 
they work in regional urban centers. This also results in areas having to 
cope with highly varying service demands as large numbers of previous 
inhabitants return to what are now their second homes in summer (e.g., 
Stjernström et al., 2013). Such changes may impact both the composition 
of the local population as well as the level of control over land use at the 
local site (see Textbox 10.3).  
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In reaction to these structural changes, multiple solutions have been 
sought, most focused on increasing and diversifying employment. In 
rural Sweden, public expectations on second home-owners from Swe-
den, Finland, Germany, and the Netherlands are that these could to some 
extent offset employment-motivated emigration. There are also some 
cases of migration related to businesses that require large areas of land 
such as dog-farming or dogsledding businesses (e.g., Müller and Marja-
vaara, 2012). However, success in such ventures may to a large extent be 
dependent on the maintenance of social services such as healthcare and 
education at the local level despite the decrease in population. While 
Gendered globalization: Greenland as an example 
Urbanization is a marked trend around the world, driven to a large extent by 
globalizing changes in employment patterns and values. Northern employment 
patterns and outdoor lifestyles have often been characterized as male oriented, 
with these historical patterns today possibly amplified by the increasing propor-
tion of women in higher education that targets specialized employment in diver-
sified employment markets. An example can be found in the case of Greenland, 
where a marked female deficit has characterized the population since the late 
1950s, largely as a result of changes in economic production in relation to work 
preference. This pattern has developed historically, following the process of 
modernization after WWII resulting in Greenlandic women marrying male 
workers from Denmark who were on temporary contracts in the building indus-
try. When they left Greenland this resulted in the first wave of expanding gender 
imbalance. At this time the fishing industry, and particularly the rapidly develop-
ing shrimp fisheries, maintained the demand for local female workers, as these 
tasks were seen as traditionally female-oriented. However, when the peeling 
process, like many of the manual tasks, became automated, the need for labor in 
the fishing industry was sharply reduced, resulting in the second wave of gender 
imbalance. After Home Rule was established in Greenland in 1979, Greenlanders 
began to take over the government and administrative jobs previously held by 
Danes. In the first decade, however, the jobs were mainly taken by males, and 
emigration of women looking for education and jobs continued, creating the 
third wave of gender imbalance, which was only somewhat mitigated by the 
shift from an economy based on the production sector towards one based on the 
service sector, which supported traditionally female labor tasks. The imbalance 
in male and female emigration patterns, related amongst other to these changes 
in employment structure, has resulted in a current gender situation involving a 
3% deficit in women (Rasmussen, 2000b; Hamilton and Rasmussen, 2009).  
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tourism has often been looked to as a potential source for employment, 
studies indicate that while tourists are often interested in the “wilder-
ness experience” in northern areas, they also require comparatively easy 
access to such sites, necessitating substantial infrastructure investment. 
Investments may, however, largely support large-scale tourism indus-
tries rather than target small-scale tourism specifically, as the former 
can gain access to media and organizational channels to reach interna-
tional customers (Müller, 2011; Keskitalo and Lundmark, 2010). Global-
ization may thus, in many cases, support large-scale rather than small-
scale developments, although synergy effects between these may exist.  
“Say No to Oil”: Protestors at Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, Tromsø, Norway, 
2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit: Harald Finkler. 
 
Immigration and migratory workers are also changing the makeup of 
communities and of labor markets. Gender issues exist here with regard 
to different kinds of potential migratory workers, for example berry 
pickers may be both women and men while oil platform workers are 
predominantly male. In addition to gender disparities, many of these 
jobs may contribute less to local long-term employment and more to 
migratory or flexible work (see Textbox 10.4). 
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The case of migrant labor in the wild-berry industry  
Research on migration and labor-market restructuring has highlighted trends 
towards globalizing labor markets with increased circularity, flexible employ-
ment, new forms of temporary contract laborers and influxes of undocumented 
migrant workers, especially in agriculture, construction and service sectors (Rye 
and Andrzejewska, 2010; Neergaard, 2009; Castles and Miller, 2009; Delgado 
Wise and Cypher, 2007; Schierup et al., 2006). The Scandinavian wild-berry 
industry is an example where both recruitment processes and regulatory 
frameworks are adjusting to new competitive global conditions (Woolfson et al., 
2011; Eriksson and Tollefsen, 2013). Since its incorporation of a large foreign 
work force, the wild-berry industry in Sweden and Finland has been recognized 
as a potentially important economic sector (SIK, 2010; Jonsson and Uddstål, 
2002; Richards and Saastamoinen, 2010), characterized by economic upgrading 
into a global commodity chain (Hedberg, 2013). The berry industry’s buyer-
driven value chain is controlled by lead companies operating in a global market, 
where Scandinavian berries are exported to China and Japan for processing into 
high-value products. The avoidance of responsibility and risk-sharing of lead 
companies and the pressures from intermediary berry companies to lower 
production costs have put low-wage workers in a highly vulnerable position 
(NAT, 2009; LO, 2013).  
In Sweden, a large majority of the labor force consists of seasonal migrant 
workers from Asia and Eastern Europe, with Thai migrant berry pickers constitut-
ing the largest group of seasonal workers (Migrationsverket, 2012). Since the 
new Law on Labor Migration in Sweden in 2008, 51,806 temporary work per-
mits have been issued, of which 18,610 were granted to Thai citizens (LO, 2013). 
EU enlargement in 2004 and 2007 made former berry pickers from Eastern 
Europe seek better-paid jobs in other EU countries, which propelled massive 
recruitment by berry companies of Asian workers to the Scandinavian berry in-
dustry. Labor rights in the industry have been weakly protected, with repeated 
reports of abuses, including human trafficking (NAT, 2009; Woolfson et al., 2011). 
Researchers have termed the last decade of Swedish labor migration policy “a 
new business-friendly ‘guest-worker’ system” (Schierup and Ålund, 2011:60) 
and the 2008 Act on Labor Migration has been strongly debated and partly re-
formed over time. Natural-resource based industries in the periphery produce 
disciplining practices of migrant workers that partly differ from those emerging 
within urban-based manufacturing, service and/or care work (Eriksson and 
Tollefsen, 2013). Nontimber forest products such as wild berries have historical-
ly and in a global perspective been overlooked and their governance usually 
neglected (Laird et al., 2010). The harvesting of non-timber forest products is 
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generally conditional on “timber-centric forestry laws” (Laird et al., 2010) and 
other legislation related to access is currently under pressure from forestry, 
agriculture and private-land tenure laws (as documented in several studies, 
Laird et al., 2010). 
In the Swedish case, these developments have led to new debates on the 
commercial exploitation of public access to forest land and berry-picking, which 
draw on longstanding historical disputes between proponents of private proper-
ty rights and advocates of the public interest (Sténs and Sandström, 2012).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Globalizing market conditions may thus have a large impact on local 
employment and job creation. While many climate change studies focus 
on adaptation to climate change (e.g. Hovelsrud and Smit, 2010), adapt-
ing to economic globalization may be as, if not more, important to those 
in the targeted resource sector. For renewable resource uses, such as 
forestry, fishing, reindeer husbandry, and tourism in northern Europe, 
studies indicate that market conditions and income play a larger role in 
the concerns of practitioners than does adaptation to climate change. 
The ways in which these industries prioritize is largely related to main-
taining employment during economic change, given the prices set for 
products on an international market. Climate change or environmental 
constraints are mainly considered to the extent to which they impact 
production, for instance, in limiting grazing opportunities in reindeer 
husbandry, impacting forest growth and harvesting conditions, or im-
pacting access to fishing resources (Keskitalo, 2008).  
At the least, these changes in the composition and societal structure 
of the population of far northern and rural areas contribute to different 
kinds of rural–urban dynamics, where we can see a trend toward rela-
tively large changes in population structure and habitation patterns, as 
well as in occupations, involving increasing urbanization and changes – 
for instance, from village to town, and from family farm to service oc-
cupations in relation to economic change and globalization (Westin, 
2012). This begs the question of how we conceptualize such popula-
tions, and requires a further understanding of the Arctic not only in 
terms of the geographically large rural areas, but in terms of interac-
tion with regional centers as well as larger global markets that often 
drive economic development. 
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10.4 Political globalization: are increasingly large 
scales of governance both empowering and 
limiting? 
In a manner similar to economic globalization, political globalization can 
be seen in a number of different ways and on a variety of levels, including 
international and supranational, national and local (see Textbox 10.5).  
Textbox 10.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Globalization and political organization on the environment 
Increased global interest in the Arctic has partly focused on environmental concerns, 
and among these prominently on climate change. While globalization is not generally 
seen to be responsible for these environmental issues, both the increased exposure 
through global media, how these issues impact the Arctic and an increasingly global 
“cosmopolitan” concern about these issues (Giddens, 2002) mean that globalization 
and environmental concerns are linked (Leichenko and O’Brien, 2008).  
Since the 1980s the world has witnessed an increasing international cooper-
ation around environmental issues (De Sombre, 2005). The Arctic has benefitted 
from this in terms of attention. Increased cooperation among Arctic researchers 
and scientists have allowed the development of consensus positions concerning 
environmental challenges (e.g. ACIA, 2005). New international environmental 
organizations, both governmental and non-governmental, have taken hold of 
these positions and adopted them as key objectives, and environmental issues 
have also sometimes interrelated with the increasing voice given to minority 
and Indigenous rights. As the first Arctic Human Development Report pointed 
out, increased global concern about minority and Indigenous rights assisted 
amongst others Arctic Indigenous peoples in their struggle to voice their con-
cerns, which included environmental challenges to the natural space that is 
important to local economies (Bankes, 2004).  
The increasing global concern around environmental issues in the Arctic also 
means that new resource development projects in the region are increasingly under 
pressure to show that their operations will minimize impacts on the environment. In 
the past, resource extraction in the Arctic often paid limited attention to negative 
impacts on the local environment. The level of pollution around the Arctic Russian 
mining city of Norilsk and mercury pollution from the gold mines around the Cana-
dian city of Yellowknife are vivid examples of highly impacting mining and resource 
exploitation. Currently, global public opinion is increasing pressure on companies 
through demands for corporate social responsibility and social licensing 
(O’Faircheallaigh and Ali, 2008). While the level of commitment to this idea varies 
across regions down to specific cases, with risks for “greenwashing”, political organi-
zation on the environment plays a part in raising the focus on the environmental 
impacts of operations and on climate change in the Arctic. 
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With regard to the Arctic, a well-established literature also exists on how 
during the 1990s political globalization helped establish the Arctic’s 
regional actors as important players in international relations, and in 
effect develop the Arctic as an international region (Young, 2005; Hein-
inen, 2005; Keskitalo, 2004). This process was largely related to state 
interests in security across East–West lines following the end of the Cold 
War, and resulted in numerous initiatives including the Arctic Council as 
well as the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (see Chapter 5, Political Systems 
and Geopolitics).  
The development of the European Union (EU) and its relationship to 
continuously wider policy areas during this time can also be seen as one 
among several developments of world regions. On an international level 
related to northern cooperation, the EU has developed both EU–Russian 
northern cooperation (on a Finnish initiative) and EU Arctic policy (for 
instance in response to a meeting between the five coastal states border-
ing the Arctic Ocean, which thus excluded many EU interests) (see Chap-
ter 6, Legal Systems). However, the strongest impact can be seen within 
EU member states: issues in which the EU has jurisdiction can funda-
mentally impact even local decision-making directly, for instance 
through directives that apply to all member states. As an example, the 
EU Water Framework Directive requires appointment of water authori-
ties at the ecosystem level, rather than the established administrative 
regional level of the state. The directive further requires development of 
local, broadly participatory water councils at the local level to feed into 
the operations of the water authorities. This shifts power towards a 
broader and different selection of actors, resulting both in potentially 
substantial participation but also in a diffusion of power from the estab-
lished administrative – and sometimes directly democratically elected – 
units of the state (e.g., Keskitalo and Pettersson, 2012). The EU may also 
influence local government levels directly by providing an additional 
source of funding, which may to some extent support local priority-
setting, and may for instance contribute to Europeanization through the 
building of networks between local governments (e.g. Pierre, 2011).  
Political globalization thus results in the transfer of power from state 
level to supranational level, but also to other levels. This often has been 
expressed as the “hollowing-out” of the state, and is frequently linked to 
economic globalization. “Hollowing out “is defined by a number of fea-
tures whereby more limited resources for the state result in responsibil-
ity for specific measures being divested upwards or downwards (cf. 
Svallfors and Taylor-Gooby, 2012). General changes in state structure as 
a result of the hollowing-out of the state include the state not able to 
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control companies moving abroad, and less tax coming in, which limits 
the state’s possibilities to support economic development and social 
welfare. Limitations in funding for welfare areas such as health may 
impact opportunities, e.g., for youth or an aging population in rural areas 
and for attracting resources for diversification and employment. This 
means that the transformation of the welfare state in relation to globali-
zation may have an increasingly significant impact on low-populated 
areas. The downscaling of the welfare state in Canada and the Nordic 
countries and the failing subsidy and support systems in Northern Rus-
sia have been seen to have negative consequences for the region (Beebe 
et al., 2004; Duhaime, 2004). 
The economic features of globalization are therefore strongly linked 
to the political and other impacts of globalization, and are often seen as 
driving force behind changes in these areas. Political globalization is also 
linked to the advent of the communications revolution, which both ena-
bles and results in the development of interest groups and organization 
on larger levels, who now compete across global arenas for recognition 
and support (Castells, 2000).  
As is the case with other processes of globalization, these processes 
result in differing responses. In general, globalization literature suggests 
that, as in the case of economic globalization, groups that may benefit 
from globalization include organized interests that are able to “jump 
scale” in order to gain international support. The first Arctic Human De-
velopment Report referred to this phenomenon when describing the 
increased global recognition of Indigenous peoples’ rights and the in-
creased transfer of legal authority to regional governments (Bankes, 
2004). On the other hand, processes of decentralization of power be-
yond the state may lead to increasingly limited access and longer dis-
tances (physical and mental) to decision-makers. Processes of decentral-
ization of power downwards, while contributing to increased local deci-
sion-making, may curtail the scope of such decision-making in cases 
where authority, but not resources, is decentralized (in line, e.g., with a 
hollowing-out of the state). Such processes may also contribute to in-
creased inequality between smaller and larger municipalities or local 
governments (e.g. Pierre, 2011; Svallfors and Taylor-Gooby, 2012).  
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10.5 Cultural and social globalization: potentially 
increased differentiation at the same locality? 
Cultural and social impacts of globalization in the Arctic are often seen as 
very complex, as they differentiate among communities and groups down 
to an individual level. Many observers have mentioned the negative cul-
tural impact that western culture has had on Indigenous communities in 
the Arctic, particularly in Canada, Alaska, and Greenland, the areas of the 
most recent settlement from the outside and where the impact of such 
settlement has been the greatest. At the same time, research on these is-
sues tends to portray these impacts as the result of colonialism and/or 
modernization rather than globalization (Bjerregaard and Young, 1998; 
Freeman, 2000) (see Textbox 10.6 for a discussion of these terms).  
Textbox 10.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Globalization and other concepts of social change 
In discussing the impacts of globalization, it is also useful to attempt to clarify its 
relationship to other large-scale forces of change. Terms that are often related to 
globalization in general include “colonialism”, “imperialism” and “moderniza-
tion”. Both “colonialism” and “imperialism” refer in different ways to the control 
of a region by an outside region or people, with “colonialism”, according to some 
definitions, referring specifically to a situation in which an Indigenous majority 
falls under the control of a foreign-based minority (Osterhammel, 2005).  
While the integration of populations into different groups or nations of greater or 
lesser internal variety is a feature of all societies over time, both concepts highlight 
the power structures and force inherent in such developments. Colonialism may 
thus include decisions made not in the interests of the particular conquered region 
and, driven by the mentality of colonialism, under the assumption that the self-
perceived superiority of the colonial civilization entitles it to rule (Osterhammel, 
2005). Such concepts of power can also be seen as inherent in the definitional right 
imposed in concepts such as “frontier,” defined as the boundary between civiliza-
tion and nature, thereby defining previous residents as part of nature rather than 
of civilization. Colonialism thus refers to overt actions often within the context of 
nation-state power. The results of such processes have had a clear impact: for 
instance, today in areas such as Arctic Canada colonialism as the imposition of an 
external world view and organization is seen as at least partially to explain many of 
the social, cultural, and economic problems that this region currently suffers. While 
the term “globalization” relates largely to an extension beyond the nation-state and 
nation-state power, mechanisms inherent in colonialism with regard to what is 
today less overt force cannot be precluded, but are rather highlighted in some 
literature, emphasizing the complex, power-laden, and varying results of globaliza-
tion (e.g., Banerjee and Linstead, 2001).  
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Textbox 10.6 continued 
 
The focus on the role of external powers has also been highlighted in con-
cepts such as imperialism, sometimes seen as the “general mode of develop-
ment of capitalism as an international system” (Liodakis, 2005: 343). In this 
regard, some argue that globalization is not fundamentally different from 
imperialism, in that it is to a large extent driven by large actors and interests, 
although those who now exert power do so in many more ways than during 
earlier periods of external domination of foreign lands (e.g., Petras and Velt-
meyer, 2000; Dale, 1999). Relative to this asymmetry of power over globaliza-
tion and globalizing features, and to the types of identities and world views 
that are expressed through them, globalization could by some definitions be 
seen as serving some imperialist aims (such as control over certain production 
by some specific entities) without explicit imperialism in the meaning of direct 
control of a foreign territory. However, as is the case with colonialism, increas-
ing globalization may both support existing power structures and the provide 
tools to challenging them.  
In general, it has been observed that the focus for instance of the 1950s and 
1960s on modernization has been largely replaced with a focus on globalization 
as a term (Jiafeng, 2009). “Modernization” was used to denote the development 
of a country or region, and often referred to large-scale developments, such as 
large-scale electrification and long-distance transportation. In this context, de-
velopments were often discussed in terms of the benefits of modernity, such as 
new technology (e.g., Black, 1966). However, in an Arctic context, “moderniza-
tion” has been used, particularly in the Canadian North, to refer to Indigenous 
peoples moving into settlements in the 1950s and 1960s: in this case, with its 
reference both to physical changes and to the desirability of such changes, large-
ly related to a view on development, a broader modernization process may thus 
also have contributed to colonialism, as it may have been driven by a colonial 
mindset and external decisions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Great variety exists among the cultures of the Arctic, and how these cul-
tures may be impacted by change (see Chapter 3, Cultures and Identities). 
As a result of impacts from the national (state) culture as well as other 
cultures in complex patterns of migration and influence (see, e.g., Box 10.4 
on Thai migratory workers), the Arctic, like other regions, is increasingly 
impacted by what is often seen as a global entertainment culture and its 
values. Studies indicate relatively high shares of Internet users as a per-
centage of population (>70%), in northern Norway, Sweden, Finland, Ice-
land, Alaska, and parts of Canada (Nordregio, 2011). Other studies cor-
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roborate that northern communities are increasingly places of modernity 
in the meaning of being seen as modernized – both with regard to living 
conditions and technology and in the self-images of the people living in 
these communities (Aarsæther and Bærenholdt, 1998).v  
Such new communications linkages and identifications may provide 
access to a larger (external) scope of identities and aspirations to choose 
from, for instance in terms of places to live. In northern Canada, re-
searchers have noted the impact of globalization in terms of providing a 
greater variety of options (Salokangas and Parlee, 2009). While such 
consequences may limit rural development and commitment to local 
areas as well as result in increasingly differentiated developments at the 
same location, they may, together with complex trends of migration and 
societal change, contribute to movement and over time limit cultural 
stress related to externally driven developments. However, lifestyle 
choices may also contribute to people’s choosing to stay in northern 
areas, for instance in desirable locations (as described for the Nordic 
countries in Westin, 2012).  
The development of hybrid or complex identities, in which individu-
als see themselves as a mix of traditional and modern elements, have 
been emphasized in research. With regard to the impact on highly local-
ized as well as on Indigenous culture, Csonka and Schweitzer discuss the 
impact of new communications technology, noting that Indigenous cul-
ture is not disappearing, “rather, it is modernity that becomes in-
digenized” (2004: 51). In a manner similar to Robertson’s notions of 
“glocalization” as concurrent local–global change (Robertson, 1995), 
Csonka and Schweitzer (2004) thus note the culturally empowering 
influences of global changes. Within this context, a reassertion of Indige-
nous culture has taken place, but also a redefinition of local identities in 
the wake of deindustrialization and with increasing awareness of for 
instance environmental and cultural values (see Chapter 3, Cultures and 
Identities. and Chapter 11, Community Viability and Adaptation). For 
instance, researchers in northern Canada have described the way in 
which global demand for Inuit art has not only improved the economic 
situation of communities such as Cape Dorset in Nunavut but also en-
hanced the voice of Inuit culture in the world in other spheres (Double-
day et al., 2004). 
Changes due to social and cultural globalization may thus increasing-
ly result in some homogeneity but also in increased heterogeneity in the 
same location, dependent on resources, choices, and societal subgroups, 
including across gender and class. The increasing focus on standing out 
in a more globalized media stream may, however, also result in further 
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“exotification” of the Arctic, which may enhance the identification of 
traditional components that can be sold, e.g., for tourism or broader 
media consumption (Viken, 2006). 
Entertainment at the ICC General Assembly, 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit: Harald Finkler. 
10.6 Summary of major trends and gaps in 
knowledge  
Globalization constitutes a trend with highly varying impacts, where the 
extent to which globalization plays a role may differ within the same 
community, down to the individual level. Differences within the Arctic 
include differential development tracks in terms of “Old World” and 
“New World”, with trends differing between northern Europe and North 
America (Keskitalo, 2004). From this perspective, the “Arctic” can be 
seen as a region with highly differing characteristics and situations. 
At the same time, many globalizing changes have similar impacts 
across most areas of the Arctic, largely related to its connotation of pe-
ripherality to major markets. Globalization represents an intensification 
of many of the effects brought about by modernity and by industrializa-
tion. Intensification of resource development in the North as a result of 
globalization may increase the conflicts between international economic 
forces and those of local use and local employment, and may largely 
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decentralize economic decision-making from the regions it impacts. In 
many instances globalization means increased dependency of local in-
terests on external powers and unstable markets. At the same time, the 
forces of globalization have also brought about many economic oppor-
tunities for northern areas, including increased development in resource 
use, creating some local employment. While politically globalization has 
partly been seen as leading to the weakening of the nation-state’s ability 
to maintain the services relevant for all its population, it is also some-
times seen as resulting in increasing empowerment of new regional ac-
tors. Culturally, globalization brings with it increasing and diversified 
impacts, but also represents the ability to find new support for tradi-
tional and local cultures. Globalization may then also be linked to some 
degree of political and cultural empowerment, depending on group and 
accessibility to different structures of decision-making.  
While a traditional focus in Arctic literature has so far resulted in an 
emphasis on areas that remain traditional rather than on the large 
changes taking place, and subsequently in a relatively limited focus on 
globalization in literature pertaining to the Arctic, globalization is an 
increasing impact in the areas. An increasing focus thus needs to be 
placed on how different state systems and regulations (for instance, 
revenue sharing systems) cause fundamentally different impacts and 
development trends in different countries and sub-regions. Local actors 
are here not necessarily passive objects of globalization, but may “resist” 
and/or co-opt the effects of globalization, and may adapt to globalization 
by using the same tools that globalization uses. They may, for instance, 
adopt external trends and images to make them fit local needs. At the 
same time, these relatively small-scale economies are also highly de-
pendent on the existence of health care, education, and other social ser-
vices, as well as on revenue from local resources, even if they are pro-
duced for global consumption, to be competitive in the future.  
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Endnotes for this chapter 
iV The well-known Global Policy Forum has four categories: economic, cultural, political, and legal (n.d.). 
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11.1 Introduction  
This chapter emphasizes the linkages between sub-systems within 
communities, and how they interact and impact each other with differ-
ent implications for future development of communities. The task here is 
to focus on evidence of linkages and feedbacks between social struc-
tures, socio-economic conditions, health and well-being and demogra-
phy, as well as some of the overarching geopolitical, physical and bio-
physical sub-systems and globalization of communities and settlements.  
In this chapter, the terms “community” and “settlement” are distin-
guished from each other: community includes political, social and cul-
tural linkages, while settlement refers to physical and territorial factors. 
The ways communities respond to challenges and opportunities differ 
within and between nations and regions, and within and between set-
tlements in the same region. While it is not feasible to describe the full 
range of such differences in the Arctic, this chapter aims to illustrate 
different examples of “good practices” for responding to challenges. 
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The chapter emphasizes the complex linkages between community 
development and processes such as socio-economic impacts, globaliza-
tion, and environmental change. While bio-physical systems may be 
characterized by delicate balances, thresholds, and tipping points, socio-
economic systems may be characterized by the fluidity, flexibility and 
adaptation of communities.  
The chapter is organized around the basis, dynamics, and perspec-
tives of communities and how these are shaped. The second section in-
troduces the types of settlement structures throughout the Arctic, em-
phasizing similarities and differences across the region. Next, we pro-
vide an overview of different types of factors contributing to both 
maintaining and changing communities. Different types of dynamics are 
identified and elaborated: first, the question of communities inside or 
between settlements; second, the consequences of more Arctic commu-
nities being developed as diasporas with important relations outside the 
Arctic; third, the urbanization process in the Arctic; fourth, the estab-
lishment of communities within settlements; fifth, the consequences of 
changes in the economic base; sixth, the impact of newcomers to the 
Arctic; and lastly, the impacts of on-going climate change. We then move 
on to discuss the perception of communities as seen by stakeholders as 
“insiders”, i.e., how different groups have very different considerations 
and visions on community life, determined through such characteristics 
as gender, generation, and vocation. The fifth section assesses the trends 
and processes that influence adaptation and viability of settlements and 
communities in the Arctic. 
The first AHDR identified three major challenges facing Arctic com-
munities that are relevant to community viability: urbanization, com-
mercialization, and privatization. In addition, globalization was noted as 
affecting the Arctic (see also ASI, 2010: 52), and will be partially includ-
ed here (see also Chapter 10, Globalization). Also, the first AHDR was 
primarily based on selected case communities of approximately the 
same size and with similar socio-economic characteristics, which facili-
tated the comparison between them but also limited the representation 
of the variations of communities. This chapter uses cases to illustrate the 
variations between different types of communities and the complexity in 
generalizing between cases.  
Since the first AHDR, the process of urbanization has been confirmed 
as one of the major factors in current human development and is dis-
cussed here in connection with settlement structures, demography, and 
social and economic consequences. The challenges of increased com-
mercialization in the Arctic are less clear, and this chapter illustrates 
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considerable variations throughout the Arctic. Currently commercializa-
tion in both national and local economies pertains more to large-scale 
industrial operations than to local renewable resources, but the im-
portance for local economies has diminished with the expansion of 
large-scale resource extraction. The divide between the center and the 
periphery has increased since the first AHDR.  
Privatization has become a major force in the present Arctic devel-
opment context. Furthermore large-scale mining, energy exploitation 
and industries led by global companies have turned into major drivers of 
change. In the first AHDR (2004), privatization was perceived as a pub-
lic-private partnership between the community and the outside world, 
but such partnerships are not as common as were anticipated. Partner-
ships are indeed formed, but business decisions are often taken without 
full participation of communities. The partnerships are also often gen-
der-biased with a focus on male employment skills and interests, while 
female qualifications and interests are not equally included (Sloan, 2006; 
Ingolfsdottir, 2011; Megatrends, 2011).  
In the first AHDR two developments that were predicted to become 
important for community development have not materialized: 1) devel-
opment based on combined pre-industrial and welfare economies, and 
2) jobs based on public initiatives. Instead, the current reality shows that 
community development is more dependent on innovation and new 
initiatives, combined with welfare systems and transfer payments.  
Finally the important question of climate change impacts was almost 
totally absent in the chapter on Community Development in the first 
AHDR. It is clear that the current rate and magnitude of climate change 
and the consequences for the social and ecological systems have become 
a general characteristic of most discussions in relation to Arctic futures. 
Even if the direct consequences of climate change on communities cur-
rently are less critical than socio-economic challenges, the Arctic as a 
region is facing major questions on how to handle present and projected 
changes. The ten years that have gone by since the first AHDR show 
marked – and in some cases fundamental – changes in the Arctic com-
munities as a result of the impacts of climate change. 
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11.2 Community basis  
11.2.1 Settlements and communities 
Settlements are defined here as the physical layout of multiple commu-
nities, containing different smaller entities. The structure, size and char-
acteristics of settlements vary considerably across the Arctic. Therefore, 
the impact of current processes of globalization and connectivity also 
vary and may have greater effects on settlements that are more deeply 
grounded in history, reliant on natural resources and with close social 
relations and interdependencies within the settlement. The number, size 
and location of settlements, towns and cities are changing through histo-
ry, due, in part, to natural catastrophes, decay or abandonment of set-
tlements due to epidemics. Likewise the temporary characteristics of 
some settlements are connected to events such as booms and busts in 
fish stocks (Hamilton et al., 2005), or exploration of non-renewable re-
sources such as oil, gas, and minerals (see Textbox 11.1).  
A broad set of factors determines settlement patterns, the structural 
traits they have, and whether settlements of different types exist at any 
point in time. Important factors include demographic dynamics, natural 
reproduction, and migration and mobility characteristics of settlements. 
Textbox 11.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction to settlement development 
The resources of the Arctic have been of interest to Euro-American colonialism 
and capitalism for centuries, causing many similarities in the development of 
the settlement patterns throughout the Arctic.  
Among the major similarities were the monopolistic conditions of colonial-
ism, such as seen for example in the cases of the Royal Greenland Trading Com-
pany in Greenland, the Hudson's Bay Company in Canada, and the Russian Com-
pany in Alaska.  
The result has been settlement patterns which can be described as a con-
glomerate of similar settlement policies, very different commercial and indus-
trial policies, and at the same time closely related to the traditional use of re-
newable resources.  
Early resource usage required a dispersed and flexible settlement structure, 
but through the process of modernization and industrialization, it became nec-
essary to connect places by creating communication infrastructures and labor 
markets, and to develop social institutions. But above all, changes in resource 
usage required much more centralized (as opposed to traditionally dispersed) 
structures (Rasmussen, 1998; Duhaime, 1987).  
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Textbox 11.1 continued 
 
During the 1950s and 1960s, only limited resistance against centralization 
tendencies was articulated, or the resistance was suppressed by governing bod-
ies. But with growing consciousness about traditions, especially connected to the 
effort towards self-determination during the 1970s, new perceptions of what 
could be an optimal settlement structure evolved. In the case of Greenland, the 
traditional settlement pattern was directly accentuated through Home Rule 
Policy, emphasizing that “the villages should be the backbone of the settlement 
policy.” But even when the official policy was stressing the importance of a con-
tinuous existence of the smaller settlements, the concentration process contin-
ued through the process of urbanization, with growing populations in the larger 
settlements and a decline of the share of the population living in smaller settle-
ments (Duhaime, 1991; Duhaime et al., 1996).  
For most of the Arctic, the majority of the population is today living in large 
settlements – towns and villages. Looking at the settlements in the Arctic outside 
Russia, more than 75% of the settlements have a population below 1,000 inhab-
itants and encompass only just below 15% of the total population. In contrast, 
less than 25% of the inhabited places have more than 1,000 inhabitants, but 
encompass above 85% of the population. The number of larger settlements is 
increasing while the smaller places tend to decline both in number and in size. 
This pattern – a few but large settlements combined with a large number of 
small places clustering around the larger places – is a general characteristic of the 
settlement structure. Most small settlements are placed in relation to a land-sea 
continuum and primarily based on the more highly productive parts of the sea, or 
inland along the large resources where resources for fisheries, hunting of sea and 
land mammals are abundant and where ample grazing resources are available. 
Another characteristic group in the Arctic settlement structure is the medium-
large scale settlements dominated by administrative and educational activities. 
The map below provides an overview of all settlements in the Arctic with a 
focus on population change during the period 1990–2010. All settlements with 
less than 5,000 inhabitants are shown as dots while settlements with 5,000 or 
more inhabitants are shown as circles with an area equivalent to the population 
number. The colors indicate the direction of change, with yellow showing places 
where no changes have taken place, red indicating places with a declining popu-
lation, and blue showing places with a population increase. The insert shows a 
map of the northern part of Scandinavia, Finland and the Kola Peninsula where 
the settlement density is highest. The map highlights a marked divide in the 
speed of change between the Arctic part of the eastern and the western hemi-
sphere. Most of the smaller places in Fennoscandia and Russia have been declin-
ing markedly in size, while in Russia a substantial number of the larger places 
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Textbox 11.1 continued 
 
have also suffered a similar fate. Changes especially in terms of declining birth 
rates have been a major factor, while out-migration from smaller to larger places 
and continued migration out of the Arctic has been important in the Arctic as a 
general pattern. Urban areas have experienced major growth as educational 
opportunities are available and new jobs related to the knowledge and service 
economies have provided new opportunities for upcoming generations (Hansen 
and Rasmussen, 2013). See Textbox 3 where further detail on the present distri-
bution and trend in settlement development is discussed. 
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While settlements are considered as being individual physical settings, 
communities are social units within them. Communities can reach be-
yond individual settlements. Therefore, the viability of communities is 
connected both to physical space, the surrounding environment and a 
sense of common identity. As a consequence, communities are social 
constructs based on dynamic relationships between people, and can 
therefore serve as sites for negotiating community sustainability and 
viability (Davidson et al., 2003). In addition, people’s ability to cope with 
change is influenced by power relations and the broader political con-
text (see Chapter 5, Governance in the Arctic). Smaller communities in 
the Arctic are often characterized as being flexible and based on a diver-
sified resource base.  
The community of Siorapaluk, Greenland, in 2007, one of world’s northern most 
settlements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit: Shari Gearheard. 
 
A focus on “community as a social unit” provides the context within which 
we may capture and understand the multiple factors creating viable and 
adaptive communities, or why a community is not viable or does not 
adapt to changes or risks (Harries and Penning-Rowsell, 2011). Interac-
tions among different stakeholders across administrative and political 
scales can potentially enhance the adaptive capacity of communities, 
while a lack of tradition and methods for building institutional knowledge 
may affect communities negatively (Glaas et al., 2010). In addition, the 
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viability of a settlement or a community is closely related to whether basic 
everyday security needs are met, ranging from concerns about the state of 
the environment, to the possibility of earning a living, to health care and 
education, to protection from imminent (physical) threats (Hoogensen et 
al., 2009; Dale, 2011; Hoogensen, 2012). In addition to socio-economic 
and ecological viability of communities, an understanding of how physical 
settlements are developed and maintained to ensure that communities 
can thrive is vital. This focus highlights the importance of population 
movements and subsequent processes of urbanization in some Arctic 
areas and de-population in others. It also reveals that there may be a 
competition between settlements (villages, towns, regions, and countries) 
when it comes to being attractive to new inhabitants. 
Textbox 2 illustrates how an overarching management scheme aims 
for knowledge-based approaches which sets parameters for the way 
actors, both within and beyond local communities, may or may not uti-
lize these resources.  
Textbox 11.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Management of settlements and communities 
Most Arctic settlements did not appear randomly, but have evolved as part of 
development which requires conscious planning and management processes; in 
some cases involving the inhabitants of the settlements, and in other situations 
based on top-down processes (Duhaime, 1991).  
While communities were formerly dependent on local resource extraction, 
the spectrum is now much wider and influenced by global development. Use of 
living resources has become polarized. On one hand with focus on effective and 
capital-intensive large-scale commercial fishing. These are usually based in 
larger settlements along the coast and generating products delivered to the 
world market. And on the other hand combinations of small-scale commercial 
fisheries, recreational and subsistence fishing which have evolved into distinct 
features of both coastal communities and inland fisheries along larger rivers and 
lakes. This raises significantly the issues of management of resources on the one 
hand – preserving the highly efficient distance fishing – but also the continued 
development of sustainable local fishing. These local fisheries also contribute to 
maintaining activities that are seen as an essential characteristic of coastal areas 
(Johnsen et al., 2005).  
The increased focus on mineral and energy resources in the Arctic adds to the 
complexity, both in relation to activities on land and in the sea. Modernization and 
restructuring of public administration has been a central theme in the Nordic 
countries after World War II, with the first part of the process starting 
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Textbox 11.2 continued 
 
back in the 1960s, and another part of the process becoming a common theme 
for debate in all the Nordic countries during the past 10–15 years. The first part 
of the process may be characterized by two factors; a response to the significant 
changes in the industrial structure after World War II, and a response to the 
process of urbanization. In addition, the increased concentration of the popula-
tion necessitated a shift from isolated small communities to more integrated 
functional units as part of the development of the Nordic welfare model. The 
pace of change has been largely related to the degree of dependence on local 
resources in combination with migration and increasing urbanization (Greve 
Harboe and Rasmussen, 2014). 
These changes have resulted in demands for adjustments in the adminis-
trative hierarchies. In this connection the municipal structures and reforms 
have been important because this means both delegation and withdrawal of 
responsibilities from or to communities. It is a process which can be character-
ized as a double-edged sword: On one hand, the delegation of responsibilities 
takes place from state authorities to regions and municipalities which enables 
the municipalities to make decisions at a higher level. On the other hand, it 
increases the size of the municipalities whereby the distance between individ-
uals and local decision-making powers are increased (Roto et al., 2013; Hansen 
and Rasmussen, 2013).  
The processes of strategic, environmental, and social impact assessments are 
becoming an important part of planning processes where public hearings some-
times enable individuals and communities to become decisive in the planning 
process. There are national differences in the precise outlining of the processes, 
but also attempts to promote similarities and comparability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Arctic settlement structures range from complex heterogeneous urban 
centers to smaller settlements where livelihoods are based on utilization 
of local resources. Settlements are typically located near the sea, or in-
land in connection with river and/or lake systems, where marine or 
fresh water resources are abundant. The increasing importance of ur-
banized centers and cities has evolved into a situation where they have 
become points of attraction of population – especially young persons 
and women – from the more peripheral settlements.  
Globalization processes such as the industrialized utilization of natu-
ral resources for the global market are increasingly a major force of 
change in many Arctic communities. For example, in fishing communi-
ties where market mechanisms have strained the economy of small-
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scale producers, larger vessels increase their catch but reduce their 
number of employees. This is affecting communities where viability is 
linked to employment in fisheries. Additionally, onshore processing fa-
cilities have become more efficient and can handle increasing amounts 
of biomass, but are employing fewer people (Johnsen et al., 2005; Jentoft 
and Chuenpagdee, 2009). Similar situations characterize other uses of 
renewable resources and such changes emphasize three important di-
mensions of such uses: resource exploitation as a basis for 
(re)construction of identity, as a foundation for the development of ways 
of life, and in the context of economic and societal development.  
Hammerfest an oil and gas town, Norway 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit Grete: K. Hovelsrud. 
 
While the majority of the Arctic population lives in urban areas and 
towns, small settlements still outnumber large centers. Most small set-
tlements, in differing ways, still utilize nearby natural renewable re-
sources. An increase in medium-scale settlements dominated by admin-
istrative and educational activities is another typical feature of the Arc-
tic. These small-scale urbanized hubs, with relatively stable economies, 
represent an important “backbone” in the Arctic settlement structure.  
Finally, there are a few very large settlements or cities which contin-
ue to grow both in importance and in size due to their attractiveness as 
administrative, economic, cultural and educational hubs, providing a 
broad diversity of services, and thereby becoming attractive to younger 
people and especially younger women pursuing higher education oppor-
tunities and jobs requiring these skills.  
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11.2.2 Demographic challenges 
The different patterns of demographic change in the Arctic are a useful 
starting point for explaining why settlements and communities are ex-
posed to different demographic challenges; not least by an increasingly 
diversified and mobile population. People move for a number of reasons, 
such as jobs, education, lifestyle preferences, and partaking in a global-
ized world. The move from a dependency on natural renewable re-
sources (fisheries, forestry, hunting and gathering, herding) to a more 
diversified economy requires a specialized workforce, access to schools 
and universities, and lifestyle changes.  
Chapter two, Arctic Populations and Migration, in this report provides 
details on different demographic components and an overview of the re-
gional differences in demographic structures and transitions (see also ASI, 
2010 on population indicators). A synthesis of such demographic charac-
teristics highlights the role of population dynamics in community devel-
opment and viability. If the birth rate does not outpace the death rate, or if 
out-migration exceeds that of in-migration, the population may be at risk 
of declining and the future of the settlement may be vulnerable. Gender 
imbalance may result if there are more women than men leaving the 
settlement. Yet another demographic vulnerability may be caused by a 
deficit of certain age groups, such as young people ages 15–24, leaving the 
settlements and looking for educational opportunities elsewhere. 
11.2.3 Cultural base of the communities  
Culture encompasses virtually all aspects of human life including lan-
guage, knowledge, worldviews, beliefs, norms, values, social relation-
ships, perceptions of risk, power relations, and understanding of and 
responses to the world we live in (Crate, 2011; see also ASI, 2010: 92, 
101, for further discussion of cultural aspects). Culture is dynamic and 
permeates rural and urban communities alike. It is important for main-
taining identity and a sense of belonging. In a multi-cultural society, cul-
ture also carries potential for creating unequal power relations and con-
flict when some cultural features are promoted more than others. Cul-
tural elements shape community viability, resilience, and both adaptive 
and maladaptive responses to socio-economic and environmental 
changes (see Chapter 3, Cultures and Identities; ASI, 2010 on indicators 
of cultural vitality).  
Arctic communities often comprise numerous cultural and ethnic 
groups, and are highly dispersed with approximately one-third living in 
settlements of less than 5,000 people. The Indigenous peoples of the 
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Arctic belong to the following major language families; Eskimo-Aleut, 
Na’Dene, Uralic-Yukagiran, Finno-Ugric and Altaic (AHDR, 2004: 47 
(map)). The distributional relationship between Indigenous and non-
Indigenous languages and cultures is highly variable within and between 
settlements, regions, and nations.  
For many communities in the Arctic, culture and identity is closely re-
lated to farming, fishing, reindeer husbandry, hunting, sewing, handi-
crafts, and berry picking, whether full-time or as recreational activities. 
Such activities are also highly valued in more industrially-based com-
munities, which are rapidly increasing in number. The continued prefer-
ence for locally produced food suggests that an industrialized society 
does not necessarily exclude hunting and gathering activities. 
11.2.4 Food security, subsistence and informal economies 
Locally produced food plays an important role in the Arctic, including for 
health and cultural well-being (see Chapter 8, Human Health and Well-
Being). Such foods are also sold and exchanged in both formal and in-
formal markets and shared, bartered and exchanged within complex 
social and economic relationships. With increased reliance upon import-
ed food stuffs in some communities, less locally produced foods are con-
sumed, with implications for health and convenience. Imported food 
products are not replacing local products entirely because harvesting 
activities for household consumption are maintained in many instances. 
But more traditional sharing systems among many Indigenous peoples 
have changed, often resulting in a reduced supply of local foods 
(Duhaime and Bernard, 2008). This trend is reversing in other regions, 
such as Norway, where interest in local foods is increasing.  
The role of local food products in the informal economy is difficult to 
assess in monetary terms, but it is clear that both the subsistence activi-
ties themselves and the consumption of the food-stuffs are considered 
vital to many household’s well-being and cultural identity (see Textbox 
11.3; also ASI, 2010, where “living close to nature” is identified as one of 
the components of well-being in the Arctic). Recent records of informal 
food distribution and transactions in Greenland – including home con-
sumption, distribution to friends and families, products informally sold 
across municipalities, at the municipal Kalaaliminerniarfik (open air 
markets as described in Textbox 11.3), and distributed to homes for 
elderly people – show a contribution to the national economy of around 
1.5% of GNP (Rasmussen 2005, Rasmussen, 2010). It has long been es-
tablished that harvesting activities cannot take place without cash in-
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The role of local food and the informal economy 
Marquardt and Caulfield (1995), in their analysis of local market development in 
Greenland, demonstrate not only how subsistence activities in Greenland co-
exist with the formal economy, but also that the discourse in Greenland has 
included subsistence and informal marketing as important elements in economic 
development. Through their analysis, they show how the informal local markets 
– the Kalaaliminerniarfik – “brættet”, arose in the 18th century to meet the needs 
of the employees of the church and the KGH (Royal Greenland Trade Company). 
They show how the local markets were used as a kind of “leveller” which re-
moved differences in access to imported goods between Greenlandic hunters and 
those working for the colonial authorities.  
The markets worked as redistribution channels through which hunters were 
able to obtain the necessary funds to buy European goods, while Greenlandic and 
Danish salaried employees were able to access valued country foods and locally 
produced items of clothing and other goods. Without the local markets a more 
clear separation might have developed between subsistence and commercial 
activities. The local markets enabled an integration of the two systems and en-
sured that the population of most of the major towns had access to nearly all 
types of country foods. It has further enabled the transition of these highly val-
ued food items into shops and supermarkets as commercial food items through-
out Greenland. The informal sector which provides traditional foods to almost all 
settlements in Greenland contributes approximately 1.5% of the GDP while at 
the same time the commercialization of the products is adding substantially 
more to the economy (Rasmussen, 2005). 
The situation in Greenland is by no means unique to the Arctic. Similar de-
velopments have taken place elsewhere, and the accompanying photos show 
how traditional food items are available through small informal market places as 
well as in the larger stores in a variety of places in the Nordic Countries and 
northwest Russia. 
come, illustrating the close connections between the formal and infor-
mal economies and subsistence and commercial production (e.g. Dahl, 
1989; Hovelsrud-Broda, 1999).  
Textbox 11.3 
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Supermarket in Illulissat, Greenland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit: Rasmus Ole Rasmussen. 
Sale of whale meat. Oslo, Norway 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit: Rasmus Ole Rasmussen. 
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There is a continuum of options for access to local versus imported food. 
The commercialization of local foods and distribution through supermar-
kets and specialty shops enables the population in most parts of the Nor-
dic countries, Faroe Islands, and Greenland, to access many traditional 
food items. The right of common access (allemannsretten) in Fen-
noscandia provides an opportunity for all to pick berries, mushrooms and 
other sought after food stuffs, resulting in a situation in which many peo-
ple are harvesting local foods. Historical use has become a popular legal 
right, and in some instances has caused conflict over the resources (i.e., 
cloudberry “wars” in northern Sweden and northern Norway). In Canada, 
where the sale of country foods is regulated by food safety laws, residents 
are trying to ensure access to local country foods through means such as 
elder/youth hunting/gathering programs, like one in Nain called “Aullak, 
Sangilivallianginnatuk: Going on the land, Growing strong” where volun-
teer hunters are teaching youth hunting skills and harvesting. The pro-
gram is helping ensure access to local foods for households in need (thus 
supporting food security in the present) and supporting the future food 
security of the community (through skills development).  
Research on food insecurity in Canada has highlighted the intersect-
ing nature of environmental and social stresses, including on-going pov-
erty, the high cost of store-bought food, and increasing difficulties in 
obtaining country foods (Chan et al., 2006). Food security in the Arctic, a 
key element in community viability, is in large parts of the region closely 
tied to the so-called, “Arctic public health dilemma” (Bonefeld-Jørgensen, 
2009). One concern is that the accumulation of environmental toxins in 
the food chain ends up in traditional food sources that consist of nutri-
ents and fatty acids essential for healthy living. In addition to threats 
posed by pollution from the south, large-scale industrial resource devel-
opment mainly in the North American and Russian contexts also threat-
en food security, health, and well-being of many communities, mainly 
due to environmental pollution or the limitations it creates in terms of 
access to hunting, fishing and gathering areas (AMAP, 2004; Loring, 
2010; Ford and Maeaumier, 2011). Local food gathering activities are 
important to health and well-being in Fennoscandia, but without having 
a strong subsistence component. Such activities are culturally and his-
torically entrenched in the rural population at large, across settlements 
and communities. Fennoscandia has a long history of co-existence be-
tween Indigenous, non-Indigenous and different ethnic groups, creating 
a pattern of multiple and localized identities with strong ties to food. 
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Local food-stuffs sold on the open market in Greenland, Kalaaliminerniarfik 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit Grete: K. Hovelsrud. 
11.3 Community dynamics 
The current rates and magnitude of demographic, social, economic, and 
environmental change in the Arctic have significant impacts on commu-
nity viability and adaptation. The processes taking place are highly com-
plex and interlinked. The purpose of this section is to highlight some of 
the processes and dynamics that have had an impact on communities in 
the past decade and may be expected to continue into the future. This 
section is closely linked to Chapter 10, Globalization.  
11.3.1 Urbanization 
Urbanization both in and outside of the region has a strong influence on 
Arctic communities (see also ASI, 2010: 52). The processes of urbaniza-
tion are often met with scepticism in communities but are also seen as a 
necessary way of adapting to a changing world (Christiansen, 2013). As 
described in a recent report on megatrends influencing Arctic communi-
ties (Megatrends, 2011), urbanization was for a long time tied to industri-
al development, bulk trade from primary industry (mostly from the fisher-
ies, hunting and herding) and public administration. With the emergence 
of a “knowledge society”, educational possibilities also shape the future of 
Arctic settlements, as centers providing primary, secondary, and higher 
education become attractive as permanent places of residence (Dahlström 
and Hedin, 2010). Examples of this trend are the ways the establishment 
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of universities in Tromsø, Norway (1972) and Nuuk, Greenland (1987) 
have spurred development and growth (Hedin, 2009).  
In the Russian context, the strengthening of educational and research 
centers in Murmansk and Arkhangelsk in Russia has been important, 
although specific Russian circumstances have led to a present decrease 
in population in both cities. Additionally, the Arctic has been an im-
portant geopolitical arena for Russia. Development of urbanised settle-
ments has also been characterized by military presence. From the mid-
1930s onwards, Soviet state policy in the Russian Arctic began to regu-
late the process of developing the Arctic regions and urbanizing the So-
viet Arctic. The urge to use Arctic natural resources for the development 
of the national economy provided the driving force for these processes 
and political presence superseded the external threat factor. In 1933–
1935, the issues of studying, developing and colonising the archipelagos 
of the Barents Sea came under the supervision of the Main Directorate of 
the Northern Sea Route, marking the transition to the centralised admin-
istration of these processes (Zahlkind, 2013). The fall of the Soviet Union 
in 1991 has resulted in a massive out-migration from the Northern pe-
riphery. Price liberalization, the fiscal decentralization and a shift in 
Russia’s approach to the development of its Arctic and sub-Arctic re-
gions have been the major causes for out-migration (Heleniak, 1999). 
Another example of an urbanizing centre is Iqaluit, the capital of Nu-
navut, Canada, where many Nunavut residents (a majority of them Inuit) 
move to seek education and government and administrative jobs. The 
challenge here is the possibility of extending rural and small community 
identity into an urban space (Abelsen, 2013). Indigenous identity, how-
ever, may not necessarily be either urban or rural. Many have skills in 
several cultures, and have multiple identities (see Chapter 3, Cultures 
and Identities). For example while living in cities, Indigenous mothers 
may make political demands for kindergartens and formal education 
systems to increase their children’s possibilities to learn native language 
and culture during the city life. 
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Textbox 11.4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Urbanization 
“Urbanization is a global trend which will significantly contribute to the shaping of 
human life in the future. The Arctic region is no exception. Since the 1960s, most of 
the population growth in the Arctic has occurred in urban centers tied to industrial 
activities, social services and public administration” (Megatrends, 2011: 22). 
The process of urbanization is partly the result of people seeking new oppor-
tunities. An increased population density enables better services such as child-
care, education, and leisure. At the same time urbanization also presents a clear 
risk of generating disparities, economically as well as socially. In many ways it is 
a natural way to adapt to an ever-changing world, but at the same time it may 
present a threat to ways of living and the life people have become accustomed to.  
The map shows the differences between the distributions of the population liv-
ing in different settlement types. Small, predominantly rural villages typically with 
less than 1,000 inhabitants are marked by yellow; the larger villages and smaller 
towns with less than 10,000 inhabitants are shown by light blue colors. Large 
towns with between 10,000 and 50,000 inhabitants are shown with middle-blue 
colors, while the cities with more than 50,000 inhabitants is shown by dark blue.  
Urban life has remained one of the distinctive characteristics of Russia’s set-
tlement pattern in its Far North during most of the last century, and today nearly 
80% of the country’s northern population are living in urban environments 
(Nord, 2005). Other countries exhibit similar trends, often with sharp disparities 
by age and gender (e.g., Hamilton and Seyfrit, 1994).  
People move for many reasons, often attracted by the promise of work, high-
er salaries and a better social life, just as urban areas usually offer better oppor-
tunities, a diversity of economic activities and more options for education and 
social networks. While cities can be considered as economic development hubs 
of their regions, they may also foster social inequality, a dynamic that has also 
become a critical issue in the Arctic.  
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The large Sámi urban populations in the three Nordic countries of Finland, 
Norway and Sweden consist of a relatively young migrant population with 
cultural roots elsewhere. But there is an emerging Sámi presence and also 
promotion of Sámi culture in cities such as Tromsø and Umeå. In addition, 
cultural events, civic organizations, and educational institutions, such as 
Sámi University College in Kautokeino, contribute to an urban Sámi cul-
ture. Despite the fact that one third of the registered Sámi population is 
living in towns, only a few studies document the situation of this segment 
of the Sámi nation. The plurality of cultural arenas in urban settlements 
constitutes important meeting places for people and cultures from within 
and beyond the Arctic. In this context, a new generation of Sámi has 
emerged, regenerating and rejuvenating Sámi identity (Pedersen and 
Nyseth, 2013). Even though the urban Sámi communities have cultural 
roots elsewhere, a 30-year build-up of institutions such as kindergartens, 
primary schools, university studies and research institutions has made the 
urban Sámi more visible. Some have described the urban Sámi culture as 
being characterized by freedom, reflection and innovation (Dankertsen, 
2006), with less stringent social control with respect to religious piety and 
traditional usage of symbols and artifacts than those characterizing many 
rural Sámi communities.  
All residents of the Arctic countries are more or less affected by ur-
banity, the world market, and globalization with positive influences on 
and from Arctic culture, behavioral norms, language, food, music and 
fashion (Dybbroe, 2007: 2). Still, the focus is generally on the distinction 
between tradition and modernity as a way to approach social problems 
and social changes (Dybbroe, 2007). While urban development in the 
Arctic countries is not comparable with the city life of New York, London 
or Tokyo, the same anti-urban discourses are found in Arctic countries. 
For example earlier urban research on Greenlanders focused on how 
Indigenous populations have adapted to city living controlled by a colo-
nial power. Despite the fact that the first signs of urbanity can be traced 
all the way back to the nineteenth century, Greenlandic literature is 
marked by many depictions of the city as a negative place to be for 
Greenlanders. Urbanization in Greenland has undoubtedly had a number 
of negative effects on many families, but it has also had a positive impact 
on life in Greenland; it has provided better housing, health care, educa-
tion possibilities and wage labor. Recent research on Greenlandic urban-
ity has shown that towns and cities are increasingly seen as positive 
places to live (Sørensen, 2008).  
For urban Sámi communities, there is a whole range of particular 
characteristics compared to more traditional Sámi communities in the 
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rural peripheries (Pedersen and Nyseth, 2013). Their composition is 
more heterogeneous reflecting the differences in material and social 
contexts of the city, compared to the more rural Sámi communities, 
which tend to have more settler type characteristics.  
Data from Statistics Canada show that Inuit made up a steady 60% 
of the Iqaluit population between 1996 and 2006, including many who 
moved there from across the territory, meaning that multiple dialects 
are spoken in the capital of Nunavut, and that Inuit residents are them-
selves a heterogeneous group (Shields and Weber, 2013). Further-
more, the data show that Iqaluit residents have become a more multi-
cultural group, with a fifth coming from other provinces or territories 
in Canada, and a growing number being new Canadians such as Suda-
nese and Somalis.  
Settlements in the Arctic may seem relatively isolated, but they are 
increasingly interrelated across boundaries through administrative, 
production and educational functions. As described above, throughout 
the Arctic, urban centers are growing in both numbers and size relative 
to rural settlements, with some small communities showing a clear de-
cline, again both in size and numbers (Hamilton and Rasmussen, 2010). 
Urbanization of the Circumpolar Arctic in some ways reflects the global 
trends. The processes driving Arctic urbanization, however, differ in 
many respects from the global processes. Firstly, and in contrast to 
much of the rest of the world, the Arctic has never developed a signifi-
cant agricultural base to drive the take-off of urbanization. The lack of 
agriculture also meant that the Arctic did not develop the internal trans-
portation infrastructure to move agricultural products to markets. In-
stead, settlement of Arctic Indigenous peoples occurred largely as a con-
sequence of colonial policies of the states that governed these regions 
from distant capitals. Arctic towns and cities built around exploitation of 
nearby resources such as gold mines tended to be highly seasonal and 
temporary. Exceptions were communities that developed as centers of 
public administration of the territories and those following direct gov-
ernment interventions for national defence or industrial policy such as 
the Russian cities of Murmansk and Norilsk, and Anchorage, Alaska 
(Armstrong et al., 1978).  
Evidence suggests that the trend for rural Arctic areas is depopula-
tion in line with areas outside the region (Heleniak et al., 2011; see also 
Chapter 2, Arctic Populations and Migration). This is dependent upon 
public policies, and is connected with questions of mobility, which is the 
topic of sections below.  
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11.3.2 The new Arctic diaspora  
The Arctic has been exposed to both substantial in- and out-migration of 
people during the last century. As discussed in the first ASI report, both 
in- and out-migration reflects the sum of various pull and push factors 
(ASI, 2010: 149). Historically, in-migrants reflect policies aimed at en-
suring national presence in the region. This presence has often been 
connected to development strategies where new economic activities 
have required newcomers with specialized skills and knowledge. Typi-
cally, the people with these assets come from the southern areas of the 
respective Arctic nations. Many of these newcomers only live in the Arc-
tic communities for a few years; others have become permanently set-
tled. For many of the permanent settlers, ties back to their place of origin 
– their “homeland” – have been maintained; for instance, through cul-
tural characteristics such as food habits and regular visits back to their 
communities of origin. The reverse process (i.e., people with origins in 
the Arctic moving south and settling there for longer periods of time, or 
permanently) has taken off since WWII and intensified so much during 
the last decades that it has a potential to become a major characteristic 
of Arctic Indigenous peoples. In spite of the geographical distance to 
their traditional homelands they have, in many cases, chosen to maintain 
personal, cultural, and economic ties to their families and communities 
of origin. This pattern of in-migrants and out-migrants has established 
what is generally referred to as a diaspora, or the movement of people 
away from their homeland (Rasmussen, 2013). 
In its original meaning, “diaspora” describes the scattering of a 
population because of force or traumatic historical event (Cohen, 
1997). A broadening of the concept recognizes that scattering process-
es connects to other causes and effects of mobility (Skeldon, 2001), 
such as labor. Furthermore, increasing mobility combined with the 
processes of scattering is no longer seen as one-directional (Brubaker, 
2005). Evidence of return has become fairly abundant, captured by the 
term “counter-diasporic migration”, referring to the process whereby 
the second generation relocates to the ancestral homeland. The ques-
tion of counter-diasporic migration has become a critical issue in the 
former Danish colonies of Greenland and the Faroe Islands (and partly 
also Iceland). The main issue in this connection is options of “well-
educated returners” as a means to cope with what is considered to be a 
stability-threatening high out-migration rate (see Chapter 9, Education 
and Human Capital). New media and other means of communication 
help in providing news and information links between homeland and 
host country, and serve as vehicles for community continuity. At the 
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New Arctic diasporas 
“What distinguishes the diasporic condition from contemporary interna-
tional migration and transnational communities are the historical conti-
nuity across at least two generations, a sense of possible permanence of 
exile and the broad spread and stability of the distribution of populations 
within the diaspora. In other words, ‘time has to pass’ before a migration 
becomes a diaspora” (Cohen, 1997: 185). 
Mobility between Greenland and Denmark has been large since the 1960s when 
the modernization process led to a large influx of Danish labor to Greenland, and 
subsequently a large outflux of Greenlanders, not the least Greenlandic women 
who entered marriage with Danish craftsmen. Since the 1970s and especially in 
the last decades, mobility has been very closely related to education, and as a 
consequence a second outmigration-wave driven by the pursuit of education and 
the fact that many relationships between young Greenlanders and Danes have 
been established in connection with training in Denmark. This has led to the 
development of a diaspora with about one-fifth of persons of Greenlandic de-
scent living permanently in Denmark, and the number is increasing.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
same time, in some areas such as Yakutia, Russia, media is drawing 
youth away from their communities to pursue a “better life” in the re-
gional centers (Crate, 2006). 
Textbox 11.5 
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Textbox 11.5 continued 
 
The illustration shows the population of Greenlanders born in Greenland in the 
period 1980 until 2012 subdivided between males and females. The top graph 
shows the group living in Greenland. It shows a marked stagnation in both males 
and females since the 1990s, while the graph below shows the population of 
Greenlanders born in Greenland but permanently living in Denmark. The popula-
tion of Greenlanders living in Denmark has been increasing, and with the num-
ber of females increasing significantly. To the right, the graph shows the average 
annual migration of males and females between Greenland and Denmark, and 
the resulting net-outmigration.  
In the Jewish diaspora the pronouncing of the wishful prayer “Next year in 
Jerusalem” is a manifestation of the unity within the diasporic community. A 
similar situation exists within the Greenlandic diaspora. Since Home Rule was 
established in Greenland 1979, 30th July to August 1st has become the world's 
largest Greenlandic cultural event outside Greenland. The event takes place in 
the amusement park Tivoli in the center of Copenhagen, and besides meeting 
with friends and relatives the arrangement includes cultural events such as 
kayak-turning, ritual mask dance and a lot of music events with both traditional 
and contemporary artists. Greenlandic country-food is available, just as a num-
ber of products from Greenland sold in booths.  
In more recent years the event has been visited by around 100,000 participants 
yearly encompassing a mixed group of Greenlanders from Greenland, Greenland-
ers from Denmark, but also Danes who are married to Greenlanders, and Danes 
who have been employees and continue to feel an attachment to Greenland.  
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Textbox 11.5 continued 
 
So similar to the Jewish hopes for the future, Greenlanders have promoted their 
own wishful thinking:  
VI SES NÆSTE ÅR I TIVOLI (See you next year in Tivoli) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photo: Karen Nathansen. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11.3.3 New economic mechanisms 
There are differences in contemporary Arctic mobility characteristics 
between age groups, levels of education and gender that are connected 
to complex individual choices and preferences. In turn, these differences 
are shaped by family relations, community attachment, status and posi-
tion within the community, and connected to the world outside the 
community and relations to the labor market. Mobility has increased in 
the past decades, both within and between communities in and outside 
the Arctic. Job opportunities, education, changes in social relations, and 
in some cases, impacts of climate change such as destruction of infra-
structure due to coastal erosion or thawing permafrost, are reasons for 
moving. The on-going processes of globalization are clearly important 
contributors pertaining to job opportunities, educational options, and 
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changes in social relations both inside and outside the communities (see 
also, Chapter 10, Globalization).  
In this context, the “knowledge economy” becomes one of the major 
driving forces with respect to upcoming generations’ decisions on 
whether to stay or leave their communities. The role of both economic 
and social innovations varies across different regions of the Arctic and 
the establishment of educational institutions in Arctic cities has in many 
areas played a role. An example is the Tromsø region in northern Nor-
way, where the establishment of the northernmost university in the 
world was an important impetus for a rapid growth in population, as 
well as a diversification of business and community life. Over the past 40 
years, Tromsø has grown from being a regional center with a population 
of approximately 35,000, still struggling with the outflow of youngsters 
to the south seeking education and career opportunities, to becoming a 
net influx area with more than 70,000 inhabitants.  
Expectations in relation to the welfare society for the older genera-
tions, and increased mobility where young people settle outside the Arc-
tic and establish families and new networks are important aspects of 
migration. The influx of newcomers to the Arctic from, for instance, 
Southeast Asia, readily involves the service sector and newcomers tend 
to settle more permanently, adding to the diversity in the population 
structure. The future role and impact of large economic activities in rela-
tion to mining, resource processing and oil and gas extraction is current-
ly a key debate as well (see Chapter 7, Resource Governance, for more in-
depth discussion on resource development activities and impacts in 
different Arctic regions).  
11.3.4 The “new” newcomers 
Newcomers to the Arctic, coming mainly for temporary and to some 
extent, permanent employment, have had an increasing influence on 
communities. In addition to seeking work, many people, predominantly 
women, come from other parts of the world to marry and start a new life 
in the North. The involvement and influence of people, either directly 
through working in industries, or indirectly through jobs created in ad-
jacent activities, constitutes one of the most important links between 
industry and the local communities. The labor market is a crucial ele-
ment in the interactions between the community and industry, such as 
mining and energy production, where the concept of labor market mul-
tipliers can be applied in order to provide a measure of the total in-
volvement of the local labor market (Storey and Hamilton, 2004). The 
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need for skilled labor generates a number of positive effects on commu-
nities. Advanced education opportunities for the local labor force to de-
velop their qualifications also lead to a general improvement of local 
skills. This demand often results in a general improvement of available 
services, which creates new jobs and thereby a more open and dynamic 
economy. In addition, the pressure on more advanced qualifications 
leads to a more innovative milieu, which in turn has a significant role in 
the development of new economic activities. Such activities, however, 
may also have negative consequences for communities. New activities 
usually require qualified workers, and if looked for locally this may 
cause a drain on local human resources mainly because of higher sala-
ries. If the qualifications are not accessible locally, the influx of new em-
ployees may put pressure on the existing physical and social infrastruc-
ture. The generally higher level of salaries in the new activities may cre-
ate wage distortion – the Dutch Disease phenomenon – which in 
addition to draining qualified workers, may increase salaries and living 
costs, threatening existing businesses (Winther, 2000).  
11.3.5 Communities and climate change: impacts and 
adaptation  
In the Arctic, the many and myriad direct and indirect impacts of climate 
change have an effect on people (e.g. Hovelsrud et al., 2011; Kapsch et 
al., 2010). At the same time, peoples in the Arctic have throughout histo-
ry and colonial encounters adapted to significant societal and environ-
mental changes. The observed and projected impacts of climate change 
present both challenges and opportunities, albeit with regional and local 
differences in how people and institutions experience, understand, and 
respond to those impacts. Climate change is interlinked with the politi-
cal, economic, cultural, and social context of a place. The impacts of cli-
mate change interact with other human-environment systems, can exac-
erbate existing challenges, and may create unexpected cascading effects 
that require adaptation (e.g. see Chapter 7, Resource Governance, for 
discussion of climate change and interactions with issues around re-
source development; also Hovelsrud et al., 2011).  
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Source: AMAP, 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Potential impacts of climate change 
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While there are regional and local differences in climate change impacts, 
there are some common drivers and processes across the Circumpolar 
region that shape community vulnerability and adaptation processes. 
These include but are not limited to access to resources and knowledge, 
attitudes and perceptions of change, economic and livelihood flexibility, 
enabling institutions, transfer of local and traditional knowledge, threats 
to cultural identity and well-being, and economic and employment op-
portunities (Hovelsrud et al., 2010). The capacity of communities to 
adapt is further determined by governance, path-dependencies, infra-
structure, and connectivity (Keskitalo and Kulyasova, 2009) and shaped 
by community values and place identity. Research focussed on climate 
change as the primary source of community vulnerability misses other 
forces that are shaping vulnerability such as colonialism, globalization, 
social and economic change, or political and institutional factors includ-
ing such as resource quotas (Jentoft et al., 2009).  
Institutions and governance play significant roles in facilitating 
community responses to climate change and flexible institutions are 
needed to avoid the imposition of rules, frameworks, and discourses that 
may limit the ability of local actors to engage proactively with change on 
their own terms (Armitage, 2005). Particular attention has been paid to 
co-management infrastructures; researchers have concluded that in 
spite of discursively emphasizing a role for traditional knowledge, these 
institutions often privilege Western science in management decisions. 
Less attention has been paid to the role of community-based and com-
munity-led institutions in facilitating adaptation responses that are 
meaningful and relevant to communities. Examples exist around the 
Arctic where municipalities, communities and individuals are adapting, 
despite the lack of national policies for adaptation.  
In Canada, there has been an increasing trend to engage Arctic resi-
dents in climate change research, including work on observing and doc-
umenting the impacts of climate change on environmental systems in-
cluding sea ice and snow, wind and weather, and permafrost (e.g. Laidler 
et al., 2009; Gearheard et al., 2010; Tremblay et al., 2008). The resulting 
data often have greater relevance to locally identified priorities and may 
play an important role for communities as the region is made more ac-
cessible to extractive industries (e.g. oil, gas, mining). Climate change has 
an impact on sea ice and travel, hunting, subsistence activity and food 
security, viability of land skills and traditional knowledge, and health. 
Regional and community adaptation planning address hazards and risks 
in relation to infrastructure, including roads and buildings.  
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Inuit hunters and Elders have become critical partners and leaders in climate 
change research in the Canadian Arctic, contributing their expert knowledge 
and skills to many projects and programs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit: Shari Gearheard. 
 
Nordic countries have a generally high adaptive capacity with respect to 
economy, technology, information and skills, infrastructure, institutions, 
and equity (Juhola et al., 2012). At the local/regional level, adaptive ca-
pacity is largely determined by socioeconomic conditions or social vul-
nerability, as well as being politically determined within governance 
networks (Keskitalo and Kulyasova, 2009). A lack of national legislation 
can hinder action at the local level or the flow of resources, but studies 
from Norway and Finland find voluntary adaptation initiatives at the 
local and regional levels, despite the absence of national policies, or the 
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lack of knowledge transfer from national to local levels (Dannevig et al., 
2012; Nilsson et al., 2010). This corresponds with studies that find that 
the way adaptation is handled as an issue at the national level coheres 
with national rationalities, while local and regional levels show diversi-
ties in the development of bottom-up adaptation technologies 
(Keskitalo, 2012).  
In Greenland, significant decadal variations in ocean temperature 
have driven socio-economic shifts throughout its history, with three 
major shifts identified during the 20th century (Rasmussen, 2007). 
Communities in Greenland have adapted to combined social-ecological 
impacts on: 1) marine mammal stocks (increased ocean temperatures 
and decreased markets); 2), the cod stock (increasing cod and increasing 
markets); and 3) diversification with cooler ocean temperatures, de-
creasing cod stocks, better technology to fish for shrimp and deep water 
Greenland halibut and an increasing market. Marine mammal hunting 
was traditionally the main livelihood activity in Greenland and also the 
main focus of the colonial economic policy for Greenland well into the 
20th century. The combination of increased human populations and 
declining European and North American markets for seal pelts and 
blubber created a need for diversifying commercial and subsistence 
activities. For the past ten years, communities located in areas where sea 
ice has been used as a platform for travel, hunting and fishing report a 
significant reduction in sea ice (Gearheard et al., 2013). This has resulted 
in significant reduction in sea ice dependent species such as ringed seals 
and narwhal, with consequences for hunting activities. Additionally, 
Greenland halibut fisheries are no longer taking place from the sea ice, 
but from smaller vessels on open water. Reduction in sea ice, decreasing 
hunting activities, increasing fisheries and a changing international mar-
ket all have adaptation implications for Greenlandic communities and 
for resource management. 
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A day at work in North West Greenland - hunters and fishers must navigate dan-
gerous ice-infested water 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit: Grete K. Hovelsrud. 
 
In Russia, the major political, economic and social upheavals of the last 
four centuries, together with the impacts of climate change, are influenc-
ing Russian Arctic communities (Forbes and Stammler, 2009). The im-
portance of the Arctic regions for Russia is expected to increase because 
of increased mining and petroleum extraction activities. This increases 
the pressure on land use, and reduces the territory of the Indigenous 
peoples with consequences for communities (nomadic reindeer herders) 
migrating across the tundra. Thus, communities need to adapt to chang-
ing climatic, economic and political conditions (Vinokurova, 2011). The 
Russian government is increasingly aware that long-term socio-
economic development in the Russian North must be seen in the context 
of climate change impacts and through a regional approach to imple-
menting climate adaptation strategies. For Indigenous peoples, these 
changes have major effects on cultural identity, health and well-being of 
individuals and communities. Other health risks for communities are 
caused by the influx of diseases from the south, from thawing perma-
frost that causes breakdowns in sanitary functions, the increasing pres-
ence of environmental toxins in food, air and soil, and changes in access 
to local foodstuffs and commercial food causing a switch from the for-
mer to the latter (Revich, 2009).  
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In Alaskan communities, climate change poses a number of challenges, 
including physical threats such as erosion, service threats such as those 
affecting water supply or transportation, and cultural threats such as dis-
ruption of hunting and fishing. Together, the threats have been assessed in 
terms of human rights and justice, especially with respect to Indigenous 
communities (Bronen, 2011; Bronen and Chapin, 2013). Coastal or 
riverbank erosion as a major threat is not itself a product of climate 
change, but the rate of erosion may be increased through climate-induced 
changes in river flow, thawing permafrost, or loss of protective sea ice 
during stormy times of the year. Changes in settlement patterns and in-
creased infrastructure build-up have exacerbated the problem (e.g., Brun-
ner et al., 2004). Contamination of water supply and damaged roads and 
runways are caused by climate change. The use of frozen rivers and sea 
ice for travel is also becoming more hazardous as dangerous conditions 
become more common as a result of warmer winters and more snowfall, 
which combine to reduce ice thickness and stability.  
Climate change poses a number of challenges for Arctic communities, 
and rural areas are more exposed due to fewer livelihood options and 
financial resources. Those communities are adapting in various ways, on 
their own and with outside assistance. Nonetheless, in many cases the rate 
and extent of change are greater than the ability to adjust. Particularly 
challenging is the fact that many impacts are interlinked, exacerbating the 
effects of physical or biological change, and requiring that effective re-
sponses overcome institutional and other barriers (see also, AMAP, 2011). 
Perhaps more importantly, the effects of climate change are occurring 
amid a number of other economic, societal, and cultural shifts, each of 
which has numerous and far-reaching impacts on community structure, 
function, and identity. Climate change thus acts not in isolation, but as an 
additional contributor to changes already underway. Community adapta-
tion, therefore, must address many causes with many potential outcomes, 
which is why larger themes such as governance, justice, and food security 
are central to the long-term viability of Arctic communities. 
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11.4 Community perspectives  
11.4.1 Communities and peoples  
Increasing globalization processes have the potential to transform Arctic 
communities by changing the connections that keep them together (see 
also Chapter 10, Globalization). This is a complex topic that requires 
attention to the fact that communities are heterogeneous entities, with 
different and sometimes conflicting interests and opinions about what is 
best for the community and the individual. Community resilience and 
ability to change are linked to cultural and community values, place 
identity, resource networks, institutions and services, and learning 
(Amundsen, 2012), all being driving forces in communities in parallel 
with globalization. In the face of globalization, people in many Arctic 
communities still express strong attachments to the places where they 
live and a willingness to work hard to be able to continue living in their 
community, to maintain social networks, a slow pace of life and safe 
communities even when challenged by factors such as outmigration, cuts 
in public services, and decline in the availability and accessibility of nat-
ural resources. At the same time, others are looking for alternatives 
(Carson et al., 2011). The different Arctic nations have different regional 
policies with respect to rural areas and infrastructural support, but even 
in Norway where the official policy is to fully maintain communities, 
outmigration is a fact on islands and in fjords. There is a general trend 
that women and youth leave communities for education and better jobs 
and men stay behind carrying out more traditional jobs and livelihood 
activities (Megatrends, 2011). This causes unsustainable gender, age and 
employment imbalances in communities. When women leave, fewer 
children are born, reducing the number of children in schools and the 
tax base by which municipalities support community services, further 
reducing population numbers and potentially leading to community 
abandonment (Martin, 2009). A stable population is crucial for maintain-
ing viable communities and municipal services, therefore, many com-
munities are trying to curb outmigration by creating jobs and activities 
that strengthen the attractiveness of places.  
11.4.2 Generation and generation shifts  
The impacts of changing gender balance and increasing generational di-
vides are closely interlinked with the foundations for community viability. 
In many Arctic communities, younger generations are faced with the chal-
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lenges of maintaining culture, language, and traditions, while at the same 
time engaging with new technologies, economic opportunities, cultural 
influences, and globalization (see also ASI, 2010). In many rural communi-
ties, knowledge about community relevant topics such as the environ-
ment, resources, and cultural relationships and values is transferred be-
tween generations. In many Arctic Indigenous communities, there is con-
cern and action towards ensuring that traditional knowledge is passed on 
to youth. The role, importance, and status of local and traditional 
knowledge is now widely accepted, and its transfer between generations 
is taking place through a number of locally-driven and research, govern-
ment, and Indigenous organization sponsored activities. 
Traditions and traditional knowledge are transferred from one gen-
eration to the next in an active process, through peoples’ practical en-
gagement with the environment and with each other. Myriad circum-
stances can influence how knowledge, values, skills, and traditions are 
shared between generations. The impacts of climate change have more 
recently spurred discussions about the ties between generations and 
the transfer of knowledge. In addition the youth – and communities – 
are confronted with the need for other types of skills and knowledge in 
order to respond to the requirements of globalization going beyond 
previous experiences available in the community. The younger genera-
tions deal with still more demanding requirements regarding social, 
socio-economic and management capabilities, and interactions made 
possible by new means of media and communication. The expectations 
and perceptions of what constitutes a good life also have a generation-
al character. The older generation of coastal fishers in the North Atlan-
tic region accept that their occupation required long periods of ab-
sence from their families, but younger fishers prefer to come home 
every day and expect to own their own boat early on in their career 
(West and Hovelsrud, 2010). Attitudes towards work have changed 
and cultural identity tied to an occupation weakened, which may influ-
ence the glue of communities.  
On the other hand, the value of a vibrant community is shared across 
generations and younger generations bring new perspectives and inno-
vations that maintain strong communities. The use of social media has 
become extremely popular in Arctic communities in recent years and in 
many cases the technology is being used to promote traditional culture 
and language among youth as well as strengthening connections across 
remote communities. Many Indigenous peoples of the younger genera-
tions, such as the Sámi, are expressing their indigeneity more strongly 
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than before, through social media and public participation wearing their 
traditional clothes and speaking their native language.  
Gender perspectives 
In most Arctic societies, gender roles have been historically distin-
guished along male and female social roles and responsibilities, but 
gender roles are increasingly changing along with changing community 
dynamics and perspectives. Communities are faced with new challeng-
es with respect to industrial expansion and climate change impacts, 
and opportunities resulting from better connectivity, infrastructure, 
and being more connected to the world economy. It is increasingly 
clear that men and women meet these challenges differently, which is 
partly related to traditional gender roles and perhaps more important-
ly, related to the level of flexibility of communities and policies. These 
are in turn driven by national policies for regional and rural develop-
ment. Gender differences in what is perceived as “the good life” has 
turned out to be one of the most important contemporary drivers of 
change in community structure, not only in the Arctic, but worldwide. 
In this respect, we find interlinked and interacting gender differences 
with respect to education, out-migration, decision-making and power 
relations. The trend since the 1990s is that women are more educated 
than men (Megatrends, 2011) and that educated women travel out of 
the communities for work while men stay behind (Sloan et al., 2006). 
But there are examples showing a reverse situation. In some settle-
ments in the Sakha Republic (Yakutia), men leave the communities to 
take employment, and the women stay behind (Vinokurova, 2011). 
This sex-ratio imbalance in the communities has major consequence 
for community life (Hamilton and Rasmussen, 2010; Sloan et al., 2006). 
Whether women stay, return, or leave, is closely related to power rela-
tions, decision-making, and access to resources including knowledge 
and information.  
There are major variations in these components throughout the 
Arctic, but it is clear that there are gender differences with respect to 
vulnerability, risk exposure-sensitivity and coping capacity (Bee et al., 
2013). Under-representation of women in decision-making, underutili-
zation of women’s knowledge and management skills, and a weak rep-
resentation of women’s views on the relationship between humans and 
nature (Sloan, 2006; Ingolfsdottir, 2011) are all aspects that may influ-
ence women’s decisions to leave the communities. Gender studies 
mainly focus on women, but there is an increasing call for more 
knowledge about the particular societal conditions that shape the vul-
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nerability and coping capacity of men. This includes the gender differ-
ences in how men and women perceive and adapt to climate change.  
Textbox 11.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gender perspectives on local and global scale 
Among the major concerns for Arctic communities are demographic challenges 
such as the aging of the population and increased mobility. Increasing mobility can 
be a challenge where the exodus of young people and especially young women has 
become a major factor. It creates the risk of inadequate number of children, and 
the tendency of former large families becoming families with one or two children 
is also an important issue (see Chapter 2: Arctic Populations and Migration).  
Regions dominated by older people often display a majority of women due to the 
fact that women live longer than men. Research, however, shows that there are pull 
and push effects for women to leave sparsely populated areas. The table below 
shows some of the major differences as reflected through a survey from Greenland 
in 2011 (Hansen and Rasmussen, 2013). The patterns are similar to what has been 
found in other Northern communities (see, for instance, Sloan, 2006).  
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Textbox 11.7: continued 
 
As mentioned above, an important push is related to the limited education and 
job opportunities offered in smaller settlements with an economic base in the 
traditional exploitation of renewable as well as non-renewable resources. This is 
paralleled by a pull related to the opportunities of both jobs and educational 
opportunities available in larger towns and especially cities.  
Furthermore, the situation is challenged by the fact that it is primarily wom-
en who respond to global challenges through education. An important conse-
quence of this is changes in the labor market and declining workforces that are 
under pressure as a consequence of demographic change, changing production 
structures and the business environment. The interaction between these factors 
generates a need for a substantial modification of the local response to the im-
pact of globalization of Arctic societies. 
The calculation of the total number of women per 100 men is a good indica-
tor of the result of differences in gender-based preferences in the Arctic. In order 
to adjust for the longevity among women compared to men in the Arctic the 
indicator has been adjusted according to the national averages. All blue and 
purple regions and settlements show a clear deficit of women. Places with sur-
plus of women are first and foremost the larger cities where education and re-
lated job opportunities are available.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11.4.3 Change and stability  
Balancing continuity and change is an important theme in all Arctic com-
munities. Increasingly, researchers and community practitioners look to 
the concept of resilience to examine the question of why some individuals 
and communities are able to accommodate and adapt to change better 
than others (Folke, 2006). Components of community viability and resili-
ence include social networks and support, safety nets, informal risk shar-
ing mechanisms, learning, active involvement, collaboration across sectors 
and societal scales, environment and lifestyle, diverse and innovative 
economies, and leadership (Buikstra et al., 2010). In addressing the ques-
tion of why some communities flourish and others do not, research find-
ings point to innovation, individual and group agency, and local institu-
tions as particularly important (Amundsen, 2012).  
Indigenous concepts of resilience are expressed through specific sto-
ries and metaphors grounded in local culture and language (Kirmayer et 
al., 2011). Here, the sense of community is embedded in a social matrix 
that encompasses relations with animals and the environment (Stairs 
and Wenzel, 1992). Relational processes that support resilience include 
  Arctic Human Development Report 461 
revising collective history, revitalizing language and culture, and engag-
ing in political activism. Institutional responses and frameworks across 
scales are critical in supporting these processes, including devolving 
governance to local institutional authorities and supporting innovation 
and flexibility in local socio-economic organizations. 
Some communities build on the local cultural history and make sure 
that adaptation processes ensure continuation of this history, especially 
with respect to maintaining the viability of the main and traditional live-
lihoods such as fishing, while others call for innovation and new sectors 
which will change the composition of the communities (Amundsen, 
2012). For example, communities endowed with fisheries resources will 
continue to have a significant fisheries industry, but structural changes 
in the fisheries and society require new industries and sources of jobs. 
Change fosters stability and enables communities and settlements to 
utilize the potential that new markets and niches provide.  
11.5 Challenges influencing community viability in 
the Arctic 
While local level approaches are imperative it is also important to note 
that community responses are shaped by complex interactions in politi-
cal and economic globalization, markets and national and international 
resource management (Keskitalo and Kulyasova, 2009). Aspects that 
may weaken the resilience of coupled social-ecological systems may also 
have a bearing on community viability, including breakdown of tradi-
tional institutions, rapid technological change and rapid changes in local 
socioeconomic conditions (Crona, 2006; Seixas and Berkes, 2003). It 
should also be noted that many changes initiated on a global scale may 
also have positive effects on, for example, community health, the possi-
bilities for individual choice, and the possibility for a changed but still 
viable community future. The summary below assesses the trends and 
processes that influence adaptation and viability of settlements and 
communities in the Arctic. 
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11.5.1 Secure communities 
A community is viable when it is able to combine outside influences with 
local cultural and social competence and creativity. It is clear that local 
environmental variability interacts with socio-economic and socio-
cultural factors, and integrates individual entrepreneurship and collec-
tive action for change. The social and cultural variations that create set-
tlements patterns and cultural expressions are broad in the Arctic, and 
hence the viability of these communities rests on highly variable skills 
and abilities. The forms and level of specific expertise that is needed 
vary greatly, depending on where a community is located, to what extent 
local traditions are dominant, or modernization and globalization pro-
cesses have led to a dependency on more centralized and urbanized 
skills and knowledge.  
11.5.2 Centralization processes  
Arctic communities have shown an exceptionally high adaptability to 
their local environments. Both within and beyond the Arctic, the 
“knowledge society” demands formalized specialization, often based on 
the use and understanding of technology replacing manual labor. These 
processes coincide with the downscaling of labor intensive natural re-
source harvesting (e.g. fisheries, reindeer herding and farming), the 
steady rise in interest from extractive industries gaining access to re-
sources in the Arctic, and in the spread of formalized educational institu-
tions, around which centralization processes accelerate. Even though 
significant land use remains connected to traditional use of renewable 
resources (Rees et al., 2008), less labor is needed to extract and utilize 
these resources. Therefore, the need for a population living close to the 
resources diminishes, and with a decreasing number of communities 
engaging in hunting, gathering and herding for economic purposes, the 
financial basis is paid jobs, of which there are relatively few in many 
parts of the Arctic. Educational opportunities, sought after by young 
people in order to secure well paid jobs, are predominantly found in 
more urbanized centres. These centrifugal forces threaten to tap the 
Arctic of people, its most precious resource. But there are currents mov-
ing in the other direction, such as the new initiative called “smart spe-
cialization” within the new strategic research program of the European 
Union, Horizon 2020. In this scheme, a heightened focus is on the im-
portance of viable regions in the EU. For the Arctic, this could mean that 
development, research, and production are merged geographically, en-
suring hands-on approaches to innovation based on the needs of pro-
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duction. This would then enable businesses to develop research and 
development facilities close to the resource upon which this new know-
how is developed, ensuring a better utilization of the resource in the 
region where it is found. 
Another trend is the so-called “lifestyle-based” move to the outskirts, 
to small-town life and to a life less involved in the high-speed economies 
of urban centers – a trend exemplified through “slow-city” – and “slow-
food”-movements, but also characterized by sporty, outdoor activities 
(Knox and Mayer, 2013).  
11.5.3 Climate change and global risks 
Local communities face major combined and interlinked challenges such 
as climate change impacts and unwanted effects of economic globaliza-
tion and ecosystem management, to which they can respond either as 
“powerless spectators” or as “adaptive managers”, seeking to secure 
future viability by utilizing possibilities and evoking internal compe-
tences of resilience (Fabricius et al., 2007). These challenges are first 
and foremost emanating from the global scene, and are therefore not 
exclusive to the Arctic. Globally, climate change, industrialization pro-
cesses and changing migration patterns due to population growth and 
pressures are major drivers for change. All of these drivers create possi-
bilities, but can also have negative consequences for community viabil-
ity. The impact of risky behavior reaches far beyond the risk taker as 
illustrated by anthropogenically driven global warming. The conse-
quences of local, regional, national politics and priorities may very well 
decide the fates of others far away (Odland et al., 2002; Beck, 2009; 
Hovelsrud et al., 2011). 
11.5.4 Industrialization based on extractive industries 
As industrialization based on the extraction of natural resources such as 
petroleum, minerals and marine resources strengthens its position in 
the North, the risks and threats increase, both to traditional livelihoods 
and natural surroundings. But these processes also bring welcome 
changes. New jobs, improved infrastructure, schools and better primary 
health care are made accessible to larger parts of the population, and 
with these an increased possibility to choose lifestyle and professional 
careers. These “dual processes” are visible in many places in the Arctic, 
for example in the Nenets okrug in Russia, where the interactions be-
tween petroleum workers, the industry and the indigenous people are a 
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complex mix of serving each other’s needs. The Nenets provide meat for 
the workers whilst the petroleum industry enhances the options for 
communications to centres with health care, educational facilities and 
governmental institutions. At the same time, traditional reindeer herd-
ing seems to be vulnerable to the global trends these changes represent 
(Rees et al., 2008). In the Norwegian Arctic, the offensive tactics of the 
petroleum industry are met with skepticism by representatives of the 
traditional fisheries along the coast, who argue that the potential bene-
fits do not outweigh the risks involved, either to the environment or to 
the way of life in the fishing villages. An alternative take on the moderni-
zation processes for these communities would be to combine the utiliza-
tion of renewable resources with an influx of white-collar and special-
ized labor, combined with efforts aiming at strengthening the basis for 
(eco- and cultural) tourism and spin-off products from the traditional 
bulk-producing fishing industry (Dale, 2011).  
11.5.5 The mobility of goods, people, and ideas  
For centuries, people in the Arctic have travelled by sea, on sea ice and 
over land. The Arctic has been an important part of international trade 
systems for millennia, and has been subjected to legislative and taxation 
demands from nation states (Kurlandsky, 1997; Jaklin, 2006). More re-
cently, natural resource extraction and, as a consequence, increasing 
physical and economic presence from industrial companies and gov-
ernmental agencies, have led to new challenges and opportunities. This 
has in many communities spurred societal and cultural processes of 
change as well as re-evaluation and revitalization of the importance of 
cultural heritage, human-environment connections, and sense of place. 
Both the Arctic diasporas and the new newcomers to the Arctic partake 
in these processes, as they both blur the borders between “us” and 
“them” and utilize the potential for flow of goods, services and people 
that the modern world provides. Within and outside of the Arctic, com-
munities adhering to an “Arctic” identity place less emphasis on physical 
settlements and historical roots as a clear denominator of identity and 
sense of belonging (Antonsen, 2011; Dale, 2011). At the same time, there 
is a revitalization of the importance of a common ancestry for some 
groups, be it based on being “a northerner” in a general sense, on ethnic 
affiliation, or on historically rooted family ties to a community or settle-
ment. Without neglecting the fact that many Indigenous groups still ex-
perience stigmatization on the basis of their ethnic background, the no-
tion of ethnic identity is balanced out by the positive connotations eth-
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nicity has for many peoples in the Arctic. Modern Sámi ethnicity may 
serve as an example of how these changes manifest themselves in the 
construction of individual identities. Being Sámi today is to adhere to the 
traditions of Sámi culture, as a provider of identity markers, but not nec-
essarily to be involved directly in traditional Sámi trades such as fishing 
or reindeer herding. It is about language for many, but not for all; it is 
about wearing a traditional dress (gákti) but not for all. Still, for most 
Arctic residents, it is about being aware of the heritage, the common 
ancestry, and a sense of belonging to a community, which, in response to 
and being a part of shaping the globalized world, changes and adapts to 
new circumstances.  
11.6 Major trends 
We identify the following key trends: 
 
 The overall demographic trend in the Arctic is outmigration from 
smaller communities to urban areas, with an increasing divide 
between centers and periphery.  
 Mobility has been on the rise in the past decades within and between 
communities, and inside and outside the Arctic. 
 Imported foods are on the rise in the Arctic, but in some areas, like 
Norway, interest in, and demand for, local food is rising.  
 The rate and magnitude of climate change vary across the Arctic and 
between and within communities, and consequently the need for 
adaptive responses vary. 
 Community connections, such as to the environment or among 
people within communities are also being transformed by increasing 
globalization. Once again, responses vary widely across the Arctic, 
but there is a trend toward outmigration as people seek 
opportunities and alternatives. In particular, there is a trend, though 
not the same everywhere, for women to leave and men to stay, 
creating a gender imbalance.  
 Temperatures are increasing and will have consequences for 
communities and the environment. 
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11.7 Gaps in knowledge  
Gaps in knowledge pertain to the basis, dynamics, and perspectives of 
communities and how these are dynamically shaped. When attempting 
to understand the dynamic nature of how communities are shaped, 
maintained and functioning, we are up against a rather grand challenge. 
When we try to generalize across the Arctic and identify the gaps this 
challenge increases. There are significant gaps in knowledge about how 
we compare and analyze lessons learned across the communities in the 
region. While it is clear that one size does not fit all, policy makers and 
decision-makers could benefit from an increased understanding of the 
different drivers of change.  
Communities are at different stages of development with different dy-
namics both internally and in how they relate to external processes. If we 
increase our knowledge about how we can create transferable lessons, 
planning for the future challenges would benefit. Another significant gap 
in knowledge is identified with respect to how communities throughout 
the Arctic will adapt to and handle the increased focus on the region both 
in terms of commercialization and climate change impacts.  
We have insufficient knowledge about the best practices for communi-
ties to handle the increasing industrial developments such as large-scale 
mining, energy exploitation, and other industries led by global companies. 
Arctic communities face major challenges from such developments, and 
from climate change. We need more knowledge about creating best prac-
tices that are transferable to other communities and processes.  
We need more and updated knowledge about how to assess the 
trends and processes that influence adaptation and viability of settle-
ments and communities in the Arctic. 
11.8 Conclusion 
This chapter emphasizes linkages and feedbacks between social struc-
tures, socio-economic conditions, health, well-being, and demography 
within communities, as well as with some of the overarching geopoliti-
cal, physical and biophysical sub-systems and globalization of communi-
ties and settlements. It looks at a wide variety of inter-related challeng-
es, opportunities, and stresses facing communities, highlighting the fact 
that communities respond differently within and between nations and 
regions, and within and between settlements in the same region.  
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Communities and settlements in the Arctic are grappling with many 
different and interrelated issues. In the last ten years, urbanization has 
continued to be a major factor for human development with great varia-
tion from place to place. Urbanization has usually been connected to 
industrialization, but now educational opportunities are also driving 
growth and development of centers. The overall demographic trend in 
the Arctic is depopulation, with an increasing divide between centers 
and periphery. 
Culture continues to play an important role in Arctic communities, 
touching all aspects of life including the dynamic relationships of people 
to place, to livelihoods, and to each other. Food and food security, an 
increasingly important and visible issue in the Arctic over the last dec-
ade, has key ties to culture, particularly in terms of subsistence activities 
and informal economies. Imported foods are on the rise in the Arctic, but 
in some areas, like Norway, local food is rising in interest and demand.  
Mobility is on the rise in past decades within and between communi-
ties, and inside and outside the Arctic. A number of factors influence mo-
bility, including education opportunities, jobs, changes in social relations, 
and in some cases impacts of climate change. Climate change, almost total-
ly absent from the Community Development chapter in the first AHDR 
(2004) a decade ago, features prominently in this chapter. Climate change 
impacts interact with coupled social-ecological systems and can exacer-
bate existing challenges, especially in rural areas where access to financial 
resources and options are fewer. Communities and individuals are adapt-
ing, based on time-tested strategies and with assistance and guidance 
from regional and national governments. The rate and magnitude of cli-
mate change vary across the Arctic and between and within communities, 
consequently the need for adaptive responses varies.  
Community connections, such as to the environment or among peo-
ple within communities are also being transformed by increasing global-
ization. Once again, responses vary widely across the Arctic, but there is 
a trend toward outmigration as people seek opportunities and alterna-
tives. In particular, there is a trend, though not the same everywhere, for 
women to leave and men to stay, creating a gender imbalance. Since the 
1990s, women tend to be more educated and tend to travel out of their 
communities. There are differences in gender in other ways, such as 
with respect to vulnerability, risk exposure, and coping ability, with men 
and women experiencing these differently. 
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12. Major Findings and Emerging 
Trends in Arctic Human 
Development 
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In this concluding chapter we highlight some of the main policy relevant 
conclusions from the Report’s chapters, present key gaps in knowledge 
on Arctic human development, and offer suggestions for future research 
in this area of study. While the report is written for a broad audience of 
Arctic residents, students of the North, and stakeholders in the future of 
the Arctic, we intend this chapter to be useful for policymakers involved 
in decisions regarding various facets of Arctic human development.  
The preceding chapters have shown that the Arctic is not a homogenous 
region. Impacts of globalization and environmental change differ within and 
among regions, between Indigenous and non-Indigenous northerners, be-
tween genders and along other axes. This volume has drawn attention to 
the diversity and important contrasts characterizing the Arctic. Neverthe-
less, in assessing the state of human development in the Arctic it is useful to 
identify a number of over-arching trends and issues that cut across various 
systems and thematic areas covered in this report.  
While we have strived to avoid repetition, the inter-related nature of 
aspects of human development necessitates some reiteration when cat-
egorizing discussions under distinct headings. Under some headings, we 
have thus abridged our discussion to minimize repetition where key 
trends and gaps have already been detailed. 
12.1 Crosscutting trends 
Urbanization in the Arctic, and more broadly, “communities on the 
move,” can be seen in the growing trend toward outmigration from local 
communities toward larger settlements and the increasing concentra-
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tion of population in urban centers. Associated with this mobility are 
“brain waves” and a “brain drain”, linked in particular to changes in 
economy and resource development. Urbanization is distinctly gen-
dered, with an increasing rate of female out-migration from smaller 
communities for educational opportunities and employment. We also 
note the emergence of “climigration” as a new dimension of Arctic mo-
bility. Aging of the population, especially dramatic in some rural places, 
brings concomitant changes in depencency ratios.  
Second, there is a dramatic burgeoning of interest in the Arctic from 
beyond the region, resulting largely from climate change and perceived 
resource development opportunities, and fuelled in part by media hype. 
Residents and outsiders both are redefining the “new Arctic”, with north-
ern identities becoming more of an asset and the Arctic more marketable. 
We cannot with full confidence forecast where this “new Arctic” is head-
ing, as some trends contradict each other: for instance, increased interest 
in non-renewable resource development balances against global commod-
ity price shifts that make such less likely; human and fiscal capacity chal-
lenges confront development projects; and numerous other disparities 
noted in the chapters make future trajectories hard to predict.  
Third, disparities in formal educational achievement continue to be 
significant in the northern regions of the Arctic states, compared to na-
tional averages. With increasing global linkages come the intensifying 
need to build human capital and capacity. Although opportunities for 
formal education in the North have increased, both in urban centers and 
through distance education, we still observe (a heavily feminized) out-
migration in pursuit of higher education. This situation perpetuates and 
exacerbates difficulties in meeting the ever-increasing demands for an 
educated workforce in the North. 
Fourth, trends toward the increase in legitimate participation in Arctic 
decision-making and continued innovation in governance can be observed 
at all scales. We witness increased self-determination and autonomy in 
governance, including an increasing Indigenous representation in re-
gional, national and international bodies. This entails ever-mounting 
demands on local and Indigenous representatives. It becomes increas-
ingly important to find viable solutions to the growing human and fiscal 
resource challenges that accompany the increased participation oppor-
tunities. In terms of innovation, we note the trend both toward a broad-
ening of informal resource govenance institutions and the elaboration of 
their relationships with more formal institutions.  
And fifth, while we witness growing expectations for resource extrac-
tive industries, at the same time we also observe an increased interest in 
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economic diversification, within and beyond extractive industries. The 
expansion of non-extractive industries is notable. While optimisim re-
mains for large-scale industrial development, the high costs of doing 
business in the North remains a reality which climate change is not like-
ly to change, and may indeed exacerbate in some places. Nevertheless, 
non-renewable resource development will remain a key economic base 
in the North in the near future, likely with ever-increasing efforts to lo-
cate production in order to minimize costs. 
Drying Fish, Alaska, USA  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit: Diana Hirshberg. 
12.2 Policy-relevant conclusions  
12.2.1 Arctic populations and migration 
 After decades of population growth, the size of the population of the 
Arctic appears to have stabilized at just over 4 million. At the same 
time, the booms and busts in the Arctic economy associated with the 
discovery and depletion of resources have always had, and will 
continue to have, a large influence on the size of regional populations. 
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Demographic change and considerable demographic diversity character-
izes the Arctic, with significant contrasts among its countries and re-
gions. The Arctic population is experiencing robust growth in some re-
gions, while substantial population declines typify most of the Russian 
Arctic. Overall, the population of the Arctic is projected to not increase 
by much in the near future. Most Arctic regions are at a late stage of de-
mographic transtion, although exceptions to this are found in regions 
with large Indigenous populations.  
The continued trend of outmigration from rural areas and increased 
concentration of the populations in the capital cities characterizes nearly 
all Arctic regions. Populations that are stable or declining, aging and 
losing females to outmigration, have implications for the allocation and 
distribution of human, financial and other resources.  
So-called “climigration”, mobility triggered by climate change, is an 
area that needs further study, in order to gain a fuller understanding of 
the impacts of climate change on migration and settlement patterns and 
choices. The gendered, age and “ethnic” dimensions of such mobility 
need to be investigated more thoroughly. Such mobility likely has 
marked repercussions for community viability in the Arctic, which we as 
yet do not fully comprehend and therefore for which we cannot ade-
quately plan. 
Given the speed of change, and the importance of demographic 
changes to Arctic human development, there is a need to further explore 
how demographic changes relate to social, cultural, economic, political, 
and enviromental changes. At the same time, many of the same trends 
and issues of a decade ago continue: the small size of the population, and 
outmigration remain important challenges.  
12.2.2 Cultures and identities 
 Interest in and awareness of the Arctic is growing, and Indigenous 
culture is increasingly seen as a resource in the North. Great cultural 
variation and complexity characterize the Arctic. For Arctic Indigenous 
peoples the challenge is not of choosing between “modernity” and 
“tradition”, but to find a fulfilling combination of the two.  
 
Several key trends noted a decade ago continue: increase connectedness 
between Arctic regions and non-Arctic national and international centers; 
decrease of local language use; and increased cultural revitalization ef-
forts. A new trend is the marked increase in the global awareness of the 
Arctic region, which can be attributed in large part to the global climate 
  Arctic Human Development Report 479 
change discourse and to expectations about future economic development 
opportunities in the North. Yet, as argued in Chapter 4 (Economic Sys-
tems), there is reason to be cautious about the current optimism sur-
rounding resource development in the region, as costs are likely to remain 
high. Net costs and benefits to Arctic residents and cultures of the growth 
in interest in the Arctic remain uncertain, as regards distributional issues 
and environmental impacts of resource development.  
While local cultures and identities continue to be vulnerable to mod-
ernization, globalization and urbanization, cultures in the Arctic, espe-
cially Indigenous cultures, have increasingly become a resource, in the 
sense of both a commodity and tool. A related trend that has strength-
ened greatly over the past decade is considering the North as marketa-
ble, which presents the Arctic region with a strategic advantage: being in 
and of the North presents new opportunities.  
The rapid changes of a globalized world will continue to profoundly 
impact the younger generation. The future of Arctic cultures and identi-
ties will rest on the choices these young people make. It is critical to 
better understand the hopes and aspirations of Arctic youth, and how 
these are linked to the persistence and evolution of Arctic Indigenous 
cultures and identities.  
Barrow Teen Centre, Alaska, USA 
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12.2.3 Economic systems 
 The Arctic will remain a high cost region. The effects of 
environmental changes in the Arctic may in some cases benefit 
economic development, but in others will make resource 
development more costly. Natural resource production will continue 
as a driving force of the Arctic economy, although expectations of 
higher prices and lower costs for Arctic resources may be overly 
optimistic.  
 
The Arctic economy continues to rest on three basic pillars: large-scale 
natural resource production for the international market, small-scale 
traditional production for local consumption, and transfers from higher 
levels of government. Over the past decade, the Arctic has experienced 
dramatic economic expansion and increased expectations for future 
investment in, and development of, oil, gas and other natural resources. 
But such expectations may prove overly optimistic, as the Arctic will 
remain a high cost region, not least because of persistent high costs of 
infrastructure and net costs of climate change. Uncertainty in commodi-
ty prices also hinders investment. 
Diversity characterizes the Arctic economy. As well, local responses 
to world markets may diverge, reflecting differences in the concentra-
tion of resources, variation in the quality of resource concentrations (e.g. 
deposits), and the level of transport infrastructure. 
While the first AHDR (2004) described the steep disparities between 
the value of what is produced in the Arctic and what actually remains 
there for consumption and investment opportunities, AHDR-II identifies a 
positive trend towards more economic benefits to the region. Recent insti-
tutional changes in the North have increased the local control and owner-
ship of northern resources in some parts of the Arctic, enhanced the role 
of residents in decision-making about resource production, and improved 
the share of resource rents and income that stays in the region. While 
continued institutional change is likely to influence the future of the Arctic 
economy, questions remain on what types of institutions work best to 
improve the economic well-being of northern residents. 
Traditional hunting, herding and fishing continue to be important to 
the economy of the Arctic, but questions remain about the role and sig-
nificance of the traditional sector in the northern economy. The mix of 
formal and informal economic activity, and the changing relative shares 
of these, has significant implications for human development and the 
viability of Arctic coummunities. We need to understand better the in-
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teraction and interdependencies between these sectors, as well as their 
connections to cultural, mental and social well-being. 
Hurtig Ruten, Norway, 2009 
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12.2.4 Political systems  
 Devolutionary pressures continue to be a defining feature of political 
systems in the Arctic. Human and financial capacity challenges to 
devolution also persist. Whether and how these basic concerns of 
governance can be addressed will determine outcomes regarding 
social issues, economic opportunities, infrastructure, and land and 
environmental management.  
 
Over the past decade, governance systems in the Arctic have continued 
to evolve. A key trend has been the continued process of devolution from 
central government to the regional and local levels. The efforts of Indig-
enous peoples to achieve self-determination and forms of self-
government – as seen, for instance, in the case of Nunavut and Green-
land – have been fundamental to the emergence of new and innovative 
forms of governance and the growth of regional autonomy. While devo-
lution must be seen as a success story it has not come without great 
challenges. The transfer of authority has brought significant benefits to 
the regional and local levels and their inhabitants, yet the attendant in-
creased roles and responsibilities make great demands on human and 
financial capital. Finding creative solutions to the persistent gaps in hu-
man and fiscal capacity is crucial. 
Likewise, while the increased representation of Indigenous organiza-
tions and regional governments in a growing number of international 
fora and committees, including the Arctic Council, is a success story, 
such representation puts further pressures on already limited resources. 
Growing demands on time and financial resources are certain to contin-
ue as non-Arctic parties become increasingly engaged in Arctic affairs. In 
the face of such increasingly vocal non-Arctic stakeholders, Arctic citi-
zens and groups will want to ensure their voices continue to prevail. 
12.2.5 Legal systems 
 While there is a trend towards the increased adoption of Arctic-
specific norms, global norms will continue to play a dominant role. 
Arctic states will continue to rely on international law and norms, 
Arctic-specific and global, to resolve territorial delimitation disputes 
in the Arctic.  
 
Arctic-specific and global norms both play important roles in the legal 
systems that encompass the Arctic. While there is a trend towards the 
increased adoption of Arctic specific norms, global norms will continue 
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to play a critical and central role. This has to do with the issue of scale, 
where challenges such as climate change and globalization cannot be 
solved locally or regionally, but rather necessitate regulations that ex-
tend beyond national borders. In terms of maritime boundary delimita-
tion issues, despite media hype about lingering disagreements, Arctic 
states appear to be committed to resolving such disputes through coop-
eration and the application of global legal norms.  
12.2.6 Resource governance 
 Arctic resource governance continues to be innovative, while 
growing in complexity, and with increasing attention to the adoption 
of best practices.  
 
Trends in resource governance first highlighted in AHDR (2004) contin-
ue: the growing importance of clearly delimited territorial rights; the 
incorporation of traditional and local ecological knowledge in decision-
making; devolution of power to local decision makers; and the increased 
involvement of Arctic peoples in ownership and development of re-
sources (see above). Emerging are trends of increasing complexity of 
resource governance, and of the adoption of best practices as ways to 
address uncertainty and unpredictability in a changing Arctic. Climate 
change, changes to Arctic economies, intensifying resource development, 
and changes in environmental and land use management, raise ques-
tions of how to best steward natural resources in the Arctic. Over the 
past decade, the extent of new challenges, including the increasing rate 
and magnitude of climate change, has elevated interest in adaptive re-
source governance, given its flexibility and its potential to better include 
different types of knowledge systems (traditional and scientific).  
Both formal and informal institutions have an important role to play 
in promoting responsiveness to conditions of uncertainty and rapid 
change. Informal institutions at the regional and international levels can 
provide greater flexibility, but the enforcement of formal rights and 
specified laws can also be required. With consultation processes on the 
rise, ensuring meaningful consultation of local populations is paramount 
in decision-making processes regarding resources. 
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Also on the rise is the adoption of best practices in Arctic resource gov-
ernance. We need to further document these experiences, as well as the 
interplay of informal and formal institutions, and examples of effective 
consultation and of best practices in resource governance. Doing so will 
assist the transfer of their basic lessons both within and among different 
legal and management systems throughout the Arctic (and beyond). 
12.2.7 Human health and well-being  
 Among emerging threats for human health and well-being are the 
direct and indirect impacts of climate change, including worsening 
food and water security, changes in the pattern of infectious diseases, 
and impacts on health care infrastructure. Continuing threats to well-
being also include mental health problems, high levels of suicide, 
accidents and domestic violence. The aging of the Arctic population 
demands attention. 
 
The emerging threats related to accelerating climate change, the persistance 
of health outcome disparities experienced by the Indigenous populations, 
and the continuation of population aging all require the attention of policy 
makers and health service agencies. Complex interactions among genetic, 
economic, social, cultural, political and environmental factors affect human 
health and well-being in the Arcitc. Accelerating globalization and climate 
change pose new challenges for individuals and communities in the Arctic, 
and create new groups at risk of marginalization. 
People in the Circumpolar North do not all enjoy the same health: 
substantial disparities exist across countries and regions, and within 
regions among population subgroups, particularly between Indigenous 
and non-Indigenous people. These disparities require the attention of 
policy makers and health service agencies.  
Climate change is affecting many aspects of life, from stimulating mi-
gration to compromising food and water security, with implications for 
health and well-being. Globalization forces have contributed to in-
creased rates of modern diseases such as obesity, diabetes and cardio-
vascular diseases. In many Indigenous communities in the Arctic we see 
a steady dietary transformation from “traditional” foods based on hunt-
ing and fishing to “western” foods. Water quality, an on-going issue in 
many Arctic communities, potentially faces further deterioration as the 
climate changes. Indicators of food and water security need to be incor-
porated into surveillance and monitoring programs across the Arctic. 
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The observed aging trend in the Arctic (described in Chapter 2, Arctic 
Populations and Migration), a process expected to continue in the com-
ing decades, has implications for health and well-being. The elderly may 
be able to make important contributions to Arctic development and 
community viability, if barriers to doing so are removed. We require a 
deeper understanding of the complexity of aging in Arctic populations, 
how Arctic societies will adapt to the aging population, and how the el-
derly can be better integrated into societal life. 
Polaris Youth Centre, Salekhard, Russian Federation, 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit: Harald Finkler. 
12.2.8 Education and human capital 
 Disparities persist in education outcomes across the North. An 
increasing incorporation of Indigenous language instruction and the 
inclusion of traditional knowledge in formal schooling is counterpoised 
against a continuing erosion of Indigenous languages and traditional 
knowledge. The development of human and especially creative capital 
is crucial to the future of Arctic societies and economies. 
 
The first AHDR (2004) emphasized as the most critical concerns in edu-
cation the control of, relevance of, and access to, education in the Arctic. 
These concerns were contextualized in recognition of a legacy of west-
ern knowledge being prioritized over Indigenous knowledge. In the past 
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decade, to address concerns over access, we see the expansion of both 
post-secondary institutions and distance education across the Arctic. In 
terms of the latter, we witness the case of the UArctic, where post sec-
ondary courses can today be accessed from just about any place in the 
Arctic, at least technologically. While institutions like the UArctic have 
made outstanding contributions to delivering post-secondary education 
in the Arctic, significant challenges persist. These include the delivery of 
primary and secondary education in rural and remote locations, includ-
ing the recruitment and retainment of teachers.  
Many other challenges continue to face education in the Arctic: 
providing education in Indigenous languages and with the integration of 
significant Indigenous knowledge content so that students perceive a 
relevance to their studies; addressing the low achievement and high 
dropout rates among Indigenous populations; and addressing the con-
tinued gender gap between males and females in formal educational 
attainment. We note improvements in the use of Indigenous languages 
in formal schooling and the growing recognition of the importance of 
local and Indigenous knowledge in (and beyond) the formal education 
system, although much work remains on this front. Maintaining the tra-
jectories of these more positive trends and addressing challenges of 
better developing human capital across Indigenous and non-Indigenous, 
and male and female, Arctic residents will be fundamental to the future 
of human development in the region. 
12.2.9 Globalization 
 In many instances globalization means increased dependency of local 
interests on external powers and unstable markets. At the same time, 
the forces of globalization bring many economic opportunities to 
northern areas, including increased resource development and 
employment. Globalization brings greater cultural diversity, 
augmenting but also potentially attenuating local cultural traditions 
and institutions. 
 
Ever-increasing connectivity to the rest of the world has intensified the 
effects of modernity and industrialization over the past decade. The Arc-
tic’s relatively small size explains why some effects of globalization are 
felt more strongly there than elsewhere. Increased economic globaliza-
tion can result in heightened dependency of local interests on external 
powers and unstable markets. Developments flowing from economic 
globalization also provide benefits to the Arctic and its regions, in the 
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form of investment and employment. Political globalization, while con-
tributing to the weakening of the nation-state’s role, also potentially 
increases the empowerment of new regional actors in the Arctic. Cultur-
ally, globalization not only erodes local cultural institutions, but para-
doxically can offer new forces to support local cultural development. For 
instance, the marketability of the North, including northern cultural 
traditions, appears to be a growing Arctic asset (as noted above). 
Whether the Arctic will achieve net positive benefits from increased 
globalization – economic, political and cultural – hinges on the develop-
ment of human capital, evolving political/governance institutions, and 
the application of legal instruments protecting the rights of indivduals 
and collectives, where necessary. 
12.2.10 Community viability and adaptation 
 Community connections are being transformed by increasing 
globalization, with responses varying widely across the Arctic. 
Differences exist in gender, age and ethnicity with respect to 
outmigration, vulnerability, risk exposure, and coping ability. 
 
This report has documented the wide diversity across the Arctic in 
terms of the various human systems. The heterogeneity characterizing 
the region means that impacts and outcomes differ among Arctic com-
munities. This diversity is well illustrated in the present discussions on 
communities in the Arctic and their ability to adapt in a time of rapid 
change. Communities and settlements in the Arctic are increasingly con-
fronted with different and interrelated issues: increased mobility, in-
cluding an increasing rate of out-migration; an increasing gender imbal-
ance; an aging population. In some places immigration and the presence 
of shift-workers alter community cohesion. Such trends test the viability 
and adaptability of Arctic communities. The complexity of changes oc-
curring in the Arctic today is amplified by the changing climate.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
488 Arctic Human Development Report 
12.3 Gaps in knowledge  
This second assessment of the state of human development in the Arctic, 
and its focus on the major trends unfolding in these times of rapid 
change, has brought attention to a number of critical gaps in knowledge 
about human development and living conditions in the North. In this 
section we list the most critical cross-cutting gaps in our knowledge, those 
that extend across the various systems and thematic issues. In identifying 
such gaps, we address direct issues of climate change only incidentally, as 
other reports, including those being prepared for the Arctic Council (Arctic 
Resilience Report, Adaptation Actions for a Changing Arctic), as well as 
national reports (e.g. The Arctic in the Anthropocene [NRC 2014]) focus 
much of their attention to this aspect of change. 
12.3.1 Understanding the needs of Arctic youth and elderly  
The population is aging in many parts of the Arctic, triggering the need 
to better understand the social, cultural, economic and political role this 
sector of the population does and could play. At the same time, the fu-
ture of the Arctic is connected with its youth. While demographic infor-
mation has for the most part increased in availability and accessibility 
over the past decade (with exceptions due to changes in national cen-
suses), there remains a need for more analysis of specific demographic 
cohorts, most notably youth and elderly. 
Youth 
The viability of Arctic cultures, languages, traditional activities, communi-
ties and settlements will rest on the choices young people make. Thus we 
need to better understand their aspirations, and the barriers to achieving 
these. Too many northern youth suffer from social alienation, which in its 
worst forms incites substance abuse and even suicide. We need to under-
stand how formal education can be made more relevant, especially among 
Indigenous youth. What role can evolving technologies play in education 
and in local employment opportunities, including in the knowledge and 
creative economy? What is, and could be, the role of both education and 
the adoption of new technologies in shaping youth’s attitudes toward 
traditional activities and northern settlements, as offering viable and at-
tractive futures? What are the most strategic investments in human capi-
tal/capacity building that can be made to guarantee that youth – both 
male and female – wish to remain in or return to the North?  
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Elderly 
Aging in the Arctic is little studied – we need to understand its complexi-
ties. How will Arctic societies adapt to the aging population, and how can 
the elderly be better integrated into societal life? What role might elder-
ly citizens contribute to economic, cultural and political development? 
How can increased old-age dependency rates be addressed? What role 
do the elderly play in contributing to community cohesion and viability, 
to connecting with Arctic “diasporas” abroad, and how does this differ 
across Arctic regions and settlement types? We also need to know more 
about the dimension of well-being of elderly, including changing roles in 
family structure, and prevalence of neglect or abuse.  
12.3.2 Gendered dimensions of Arctic change 
While the past decade has seen a substantial expansion of research on 
gender in the Arctic, we still note significant gaps in knowledge. Men and 
women are not affected equally by climate change and globalization, and 
their impacts on traditional and non-traditional economic activities in 
the Arctic, on political systems, on education and health care provision, 
etc. We lack knowledge about the gendered dimensions of contemporary 
cultural practices and expressions, including on the (re)negotiation of 
cultural and other identities. Gaps remain in our knowledge about the 
gendered aspects of domestic violence in the North. The gendered char-
acteristics of decision-making regarding resources at different scales 
need further investigation, especially due to the dynamism that charac-
terizes such gendered roles regarding control of and access to resources. 
Insufficient attention has been paid to the gendered nature of Arctic 
geopolitics, at all scales, but especially at the national and international 
scales: how does masculinism drive the very issues that are dealt with in 
national and international forums regarding the Arctic? Ways in which 
to effectively address the growing gender gap in education and human 
capital development also are critical to human development in the Arc-
tic, given the impact gendered out-migration has on the social life and 
economy of Arctic communities. 
12.3.3 “Soft securities”: food, water, and energy 
Food security is declining in the Arctic. Both environmental change 
(climate change and long-distance pollution) and globalization play a 
role here, as local foods become less available or attractive, and im-
ported foodstuffs of lesser nutritional value and high cost gain popu-
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larity. Contradictory results of food insecurity in the North include 
both increased hunger and heightened prevalence of obesity and dia-
betes. We need to better understand the evolving role of traditional 
activities that produce “country foods” in northern societies, and their 
evolving interdependencies with the industrial sector. We also need to 
better understand the contributions of the traditional activities to cul-
tural, social and mental, as well as physical, well-being: food is strongly 
tied to culture. What economic policies can enhance food security? 
How can local educational initiatives contribute?  
Climate and other environmental changes affect water security as 
well, while global shifts in energy prices and related transportation costs 
compromise energy security in many Arctic settlements dependent in 
imported fuel. Research is needed here on innovative, economically ef-
fective ways of providing these key physical components to human well-
being. A diverse set of solutions will likely be necessary, give the diversi-
ty of northern places. To track progress on food, water and energy secu-
rity, we also identify the need for a specific set of indicators. Developing 
these with local community members, in order that they may under-
stand and effectively take part in such monitoring, is critical. 
12.3.4 Arctic settlements and communities 
Questions remain on the economic role of large settlements in the eco-
nomic growth of Northern regions. Urban settlements may help to gen-
erate new types of economic activity and change the cost of resource 
development. Better knowledge of the economies of these urban places 
in the North and their relationship to the economies of their surround-
ing regions will increase our understanding of the Northern economy. 
The stakes – both costs and benefits – of larger scale resource de-
velopment projects appear particularly high for smaller Arctic com-
munities. Such projects potentially involve influxes of new residents 
(often temporary), the opportunity to negotiate employment and reve-
nue sharing agreements, the threat of negative environmental impacts, 
and a potential loss of local “fate control”. Where have Arctic commun i-
ties most benefited from such developments, and what factors ensured 
positive outcomes?  
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In terms of community dynamics in the Arctic, we poorly understand 
the role of Arctic diasporas in contributing to community identity, eco-
nomic condition, and political strength. Similar information is needed 
about the “new newcomers”. We also need to understand more about 
racisms and other exclusionary practices in the North: along what axes 
are they expressed and performed, how do they affect long-term and 
new-comer populations, and how can these be effectively addressed?  
Town of Nanortalik, South Greenland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit: Joan Nymand Larsen 
12.3.5 Arctic institutions 
The introduction of a variety of new institutions represents one of the 
most significant changes in the Northern economy. Yet, we lack 
knowledge on what types of institutions work best to improve the eco-
nomic well-being of northern residents; and what roles institutions, for-
mal and informal, play in meeting future needs of human development in 
the North. New institutional arrangements provide residents of the North 
with more control over local resource projects. There is a need to know 
more about how informal institutions in the Arctic may complement for-
mal institutions in achieve the best outcomes in resource management.  
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12.3.6 Global linkages and new Arctic actors 
Arctic studies have mostly focused internally on the region. Indeed, 
while in this report we have explicitly heeded global linkages, this has 
more been in terms of how global processes play out in the Arctic. Yet 
Arctic processes also impact the non-Arctic world at both the regional 
and global scale. We need to continue to work toward a more compre-
hensive understanding of the social, cultural, political, economic and 
environmental linkages between the Arctic and the rest of the world. 
How can we better evaluate the changing importance of the Arctic to the 
globe – economically, environmentally, and politically?  
We need to better understand the ambitions of non-Arctic states in 
the Arctic, and the impacts these may have on Arctic future. How will 
increased interest by non-Arctic states in participation in forums, such 
as the Arctic Council, play out? How will their participation shape such 
forums and what will be the impact on the voices of Arctic participants 
(such as Permanent Participants in the Arctic Council)? How will these 
interests and activities vary across the non-Arctic states? And how will 
the role of other organizations, including global environmental, regula-
tory, and economic institutions, transform and adjust, as the political, 
economic and environmental landscape of the Arctic is altered? 
12.3.7 Promulgating and adopting best practices 
The Arctic has generated many innovations: in adaptive governance 
practices, in the inclusion of local and Indigenous voices in decision-
making and also in research, in the development of power- and econom-
ic benefit sharing structures, and in initiatives related to distance educa-
tion and telemedicine. Some of these innovations address the impacts of 
climate change and the myriad effects of globalization. While such inno-
vations have strikingly contributed to Arctic human development, we 
still need greater insight into the conditions under which these innova-
tions can be transferred to other northern places and what adaptations 
are required. How do we effectively transfer lessons learned in one part 
of the Arctic to other parts? We also need to address the challenges of 
capacity (human and fiscal), noted repeatedly in this report: doing so is 
essential to the co-production of the knowledge and strategies needed to 
address a changing Arctic.  
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Best practices need to be identified and adopted for the preservation 
of Arctic languages and the incorporation of these languages and tradi-
tional knowledge into governance structures at all scales. We need to 
elaborate on best practices for establishing and maintaining genuine and 
trustworthy partnership between local communities and higher levels of 
government, local communities and researchers, and local communities 
and businesses. Acknowledging that local support for external resource 
development projects typically hinges on protection of local rights to the 
land and resources necessary to continue pursuing their traditional ac-
tivities, we need to better understand the diversity of opportunities for 
ensuring such rights where resource development is also pursued. 
We need to develop best practices for evaluating the impact of eco-
nomic development initiatives in the Arctic, which fully calculate envi-
ronmental, social and cultural costs and benefits. Better practices for 
remediation following resource development need to consider any 
benefits that infrastructure adjustments (e.g. adaptation rather than 
removal) might offer. 
12.3.8 Arctic social indicators and monitoring 
Efforts are needed to address the persistent gaps in data availability, the 
lack of common data protocols and the lack of primary data collection in 
order to enable the more complete measurement and tracking of Arctic 
specific social indicators. Also needed is work on the current set of ASI 
indicators and their technical definitions, in terms of fine-tuning these 
indicators to increase their strength and applicability, but also to reeval-
uate and adjust the set of indicators to better reflect the impact of global 
changes, including the complex interactions between bio-physical 
changes and changes in human systems. Additionally, we have highlight-
ed the need to identify key indicators to enable us to better follow the 
changes in food, water and energy security in Arctic populations. Such 
indicators are recommended to be gender-sensitive, since such insecuri-
ties affect men and women differently. 
Availability of, and access to, primary data presents significant chal-
lenges in devising and measuring indicators of human development in 
the Arctic. For instance, primary data collection on the size of the tradi-
tional economy is needed to help answer questions on the role and sig-
nificance of the traditional sector in the Arctic economy across the Cir-
cumpolar North. Traditional harvesting plays an important economic 
and cultural role throughout the North, but comparing this activity to 
activities that take place in the resource and public sectors in many 
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countries remains problematic. Developing measures of the extent and 
significance of this economic activity would allow a more complete pic-
ture of the Northern economy.  
In general, data gaps and lack of primary data prevent us from mak-
ing circumpolar wide comparisons. Especially difficult is the application 
of the indicators developed by the ASI project for the specific dimen-
sions of Arctic human development identified by the first AHDR (2004) 
on “closeness to nature”, “cultural well-being”, and “fate control”. While 
gathering, accesssing, and filling these data gaps remain formidable, 
challenges also extend beyond data to issues of indicator concepts, defi-
nitions and standardized measures, as well as questions of data storage 
and management. The implementation of an ASI monitoring system 
would contribute greatly to addressing these critical gaps and to track-
ing human development in a manner beneficial to policy-makers. 
The original 'Eskimo row', Disko Bay, Greenland  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit: Peter Prokosch. 
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12.4 Conclusion 
The current assessment of human development in the Arctic has shown 
that the region continues to face significant challenges, e.g., outmigration 
from local communities, emerging health challenges, emerging threats 
related to climate change, persistent disparities between Indigenous and 
non-Indigenous standards of living, continued gaps in education between 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous people and between males and females, 
growing human and fiscal capacity challenges, violence and discrimina-
tion, and threats to traditional livelihoods. At the same time, Arctic success 
stories are many – and should be underscored. While the region is facing 
rapid change and complex challenges, we can distinguish adaptation, in-
novation and resilience as characterizing many northern communities. 
This assessment has noted the many contrasts between and within re-
gions across the Arctic, between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples, 
between males and females. As emphasized in our focus on Arctic com-
munity viability and adaptation, many factors come into play in determin-
ing the success and ability of communities to adapt to change. Examples of 
Arctic success stories highlighted in this volume include:  
 
 The increasing use of Indigenous knowledge: There is increasing use of 
Indigenous languages in formal schooling in the Arctic, and a growing 
recognition of the importance of local and Indigenous knowledge in 
many aspects of life in the Arctic. There is also awareness that the 
increased use and recognition of Indigenous knowledge represents a 
potentially important contribution to advancing the competitive edge 
of the region. 
 The increase in Indigenous participation, control and ownership: 
Recent institutional changes in the North have increased the local 
control and ownership of northern resources in some parts of the 
Arctic, and have had an important effect on the relationship between 
international and local economies. The continued process of 
devolution from central government to the regional and local levels 
has placed more control in the hands of Indigenous and local 
communities.  
 The continued growth of innovative governance arrangements: The 
efforts of Indigenous peoples to achieve self-determination and forms 
of self-government have been fundamental to the success of the 
emergence of new and innovative forms of governance, and the 
growth of regional autonomy. This has brought significant benefits to 
the regional and local level and its inhabitants. 
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 The emergence of Arctic identities and a sense of Indigenous identity 
becoming an asset rather than a hinderance: culture, especially 
Indigenous culture, in the North has increasingly become a resource, 
both in the sense of a commodity and in the sense of a tool that 
makes external recognition easier. Also, there is a growing sense of 
the marketability of the North. This may provide the region with a 
strategic advantage, where being in the North presents new 
opportunities. We also see an emerging trend to the coexistence of 
tradition and modernity in individual and community lives. 
 
We conclude this report by offering a number of suggestions for follow-
up activities. These are based on discussions with lead authors and con-
tributing authors during the AHDR-II process. 
Dissemination: The production of a second assessment of Arctic hu-
man development represents a significant effort in terms of time and 
resources, and in it brings together many (and sometimes divergent) 
perspectives from a whole range of disciplines. We suggest wide dissem-
ination, including through a series of well-targeted “townhall” meetings 
in Northern settlements – to address a range of issues discussed and 
brought to the forefront in this volume, as a highly effective dissemina-
tion and outreach activity. Such townhalls would serve the purpose of 
reaching a variety of stakeholders and provide an opportunity to discuss 
issues addressed in the AHDR that are of importance to local communi-
ties, just as it provides critical feedback to the AHDR-II group which can 
help identify gaps in knowledge and identify issues for the next volume. 
We also suggest translation of the report, or at least its introduction and 
conclusion, including into Russian, Inuktitut and Mandarin. 
Monitoring: There remains a critical need to implement a system for 
collecting, storing, and tracking data on Arctic social indicators, to pro-
vide a tool for measuring changes in human development in the Arctic, 
as outlined in the section above. 
Science Plan: Efforts should be made to support and undertake the 
drafting of a science plan based on the findings and conclusions of this 
report. The AHDR-II team is in a unique position to provide a science 
plan for addressing critical gaps in knowledge on Arctic human devel-
opment and living conditions in the circumpolar region. 
AHDR and the youth: The AHDR (Volumes I and II) has targeted a 
broad audience, and has been written in a style to increase its accesibil-
ity to a broad range of audiences – from local communities to Northern 
colleges and universities to policy makers and the Arctic Council. Yet, as 
emphasized in this volume, the future of the Arctic will be determined by 
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the choices of the youth and their aspirations and priorities as concerns 
culture and identities, where to study and where to live, and what occu-
pations and lifestyles to pursue. We suggest the production of a followup 
version of the AHDR that targets specifically the youth – the next genera-
tion of Arctic residents, and a new audience for the AHDR – which would 
include issues and topics of interest and importance to this group. This 
would not replace the next decadal assessment of human development 
in the Arctic (AHDR-III), but serve as a companion volume. 
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AHDR Sammenfatning  
Formålet med AHDR-II – Arctic Human Development Report: Regional 
Processes and Global Linkages – er at give en opdatering til den første 
AHDR (2004) om menneskelig udvikling i Arktis; samt at fremhæve 
de vigtigste tendenser og forandringer indenfor en række emner og 
tematiske områder omkring menneskelig udvikling i Arktis i det se-
neste årti; og på baggrund af denne opdatering og vurdering, at iden-
tificere og fremhæve nogle politisk relevante konklusioner samt 
mangler i vores viden om Arktis; og at sætte fokus på fremtrædende 
arktiske succeshistorier. 
AHDR-II søger at belyse og vurdere de vigtigste ændringer og trends i 
menneskelig og samfunds udvikling i Arktis i det sidste årti indenfor 
følgende systemer og tematiske områder: demografi; migration; økono-
mi; uddannelse; sundhed og velvære; kultur og identitet; politiske sy-
stemer; ressource styring; retssystemer; globalisering; og bæredygtige 
samfund og tilpasning. 
Rapporten indeholder en bred vifte af konklusioner der har politisk-
økonomisk relevans. Baseret på disse resultater, peger vi på en række 
tværgående tendenser med relevans for beslutningstagere, herunder 
Arktisk Råd. Vi konkluderer blandt andet, at den kombination af hurtige 
og stressbetonede forandringer, som blev fremhævet i den første AHDR 
(2004), fortsætter i dag, men forstærket og med forøget hastighed. De 
samfunds- og miljømæssige ændringer konfronterer på forskellig vis 
arktiske beboere, lokalsamfund og socioøkonomiske sektorer, og udfor-
drer trivslen i Arktis.  
Urbaniseringen i Arktis accelererer, og migrationen fra landdistrik-
terne mod større bosættelser og byer, samt en forøget koncentration af 
befolkningen, og fremkomsten af ”climigration”, er alle voksende ten-
denser. Interessen for Arktis er vokset markant, hvilket tildels kan 
tilskrives klimaændringer og stigende forventninger omkring udvik-
lingsmuligheder indenfor mineral- og andre ressource sektorer. Der er 
høje forventninger for vækst i ressource udvinding, men samtidig er 
der tegn på vækst i andre sektorer, som f.eks. turisme. Arktiske identi-
teter ses i voksende grad som et aktiv, og samtidig er arktiske beboere 
selv ved at omdefinere, hvad det vil sige at være "nordbo”. Der fore-
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kommer øget deltagelse i arktiske beslutningsprocesser og en fortsat 
innovation i regeringsførelse.  
Rapporten identifierer en række arktiske succeshistorier. Den aktuel-
le vurdering af den menneskelige udvikling i Arktis har vist, at regionen 
fortsat står overfor store udfordringer, men samtidig med er der mange 
eksempler på arktiske succeshistorier, og de indkluderer blandt andet: 
En stigende brug af oprindelige folks viden og brug af de oprindelige 
sprog i folkeskolen i Arktis; forøget lokal deltagelse, kontrol og ejerskab, 
hvor man blandt andet ser, at de seneste institutionelle ændringer i Ark-
tis har skabt mere lokal kontrol og ejerskab i ressource sektoren i nogle 
dele af Arktis, som så også har haft en vigtig indflydelse på forholdet 
mellem internationale og lokale økonomier. Ligeledes er der en fortsat 
vækst i innovative forvaltningsordninger. Indsatsen blandt oprindelige 
folk for at opnå selvbestemmelse og nye former for selvstyre har været 
grundlæggende for succes i nye og innovative former for styring, samt 
vækst i selvstyre. Og afslutningsvis, identiteten blandt folkefærd i Arktis 
ses i stigende grad som et aktiv, hvor kulturen, og især den indfødte 
kultur, fremstår som en form for ressource.  
AHDR-II peger på manglende viden indenfor nogle vigtige felter, her i 
blandt en manglende viden om ungdommens og den ældre befolknings 
behov og ambitioner. Befolkningen bliver ældre i mange dele af Arktis, 
hvilket har øget behovet for mere og bedre viden omkring de sociale, 
kulturelle, økonomiske og politiske roller denne del af befolkningen kan 
spille. Ligeledes, fremtiden i Arktis afhænger i stor udstrækning af ung-
dommen, deres valg, ambitioner og håb om fremtiden, og det er et om-
råde hvor der er brug for mere viden. Der er også brug for mere arbejde 
omkring udarbejdelsen af arktiske sociale indikatorer og deres tekniske 
definitioner, som kan bidrage til at fremme deres styrke og anvendelig-
hed. Der er også huller i vores viden om køn og kønsroller i Arktis, samt 
en specielt markant mangel på data om køn indenfor de forskellige 
AHDR systemer og tematiske områder. Der er ligeledes brug for mere 
viden om bysamfund og institutioner i Arktis, og deriblandt hvilken rolle 
forskellige institutioner – formelle og uformelle – vil eller kan spille for 
at imødekomme de fremtidige behov der vil opstå omkring ændringer i 
folkets velfærd og udvikling i Arktis.  
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The goals of the second volume of the AHDR – Arctic Human 
Development Report: Regional Processes and Global Linkages – 
are to provide an update to the first AHDR (2004) in terms of an 
assessment of the state of Arctic human development; to highlight 
the major trends and changes unfolding related to the various 
issues and thematic areas of human development in the Arctic 
over the past decade; and, based on this assessment, to identify 
policy relevant conclusions and key gaps in knowledge, new and 
emerging Arctic success stories.
The production of AHDR-II on the tenth anniversary of the first 
AHDR makes it possible to move beyond the baseline assessment 
to make valuable comparisons and contrasts across a decade of 
persistent and rapid change in the North. It addresses critical 
issues and emerging challenges in Arctic living conditions, quality 
of life in the North, global change impacts and adaptation, and 
Indigenous livelihoods.  
The assessment contributes to our understanding of the interplay 
and consequences of physical and social change processes 
affecting Arctic residents’ quality of life, at both the regional and 
global scales.  It shows that the Arctic is not a homogenous region. 
Impacts of globalization and environmental change differ within 
and between regions, between Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
northerners, between genders and along other axes. 
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